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Abstract 
o 
In the contemporary corporate marketplace a novel ethical proposal is being formulated. 
This is manifest in the suggestion that it is desirable for companies to behave in a 'socially 
responsible' manner, or practice what is formally referred to as 'Corporate Social 
Responsibility' (CSR). Distinct from conjunctions of 'business' and 'ethics' that have gone 
before, contemporary CSR proceeds on the basis of a unique claim - that it is possible for a 
corporation to 'do well, by doing good'. Known as the 'business case' for CSR, this proposal 
is of special sociological significance, this thesis argues, insofar as it understands 
'marketability' to be an inhering aspect of the 'ethical' itself. Drawing on contemporary 
developments in the field of social studies of science (STS) and, relatedly, 'newer' economic 
sociology, this thesis attends to the question of what, in-practice and as-practice, this newly 
described market-ethics may be said to 'do.' This focus on 'doing' distinguishes the present 
work from prior sociological and economic accounts of the relationship between markets 
and ethics, which have been noticeably constrained by both historically conferred 
disciplinary remits and by the tendency to peremptorily prescribe ethics within the narrow 
bounds of classical deontological or utilitarian moral theories. Methodologically, this inquiry 
proceeds by first observing the assembly of particular market spheres or market 'nexuses' of 
CSR practice, and secondly by investigating the ways in which the 'ethical' is variously 
enacted within these. Three interlinked but delineated 'nexuses' of CSR focus provide 
empirical substrate for discussion - the 'ethical corporation,' 'ethical consumer,' and 'ethical 
career.' Paying heed to the multiply-reflexive constitution of these differentially assembled 
markets, ensuing critical discussion finds the 'doing' of ethics therein to be largely 
constituent in contingently engaged affective and material practices. Against accounts then 
that de-cry the increasing 'marketisation' of ever more aspects of everyday life, (often 
seeking to indiscriminately discern in all market practice a totalising neo-liberalism on the 
march), the present thesis embodies an alternative theoretical approach wherein what it is 
possible to do in a market context is not prescriptively decreed or pre-maturely proscribed. 
In line with this emphasis, questions regarding the possibility of ethics, and finally, of 
effective alternative politics in market contexts are reexamined as part of the process of 
critically rethinking what present sociological understandings admit to and exclude from the 
designation of 'market' itself. 
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Introduction 
o 
This thesis investigates how a concern with what is 'ethical' has become a 
significant feature of the twenty-first century landscape of global business. Manifest 
foremost in the suggestion that corporations should behave in a 'socially responsible' 
manner, or, as this set of socio-moral expectations has come to be formally denoted, 
practice 'Corporate Social Responsibility' (CSR), 'ethics' in this contemporary 
usage are recast as both an appropriate business consideration, but also and 
significantly, as that which make 'good business sense.' This suggestion is entailed 
in CSR's structuring maxim - what is known as the 'business case' for CSR. This is 
the proposition that, in the contemporary corporate marketplace, financial gain has a 
relationship to 'ethical' corporate behaviour, or that a company can 'do well by doing 
good.' 
An alignment of corporate and 'ethical' interests that is validated by the 
suggestion of enhanced profitability appears prima facie to provide little opportunity 
for further elaboration beyond questions regarding the empirical veracity of this 
proposition, or the authenticity of corporate commitments to ethics. And primarily, 
these are the kind of questions that have been and are being asked: by businesses and 
in disciplines such as Management Studies ('how can we prove that ethics is good 
business? What kinds of measurement tools are most effective in showing this?); and 
in media and popular discourse ('is CSR 'for real,' or just another marketing ploy 
with no actual ethical substance?). In the proceeding pages however, this thesis poses 
a different set of questions. The terms of debate that construct and characterise CSR 
are not treated as opposing sides between which it is necessary to choose. Instead, 
the content of such debates becomes a kind of analytical substrate. A 'sociological' 
account, suggests here a critical opportunity to come at the question of 'ethics' as 
they are constituted and practiced in market contexts from an alternative angle. 
'Doing well by good' is understood as a significant proposal in the present 
context to the extent that this both recognises and inaugurates what I will call a 
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'market ethics.' This is a formulation with a number of different dimensions and 
levels of meaning. On the one hand, and most basically, 'market ethics' refers to the 
dual and co-implicating possibility that there is a 'market-for-ethics,' that 'ethics' 
may be 'marketable' or saleable - you may 'market' ethics. These suggestions 
though also operate on our understandings of 'markets' and 'ethics' at a more 
transformative and fundamental level. In this way, 'market ethics' speaks also of an 
emergent possibility or new kind of enactment, an 'ethics' done in 'market' mode. 
This proposal is, undoubtedly, a counter-intuitive one. Ethical problems, as 
Chapter Two in particular will discuss, have typically been understood as external to 
the market. Too complex to be addressed in a 'rationally self-interested' and 
'reductive' market sphere, ethical problems are those that, by their very nature, need 
be resolved elsewhere, (politically for instance). 'Market ethics' however is, above 
all, an exploratory formulation. The tensions that inhere in the coupling of the 
'market' and the 'ethical' function as a context through and against which this thesis 
organises its inquiry and seeks to pose a dual-pronged question. Taking 'ethics' as 
described by the CSR 'business case' as its object, the aim of this thesis is not to 
impose upon this a prior evaluative framework, or ask whether, for instance, such an 
'ethics' lives up to the requirements of traditional moral philosophy. Instead, the 
thesis on the one hand investigates what is involved in the processes and practices of 
'doing' ethics as 'market ethics;' on the other hand it asks what an 'ethics,' so 
configured, might be said to 'do' in terms of reorganising our conceptions of both 
'ethics' and 'markets.' 
The ethical obligation in the present work then, is not the resolution of the 
various tensions through and in which CSR is wrought, or the adjudication of 
debates regarding whether or not a 'market ethics' may be said to properly count as 
'ethical' as such. The guiding obligation is instead to the productivity of this 
contemporary proposal. Given this enabling opportunity, the current thesis suggests, 
CSR might speak interestingly in creative and potentially unexpected ways. 
To proceed along such lines however, it is necessary to begin with an 
understanding of both historical and contemporary theories of the relationships 
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between business and society, economics and sociology, and markets and morals-
Chapters One and Two are devoted this task. 
The significance and novelty of a 'market ethics' as this is designated by the 
CSR business case is established in Chapter One vis-a.-vis previous configurations of 
the business-society relationship. This overview of major debates regarding the 
social responsibilities of business will demonstrate that while there are certain 
continuities of concern, contemporary CSR also marks a crucial departure in both 
theoretical and practical terms. As a market phenomenon, CSR defines a self-
interested ethical, and on this basis is theoretically distinguishable from both 
deontologically centred 'Business Ethics' based approaches, and from the kind of 
shareholder-value-based neo-classical economics (propounded by figures such as 
Milton Friedman) that understand wealth creation, a priori and necessarily, to be 
ethical. This re-orientation is practically accompanied by a disciplinary shift in 
which more traditional Business Ethics departments are superseded by a 
commercially focussed Management Studies. Herein, abstract deontological 
'shoulds' are replaced in academia by an empirical focus on establishing the veracity 
of the business-case claim, and commercially by a convergence of concern regarding 
how ethics may actually be practiced. 
The sociological significance of these shifts in the business-society 
relationship are highlighted by a parallel reading of the relationship between the 
economic and social as theorised within Economic Sociology. In order to 
sociologically approach CSR as market-based, the need to examine what we permit 
to and exclude from our understandings of what is 'market' comes to the fore. Here, 
the relationship of 'embeddedness' between the economic and social, as elaborated 
by Mark Granovetter, will be introduced. To the extent however that this is 
committed primarily to establishing the relative position of the 'economic' vis-a.-vis 
the 'social' this approach exhibits serious limitations in the present context and an 
evident need to consider other sociological approaches to markets emerges. 
Inasmuch as more recent 'performativity' accounts shift the focus from the relative 
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positioning of the 'economic' per se, to the function of particular concrete markets, 
these offer, in the present instance, a potentially more fruitful mode of inquiry, one 
however that, as I will discuss, is not entirely without its own problems and pitfalls, 
(also see Chapter Seven on this point). 
From business and society, and economics and sociology, Chapter Two turns 
its attention to sociological discussions of the relationship between markets and 
morality. It is here that we encounter both the notion that, as I have already 
mentioned, ethical problems are external to the market, and, more extreme than this, 
the idea that markets are fundamentally detrimental to morality. An overview of 
historical and contemporary literature on this subject illustrates the continuing 
pervasiveness of these tendencies even in more recent and theoretically sophisticated 
approaches that seek to describe the contemporary era in terms 'economisation,' 
'marketisation,' individual 'responsibilisation' and forth. Often attendant in 
descriptions along these lines, particularly as they are made within a Foucauldian 
governmentality framework, is a critique of markets on the basis of their definitive 
'neo-liberal' function. Ostensibly a political criticism, this is also, frequently, a moral 
one. When 'marketisation' necessarily describes the progressive expansion of a 'neo-
liberal regime,' description and critique are one and the same moment. For all the 
critical sophistication such an approach brings then to the understanding of markets 
as practical and reflexive endeavours, the 'market' and the 'moral' can remain 
distinct, a separation re-instantiated on the basis of a prevailing concern with 
ultimate 'ends' in which markets are approached simply as a symptom of something 
else. 
The 'means' as it were, of ethics as practiced in and as market, require 
serious elaboration on their own terms. Where prevailing approaches persist in 
utilising a dualistic spatial metaphor in order describe the 'economic' and 'social,' 
'market' and 'moral' however, the opportunities for any such elaboration are already 
curtailed. The problem of attending to ethics-inlas-practice then, becomes one of 
practice, or research practice to be more precise. As Chapter Three will suggest, in 
order to empirically research the 'doing' of market ethics, it is necessary first to 
identify the 'sites' in which this takes place. The question of 'site' in relation to the 
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'market' though is not a straightforward one. More than simply made up of 
'multiple-sites,' markets are changing, evolving and dynamically self-reflexive 
mechanisms, and thus require a set of research methods able to sensitively attend to 
this constructive complexity. 
To this problem, this research introduces the idea of the nexus. The 'market,' 
in the present thesis, refers flexibly at once to a number of possibilities. Most 
straightforwardly, markets are particular sites for the exchange goods. In economics 
parlance they are price setting mechanisms. Between the most concretely particular 
and abstractly general however, what is 'market' might be understood to be 
empirically manifest in patterns of attention and affect that give rise, variably, to 
profit, or, more accurately, to the potential to financially profit. These shifting, 
empirically observable constellations of attention, affect, and (potential) profitability 
are the kinds of market formation that this thesis describes using the term 'nexus.' 
To elaborate in relation to CSR, recall again the business case proposal that a 
company may' do well by doing good.' Though not made exactly explicit in this 
suggestion, the 'good,' perceivably, from which profit might result is not a universal 
or unchanging one. Otherwise put, what is 'good' is, in this formulation at least, a 
very particular designation, one which is arrived at through the function of the 
temporal and situational, attentive and affective contingency of 'goodness' in 
relation to profitability. 
An alternative and more straightforward way of saying this is to point out that 
CSR is not practiced for its own sake or abstractly in relation only to its own terms 
per se. Rather, CSR is always an address made to certain relevant 'others,' 
interlocutors if you like, through whom the possibility that a company may 'do well 
by doing good' is understood to be realisable. The business case for CSR, following 
this, might be understood to function as a kind of sales pitch - for the business case 
to be 'true,' 'goodness' must be bought by CSR's addressees, and, crucially as I 
understand it, this means that it is these addressed 'others' who functionally and 
collectively discern what the 'good' is to be at any particular moment. Noticing and 
caring (attention and affect), to much simplify this suggestion, have to coincide in 
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relation to a given 'good,' before this can qualify to be such in a CSR that attaches 
potential profitability to what is 'good.' 
The matter of CSR's 'addressees,' and how the articulation of attention affect , 
and profit both identifies these groups, and gives rise to particular contemporary 
versions of the 'good' are, for this thesis, of themselves of major methodological 
importance inasmuch as they provide a direction, structure and rationale for the 
empirical work. Recalling the earlier description of the market as 'nexus,' I suggest 
that the methodological problem of 'site' becomes in this market context, a matter 
instead of firstly identifying CSR's addressees or important 'others,' and secondly, 
attempting to empirically discern how, in practice, these collectivities may be said to 
'do' ethics in this particular contemporary mode. 
Where attention, affect, and profit coincide to form a nexus, this, broadly 
speaking, marks out a collectivity of 'others' to whom CSR makes an address. 
Methodologically speaking though, one further consideration is important - that of 
intensity. 'Market' as 'nexus' seeks to recast the methodological problem of site in 
terms of intensity such that the most intense co-articulations of attention, affect, and 
potential profitability signal which areas should become a focus for empirical 
inquiry, or as I will call it, become a 'focal nexus' for empirical research. Following 
this rationale, and as Chapter Three illustrates in greater depth, three distinct but 
interlinked focal nexuses on which the empirical chapters will be base may be 
discerned - the 'Ethical Corporation,' 'Ethical Consumption,' and 'Ethical Career.' 
The first of these, 'Chapter Four - Ethics by Number?' charts the academic 
and commercial consequences of the practical convergence around business case 
CSR described in Chapter One. 'Doing well by doing good,' functions in this arena 
as a kind of testable hypothesis in relation to the notion of the ethical corporation. 
This gives rise, in practice, to a proliferation of competing measurement techniques 
designed variously to correlate 'ethics' and 'profit,' rank companies on the basis of 
their quantitatively measured ethicality, and chart popular perceptions regarding the 
relative ethicality of particular companies, to name just a few of the numerous 
developments along these lines. Returning then to some of the earlier introduced 
tensions between what is rightfully non-economic versus economic, these are 
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elaborated with regard to sociological treatments of the quantitative versus 
qualitative. While notions such as 'reductiveness' tend to characterise the 
sociological responses to a 'quantification 'of the 'qualitative,' an 'ethics by number' 
suggests that these descriptions are never quite so 'pure' in practice. Number has its 
own texture, and it is herein that the boundary between the quantitative and 
qualitative, and the economic and the ethical becomes interestingly blurred. 
Chapter Five, 'Ethical Consumption,' is in two parts. Both draw on the same 
set of empirical material - a year long collection of blog posts and user comments 
from The Guardian Online's 'Ethical Living.' The emphasis in Part I, in contrast to a 
discussed range of consumer culture literature, is on the material, practical aspects of 
consumption as dOing, by comparison to consumerism as having. The over-
determinism that critiques of consumerism can manifest is tempered through an 
attention to how ethical consumptive practices work to invest the very substance or 
materiality of these practices with ethical significance. In full colour, sound, and (as 
will be discussed) furriness, the 'ethical' is manifest in a surprising range of material 
and affective consumptive relationships. It is not only the mere fact of this 
materiality itself that is critically important though, this frequently made observation 
requires some extension. Practically and affectively speaking, material things are 
differentially invested with potential. One material is not, in a relativist way, easily 
made ethically equivalent to another - the question is of what consumer practices 
and objects, on the basis of their particular materiality, may be made to do. 
Part II, 'Ethical Consumption as Market Practice,' continues with the 
affective-material emphasis of Part I, but brings this to a discussion of the 
sociological critique of market 'choice,' especially where this is made through a 
contrast with apparently dissimilar' care.' The notion of consumer choice is an 
important one for CSR, 'doing well by doing good' fundamentally understands a 
competitive marketplace in which consumers would prefer to make more 'ethical' 
choices, and in which these may even be priced at a premium. As the discussion in 
Part I will have already began to suggest however, in the lives of the surveyed 
bloggers and commenters, 'choice' finds itself wrapped and riddled through with 
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'care,' each notion respectively neither as impoverished nor as sequestered as their 
typical description would suggest. 
Chapter Six encounters a very new, but rapidly ascendant notion - 'The 
Ethical Career.' Utilising material gathered from graduate careers fairs, ethical 
careers presentations, interviews with careers advisors, and a year of participant 
observation with the London School of Economics and Politics Student CSR 
Society, this chapter begins by addressing the definitional problem that the notion of 
an 'ethical career' presents with regard to conventional understandings of 
employment. Here, the problem of ethical self-interest reoccurs, only in the context 
of the 'ethical career' another and further complicating dimension is added. The 
'ethics' at stake, as well as being 'self-interested' are also largely 'self-defined' by 
ethical career aspirants themselves. Such an 'ethics,' while undoubtedly problematic 
in the traditionally definitive terms of moral philosophy, moves far away from such 
rule-bound descriptions, and works instead to reinvent ethics in the context of the job 
market as a type of future-orientated and innovatively generative potential concerned 
to push the boundaries of what markets themselves may actually do. 
This analysis of the 'ethical' is, at the same time and almost inevitably, also a 
commentary on the political. Or, more specifically, on what types of 'politics' are 
generally seen fit to count as such. Question of politics are, very often, intimately 
tied to questions of ethics, and this is perhaps never more so than when the 'ethics' in 
question is 'market' one. Throughout the chapters of this thesis I devote various 
sections of discussion to making explicit the political overtones, constraints and 
potentialities that a market ethics, as this is variously manifest, engineers in the 
particular context of its emergence. In Chapter One, for instance, explicitly political 
debates about whether CSR should be legislated (as opposed to being, as per the 
business case, a market practice based on the voluntary, and hence competitively 
differentiating, nature of compliance) are addressed under the heading 'Market 
Politics.' The question here is whether the fact of a market is anti-political in 
consequence, signalling, as per the critiques of neo-liberalism discussed in Chapter 
Two, an end of political contestation in favour of the efficiency of markets, or, 
whether markets can functionally generate a politics worthy of this description in 
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their own right. Chapters Four, Five and Six also revisit this question with regard to 
their respective empirical focus. So, in Chapter Four, the issue of quantification is 
also a problem of the quality of human judgement versus the 'anti-political' 
calculativeness of number. In Chapter Five, the critique of 'choice' as a 
manifestation of individualising responsibilisation, as opposed to 'caring' non-
market motivations, is encountered. And, in Chapter Six, an analogous question 
emerges around the re-invention of ethics as a property of the self. 
The most thorough address this thesis makes however to the question of 
politics is to be found in the final chapter - 'Reflexions on 'Crisis." Not addressed 
specifically until the last chapter, but implicitly at stake in the designation of 'market 
ethics' throughout, is the question of the ethics of markets themselves. Or even, as 
this might be more broadly construed, the ethics of capitalism itself. Following the 
financial crisis and subsequent 'global' recession of2008-9, questions such as these 
have of course become pertinent in an unprecedented way. Financial crisis provides, 
in this regard, an opportune moment for reflexion across the time of the preceding 
finance-driven bull market, which, not so coincidently, is also the time of the CSR 
boom that this research seeks to address. 
The question of what will become of a market based CSR in the context of 
'failed' markets is one that, especially in the immediate wake of crisis, many have 
sought to ask and answer. While I can not begin to respond to this directly, (it is, in 
the very least still at the end of2009, too early to say), the presumption offailure and 
the declaration of crisis are themselves of much critical import in the present project, 
particularly with regard to the issue of effective alternative politics. Widely hailed as 
a great opportunity for Left politics, the so-called 'crisis of capitalism' begins to look 
already, as the British economy starts to find its way out of recession, much like an 
opportunity missed. It is the actual ascription of 'crisis' here however that needs to 
be critically addressed, especially in relation to the question of what such an 
ascription both begets and allows. 
Picking up where Chapter One's discussion of 'performativity' left off, the 
interpretive dynamic of 'success' and 'failure' is demonstrably in evidence not only 
in popular and economic accounts of crisis, but also in the performative demand that 
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things either work, or (counter-performatively) do not work. In this way, and 
problematically so in regard to the kind of political responses approaches along these 
line can generate in a market context, the character of 'success' versus 'failure' is left 
critically unquestioned. The polar linearity of 'success' and 'failure' actively 
conceals however, what I will suggest are a much more complex set of market 
dynamics at work in highly financialised economies. It is only in and through an 
attempt to think ethics as a functional potential of such dynamics, that the question of 
the possibilities entailed in the suggestion of a 'market ethics' might be adequately 
described, and the desire to contribute incisively in contemporary market politics 
critically realised. 
15 
Chapter One 
o 
Corporate Social Responsibility - A Market Phenomenon 
Commentators are often quick to point out that CSR is not a 'new' issue per 
se; questions of social responsibility, it is claimed, have long dominated both 
mainstream academic and public discussion of the relationship between business and 
society.} Without seeking to directly weigh into debates regarding the relative 
novelty of the 'social responsibilities of business' concept though, it is important to 
note that thinking on this topic has evolved significantly, and in discernable stages, 
over recent history, and particularly in the last ten or so years. 
This chapter will begin with a historical overview of the main debates 
regarding the social responsibilities of business that have taken place over the years -
from early concerns centred on employee well-being, through a period in which 
corporate philanthropy constituted the main means of societal contribution, to more 
academic debates that have polarised economists and business ethicists over the 
appropriate role for business in society. Moving though, from past to present, I will 
suggest that while contemporary CSR is of course contiguous in certain ways with 
those approaches that have preceded it, significantly, it also makes a crucial break 
with these. 
It is widely proposed at present that there is a 'business case' for CSR - the 
suggestion here being that, in the contemporary marketplace, 'ethics' are in 
themselves big business - that it is possible for a company to do well by doing good. 
1 See, for instance, William C. Frederick, Corporation Be Good: The Story o/Corporate Social 
Responsibility (Indianapolis: Dog Ear Publishing, 2006). Writing which traces a history of CSR is 
reasonably commonplace. This may perhaps be due to a desire to give foundations to the practice 
which act to make it more legitimate in the present, or similarly, the allusion to a tradition may serve 
to better establish the practice amongst the 'correct' historical concerns of business. These 
suggestions are largely speculative, it should be noted though that where I seek to 'trace a trajectory' 
as it were, this is specifically with regard to the perceived relationship between 'social responsibility" 
and 'profitability,' and is undertaken so as to suggest that the current prevailing approach to CSR is 
distinctive in this regard. 
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This direct linkage of 'virtue' and 'profit' is unique with regard to previous 
perspectives on the social responsibilities of business, each of these proposing a 
much more obfuscated role for self-interest, if any at all. Thus, while on the face of 
things, it is hard to be critical of businesses seeking to act in a more 'socially 
responsible way,' the popular scepticism that palpably surrounds this contemporary 
suggestion is understandable nonetheless. 
However, the resolution of this debate, so to speak, is not the intention of this 
chapter. Instead, the focus here will be on understanding the significance of this 
market basis for CSR, asking in particular how it might be possible to employ some 
of the insights provided by economic sociology to this end. Given the long history of 
discussion in economic sociology of the relationship between the 'economic' and 
'social,' this field provides a wealth of resources with which to begin to think 
through this problem. 
In an express attempt to avoid the pit-falls of an approach that would insist on 
thinking 'markets' and 'ethics' separately, the relationship of 'embeddedness' 
between the economic and social, as elaborated by Mark Granovetter,2 will be 
introduced and considered. Contra the neo-classical economic insistence on a 
rational market actor, Granovetter and those writing after him usefully point out the 
degree to which market actions are always very much 'embedded' in the webs of 
social relations through which they are practically conducted. Applied to the 
question of a market-based 'ethical' however, this approach, as will be discussed, 
exhibits some serious limitations - in particular around its commitment to 
establishing the relative position of the 'economic' vis-a.-vis the 'social.' 
An evident need to re-think sociological approaches to the market itself 
emerges from an engagement with the economic sociology literature on 
'embeddedness.' However, by shifting the focus from the relative positioning of the 
'market' per se, to the issue of what it is that particular markets might be said to do, 
much more recent work in the field of economic sociology, in particular, that of 
2 Mark Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embedded ness," 
American Journal of Sociology 91, no. 3 (1985). 
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Michel Callon,3 offers a potentially more promising mode of inquiry in the present 
context. 
Providing an account of the performative function of economics, CalIon and 
others writing in this vein re-describe the economy-society relationship as a co-
articulating and productive one. This, as will be shown, has certain advantages with 
regard to approaching the questions that the present thesis seeks to explore, 
especially with regards to recognising the dual and simultaneous nature of the 
'economic' and 'social' as described in the business case proposition. 
Furthermore, as I will discuss towards the end of the chapter, insofar as such 
an approach opens in novel ways onto the issue of politics, it can be usefully applied 
to rethinking certain apparently intractable debates that persist in CSR. Here, using 
this framework, I will examine one particular issue in CSR - that of the merits of 
voluntary corporate responsibility, versus formal state and legislative regulation. As 
will be seen, while it is tempting (and perhaps not entirely inaccurate) to account for 
the predominantly voluntary nature of CSR in terms of a ever-pervasive neo-
liberalism and an inexorable growth of markets, this approach might also serve to 
misrecognise the significant types of newly configured forms of market politics that 
may otherwise be seen emerge and proliferate in debates such as this. 
A discussion of some of the recent contestations of, and alternatives to, 
CalIon's approach however, will also serve to highlight the need to exercise some 
caution around the ascription of economic performativity. Laying the groundwork 
for a discussion to be taken up again in Chapter Seven, I will suggest that, to the 
extent that the successful function of economics, (in a broad sense), is implied by its 
description in terms ofperformativity, the critical acuity of such an approach may 
ultimately be delimited. This is especially evident following the 2008 financial crisis 
and ensuing recession which, in Chapter Seven, will provide a context for the further 
articulation of a critique along these lines. 
3 See the collection, Michel CalIon, ed., The Laws of the Markets (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998). 
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Once Upon a Time: From Paternalism to Philanthropy 
Early accounts of the social responsibility of business can be seen to have 
emerged out of the changing relationships between economic classes, that 
themselves mark, in many respects, the origins of modem commerce. The advent of 
industrialisation, and its accompanying population moment, was perceived by some 
as a matter of moral and sometimes religious concern. Against rising urban 
crowding, squalor, and industrial pollution, many now famous industrialists sought 
to provide for and take care of their workforce.4 George Cadbury's Bourneville 
workers village is a prominent example of this kind of paternalistic employer-
employee relationship. Here, workers were provided with housing, sporting facilities, 
and, in line with Cadbury's Quaker religion, means of education such as adult 
schooling. "Why," Cadbury had famously asked, "should an industrial area be 
squalid and depressing? Why should not the industrial worker enjoy country air and 
occupations without being separated from his work?,,5 This form of hierarchical 
patronage, undoubtedly problematic today, attests nonetheless to a lengthy historical 
lineage of business responsibility beyond direct commitment to profit and 
compliance with the law. 
While paternalism was most usually a function of the employer-employee 
relationship, corporate philanthropy extends to the wider community, and is 
frequently understood as motivated by a wealthy individual's desire to 'give 
something back.,6 Corporate giving or corporate donation, more so historically than 
at present, was often a means of sponsoring a related field - a pharmaceutical 
company might donate to the local university's chemistry department for instance, 
perhaps in the hope that some of the department's graduating students may go on to 
approach the company for a job. The link between corporate philanthropy and self-
interest here though, is at best a highly tentative one. Philanthropic giving is only 
4 Tom Cannon, Corporate Responsibility: A Text Book on Business Ethics, Governance, Environment, 
Roles and Responsibilities (London: Pitman, 1994). p.5 
5 George Cadbury, quoted in. BBC News, "Workers' Village Idea Is Not New", 20th February 2004. 
6 Malcolm Keay, "Briefing Paper: Towards Global Corporate Social Responsibility" The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/3105_towards_global_corp_resp.pdf 2002. 
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very rarely understood to directly improve a company's worth; rather, these 
expenditures might only be understood as 'self-interested' (if it is possible to 
characterise them as such at all) in a very broad and indirect sense. 
A particularly strong culture of corporate philanthropy can be seen to emerge 
in both Britain and the United States from 1950 or so, reaching its peak in the late 
1960s to 1970s. So-called 'five per cent' clubs emerged in this period, populated by 
business leaders who committed to donating at least five per cent of their pre-tax 
company earnings to a variety of charitable causes.7 In this corporate climate, peer 
pressure amongst companies to be more philanthropic was strong, however this 
competition can not be said to have arisen from any expectation that the most 
generous firms would consequently be more profitable than their competitors. The 
benefits derived from charitable donation, it was recognised, would accrue to society 
as a whole, not only to the particular firm that had enabled them. As summed up by 
the then Committee for Economic development in the United States, corporate 
giving took part in the "broad recognition that corporate self-interest is inexorably 
involved in the well being of the society of which business is an integral part."g 
In positioning corporate paternalism and philanthropy 'historically' as it 
were, it is important here not to overstate the linearity of the proposed temporal 
trajectory. Of course, instances of corporate paternalism might still be pointed to 
today, in the provision of company health insurance for instance, even if these do 
manifest in slightly altered ways. Similarly, corporate philanthropy may still be 
readily observed, even if again the form of this has changed over time. The example 
of corporate sponsorship springs to mind here, sitting arguably as it does between 
advertisement and charity. What I am attempting to draw attention to in this 
overview is not the discrete stage-by-stage evolution of a concept that cumulates in 
the present with contemporary CSR, but instead, changing trends, especially with 
regard to the appropriateness of business self-interest in relation to its perceived 
social responsibilities. The particular moment in which certain business-society 
configurations emerge is of course significant in determining the nature of these. 
7 David Vogel, The Market/or Virtue: The Potential and Limits o/Corporate Social Responsibility 
(Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2006). p.18 
8 Committee for Economic Development, quoted in Vogel, Ibid., p.19 
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Business Ethics and the Academy vs. Economics 
The political climate of the 1970s, for instance, might be understood to have 
brought about something of a renewal of attention to issues of corporate social 
responsibility. Public protests and boycotts surrounding the use of Dow Chemical 
products in Vietnam are a notable example of the kind of political lobbying which 
many corporations during this period were subject to. The rise in public attention to 
corporate practices, and the explicit politicisation of corporate activities, resulted 
then in the emergence of a more regulatory culture around business in which 
'Business Ethics' became a popular and widely offered academic subject. 
Rapidly spreading through Business Schools and Philosophy departments 
(particularly in the US, but also in the UK), Business Ethics, as a discipline, was 
primarily concerned, in this particular political climate, to see that the power exerted 
by businesses was put to good use. Drawing on moral philosophy to make their case, 
this group of scholars, of which Archie Carroll is a well-known example, put forward 
what has come to be referred to as the 'ethical' model ofCSR.9 With regard to the 
question of self-interest and socially responsible behaviour, Carroll and his fellow 
ethicists suggest that it is the moral duty of business to be socially responsible, and 
that hence corporations should behave in this way without regard to the matter of 
self-interest. This normative prescription for corporate behaviour is most frequently 
articulated in theoretical terms by members of this discipline who develop schemes, 
models, and paradigms that employ various philosophical justifications for the 
approach to corporate ethics they propound. 
At the same time that the academic study of Business Ethics was gaining in 
popularity however, over in the Economics department, a simultaneous, but contrary 
proposal regarding the social responsibilities of business was being formulated. It 
was from here, within the neo-classical economic framework built on John Stuart 
Mill's utilitarian account of ethical decision making, that the renowned economist 
9 Archie B. Carroll, "Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a Definitional Construct," 
Business & SOCiety 38, no. 3 (1999). 
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Milton Friedman famously exclaimed, "[t]here is one and only one social 
responsibility of business - to use its resources and engage in activities designed to 
increase its profits." 10 
In contrast to the moral absolutism of the Business Ethicists, Friedman and 
his fellow economists reasoned that, given every economic agent acts rationally (in a 
market of free choices) so as always to maximise his own utility, and because any 
benefit to the individual also always simultaneously benefits the economic entity, 
then the pursuit of ones own interest is, by extension, also of benefit to society as a 
wider whole. Thus, even though a collective optimum is anticipated neither by 
planning nor by any intention on behalf of the participating individuals, this optimum 
is necessarily guaranteed in the eyes of neo-classical economists by the supposed 
'freedom' of the underlying marketplace in which economic decisions are made. 
So, while for these economists self-interest was conveniently coincident with 
social responsibility, the ethicists on the other hand, were left facing a somewhat 
more difficult dilemma, their advice inevitably to fall on the largely deaf ears of 
corporations that ultimately understand their operations to take place in the sort of 
free market economy propounded by the economists. l1 Suffice to say, insofar as 
these perspectives characterised the main modes of approach to the issue of 
corporate social responsibility in the thirty or so years following the early-1960s, 
little which was new or substantially progressive emerged in this field, and hence 
debate about corporate responsibly lay largely stagnant. 
'Not an Oxymoron': The Business Case for CSR 
CSR is thriving. It is now an industry in itself, with a full-time staff, websites, newsletters, 
professional associations and massed armies of consultants ... 
The Economist, 200412 
10 Milton Friedman, "The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits," The New York 
Times Magazine 13 September, 1970. p.32; Originally published in Milton Friedman, Capitalism and 
Freedom (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1962). 
11 Again, the past-tense of this statement is not intended to suggest that today work in these . 
disciplines, or from these perspectives, has ceased. Today however these approaches are re-artIculated 
in relation to the so-called 'business case' proposal. 
12 "Two-Faced Capitalism," The Economist, January 24, 2004. 
Ethical Corporation - Not an Oxymoron 
Ethical Corporation Magazine slogan 13 
Indeed, it is only recently that concerns about social responsibility have 
reappeared and become a matter of public debate. Now however, questions regarding 
the social responsibilities of business are most frequently encountered in the context 
of the very contemporary claim that there is what is referred to as a 'business case' 
for CSR. In the course of the preceding overview, I outlined a range of perspectives, 
practical and theoretical, that have attempted to approach, in one way or another, the 
question of the social responsibility of business. Focussing on the issue of 'self-
interest,' it is possible to see that although each of these historical approaches has a 
unique relationship to this, all ultimately address it in the abstract. Corporate 
philanthropy recognises the benefits of contributing financially to the society in 
which business operates, but as I noted previously, giving is not undertaken in the 
expectation that the most generous will consequently be the most financially 
successful. 
For the business ethicists, 'self-interest' undermines the moral imperative 
tout court, and is therefore summarily barred from playing any role as 'incentive' to 
responsible behaviour. While, for the economists, self-interest is the unwavering rule 
of human behaviour, and that which ensures economic and social prosperity, but 
only however, via an indirect and idealised notion of a 'common good.' It is on this 
note that the presently defined 'business case' differs significantly from those 
accounts of corporate social responsibility that have preceded it. This is succinctly 
captured by contemporary CSR's structuring maxim - that it is possible to 'do well 
b d . d,14 Y ozng goo. 
13 See, www.ethicalcorporation.com. 
14 This term is ubiquitous in popular, commercial, and academic accounts of CSR. It is something of a 
slogan, or incantation, frequently repeated, and attested to from a variety of quarters. For usage see, 
Vogel, The Market/or Virtue: The Potential and Limits o/Corporate Social Responsibility. Chapter 
Two. 
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Simply, in the current cultural and economic climate,15 proponents claim that 
CSR makes good business sense. This sentiment is summed up by General Electric 
CEO and prominent corporate figure Jeffrey Immelt, when he notes: "The world has 
changed ... It's up to us to use our platform to be a good citizen. Because not only is 
it a nice thing to do, it's a business imperative.,,16 Likewise, the vast majority of 
contemporary business writing on the subject of CSR emphasises the dimension of 
financial profitability - here the titles of these popular recent publications speak for 
themselves: Profits with Principles: Seven Strategies for Delivering Value with 
Values;17 The Sustainability Advantage: Seven Business Case Benefits of a Triple 
Bottom Line;18 and, Make Poverty Business: Increase Profits and Reduce Risks by 
Engaging With the Poor. 19 
Significantly, the currency and influence of the 'business case' for CSR is 
also reflected in a changing academic research agenda in the field. Previously, 
research in this area was primarily conducted in Business Ethics departments, 
published in specialist journals, and, as already discussed, tended to be largely 
theoretical in nature. Following the proposed 'business case' however, a new focus 
for academic activity has emerged in the relatively recently assembled field of 
'Social Issues in Management.' Here, the approach is overwhelming empirical in 
focus as the actual veracity of the 'business case' itself becomes the topic of 
examination. Proceeding mostly quantitatively, scholars in this field aim to establish, 
via a range of calculations, the exact extent of profitability that may be attributable to 
the practice of CSR. 
Hence, in contrast to the business ethics approach, research in this field might 
be said to proceed via quantification, not just prescription, though both might 
15 See Chapter Seven for a discussion of how the economic downturn beginning in 2008 has effected 
the way in which claims in the 'business case' vein are being made. While these retain their 'essence' 
as it were, changing understandings about the efficacy of markets themselves inevitably leads to the 
evolution of an account that encompasses this shift in sentiment. 
16 Jeffrey Immelt (added italics), in Marc Gunter, "Money and Morals at GE," Fortune 2004. p.176 
17 Ira Jackson and Jane Nelson, Profits with Principles: Seven Strategies/or Delivering Value with 
Values (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2004). 
18 Bob Willlard, The Sustainability Advantage: Seven Business Case Benefits 0/ a Triple Bottom Line 
(Gabriola Island, B.C: New Society, 2002). 
19 Craig Wilson and Peter Wilson, Make Poverty Business: Increase Profits and Reduce Risks by 
Engaging with the Poor (Sheffield: Greenleaf, 2006). 
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arguably be said nonetheless to be normative in dimension. I will return to discuss 
this shift in empirical focus in more detail however in Chapter Four - there, the 
quantitative studies I have briefly mentioned here will constitute some of the 
empirical material for my own analysis of the function of measurement and number 
in the enactment of a market-specific 'ethical.' 
Returning for the moment though to the 'business case' for CSR, and re-
approaching this again from the point of view of 'self-interest' that I have discussed 
already in regard to historical accounts of social responsibility, a significant 
difference can now be seen to emerge. Insofar as contemporary CSR creates and is 
participant in a 'market for virtue,,20 'ethics' is understood as a market value to the 
extent that it constitutes a differentiated selling point or lends competitive advantage. 
'Self-interest,' in the form of profitability, is thus, in this account, not abstractly 
conceived to contribute to a general social good, or disqualified as the very thing that 
undermines the possibility of 'ethics' itself. Rather, 'social responsibility' as a 
particular and differentiated practice, is understood to be a channel through which 
profit may resultantly flow. 
This flow, moreover, is thought to take specific and very practically 
conceived paths, clear statements of which can be readily found in the ever-growing 
Management literature on the topic. Under the heading "Public and consumer 
relations," in one account for instance, it is clearly stated that, "a responsible image 
can be helpful (and profitable) to a company. Other things being equal, customers 
will prefer to take their business to a company with whose activities they feel 
comfortable." Similarly, under the title, "Reputation and brand management: ... 
many companies increasingly see their reputation as one of their key assets. 
Reputation can be damaged overnight by charges of malpractice or irresponsible 
behaviour, for example, sweatshop practices in the supply chain.,,21 Financial 
benefits in CSR are also readily perceived to accrue through better "[ s ]taff 
recruitment and motivation,,,22 or, at the more negative end of the spectrum, CSR 
might even be reckoned as a means of 'risk management,' lessening potential 
20 Vogel, The Market/or Virtue: The Potential and Limits o/Corporate Social Responsibility. 
21 Keay, "Briefing Paper: Towards Global Corporate Social Responsibility." 
22 Ibid. 
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'exposure to liability. ,23 As summed up in a recent CSR manual, the "[t]ocus is on 
practical action rather than theoretical discussion for companies taking steps to 
achieve effective corporate responsibility." A kind of convergence on and in practice 
may therefore be said to be taking place.24 
As per the previous Jeffry Immelt quote, there is a pervasive sense that CSR 
has differently re-emerged in the present because the 'world has changed.' Indeed, 
many 'reasons' are supplied in answer to the question 'why has CSR come to matter 
now?' most of which seek recourse to some version ofa changed or changing world. 
In the same way that 'paths to profit' can be seen to proliferate in the commercial 
literature on CSR, so do explanations of the reasons as to why this is the case. A 
starting list of these would include the apparent "expansion of global and national 
markets," relatedly, the "growth of world trade and investment," "globalisation" (in 
the many ways in which this is manifest), "increasing privatisation and economic 
deregulation,,,25 as well as the "massive disparity between huge [corporate] profits 
... against instances of dire poverty [in the developing world],,,26 and, perhaps less 
over-archingly, the notion that we are presently in the throes of a "lifestyle 
revolution," fuelled by companies that compete on terms of innovation and 
"progressive trendsetting.,,27 
Whatever the particular details of the manifold means by which CSR might 
be understood to equate to profit, or, by which its contemporary emergence might be 
accounted for, it is not my intention to fully document or enter into these debates 
here. Equally, the preceding 'list' is not compiled with an eye to judging the veracity, 
or relative plausibility of the various scenarios offered. Instead, the point which I 
understand to be particularly significant is the constitution in itself of CSR as 
'market. ' 
This rendition of social responsibility is marked in its departure from the 
historical accounts that were the subject of preceding discussion. While it is possible 
23 Sumi Dhanarajan, "Managing Ethical Standards: When Rhetoric Meets Reality," Development in 
Practice 15, no. 3&4 (2005). p.529 
24 Roger Cowe, The Corporate Social Responsibility Manual: A Practical Approach to Sustainable 
Business Success (London: Spiro Press, 2002). (book jacket). 
25 Vogel, The Market/or Virtue: The Potential and Limits o/Corporate Social Responsibility. p.8 
26 Dhanarajan, "Managing Ethical Standards: When Rhetoric Meets Reality." p.530-1 
27 Vogel, The Market/or Virtue: The Potential and Limits o/Corporate Social Responsibility. p.ix 
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to trace a history of corporate social responsibility as I have done here~ it is important 
to re-iterate that the 'business case' for CSR should not be read as a sort of end-
point, or natural resolution of the preceding perspectives. Nor, significantly, does it 
represent any 'synthesis' or 'integration' of the preceding approaches. Though some 
commentators have called for greater co-operation between practitioners in the field 
of CSR, and theoreticians working in Business Ethics departments,28 conversely, the 
significant divergence that this 'shift to market' may be said to represent might 
alternatively be underscored. 
If Friedman were alive to survey contemporary developments in CSR there 
is no doubt he would find himself significantly less troubled today than on his first 
foray into this field in 1962. There are indeed parallels between the original accounts 
of social responsibility provided by neo-classical economists and the market-based 
account that is pervasive today - 'profit' for instance, still occupies pride of place in 
the contemporary agenda. However, the central tenet of current CSR, that it be 
voluntarily adopted such that it might constitute a profitable or distinguishing edge in 
the competitive marketplace, is entirely novel with regard to prior accounts. The 
corporate address to ethical issues in the form of contemporary CSR with which this 
thesis is concerned is not, I might re-iterate, governmentally demanded or legally 
regulated. Although debates concerning the merit of legally regulated CSR 
compliance do occur with frequency (and will be discussed in some detail towards 
the end of this chapter), it is arguable that these are sidelined by an increasing 
practical convergence around voluntarism, especially when this is coupled with a 
consideration of the unwillingness demonstrated by governments to legislate this 
field. 29 
'Ethics,' in a voluntary compliance context, might be significantly 
understood to be involved in a kind of 'becoming' market, whereby the relative 
position of this (internal/external to the market itself), is undergoing constant re-
negotiation. By contrast, previous accounts of the social responsibility of business 
28 See, Diane L. Swanson, "Towards an Integrative Theory of Business and Society," Academy of 
Management Review 24, no. 3 (1999). 
29 "Corporate Social Responsibility: A Government Update," in Department of Trade and Industry 
(www.csr.gov.uk.2004).This is elaborated upon in a latter section of the chapter under the heading 
'The Market vs. the State?' 
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have largely understood the 'ethical' to be external to the market in which business 
operates, or, as in Friedman's utilitarian reckoning, understood it to be the constant 
and inevitable outcome of any economic action. In either case, these approaches, 
have, differentially, re-inscribed relatively static, standard, and incontestable 
accounts of the 'ethical' as either finite moral absolute or generalised 'common 
good.' Given, however, that ethics in contemporary CSR is that which 
simultaneously is made possible and constrained by the market, an interesting set of 
questions emerge at this particular moment around the suitability of our conventional 
understandings of the 'economic' and 'social,' 'ethical,' and as I will go on to 
discuss later in this chapter, 'political,' in this context. 30 
Where preceding discussion sought to describe the development of 
contemporary CSR in relation to previously prevalent accounts of the relationship 
between business and society, in what proceeds the focus will be on beginning to 
understand the sociological significance ofCSR's 'becoming' market. A proposition 
that is simultaneously economic, social, and ethical, business case CSR describes 
two interrelated tensions that are both inherent in, and potentially illuminated by, a 
turn to certain sociological literatures. Firstly, the suggestion of a 'market for ethics,' 
seems to present something of a paradox in terms of conventional sociological 
approaches to the description of 'ethics' and 'markets.' There is a long history of 
inquiry into the 'morality of markets,' as it is often phrased, and, in sociology at 
least, this has usually centred on a description of 'self-interest' as ethical anathema. 
An engagement with this literature though will be the task in Chapter Two, as in the 
present chapter it is the second emergent tension that I wish to address. 
Brought to the fore via a conjunction of 'corporate profitability' and 'social 
responsibility' are a number of problems surrounding the sociological description of 
'economic' phenomena. What CSR usefully highlights here, I would suggest, is 
30 My proposal that the advent of a market-based CSR provides a fruitful ground from which to re-
approach conventional sociological notions of the economic vis-a-vis the social and so forth, need be 
distinguished from the notion that these have ever represented different logics which now are in the 
process of empirically converging. At stake is not a spuriously defmed 'convergence,' instead the 
present description seeks to highlight, through attention to contemporary CSR, the intricacies of 
mutual implication and reflexive co-articulation between conventionally distinct conceptual fields. 
See, for discussion, Don Slater, "Capturing Markets from the Economists," in Cultural Economy, ed. 
Paul Du Gay and Michael Pryke (London: Sage, 2002). p.60 
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certain impoverishment prevalent in conventional sociological approaches to markets 
specifically, and economics more broadly. The 'sociological' and 'economic' come 
into contact most explicitly in the field of Economic Sociology, so it is here I will 
begin, and in particular with Mark Granovetter's account of economic 
'embeddedness. ,31 This notion, and the literature that develops from it, generates a 
series of significant questions and elaborations regarding the relationship between 
what is 'economic' and what is 'social.' As will be seen however, it also remains in 
many ways inadequately equipped to address the kind of market relations that can 
presently be seen to characterise CSR. 
The 'Embedded' Economy of Economic Sociology 
Max Weber's writings on the relationship between religious doctrines and 
economic life is a classic source of the observation that the 'social' has an 
independent effect on the economic.32 Subsequent to this though, and against which 
more contemporary economic sociology has articulated it aims, the structural-
functionalist school of the 1950s, lead by Talcott Parsons,33 sought to complement 
mainstream economics by primarily examining what were understood to be the 
sociological aspects of economic phenomena. 34 In instituting this approach, 
structural functionalism effectively established a tacit division between the economic 
and the social, which mapped easily onto a disciplinary and intellectual division of 
labour between Economics and Sociology - a situation sometimes referred to as 
'Parson's Pact. ,35 
31 Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness." 
32 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o/Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (London: 
Unwin University Books, 1971 [1930]). 
33 See; Talcott Parsons and Neil J. Smelser, Economy and Society: A Study in the Integration 0/ 
Economic and Social Theory (London: Routledge, 1956). 
34 Richard Swedberg, Goran Brulin, and UlfHimmelstrand, "The Paradigm of Economic Sociology: 
Premises and Promises," Theory and Society 16 (1987). p.206 
35 See, David Stark, quoted in, Donald MacKenzie, "Long-Term Capital Management and the 
Sociology of Arbitrage," Economy and Society 32, no. 3 (2003). p.350 
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More recently however, a 'new,36 economic sociology has emerged, calling 
off Parson's peace with economists and seeking to challenge this spurious division of 
labour by proposing that social processes be understood as absolutely core to 
economic life, (as opposed to mere 'accompaniments' to it per se). The relative 
positioning of economic sociology as discipline vis-a.-vis neo-classical economics is 
made very explicit by those who undertook some of the earlier work in this field. 
By and large, the intention of this revived economic sociology, spearheaded 
by figures such as Mark Granovetter, Harrison White, and Viviana Zelizer,37 has 
been to contest and radically amend (in differing ways) the analysis of markets and 
economic action provided by neo-classical economics. Importantly, this purpose is 
frequently cited by economic sociologists as being motivated by the perceived 
encroachment of economics onto disciplinary 'turf thought to rightfully belong to 
sociology. The Nobel Prize winning economist Gary Becker (who is well known for 
his application of economic models to the understanding of family life), 38 is 
frequently described in economic sociology texts as pioneer of this perceived 
economic 'invasion' of the socia1.39 
It is against a neo-classical economics understood to be ill-equipped to deal 
with questions of the social that Granovetter introduces his seminally important 
interpretation of 'embeddedness.' He states, "I concentrate here on economic 
36 I include 'new' in inverted commas here to indicate that although this field is indeed often referred 
to in this way, much economic sociology in the 'embeddedness' vein is no longer especially new, and, 
in British and European economic sociology at least, 'newer' approaches have since emerged, in 
particular a group of Actor Network Theory (ANT) derived approaches, (as I go to discuss later in this 
chapter). 
37 American sociologists, Granovetter, White, and Zelizer are understood to have pioneered the 'new' 
economic sociology which, generally speaking, has drawn upon network theory in various ways to 
demonstrate, using Granovetter's terminology, how markets are socially embedded. White develops 
perhaps the most advanced social network theory of markets, applying this to economic sociology by 
demonstrating how production markets consist of firms settled into so-called market profiles, which, 
maintained via the signalling of intentions, confer protection from unnecessary competition and limit 
uncertainty. See; Harrison C. White, Marketsfrom Networks (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2002).; Viviana A. Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money (New York: Basic Books, 1994).; For 
further discussion see; Jakob Arnoldi, "Introduction: The Richness of Markets," Theory, Culture & 
Society 24, no. 7-8 (2007). 
38 Gary S. Becker, A Treatise on the Family (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).; see 
also, Gary S. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1976). 
39 See, for instance, Bernard Barber, "All Economies Are 'Embedded': The Career of a Concept and 
Beyond," Social Research 62, no. 2 (1995). p.407, also, Ben Fine, "The Triumph of Economics," in 
Virtualism: A New Political Economy, ed. James G. Carrier and Daniel Miller (Oxford: Berg, 1998). 
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behaviour for two reasons: (i) it is the type-case of behaviour inadequately 
interpreted because those who study it professionally are so strongly committed to 
atomized theories of action; and (ii) with few exceptions, sociologists have refrained 
from serious study of any subject already claimed by neoclassical economics.',4O 
Originally introduced by the substantivist economist Karl Polanyi, the notion of 
embeddedness, as particularly redefined in Granovetter's 1985 account, suggests that 
all forms of economic interaction are embedded in social relations.41 
For Granovetter, relations between actors in the economy form something of 
a structural web of social connections. This is in stark contrast to the "social 
atomization" famously claimed by Adam Smith to be the ''prerequisite to perfect 
competition.,,42 As the economist Alan Hirshman elaborates, in the ideal free-market: 
"large numbers of price-taking anonymous buyers and sellers [are] supplied with 
perfect information ... [and] function without any prolonged human or social 
contract between parties.,,43 In economics therefore, it is observably the case that 
"the fact that actors may have social relations with one another has been treated, if at 
all, as a fictional drag that impedes competitive markets.,,44 
The rational, self-interested, and utility maximising actor, or famous homo 
economicus 45 of neo-classical economics, is thus superseded in Granovetter' s 
40 Mark Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embedded ness," in The 
Sociology o/Economic Life, ed. Mark Granovetter and Richard Swedberg (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1992). p.73 
41 Ibid., p.68 Granovetter's 'embeddedness' unlike that of Poly ani, does not assume the existence of 
an institutional framework in which the economy is constituted. See, Karl Polanyi, "The Economy as 
Instituted Process," in Trade and Market in the Early Empires: Economies in History and in Theory, 
ed. Karl Polanyi, Conrad Arensberg, and Harry Pearson (Glencoe: Free Press, 1957). It is worth 
noting that, even further than this distinction, 'embeddedness' has multiple and different meanings in 
the work of other economic sociologists depending on the kind of sociological framework that they 
seek to employ. Both, Fligstein and DiMaggio, for instance, provide differing accounts from a 'new 
institutionalist' perspective. Herein the focus is on the operation of economic institutions via scripts, 
routines, classification and other forms of 'unreflective activity.' See; Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. 
Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in 
Organizational Fields," American SOCiological Review 48 (1983).; Neil Fligstein, The Trans/ormation 
o/Corporate Control (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). 
42 Adam Smith (1776), quoted in, Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem 
ofEmbeddedness." p.56 (original italics). 
43 Alan Hirschman, quoted in, Ibid., p.55 
44 Ibid., p.56 
45 Thorstein Veblen provides a classic description of homo economicus in an 1898 article: The human 
material with which the inquiry is concerned is conceived in hedonistic terms; that is to say, in terms 
of a passive and substantially inert and immutably given human nature ... The hedonistic conception 
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account by an emphasis on the social and relational ties that economists do not admit 
to their analysis of market behaviour. Summarising the economic sociology critique 
of mainstream economics Marion Fouracde writes: 
Economists get it wrong because they do not pay attention to social connections 
among market actors; to the power dynamics, institutional context, and cultural rules 
that underlie market organisation; or to the habitus and practical skills of the 
individuals involved in the market game. In short, economists get it wrong because 
their theory of society (utilitarianism) is simplistic, reduced to a theory of rational 
action.46 
The 'embeddedness' of economic action, by contrast, draws specific attention 
to the quality and type of ties between actors, as well as the shape and position of 
social networks - which are understood to be determining of both individual and 
collective market outcomes.47 Any suggestion of the independence of economic 
actions from social relations is thus characterised in Granovetter's account as a 
"grievous misunderstanding,,,48 (in the case of which 'embeddedness' might be 
usefully introduced as a corrective and reminder of the "extent to which business 
relations are mixed up with social ones,,).49 
The appeal of Granovetter' s embeddedness as a rej oinder to totalising and 
overly rational economic accounts of market behaviour is clear. Recall the problem 
of accounting for CSR as a market practice, but simultaneously, being wary to avoid 
equating this recognition with the economic reduction whereby 'market practice' can 
only ever amount to financially motivated self-interest. Indeed, the very 'career' of 
the concept of embeddedness,50 as Bernard Barber points out, may be understood as 
a continuing struggle against this tendency towards the "absolutization of the 
of man is that of a lightening calculator of pleasure and pains, who oscillates like a homogeneous 
globule of desire and happiness under the impulse of stimuli that shift him about the area but leave 
him intact. He has neither antecedent nor consequent. He is an isolated definitive human datum." 
Thorstein Veblen, "Why Is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science?," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 12 (1898). p.373 
46 Marion Fourcade, "Theories of Markets and Theories of Society," American Behavioral Scientist 
50, no. 8 (2007). p.18 
47 Ibid., p.l 0 17 
48 Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem ofEmbeddedness." p.53 
49 Ibid., p.65 
50 Barber, "All Economies Are 'Embedded': The Career ofa Concept and Beyond." p.388 
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market."Sl An absolutisation which, based on "implicit reductionism, leads on to the 
analytical and concrete errors of seeing the market and its close theoretical 
companion, rational choice, as the sole explanations of social behaviour."s2 
Writing from a sociological perspective, a certain scepticism or wariness of 
the term 'market' is almost second nature. The phrase 'reductionism' tends to present 
itself, as though via intuition, at the very mention of market transaction (especially as 
this may be explained by an economist). A precautionary 'reminder' of the social in 
the form of the embeddedness argument, does, in this context, seem sensible to say 
the very least. Yet, given that our present concern is with the issue of corporate 
social responsibility, one can not help but wonder if, in this matter, to insist on 
embeddedness is essentially to preach to the converted? 
The problem is a reasonably complex one that can be approached in two 
ways. On the one hand, applying an economic reading to the CSR market, we might 
conclude that the practice and popularisation of CSR may be entirely rationally 
accounted for - 'business is happy to practice social (or any other kind) of 
responsibility insofar as this action is in the best interest of improving the bottom 
line.' In this scenario, the 'economic' is firmly disembedded from the 'social,' yet 
still capable of making an address to it, in line with financial interests. On the other 
hand though, it is possible that CSR is not a business add-on, but rather, in its 
contemporary incarnation, that which 'resides at the very core of business practice.' 
In this account, commonly proposed by CSR practitioners themselves, 
'embeddedness' is the very basis of possibility for CSR itself - the term 'corporate 
social responsibility' semantically recognising the kind of interdependence of the 
economic and social that economic sociology is keen to underscore. 
Within the confines of the economics versus sociology debate as I have set it 
out here, this problem is in the first case largely intractable, and in the second class, 
essentially moot. On the one hand, CSR may be totally accounted for within an 
economic framework, and on the other, the economic and social are self-evidently 
recognised to be part and parcel, (however, very little more can be analytically 
51 Barber (1977), in Ibid. 
52 Ibid., p.40 1 
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ascertained from this latter point in itself about the nature of this relation). Given that 
CSR is at once both a market-based phenomena and a practice that deals explicitly in 
both the 'economic' and 'social,' the question, in light of the problems outlined here, 
necessarily becomes: How otherwise might markets be analytically approached? 
'Shadow-Boxing with Homo Economicus,?53 
Insofar as 'new' economic sociology wields 'embeddedness' as both a means 
of denouncing and enriching neo-classical economic approaches, it finds itself in 
something of double bind. Economic theory is at once in need of replacement, 
(charged with reductionism and social impoverishment), and enhancement, 
(economic agents need 'a bit more soul,' in the form of 'culture, values, or 
passions '). 54 However, to the extent that economic sociologists spend their time 
either ministering to or critiquing homo economicus, they are inevitably confined to 
operate within the invisible grip of economics. 55 The import of social relations in 
economic life is not asserted as starting premise or point of departure, instead, for 
economic sociology, it is as though the burden of proof of the 'social' were the main 
disciplinary task: that all markets are "economic, until proven social. ,,56 
Like the economists it criticises, economic sociology assumes, within the 
scheme of enrichment/denunciation it operates, that the economy is indeed both 
amoral and asocial. 57 Given the stress on anti-reductionism, some commentators 
have keenly pointed out that a humanistic moral agenda can be discerned here,58 one 
that, I would suggest, in some ways parallels that of the business ethicists discussed 
earlier in this chapter. While both groups are keen to prescribe the betterment of 
economic life (at the same time pointing out why this is so desperately necessary), 
53 Daniel Thomas Cook, "The Problem of Consumption and the Ghost of Homo Economicus," 
Accounts: ASA Economy Sociology Section Newsletter 6, no. 1 (2006). p.6 
54 Michel CalIon, "Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics," in The 
Laws o/the Markets, ed. Michel CalIon (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998). pp.50-1 
55 Cook, "The Problem of Consumption and the Ghost of Homo Economicus." p.6 
56 Ibid. 
57 CalIon, "Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics." p.51 
58 Don Slater, in Michel CalIon, Andrew Barry, and Don Slater, "Technology, Politics and the Market: 
An Interview with Michel CalIon," in The Technological Economy, ed. Andrew Barry and Don Slater 
(London: Routledge, 2005). p.1 07 
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each manages to fall prey to making the very assumption that they seek to critique 
economics or business on the basis on - effecting a division of the economic from 
the social or moral. 
Neo-classical economics may provide a less than adequate account of market 
behaviour, but in describing the 'social' with reference to the perceived 
impoverishment of this in economic accounts, 'embeddedness' may do to social 
relations a similar disservice. As the French sociologist Michel CalIon points out, 
when understood as that in which economic relations are 'embedded,' "society is 
imagined as a context."S9 By intervening in the situation as though it were a matter of 
the economic and social jostling for relative position, economic sociology stakes 
'society' as its ground and, as CalIon describes it, subsequently proceeds to imagine 
"how to put this strange beast, the market, in this frame.,,6o 
Configured as 'sparring partner' to mainstream economics, economic 
sociology has thus had little room in which to move, and as such, has largely been 
confined to a rather repetitive insistence on the primacy of the social in the economic 
- in the process of which however, sufficient justice is done to neither. More 
particularly though, as one commentator has suggested, the apparent showdown 
between economics and sociology is perhaps more a case of shadow-boxing61 than 
live combat - sociology may emerge from the scuffle unscathed, but equally what 
has been learnt about what is 'economic'? Dissolving the economic into the social, 
'embeddedness' tells us more, ultimately, about traditional sociological concepts-
networks, relationality, kinship, and so forth, than it can about specific markets, and 
the kinds of practices that constitute their function. 62 
In the context of the present inquiry, the relative disciplinary positionings of 
economics and sociology are not foremost at stake. The challenge, almost in 
contradistinction to this, is to preserve both the 'economic' and 'social,' and describe 
these together in the development of particular 'markets-for-ethics' and in the 
59 Canon, Ibid. 
60 Canon, Ibid. 
61 Cook, "The Problem of Consumption and the Ghost of Homo Economicus." p.6 
62 Karin Knorr Cetina and Urs Bruegger, "Traders' Engagement with Markets: A Postsocial 
Relationship," Theory, Culture & Society 19, no. 5/6 (2002). p.162 
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practice of a market-based 'ethical' or 'market ethics. ,63 This much is, as I have 
previously described, actually suggested by the business case proposition itself 
through the linking of profitability and social responsibility. The practical aim then, 
in seeking to ask questions of a market-based phenomenon as I am doing here, is not, 
as I understand it, to formulate a pre-emptive critique of the 'economic,' rather, the 
stated question at hand regards 'what the CSR market may be said to do?' And, asks 
more practically, as to the particularities of' doing ethics' in specific market 
contexts. 
This desire to address markets and market practices in their specificity and 
without dissolving the economic altogether has elsewhere already functioned as a 
significant impetus towards the development of new approaches within economic 
sociology. Of particular note herein, (and especially in relation to the preceding 
questions), is a re-conceived role for both 'economics' (as a discipline) and 'the 
economic' (as a categorisation). In the following section I will begin to describe 
some of the developments along these lines in current economic sociology, 
beginning with CalIon's seminal re-description of economics in terms of 
'performativity. ' 
Before continuing with this however, I want briefly to note that to begin with 
CalIon is not to imply by corollary that contemporary debate in economic sociology 
is predominately structured around this particular approach. Rather, as I will aim to 
describe in the course of ensuing discussion, recent work in economic sociology 
extends out in number of directions and into new fields of inquiry. So much so that, 
arguably, the continued use of the umbrella term 'economic sociology' itself 
becomes problematic insomuch as this may refer to work that focuses on 
significantly different objects, and proceeds also on differing and sometimes strongly 
opposed theoretical and methodological grounds.64 
63 The term 'market ethics' is however designed to recognise both that there is a 'market-for-ethics' 
and emphasise the practical 'doing' of ethics as market/in markets as per the description in the 
Introduction. The specificity of particular "markets-for-ethics' will be addressed in Chapter Three as 
an empirical and methodological issue. 
64 Karin Knorr Cetina, "Economic Sociology and the Sociology of Finance: Four Distinctions, Two 
Developments, One Field?," Economic Sociology - The European Electronic Newsletter 8, no. 3 
(2007). p.5 
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Performing the Markets 
In his 1998 collection The Laws of the Markets, CalIon addresses 'new' 
economic sociology's problematic relationship with economics by proposing 
alternatively that the "economy is embedded not in society but in economics.,,65 For 
CalIon, it is meaningless to make a distinction between the economy as "existing 
reality," and economics as an "analytical discourse,,66 that explains this. Instead, 
employing the term 'economics' in a much broader sense than discussions of 
embeddedness allow, CalIon says his position "consists in maintaining that 
economics ... performs, shapes and formats the economy, rather than observing how 
it functions.,,67 
This notion of a 'broadened' sense of what 'economics' includes is an 
important one. As Don Slater notes, CalIon treats 'economics' in much the same way 
that Foucauldian perspectives understand 'government. ,68 'Economics' in this 
reading is not only an academic theory, it is this in addition to also being a set of 
various, but linked, ideologies, practices, logics, techniques, and discourses, from the 
most oblique to the most mundane. 
Central to CalIon's thesis is the notion that economics actively 'performs' 
and configures the markets it claims otherwise only to describe. Contributing to a 
tradition started elsewhere in the social sciences,69 CalIon applies J.L. Austin's 
Knorr Cetina makes this argument with regard to distinguishing 'economic sociology' specifically 
from the recent' sociology of fmance.' While significant overlaps do exist in contemporary work in 
these fields, Knorr Cetina notes in particular how the recent interest in fmancial markets (or exchange 
markets) marks a significant shift from the traditional economic sociology focus on producer markets 
(i.e. White), and the central role designated by this focus to intra-firm organisation, (i.e. Swedberg). 
See; Richard Swedberg, "Major Traditions in Economic Sociology," Annual Review of Sociology 17 
(1991). 
65 CalIon, "Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics. "p.30 
66 Ibid., p.29 
67 Ibid., p.2; See also, Michel CalIon, "Four Models for the Dynamics of Science," in Handbook of 
Science and Technology Studies, ed. Sheila Jasanoff, et al. (London: Sage, 1994). 
68 Don Slater, "From Calculation to Alienation: Disentangling Economic Abstractions," Economy and 
Society 31, no. 2 (2002). p.245 
69 CalIon acknowledges that his description of 'performativity' has antecedents in other areas social 
science. Notably, Judith Butler employed this term in her 1990 book 'Gender Trouble' in order to 
understand gender as a kind ofre-iterative performance and thus denaturalise the presumed co-
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understanding of 'performativity,70 to economic theory, knowledge, and practice, in 
order to highlight the productive, as opposed to merely 'representational' function of 
economics. On this reading, the 'enhancement and/or replacement' couplet 
promulgated through embeddedness is abandoned, and 'economics' itself comes 
instead to occupy a leading role in the study of economic phenomena. 
CalIon's 'performativity programme' (as this has now come to be known), 
operating under the banner "no economy without economics,,,71 works to resuscitate 
the rational and calculative market actor of neo-classical economics by 
controversially suggesting that this account is not just a fiction that it is necessary to 
debunk. In The Laws o/the Markets, CalIon writes: 
Yes, homo economicus really does exist. Of course, he exists in the form of many 
species and his lineage is multiple and ramified. But if he exists he is obviously not 
to be found in a natural state - this expression has little meaning. He is formatted, 
framed and equipped with prostheses which help him in his calculations and which 
are, for the most part, produced by economics.72 
In this much quoted passage, the actual 'existence' of homo economicus is 
crucially qualified on the basis that he is neither simply 'natural,' nor understood to 
act alone. Rooted in the earlier 'actor-network theory' (ANT) that CalIon was 
involved in developing alongside Bruno Latour and others,73 a distinctive feature of 
the 'performativity' approach is a certain agnosticism about the nature of actors 
(which may also be collective and/or non-human entities), as well as a lack of 
interest in prior theories of 'social structure.' Instead, as CalIon suggests, it is the 
task of the social scientist to follow the linkages between actors (human and 
incidence of sex and gender. See, Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of 
Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990). 
70 John Langshaw Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962). 
71 Koray <;ali$kan and Michel CalIon, "Economization, Part 1: Shifting Attention from the Economy 
Towards Processes of Economization, " Economy and Society 38, no. 3 (2009). p.370 
72 CalIon, "Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics." p.51 (original 
italics) 
73 Michel CalIon and Bruno Latour, "Unscrewing the Big Leviathan: How Actors Macro-Structure 
Reality and How Sociologists Help Them to Do So," in Advances in Social Theory and Methodology. 
Towards an Integration of Micro- and Macro-Sociologies, ed. Karin Knorr Cetina and Aaron V. 
Cicourel (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981).; See also, Michel CalIon, "Some Elements of a 
Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Scallops and the Fishermen ofSt Brieuc Bay," in 
Power, Action and Belief A New Sociology of Knowledge , ed. John Law (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1986). 
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otherwise) as these are formed in activities and practices.74 'Social structure,' 
following this and again contra 'new' economic sociology, is understood to exist 
only to the extent that it is manifest via these coalesced linkages. 75 
The foregrounding of discursive and material practice over a pre-determined 
'social,' provides a useful point of re-entry through which CSR's previously 
described 'practical convergence' might be sociologically illuminated. Recall, from 
earlier in this chapter, the way in which prior theoretical reckonings of the business-
society relationship are largely superseded by contemporary business case CSR in 
both the academy, (through the ascendancy of quantitative Management 
perspectives), and commercially, where CSR, as I have argued, is a 'market 
practice.' The requirement for attention shifts, in such a situation (as I have already 
gone some way to suggesting via the structuring emphasis on 'doing'), towards the 
theoretical means through which practice may be approached in an open-ended and 
critically astute way. The question that remains though is whether a Callonistic 
approach focused on neo-classical economics and seeking to analytically proceed 
through the ascription of performativity provides sufficient enough scope in this 
regard. 
The 'Socio-Technical' as a Problem of Scope 
For CalIon and his colleagues, following the central role accorded to neo-
classical economics, the focus on market practice to emerge from this approach has 
been overwhelmingly concerned with calculative practices, and in particular, what 
are described as the "socio-technicaI"76 aspects of these. In this vein, the term 
"agencement"n is introduced in order to re-Iocate or re-distribute the calculative 
agency typically ascribed to human actors, across the various metrological tools, 
prostheses, equipment, models, and so forth that are involved in the achievement of 
74 For example; Michel Callon, "Can Methods for Analyzing Large Numbers Organize a Productive 
Dialogue with the Actors They Study?," European Management Review 3, no. 1 (2006). 
75 Callon, Barry, and Slater, "Technology, Politics and the Market: An Interview with Michel Callon." 
76 Michel Callon, "Why Virtualism Paves the Way to Political Impotence: Callon Replies to Miller," 
Economic Sociology - The European Electronic Newsletter 6, no. 2 (2005). p.13 (added italics) 
77 Fabian Muniesa, Yuval Millo, and Michel Callon, "An Introduction to Market Devices," in Market 
Devices, ed. Michel Callon, Yuval Millo, and Fabian Muniesa (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007). p.4 
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calculation and measure in market contexts. In its practical and functioning aspects, 
the "agencement" is described by Fabian Muniesa, Yuval Millo and CalIon as a 
'market device,' a notion that seeks again to underscore the performative relation 
between objects and agency: devices work, they do things, "they act or make others 
act." 78 
Broadly following this emphasis on market materiality, a burgeoning 
literature, most notably focussed on financial markets, has sought to examine the 
performative function of economic models.79 Donald MacKenzie and Yuval Millo's 
study of how the Black-Scholes Merton pricing formula operated on the Chicago 
options market is exemplary in this regard. 80 To the extent that the Black-Scholes 
Merton formula provided a means through which an unambiguous figure for option 
value could be derived, MacKenzie and Millo describe a transactional logic that 
converges on numerical calculation and formulae (and, as a consequence, away from 
interpersonal relations). In this technical convergence, what is most significantly 
discerned is a performative relationship between formula and option prices: the more 
traders that adopted the formula, MacKenzie and Millo suggest, the more option 
prices conformed to the expectations of the model. 
Elsewhere in the sociology of finance however, accounts that describe the 
performativity of economic practice have been challenged on the basis that a "model 
is not a market.,,81 While maintaining an emphasis on the materiality of market 
practice, a number of recent ethnographic studies of financial markets have achieved 
78 Ibid., p.2 
79 See the collection; Donald MacKenzie, Fabian Muniesa, and Lucia Siu, "Do Economists Make 
Markets?," ed. Donald MacKenzie, Fabian Muniesa, and Lucia Siu (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2007).; also, Donald MacKenzie, Material Markets: How Economic Agents Are Constructed 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).; Donald MacKenzie, "An Equation and Its Worlds: 
Bricolage, Exemplars, Disunity and Performativity in Financial Economics," Social Studies o/Science 
33, no. 6 (2003).; Donald MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape 
Markets (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006). . ' . 
80 Donald MacKenzie and Yuval Millo, "Constructing a Market, Performmg Theory: The Hlstoncal 
Sociology of a Financial Derivatives Exchange," American Journal o/Sociology 109, no. 1 (2003). 
81Daniel Beunza, "A Model Is Not a Market: Promises and Pitfalls of Quantitative Finance" (Ross 
School of Business, 24th October 2008). 
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greater flexibility and broadened the scope of this observation, even while largely 
still concerned with market practices of a 'socio-technical' nature. 82 
The requirement for 'flexibility' and 'scope' derive, with regard to the 
research problem at hand, from the original co-implication made in the business case 
proposition itself. 'Doing well' is clearly an economic imperative. To the extent 
though that this meets, in CSR, 'doing good,' a proposition made in a social, ethical 
and (as I will go on to elaborate further in Chapter Three) affective register, a overly 
technical interpretation of what counts as economic practice may function to a priori 
delimit analytical scope in the present case. As Chapter Four will discuss, CSR is 
undoubtedly a calculative and technical achievement in some areas of its practice; 
further attention though to what I describe as the 'texture of the quantitative' will 
suggest even here the need to rethink the supposed coherence of the technical. Less 
obviously 'technical,' but thoroughly 'material,' consumer and labour markets also 
come up for analysis in the latter chapters, and, as such, some breadth and open-
endedness around the kind of practices that the term 'market' might describe is 
required from the outset. 
In this regard, ethnographic accounts that describe processes of 'technocratic 
unwinding,83 and the undermining of technological rationality in market contexts84 
function as a useful counterpoint to the 'faithfulness' that Callonistic accounts 
necessarily imply via the original proposition that economics 'works.' Similarly 
important are accounts that have pointed beyond the limited technically-derived 
agency with which objects and practices are imbued through the notion of 'market 
device,' to understand the way in which some objects, as 'doers of things,' may 
related to as "experiencing, feeling, reflexive and remembering beings - as bearers 
of the sort of experiences we tend to reserve for the sphere of intersubjective 
relations.,,85 Observing this object-relationality with regard to the screens via which 
82 See, for instance; Karin Knorr Cetina and Urs Bruegger, "Global Microstructures: The V~al 
Societies of Financial Markets," American Journal of Sociology 107, no. 4 (2002).; Knorr Cetma and 
Bruegger, "Traders' Engagement with Markets: A Postsocial Relationship." 
83 Annelise Riles, "Real Time: Unwinding Technocratic and Anthropological Knowledge," American 
Ethnologist 31, no. 3 (2004). . . . . 
84 Caitlin Zaloom, "Ambiguous Numbers: Trading Technologies and InterpretatIOn m FmancIal 
Markets" American Ethnologist 30, no. 2 (2003). 
85 Knorr' Cetina and Bruegger, "Traders' Engagement with Markets: A Postsocial Relationship." p.163 
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currency traders experience, act in, and become part of the market, Karin Knorr 
Cetina and Urs Bruegger coin the term 'post-social' to describe "new kinds of bonds 
such as those constructed between humans and objects.,,86 Elsewhere, and also 
described on the basis of ethnographic observation of traders, the same authors 
describe how an object-inclusive intersubjectivity underlies "the reflexive 
coordination of contemporary markets that while "global in scope [are] microsocial 
in character. ,,87 
The question of market coordination is an important one in the context of the 
present research and I return to address this in more depth in Chapter Three where 
'markets,' as a research object, will be understood to present a empirical challenge to 
conventional sociological methods. Equally, given that the nature of the practices 
inaugurated via the suggestion of a 'market ethics' is a central concern of the present 
work, the practical ethical and relational potentialities produced in specific market 
contexts is also an enduring concern, and an issue that requires further attention. The 
section entitled 'Making Means Mean More - Towards Ethics as Practice' in the 
following chapter will thus continue where this very brief discussion of the 
'materiality of markets,' has left off. 
F or now though, and to conclude the discussion with which the latter half of 
this chapter has been concerned, I want to turn to another body of ethnographic 
work, one that has very explicitly staked its claim in economic sociology against the 
Callonistic emphasis on calculative "disentanglement.,,88 The primary source of 
disagreement here though, I suggest, is political, and as such provides an opportunity 
to discuss in this final section the implications that ensue in the adoption of one 
theoretical perspective here over another. At stake, as I will demonstrate with 
reference to the on-going 'regulation' versus 'voluntarism' debate in CSR, is our 
critical ability to effectively describe, and hence potentially intervene in debates that 
emerge in contemporary market contexts. 
86 Ibid., p.162 
87 Knorr Cetina and Bruegger, "Global Microstructures: The Virtual Societies of Financial Markets." 
p.905 . . . . . 
88 Michel Callon, "An Essay on Framing and Overflowing: EconomIC Extemahtles RevlSlted by 
Sociology," in The Laws o/the Markets, ed. Michel Callon (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998). p.253 
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Market Politics 
CalIon's emphasis on 'disentanglement' from the social as a supposed 
precondition for calculation has met with much resistance in the form of 
ethnographic work that has alternatively demonstrated the 'entangled' character of 
market transactions.89 Daniel Miller, whose 1998 ethnography of shopping practices 
sought to underscore the socially contingent nature of consumption, has been 
especially vocal in his critique, suggesting that CalIon aligns himself with 
economists in "mistaking a representation of economic life for its practice. ,,90 The 
abstracted market of the economists, for Miller, is simply not empirically in evidence 
in instances of 'real' market transaction, which, by contrast, he characterises as 
culturally constituted in nature. In order to articulate this, Miller develops a theory of 
'virtualism, ,91 which, while recognisant of the 'performative' power of economics in 
a manner not dissimilar to CalIon, suggests that this creates a kind of ideological 
'virtual' reality as opposed to describing an empirical core of economic activity. 92 
To describe this further, 'virtualism,' Miller explains, occurs as a function of 
the extraordinary power of economics to "reconstitute the world in its image. ,,93 
Where market models come to organise exchange, what occurs might be described as 
a case of 'mistaken' reality, and as such it necessary for sociologists and 
anthropologists of markets to contest this. Miller notes of the key argument in his 
book on virtualism: "what needed to be emphasized was the degree to which 
economics and other abstract models were managing to accrue such power that they 
89 Roy Dilley, ed., Contesting Markets: Analyses of Ideology, Discourse and Practice (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1992).; James G. Carrier, ed., Meanings of the Market: The Free Market 
in Western Culture (Oxford: Berg, 1997). 
90 Daniel Miller, "Turning Callon the Right Way Up," Economy and Society 31, no. 2 (2002). p.219; 
See also, for a critique of Callon on the basis of a supposed uncritical alliance with economists, Phillip 
Mirowski and Edward Nik-Khah, "Markets Made Flesh" (paper presented at the 4S-EASST 
Conference, Paris, 27th August 2004). 
91 Edited with James G. Carrier; James G. Carrier and Daniel Miller, eds., Virtualism: A New Political 
Economy (Oxford: Berg, 1998). 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
43 
were able to transfonn actual economic practices, making them accord more with 
these same models.,,94 
It is CalIon's perceived complicity with a powerful, and for this reason, 
dangerous, neo-classical economic world-view that lies at the heart of Miller's 
critique. At stake here, in the emphasis on false ideologies and duplicitous power. is 
the kind of politics that is enabled, or disabled, via the suggestion that economics 
might actually function to produce economic life in its image. Or, more precisely 
than this, what is most significantly at stake is what is to count as the right kind of 
politics. 
In his political objection to CalIon's approach, Miller is certainly by no 
means alone. Departing from the political 'heartlands ,95 of sociological critique, 
CalIon pays little heed to traditional concerns regarding capital and class. Lacking a 
general political economy, CalIon's work is charged by critics with apoliticism-
thought to be symptomatically reproductive of the broader agnosticism with which 
the 'cultural turn' is often more generally charged.96 According to critics such as Ben 
Fine, the emphasis on description via which an account in tenns of perfonnativity 
proceeds, results in a kind of circularity or tautology whereby that which is simply 
asserted, is in fact that which needs to be explained. Moreover, the idea that 
economists constitute markets re-doubles the "economics imperialism,,97 instated by 
figures such as Becker (against whom, as was discussed earlier, 'embeddedness' was 
conceived). Only, for Fine, this 'new phase' of imperialism is even more virulent to 
the extent that possibilities for effective political contestation are negated in the same 
moment that an economic macro-structure is denied. The result, as Fine recounts it, 
is a situation wherein "[ c ]apitalism is an invention of anticapitalists.,,98 
Against the perceived apoliticism of CalIon's approach, Miller's politics are 
ofa pronounced and familiar emancipatory variety. The 'virtual' recreates a critical 
94 Ibid., p.229 
95 Liz McFall, "Devices and Desires: How Useful Is the 'New' New Economic Sociology for 
Understanding Market Attachment," Sociology Compass 3, no. 2 (2009). p.275 
96 See, for instance, Chris Rojek and Bryan Turner, "Decorative Sociology: Towards a Critique of the 
Cultural Turn," The Sociological Review 48, no. 4 (2000).; Andrea Whitle and Andre Spicer, "Is 
Actor-Network Theory Critique?," Organization Studies 29, no. 4 (2008). 
97 Ben Fine, "Callonistics: A Disentanglement," Economy and Society 33, no. 3 (2003). p.482 
98 Barry, Slater, and Callon (2002), quoted in Ibid., p.481 
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space wherein sociology may politically intervene in the traditional way by means of 
normative assessment, while at the same time paying heed to observable instances of 
economic performativity. With regard to the present research however, an a priori 
understanding of what constitutes 'political' engagement is highly problematic. The 
'political' question, as it were, is an open one - the content of this that which stands 
to be articulated through the course of engagement with CSR as it is empirically 
manifest. In this way, the 'truth' versus 'falsity' implied in Miller's formulation of 
the virtual, imposes a restriction from the outset on the possibilities entailed in the 
process of 'becoming market.' 
The problem I am describing here may be elaborated through the oft-
occurring spatial metaphor whereby markets are understood to have 'outsides' and 
'insides.' For the economic sociologists of embeddedness with which this discussion 
began, market 'outsides' are taken for granted. The social is the larger structure 
inside which economics subsists and is contained. This understanding, insofar as 
'new' economic sociologists are concerned, is significant because, otherwise lacking 
in such an appreciation, neo-classical economics is a hopelessly reductive ideology, 
and one which furthermore threatens to encroach the domain of sociology in its 
purvIew. 
Miller extends this account by recognising the productive power of 
economics, (such that things may be made economic) - but this process is a 
dangerous 'false' one, constitute in unequal power, and capable of obscuring a 
cultural realm of a more 'true' nature. The 'virtual' is imposed from above, from on 
top of or outside of the erstwhile 'real,' but capable of exerting negative effects 
nonetheless. 
For CalIon however, that which is 'external' to the market is very different 
from a social context, or 'virtual reality' per se. In order to understand the dynamics 
of what can count as 'market,' CalIon turns to the notion of 'externality' as deployed 
within conventional economics. Here, he explains, "[ e ]conomists invented the notion 
of externality to denote all the connections, relations and effects which agents do not 
take into account in their calculations when entering into a market transaction. ,,99 
99 Canon, "Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics." p.16 
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This is illustrated with the example of a chemical plant that, when discharging its 
toxic waste, pollutes the local river, and hence produces a negative externality for 
those parties that would otherwise seek to use or enjoy the river, whether these be 
fisher-people, bathers, or other river users. 100 The chemical factory in question, in 
taking the decision to the dump toxic waste, does so without taking into account the 
possible effects on river users, and thus constitutes them as extra-market or, 
'externality.' So simply, and in other words, an externality is that which the market 
does not count. 
As CalIon points out, this notion is of importance for economic theory as it 
marks the limits of effectiveness of any given market. 101 In terms of the present 
discussion though, it is more usefully drawn upon insofar as it illustrates certain 
dynamics of market 'construction.' 102 Another way that the effects of externalities 
may be illustrated is through evoking the metaphors of 'frame' and 'overflow.' Here, 
the toxic waste (overflow) is external to the 'frame' of economic relationships in 
which the company makes it decisions. 103 As 'negative externality' the ill-effects 
experienced by river users are not taken into account by the polluting company. 104 
However, 'overflows,' as CalIon notes, only remain devoid of significance to the 
extent that they do not give rise to being noticed, or becoming significant. 
The point at which the overflow is noticed, or identified, its source and 
targets recognised, its effects described, measured, quantified and compared, the 
'externality' is no longer strictly such, and are-framing of relations may occur 
whereby it becomes "meaningful to assert that X, Y, and Z should be allowed to 
participate in negotiations concerning contracts between A, Band C from which they 
were formerly excluded.' That which is 'external' to the market therefore, is not 
permanently or incontestably so. The option of "internalizing the externalities" may 
100 Ibid., pp.16-17 
101 Ibid., p.17 
102 Ibid. 
103 CalIon, "An Essay on Framing and Overflowing: Economic Externalities Revisited by Sociology." 
p.259 
104 Ibid., p.248 
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exist - the "reframing [of] hitherto uncontained overflows" 105 becomes, essentially, a 
political matter. 
Here, it is worth distinguishing the process of framing and re-framing, from 
that of embedding and disembedding. The 're-framing' of culturally meaningful 
processes as 'market' does not constitute a 'disembedding,' as is Miller's concern. It 
is important to note, as a rejoinder to claims regarding the supposed separation of the 
economic from the social, that any item or relation, in the process of becoming 
economically significant, does not simply shed its 'prior' or 'external' meanings or 
significances. As I hope to explore in the course of this research, the process 
whereby 'ethics' are involved in a 'becoming market' is a more complex one than 
such a reading would give credit to. The way in which 'insides' and 'outsides' 
emerge, shift, and change, is subject to a highly contingent set of processes that 
partake not only of the 'economic,' but, as is especially evident in the case ofCSR, 
the 'political' and of course 'ethical' as well. 
The Market vs. the State? 
The political contestability of the 'becoming market' I describe is especially 
evident in a particular and recurring CSR debate. Although the account of CSR put 
forward and popularised in terms of a 'business case' holds, by definition, that only 
'socially responsible' corporate actions which go above and beyond what is legally 
required can be said to count as CSR per se (because it is the competitive advantage 
conferred by voluntarism that constitutes the 'business case' itself), calls continue to 
arise from some quarters (notably from activists and the NGO sector) for the state to 
regulate and legislate CSR activities. Corporations, so those calling for regulation 
contend, cannot be relied upon to act responsibly of their own accord. On the other 
hand, as those within business and much of the CSR industry itself point out, it is the 
vary fact of a market for CSR that has driven is re-emergence, and acted to build the 
strength of the movement. As such, any government invention would undermine the 
possibility of CSR itself, and therefore, so the 'business case' holds, business (via the 
105 Ibid., p.259 
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mechanism of the 'market') is best left in this regard to its own devices. As summed 
up by John Elkington, founder of London-based CSR "strategy consultancy,,}06 
SustainAbility: "As we move into the third millennium, we are embarking on a 
global cultural revolution. [And] [b ]usiness, much more than governments or non-
governmental organisations, will be in the driving seat.,,107 
Interestingly, in the United Kingdom at least, the national government 
strongly echoes these sentiments, the CSR Minister Stephen Timms stating in a 2004 
government report: 
I am well aware of the many and increasing calls for more regulation of company 
behaviour. And I agree that Government has a responsibility to ensure minimum 
legal standards. I remain convinced [though] that the main focus of CSR should 
continue to be a voluntary one ... CSR should continue to take compliance with 
legal requirements as base and go beyond that in the interests of business and the 
rest of society.108 
It would seem, from one perspective, very difficult to defend or describe this 
scenario in terms of 'increasing political contestation.' The un-holy alliance of 
business and government described here could, on one understanding, be read as the 
cumulative result of twenty years of the kind ofneo-liberalism that some claim has 
worked to produce "the most de-politicised period in the history of the market.,,}09 
As is illustrated by the present example, the idea that there are 'markets' on the one 
hand, and 'government invention,' on the other, is becoming increasingly difficult to 
maintain. 
Within such a scenario though, the question becomes whether it is possible 
(or, latterly, desirable) to develop an account of markets as themselves political in 
organisation. In the present example, I think is possible to say that far from 
106 John Elkington, Cannibals with Forks: The Triple Bottom Line o/21st Century Business (Oxford: 
Capstone, 1997). (backcover). See, www.sustainability.com. According to the SustainAbility website 
the company, "[e]stablished in 1987 ... advises clients on the risks and opportunities associated with 
corporate responsibility and sustainable development. Working at the interface between market forces 
and societal expectations, we seek solutions to social and environmental challenges that deliver long 
term value. We understand business and what society expects of it." 
107 Ibid., p.3 
108 Stephen Timms, "Corporate Social Responsibility: A Government Update." 
109 Don Slater, in, CalIon, Barry, and Slater, "Technology, Politics and the Market: An Interview with 
Michel CalIon." p.1 06 
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restricting the space of political debate, the fact of a market for CSR opens up a 
space of political possibility that may not otherwise have appeared - one in which 
traditional means of politics may function as hindrance, not aid. Along similar lines. 
CalIon comments that "it is a mistake to describe capitalism as homogenous and, 
being homogenous ... not concerned with questions which are termed usually as 
political, ethical and so on. If you accept the diversity of what is usually called 
capitalism, you are led to recognise that in some markets you have constant 
discussions or negotiations about ethical or political questions." 110 
Andrew Barry's distinction between politics "as a set of technical practices, 
forms of knowledge and institutions," and the political "as an index of the space of 
disagreement," proves useful in this context. Ill As he points out, "what is commonly 
termed politics is not necessarily - or generally - political in its consequences," II2as 
such, the call for CSR to be regulated by the government, insofar as this would 
reduce the amount of contestation around this topic, might be understood to have 
unintended 'anti-political' effects. The process therefore, whereby 'ethics' becomes 
'market' in the practice of CSR is, significantly, a political one. In addition then to 
considering the apparent de-regulation and de-politicisation that might be said to 
characterise neo-liberalism and the supposed 'growth' of markets, it is also necessary 
to note the concomitant re-regulations to which an account of 'market politics,' such 
as that which has been briefly elaborated here, may seek to attend. In this emphasis 
and understanding, the matter of how market functions become political, but also, 
may be prevented from being so, comes to the fore. 1 13 As the following chapters seek 
to explore, in the so-called 'market for ethics,' what possibilities and 
circumscriptions otherwise emerge for the 'political'? 
Once again though, where questions are of a political nature, the largely 
intractable problem of what is to count as the 'right' kind of politics remains. That 
110 Ibid., p.113 
III Andrew Barry, "The Anti-Political Economy," Economy and Society 31, no. 2 (2002). p.270 
112 Ibid. 
113 Barry, "The Anti-Political Economy." p.279 
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debate over the relationship between sociology and economics endures so 
vehemently still in relation to CalIon's work is more than a little ironic given 
Callon's own original insistence that the key task for economic sociology was 
neither to enhance nor replace the economic agent, but understand instead how he 
has come to be SO.114 Perhaps though, the very endurance of the debates I have 
described in this chapter, might itself be understood to highlight a continuing 
constraining logic at work here vis-a.-vis sociological encounters with the 
'economic.' That, for all its supposed emphasis on 'practice,' performativity 
continues to reproduce traditional divisions and bi-polar outcomes, suggests to me 
finally, that despite protestations to the contrary, (and as Chapter Seven will 
elaborate) it may also find itself bound and delimited in familiar ways. 
As my discussion of 'market politics' sought to suggest, 'truth' and 'falsity' 
are precepts inadequately equipped to sensitively deal in the changing possibilities 
and potentialities generated in the kind of contemporary market contexts to which 
this thesis addresses itself. And yet, in the performative demand that economics 
'works,' we might begin to wonder whether a not dissimilar problematic effectively 
emerges. 'Perfonnativity,' seems to provide a means of exploring what is achieved 
practically and processually. That such a description may result however in the 
conclusion that something 'works,' is at once entailed in the proposal that something 
be 'perfonnative' in the first place, and yet it is also necessary that in describing 
what 'becomes' any such conclusiveness is finally denied. This problematic becomes 
particularly pertinent in light of the 2008 financial crisis and the developments that 
ensue from this, (as Chapter Seven will discuss). The suggestion that economics 
'works' is not, as I understand it, primarily to be avoided on the basis of any 
undesirable or apolitical alignment with neo-classical economics that this mayor 
may not confer. Rather, if it is to be approached with caution, this is on the basis that 
'working' and 'not working' (or as per Chapter Seven, 'success' and 'failure'), are 
only two potential outcomes amidst the myriad of otherwise 'becomings' that are of 
114 McFall, "Devices and Desires: How Useful Is the 'New' New Economic Sociology for 
Understanding Market Attachment." p.270 
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social, ethical, and political significance in the reflexive contemporary contexts that 
this thesis seeks to describe. 
It is for this reason that, although business case CSR presents itself in the 
form of a hypothesis which, being so, begs to be proved or disproved, my critical 
concern is with the rather less definitive' doings' that this proposal brings to life and 
the variety of different forms that these may take. 115 The encounter between CSR 
and economic sociology to which this chapter has played host, reveals a missed 
opportunity of sorts - the unearthing of a critical space otherwise largely obscured by 
the countervailing demand that markets are soluble in the social, or else uniquely and 
uniformly 'economic' to the exclusion of all else. 
To recap the discussion that has preceded: I have proposed that given 
contemporary CSR is market-based in practice and business case by definition, 
contemporary sociological treatments of markets may be approached in order that the 
specificities and limitations of these with regard to the present problem might be 
highlighted. Where sociological perspectives have sought primarily to note the 
'embeddedness' of economic accounts, the possibilities for productive critique, I 
have claimed, become limited. Seeking to develop a critical space that is 'within' the 
market, but not aligned with, or against 'economics' per se, this chapter has 
attempted to define an approach wherein the dynamic and reflexive contingency of 
'becoming market' might be attended to with a degree of critical sensitivity. This 
suggestion does not amount to a coherent 'sociology of markets,' or any such thing-
the enormity of such a task is well beyond the purview described by the present 
concern. Instead, the sociological encounter with what is 'market' that has begun 
here is carried through the chapters that follow, the tensions wrought in this 
encounter fashioning along the way various challenges of both a methodological and 
analytical nature. 
115 And, in this respect, I agree with Miller's suggestion that it is "enormously important to stick with 
the integrity of ethnographic observation." See; Daniel Miller, "Reply to Michel CalIon," Economic 
Sociology - The European Electronic Newsletter 6, no. 3 (2005). p.8 
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Chapter Two 
o 
Market Morality 
'I've always found ethics quite difficult to do in business - enlightened self-interest I 
understand!' 
Lord Ronald Oxburgh, Ex-Chairman, Shell Transport and Tradingl16 
The supposed impossibility of a 'self-interested ethical,' is widely attested to 
- the opening epigraph demonstrates this much. While such a comment derives its 
intelligibility from the perceived mutual exclusivity of 'self-interest' and 'ethics' 
however, the introduction of an enigmatic 'enlightened self-interest' of business case 
derivation hints at contemporary shifts occurring around this traditional 
incompatibility. 
In the previous chapter, I briefly described the utilitarian coincidence via 
which neo-classical economics understands the relationship between markets and the 
creation of favourable social outcomes. Friedman's suggestion that the only social 
responsibility of business is to be profitable exemplified this. The pursuit of 'self-
interest,' therein and to recap, was understood to result ultimately in 'the greatest 
good for the greatest number' via a kind of wealth multiplication process proposed to 
act at the level of society as a whole. Against this, critics of the market have long 
presented radically opposing views with regard to the matter of morality. Sociology, 
in particular, has a significant historical legacy in this vein, built largely on Marx's 
analysis of alienation and exploitation in the capitalist production process, but also, 
following others, (Veblen, for instance), 117 consumption too has been the subject of 
much criticism on moral grounds. 
116 Lord Ron Oxburgh, speaking at Energy, Politics and Survival, 3rd March, 2008, Hong Kong 
Lecture Theatre, The London School of Economics and Politics. 
117 Thorstein Veblen, Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study in the Evolution of Institutions 
(New York: Macmillan, 1899). 
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The present chapter will begin with a discussion and overview of some of the 
major moral critiques of markets to emerge within classical and more contemporary 
sociology.118 Within this work, the specific nature of moral objection differs; 
however, as many contemporary observers have noted, certain orientations or styles 
of objection are typically encountered and, as such, approaches may be characterised 
on this basis. Hence, Alfred Hirschman has described a 'self-destruction' thesis 
wherein the self-interested nature of capitalist market exchange is proposed to 
undermine the very moral foundations of the society in which such exchange takes 
place. 119 Viviana Zelizer identifies a 'boundless market' model, wherein the market 
is understood to exert its powerfully morally destructive effect via ever increasing 
d·· . 120 A d I dl . commo It1zatlOn. n ,re ate y, MIchael Sandel notes a 'corruption' argument in 
which certain moral goods are supposedly diminished if bought and sold - the 
suggestion being, in other words, that there are some things that money just can not 
buy. 121 
The intention in employing these different characterisations is not to compare 
and contrast between them,122 rather these descriptions will be employed alongside 
118 The focus on explicitly moral critiques of markets is what marks the literature reviewed in this 
chapter distinct from the previous. Having said this, and as per dicussion in Chapter One, the extent to 
which some of the economic sociology approaches discussed in the present chapter are also moral 
critiques is certainly debateable (cf footnote 58). Some earlier writing in economic sociology, such as 
Karl Polyani's Great Transformations, as will be briefly discussed in this chapter, is quite explicitly 
moral ising in both intention and tone. Largely though, the kind of 'new' and 'newer' economic 
sociology introduced in the previous chapter has, it has been suggested, "consciously avoid[s] taking 
an explicitly normative position on the market as such." Marion Fourcade and Kieran Healy, "Moral 
Views of Market Society," Annual Review of Sociology 33 (2007). p.14 (added italics) 
The focus in this chapter on 'sociological' perspectives on markets and morality is not intended to 
suggest that it is only from within sociology that such work emerges. See, for example the classic 
Social Limits of Growth, by economist Fred Hirsch; Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978). 
119 Albert O. Hirschman, "Rival Interpretations of Market Society: Civilising, Destructive or Feeble?," 
Journal of Economic Literature 20, no. 4 (1982). 
120 Viviana A. Zelizer, "Beyond the Polemics on the Market: Establishing a Theoretical and Empirical 
Agenda," Sociological Forum 3, no. 4 (1988). 
121 Michael Sandel, "What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets," in The Tanner Lectures 
on Human Values (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2000). 
122 It needs be noted that Hirschman, Zelizer and Sandel all write in different fields and provide their 
accounts at different times and with different purposes. Furthermore, the characterisations I discuss in 
the present chapter are not the only ones described by the authors. In addition to the 'self-destruction' 
thesis, Hirschman, an economist, notes a 'doux commerce' thesis (in which markets are understood to 
have a civilising effect), and a 'feudal shackles' thesis, (in which markets are thought to be too 
'feeble' to completely throw off the 'shackles' ofa feudal past, and as such are not actually the 
supposed 'free' markets they are purported to be). Zelizer, writing from an economic sociology 
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one another in order to highlight the extent to which sociological approaches have 
tended to posit a causal relationship between the market and moral order - one in 
which the market has typically been understood to have deleterious effects in the 
realm of morality. This traditional divisibility of the 'market' from the 'moral' is 
problematic however in the context of the present research. 
Towards thinking markets and morals in the same space, this chapter turns 
subsequently to the sociological study of 'Moral Economy.' This proves useful 
insofar as it demonstrates a history of moral concerns in economics literature as well , 
as illustrating the ongoing and underlying importance of these in economic 
transaction. This literature, which will be typified here primarily by Amartya Sen's 
classic work 'On Ethics and Economics,' 123 in addition to more contemporary 
commentaries (such as those provided by Andrew Sayer),124 is specifically attentive 
to the moral status accorded to self-interest, and as such, makes some in-roads 
towards a broadened conception of this. Here though, having proposed this necessity, 
it is worth noting upfront that it is specifically not my intention to philosophically re-
coup self-interest and, by bizarre contrast, subsequently offer this as some kind of 
universally laudable ethical foundation. Rather, my professed concern regarding the 
perspective, also describes a 'subordinate market' model in which the social, cultural, and structural 
restraints to the supposedly 'autonomous' market are highlighted, (this model being the most 
analogous to the 'embeddedness' perspectives popular in economic sociology and discussed in the 
previous chapter), in addition to a 'multiple market' model wherein the market is understood as an 
interaction of cultural, structural and economic factors. Sandel, a philosopher describes in addition to 
a 'corruption' argument, a 'coercion' one centred on the involuntary (and on this basis) morally 
problematic nature of some market exchanges, (however focuses overwhelming in his descriptions on 
the 'corruption' argument which he describes as prevalent and more important). Given that the present 
chapter seeks to review sociological perspectives specifically, and moreover only these with an 
explicit address to the morality of markets, the three characterisations that I focus on are chosen 
inasmuch as they are most representative of the orientations found in this work. Lastly, should be 
noted that each theorist has a different relationship to the orientations they describe - Hirschman is 
concerned positivistically with which account is 'true,' however concedes that each may be so in its 
own place or time; Zelizer is proposing a future empirical agenda against 'boundless markets' 
accounts and based on a 'multiple markets' approach, and Sandel is participant in endorsing the anti-
market critique he identifies and describes. It is, as I say in the text, the way in which the highlighted 
orientations draw attention to the patterns in the sociological literature concerning the relationship 
between markets and morality that marks them out as useful for present purposes. 
123 Amartya Sen, On Ethics and Economics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987). 
124 Andrew Sayer, Moral Economy and Political Economy (Lancaster University, 2000 [cited 15th 
May 2008]); available from http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uklsociology/papers/sayer-moral-economy-
political-economy.pdf.; Andrew Sayer, "(De)Commodification, Consumer Culture and Moral 
Economy," Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 21 (2003).; Andrew Sayer, Moral 
Economy (Lancaster University, 2004 [cited 24 April 2008]); available from 
http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uklsociology/papers/sayer-moral-economy.pdf. 
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ethical status of "self-interest' is always in reference to the particular set of 
contemporary circumstances under study wherein it is commonplace to reconcile 
(not wholly unproblematically, as those involved in CSR themselves are of course 
the first to attest to) practices that are at once understood to be 'ethical' and profit 
maximising (and thus self-interested). 
Given that this is the case, the insights accorded by the moral economy 
approach can stretch ultimately only so far. As will be shown, the field of moral 
economy, in a roughly analogous way to the 'new' economic sociology approaches 
to 'embeddedness' discussed in the previous chapter, falls short of any profound 
recognition of the reflexive interplay between, in this case, the economic and ethical 
as may be witnessed functioning in contemporary CSR. The morally staked 'outside' 
to markets characteristic of the previously discussed 'corrupting/boundless' market 
descriptions, is re-worked by a 'moral economy' understanding, and yet the status of 
this 'moral' remains problematic, as I will go on to explain, in both its prescriptive 
and proscriptive dimensions. 
Following this, I turn to Foucauldian-inspired approaches that seek to 
understand markets as both moralised, but in addition, actively moralising entities. 
The problematic spatial imaginary of market 'insides' and 'outsides' is, in theory at 
least, superseded in such accounts in favour of an emphasis on the practical and 
reflexive making or constitution of markets. To the extent however that a 
"governmentality' perspective seeks to describe market practices in terms of 
processes of , market is at ion,' 'individual responsibilisation,' 'economisation,' and so 
forth, the actual practice at stake risks, I will suggest, being overridingly cast as a 
mere symptom of something else - frequently a 'pervasive neo-liberalism.' 125 
Against this tendency, in the final section of the chapter, I will begin to 
outline an approach wherein practice itself is foregrounded as that in and through 
which the 'ethical' and 'market' are reflexively enacted or performed - ethics in/as 
(market) practice. In order to do so, and beforehand, I will attempt to understand 
125 Following from the comments in footnote 118; the distinction between 'moral' and 'political' 
critique is also one that is difficult to clearly or defmitively establish. In some of the discussed 
governmentality approaches this is evident where the charge of'neo-liberalism' is simultaneously a 
moral and political critique. 
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how CSR evolved 'enlightened self-interest' as an organising 'ethic' through a 
change in emphasis from 'responsibility' (as obligation), to the more 
contemporaneous orientation towards 'responsiveness,' (a capacity and set of 
techniques), as elaborated by William Frederick and others. 126 This will lead, latterly. 
to a description of Bruno Latour's treatment of 'ends' and 'means,' or the 
problematics of 'intentionality' in ethical practice. It is by 'making means mean 
more,' or taking 'means' seriously as ethical practice, I will suggest, that a 
description of contemporary market ethics, as these are instantiated in CSR stands to , 
open-endedlyemerge. 
Separable Spheres - Markets versus Morals 
The Self-Destructing Market 
It is back to Marx's writings on the generally corrosive nature of capitalism 
that many sociological critiques of the relationship between markets and morality, 
both classical and contemporary, may be traced. The alienation of human labour (and 
resulting commodity fetishism) that Marx describes find expression, in the 
Communist Manifesto, as concerns about the breakdown of traditional values and 
institutions. Love, family, patriotism - with their passing into commerce these 
morally cherished social relationships become, for Marx and Engels, distorted and 
overridden by the power of money. 127 Characteristically though, for Marx this 
process is a dialectical one. Social relationships between persons and material 
relations between things become inverted as a function of capitalism, perceived as 
social relationships between things, and material relationships between people. 128 
The alienation to derive from commercial exchange is also a concern for 
Georg Simmel in The Philosophy of Money. Where money becomes the primary link 
126 William C. Frederick, "From CSRI to CSR2," Business & Society 33, no. 2 (1994 [1978]).; also; 
Robert W. Ackerman and Raymond A. Bauer, eds., Corporate Social Responsiveness: The Modern 
Dilemma (Reston, VA: Reston, 1976). 
127 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (New York: Penguin, 1998 [1848]). 
128 Marx, K. Capital, in Fourcade and Healy, "Moral Views of Market Society." p.1O 
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between people, Simmel suggests, inter-personal bonds of kinship, blood, loyalty 
and so forth are replaced by an impersonal and calculative logic of rationality. 129 The 
pervasiveness of monetary exchange then, sees extended into areas of social, 
aesthetic, and moral life, a quantitative and abstracting spirit that prevails over the 
traditional primacy of 'unquantifiable' qualities - qualities that are rightfully of 
another, morally superior, realm. 
Writing in the tradition of Marx and Simmel, the Frankfurt school scholar 
Max Horkheimer provides an account of the deleterious transfonnation of reason in 
line with self-interested capitalism. In the Eclipse of Reason, Horkheimer suggests 
that the moral function of reason is diminished to the extent that it becomes an 
instrument for deciding only means and can say nothing of ends as a function of 
capitalism. Where previously, Horkheimer suggests, reason was called upon to 
simultaneously define both the means and ends of human action, and credited with a 
privileged position in matters of liberty and justice, the agnosticism of self-interest 
sees reason demoted, and stripped of clout with regard to matters of moral 
concem.
130 Thus, for Horkheimer as for Marx and Simmel, the pursuit of economic 
self-interest largely results in the undennining of the traditional moral values and 
bonds thought to hold society together. 131 
Emile Durkheim seems to goes some way towards resisting this classic 
analytical trend via his emphasis on the mutual obligations that arise from the 
division of labour and the moral underpinnings of contractual relations. In small part 
at least, the division of labour on which modem society rests recalls for Durkheim 
the kind of "common consciousness,,132 then attributed to proposedly socially 
cohesive pre-market societies. Contractual commitments, in order to hold, likewise 
129 Elsewhere however, Simmel's approach to the question of the morality of market exchange is more 
ambivalent. In Conflict and the Web o/Group Affiliations, Simmel understands competition, via the 
figure of the consumer, to approximate on occasion a relation akin to love. See, Georg Simmel, 
Conflict and the Web 0/ Group Affiliations, trans. Kurt H. Wolff (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 
1964 [1908]). pp. 61-3. For further discussion of this point see; Hirschman, "Rival Interpretations of 
Market Society: Civilising, Destructive or Feeble?" p.1472 
130 Max Horkheimer, Eclipse o/Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947). p.34 
J3J Ibid., p.36 
J32 Emile Durkheim, Division o/Labour in Society, trans. George Simpson (New York: Free Press, 
1964 [1893]). p.148. In terms of Durkheim's enduring contribution to social theory this emphasis in a 
minor one. More usually associated with Durkheim is the breakdown or confusion of social and moral 
norms captured by the term 'anomie.' 
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rest upon a set of indispensible moral relationships. Truth-telling, trust, keeping-
one's-word - while these bonds may be unintended by the contract, nonetheless, in 
order for it to function, they need be in place. These instances of social cohesion and 
moral necessity in the realm of market practice are for Durkheim however, only 
"superficial" and interest can "bring people closer together ... [for] a few moments 
only; it can only create an external tie among them.,,133 
Moreover though, and more problematically, to the extent that such 
'superficial' moral bonds may themselves come to mistaken for true, un-self-
interested morality, replacing, in the process, any countervailing 'authentic' morality, 
then the entire system on which market exchange rests threatens to undermine itself 
by eroding the moral basis of its own function. This internal problematic is what 
Alfred Hirschman describes as the 'self-destruction thesis,' 134 and is a commonly 
identifiable feature of the kind of classical sociological approaches to market 
capitalism that I have discussed here. This is most obviously so perhaps in relation to 
Marxist thought where the notion that capitalism carries within itself the "seed of its 
own destruction,,135 is the basis upon which socialist revolution is both predicated 
and predicted. 
The notion that market society functions in a self-destructive and morally 
self-undermining way is not however restricted only to historical accounts. So 
widespread is this idea, it frequently forms the basis of popular moral criticisms of 
market function. Here, the financial crisis of 2008 provides a case in point. Self-
interest, graphically depicted in the popular imaginary in the form of greedy and 
immoral bankers, is widely understood to have been the actual cause of what many 
have claimed was an entire meltdown of the financial system. Whether or not an 
understanding of this event in terms of 'crisis' or 'systematic meltdown' is accurate 
or critically desirable is an important question (and one that I return to discuss in 
Chapter Seven); for now though, to two other related variants of moral critique via 
which both historical and contemporary sociological accounts have addressed 
markets. 
133 Ibid., p.176 
134 Hirschman, "Rival Interpretations of Market Society: Civilising, Destructive or Feeble?" p.1466 
135 Ibid., p.1467 
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The Corrupting and Boundless Market 
It is arguably in relation to commodification and consumption that moralistic 
critiques of markets are most frequently and enduringly assembled. Veblen's famous 
". . ,,136 d I conspIcuoUS consumptIon suggeste ong ago that moral and aesthetic 
degradation result in the competitive process of purchasing. People do not consume 
in order satisfy needs, Veblen suggested, they consume instead as a means of 
demonstrating wealth and acquiring respect on this basis. As such, traditional ethical 
concerns are purportedly eclipsed by a drive for wealth and admiration of wasteful 
and greedy excess. 
At the heart still of many contemporary sociological accounts of 
commodification is the moral proposition that some things lie rightfully outside the 
market sphere. Markets are not only morally 'corrupting' in influence, as Michael 
Sandel suggests, but also voracious in appetite and thus, as Viviana Zelizer notes, 
understood as liable to break their 'bounds.' Common to both 'corrupting' and 
'boundless' critiques of markets is the intrinsic assumption that some goods, on the 
basis of their very nature, should simply not be bought and sold. This suggestion is 
of course most intuitively and obviously appealing in relation to the most morally 
significant and irreplaceable of' goods. ' 
Robert Titmuss' s well-known book on the blood donor system in Britain is 
something of a contemporary classic in this vein.137 Comparing voluntary and 
commercial systems of blood donation, Titmuss argues that it morally detrimental to 
the social order to tum blood into a commercial commodity. When even human 
tissue is saleable, the "possessive egoism of the marketplace,,138 threatens, according 
to Titmuss, to usurp the erstwhile moral foundations on which social order otherwise 
rests. Moral objections along these lines have been similarly made in relation to 
136 Veblen, Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study in the Evolution of Institutions. 
137 Richard M. Titmuss, The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy (London: Allen 
& Unwin, 1970). 
138 Ibid., p.13 
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t't' 139 '.f.': 140 141 pros 1 utlOn, marrIage lor money, surrogate motherhood, as well in relation 
to the more general commodification of 'bodies' 142 and 'feeling.' 143 
In the context of such accounts, the market threatens dangerously to become 
"a sphere without boundaries, an unzoned city - for money is insidious, and market 
relations are expansive.,,144 On this basis therefore, and in response, it becomes 
necessary, as Michael Walzer argues in Spheres of Justice, to actively "block,,145 
certain goods and values from market exchange in order to protect their integrity. 
Goods and services in society, Walzer argues, have social meanings closely related 
to the culture of that society, and it is these meanings that should be influential in 
deciding how goods are to be distributed, whether voluntarily, by the market, or by 
the state. 146 
In many critiques of commodification, a spatial metaphor reoccurs - the 
intra- and extra- market - coupled with a notion of ethical integrity. Some things are 
'marketable,' but others are not. That which is 'not' needs be maintained as 'outside' 
on the basis of its ethical integrity; some things, as it is frequently expressed in an 
alternative way, are simply 'priceless.' 147 Following such critiques however, if 
certain 'ethical' goods should not be economically valued, if they can only 
authentically exist 'outside' of markets, (because to be subject to market exchange 
would be to degrade their moral quality), what is to be made of the proposition that 
'ethics' themselves be marketable? 
F or those writing in the tradition of ethicists such as Levinas and L0gstrup, 
this question entails from the outset a complete paradox or total impossibility. As 
139 Sandel, "What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets. " p.95 
140 Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, trans. Tom Bottomore and David Frisby (London: 
Routledge, 2004 [1900D. 
141 Elizabeth Anderson, "Is Women's Labour a Commodity?," Philosophy and Public Affairs 19, no. 1 
(1990). 
1~2 Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Loic Wacquant, eds., Commodifying Bodies (London: Sage, 2002). 
143 Arlie Hochschild, The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1983). See also, for general representation of this style of argument; 
Margaret Jane Radin, Contested Commodities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). 
144 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (Oxford: Robertson, 1983). p.119 
145 Ibid. 
146 Reasoning such as this might be understood to broadly underlie debates around CSR, such as that 
introduced in the previous chapter, whereby the relative merits of voluntary versus state-backed 
legislative compliance are at stake. . 
147 This notion is revisited in Chapter Four where discussion will centre on commercIal attempts to 
quantitatively correlate CSR and corporate profitability. 
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Zygmunt Bauman notes in a recent book on ethics and consumerism: while "[i]t is 
true that objectively good - helpful and useful - deeds have been time and again 
performed out of the actor's calculation of gain, be it Divine grace, public esteem, or 
absolution from mercilessness shown on other occasions," such deeds "cannot be 
classified as genuinely moral acts precisely because of having been so motivated." 
For Bauman, and following in a long tradition of such defmition, ethical-self-interest 
is an anathema - it is necessary that "[i]n moral acts, 'ulterior motive is ruled 
out. ",148 
Writing under the heading, "What Chance of Ethics in a Globalized World of 
Consumers?,,149 Bauman can then only conclude that, in contemporary consumerist 
society, ethical possibilities are necessarily curtailed. Where "more and more areas 
of contemporary society have become assimilated to a 'consumer model,,,,150 
relations of an ethical nature, so Bauman's reasoning goes, are threatened and 
become increasingly rare given that ethics can, definitionally, "not serve any 
"purpose" and most surely [ can] not [be] guided by the expectation of profit, 
comfort, glory, or self-enhancement.,,151 
Strongly implicit here, and equally so in all the literature I have discussed 
thus far, is the idea that there exists between markets and morals a relationship that is 
causal in nature. Whether self-destructive, boundless, corrupting, or, (as is possible), 
all three at once, markets are understood to exert powerful effects on the moral. 
Morality, on the other hand, only very occasionally 'speaks back,' as it were, and 
when it does, as in Durkheim' s work, this is often only in a hollow or ultimately 
ineffectual way. 
The problem of course that such accounts present in the present context is an 
inability to contend meaningfully with the proposition that markets and morality may 
be co-constituting, or occupy the same space. While such work serves usefully to 
highlight the particularity and indeed the theoretical difficulty ofCSR's business 
case suggestion - that is possible to 'do well by doing good' - the 'good' proposed 
148 L0gstrup, in, Zygmunt Bauman, Does Ethics Have a Chance in a World o/Consumers? 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008). p.31 
149 Bauman, Ibid. 
150 Colin Campbell, quoted in Ibid., p.59 
151 Ibid., p.62 
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here, following the preceding discussion, could only ever be an 'inauthentic' one, a 
marauding 'good,' unfit on this basis to qualify as 'ethical' at all. 
Thus, in much the same way that, in the previous chapter, 'business' was 
separable from 'ethics' in the study of business ethics, and 'philanthropy' separable 
from 'core business practice,' the supposed divisibility between markets and 
morality can not predict or respond to the development of a conjunction between the 
two beyond dismissing this as inauthentic or impossible. Here though, at this 
apparent impasse, two alternative possibilities may be pursued in order to create 
greater critical space around the problem that CSR presents. Firstly, that 'self-
interest' might itself have more ethical potentiality than is typically supposed, and 
secondly, that markets themselves may be understood as normative structures. Both 
of these suggestions are taken up in the contemporary study of 'moral economy,' a 
field in which classical economic doctrine is critically re-approached in order to 
demonstrate that morality does indeed have a place in economic practice. 
'Moral Economy' - Integrating the Moral and Economic? 
The term 'moral economy' seeks to simultaneously designate under this title 
both an object of study and kind or style of inquiry. 152 While today 'moral economy' 
refers primarily to a contemporary field of critical inquiry, this term has evolved 
significantly over time. Now classical accounts of 'moral economies' offered by 
writers such as Marcel Mauss and Karl Polanyi focused on pre-market societies, and 
sought to demonstrate morality in community bonds and the corresponding sense of 
economic justice that these were understood to impart. I53 Contrasting these human 
interdependencies with a modem 'atomised' marketplace, these theorists provide an 
account of what we supposedly have lost in "the substitution of a rational economic 
system for a system in which the exchange of goods was not a mechanical but a 
152 Sayer, Moral Economy. p.2 
153 See, Marcel Mauss, The Gift, trans. Ian Cunnison (New York: Norton, 1967).; Karl Polanyi. The 
Livelihood of Man (New York: Academic, 1977). See also, James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the 
Peasant (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976).; E.P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the 
English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century," Past and Present 50 (1971). 
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moral transaction.,,154 Morality itself, for these writers, may therefore be understood 
as a function of the presumed 'embeddedness' of the economic in the social in pre-
market societies. I55 Forms of protective legislation and other externally derived 
instruments for intervening in markets are, for Polanyi, subsequently understood to 
be morally-agentic counter-measures against the "deleterious action of the 
market.,,156 
Insofar however as all forms of economic activity might be understood to be 
influenced by and depend on certain underlying moral norms, sentiments, 
dispositions and behaviours (both internally emergent and externally implied), it is 
not just pre-market economies that qualify as 'moral,' but, as contemporary moral 
economy approaches suggest, this designation may be applied usefully to the study 
of advanced capitalist market economies as well. 157 Working on this basis, theorists 
of moral economy propose a two-pronged aim to their inquiry. 
On the one hand, 'the moral economy' denotes, as I have already noted, an 
object of study. Here attention is drawn to the various structuring moralities 
understood to subsist within all forms of economic transaction, but additionally, to 
the supposed 'compromise' of these norms by economic forces. 158 In this sense, 
moral economy provides, as explained by Andrew Sayer (a prominent proponent of 
this approach), a "positive" or analytical contribution to social science. 159 By 
proposing that moral considerations influence our economic behaviour at every 
stage, moral economy acts as a counterpoint to neo-classical economic approaches 
that insist on a wholly rational economic actor who calculatedly transacts on the 
'self-interested' basis of preference or 'utility maximisation.' 
Equally important for Sayer though, is a second possibility that emerges from 
the designation of 'moral economies' - the potential that, given the ethical 
implications of economic transactions, a normative moral economy might be 
154 E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Introduction to the Gift, by Marcel Mauss (New York: Norton, 1967). p.ix 
155 William James Booth, "On the Idea of the Moral Economy," The American Political Science 
Review 88, no. 3 (1994). p.656 
156 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957). p.132 
157 Booth "On the Idea of the Moral Economy." p.658 , 
158 Sayer, Moral Economy and Political Economy. p.2 
159 Ibid. 
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developed to evaluate them. 160 The concept of moral economy thus operates as both 
means through which normative issues in contemporary economies may be brought 
into focus, but also as a vehicle through which the functioning of 'moral economies' 
might be commented upon or regulated. 
Moral economy thus marks out the 'proper' role of self-interest in economic 
transactions as an issue of particular interest. If morality is understood in general to 
serve as a kind of constraint on self-interest, and, given moral concerns can be seen 
to actively underlie all economic transaction,161 then, so the reasoning goes, the 
dominance of self-interest as a singular economic rationale need also be re-
considered. 
A rough parallel may be provisionally drawn here between the suggestion of 
'enlightened self-interest' as an ethical basis for CSR, and the occupation by 'self-
interest' of explanatory ground within neo-classical economic theory that moral 
economists would populate instead with underlying moral norms and influences. 
Although these concerns are not identically coincidental, the problematisation I am 
attempting here and the moral economist's desire to see ethical considerations in 
economic transactions taken into account, both bump up against a 'self-interest' that 
appears to stolidly resist colonisation by anything other than the most calculative 
reasomng. 
Amartya Sen's distinction between 'ethical' and 'engineering' approaches to 
economic questions is illuminating in this regard insomuch as this demonstrates the 
perspectival gap between moral economy approaches on the one hand, and neo-
classical economics on the other. 162 Drawing on Aristotle's The Nicomeachean 
Ethics, Sen recalls an economic tradition in which it is it impossible to dissociate the 
study of the economic and ethical. Herein, wealth is not understood be an end in 
itself; instead, "[t]he life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and 
wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful for the sake of 
160 Ibid. 
161 There are many different philosophical defenses and interpretations of this view, it is widely held 
across various moral theories however - Kantian, Rawlsian, and Utilitarian approaches all having this 
notion at base. See, Eric H. Beversluis, "Is There 'No Such Thing as Business Ethics'?," Journal of 
Business Ethics 6 (1987). p.87 
162 Sen, On Ethics and Economics. p.3 
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something else.,,163 Sen denotes this the 'ethical' approach. In contrast to this 
tradition in economic thought on the other hand, Sen also describes an 'engineering' 
approach characterised "by being concerned with primarily logistic issues rather than 
with ultimate ends and such questions as what may foster 'the good of man.' 164 Here, 
"ends are taken as fairly straightforwardly given, and ... [h]uman behaviour is 
typically seen as being based on simple and easily characterisable motives. ,,165 
The predominance of the latter 'engineering' understanding in contemporary 
mainstream economics is indicative, for Sen, of a neglect, or narrow reading of 
classical accounts of the 'self-interested' motivations behind economic behaviour. In 
particular, Adam Smith's The Wealth a/Nations is singled out insofar as this is 
understood to develop a much more complex perspective on the role of self-interest 
than is borne out in the ubiquitous contemporary references made by neo-classical 
economists to its supposed championing of self-interested motivation. 166 Much time 
is devoted in this way, by Sen and others working in a moral economy framework, to 
recouping Smith's works from the purportedly neglectful clutches of these neo-
classical economists. Close attention to The Wealth a/Nations reveals by contrast, it 
is claimed, a careful and considered account of self-interest as only one economic 
motivation amongst others, including a wide range of what are understood as moral 
emotions or sentiments.167 
While the particular issue of Smith's legacy in neo-classical economics is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, what does usefully emerge herein is an interesting 
critique of the possibility of 'pure' self-interest in economic transaction. As Sen 
convincingly points out: "The self-interest view of rationality involves inter alia a 
firm rejection of the 'ethics-related' view of motivation ... To see any departure 
from self-interest maximization as evidence of irrationality must imply a rejection of 
the role of ethics in actual decision taking.,,168 This claim is not designed to refute 
that self-interest plays a substantive role in motivating economic behaviour, but 
163 Aristotle, in Ibid., p.3 
164 Ibid., p.4 
165 Ibid., p.4 
166 Ibid., p.21 
167 Sayer, Moral Economy. p.7 
168 Sen, On Ethics and Economics.p.15 
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rather draw attention to the "plurality of motivations" 169 that might be unearthed 
from beneath a crushing logic of 'rational self-interest.' As Sayer concurs, "the 
pursuit of self-interest is common enough in economic activities [however], there is 
no reason for accepting the dogma that it is the only motivation involved.,,1?O 
More interesting though than simply 'a number of competing motivations in 
addition to self-interest,' is the further suggestion that the "contrast is not necessarily 
between self-interest, on the one hand, and some kind of a general concern for all, on 
the other.,,1?1 Instead, as Sen points out, "[t]he traditional dichotomy between 
'egoism' and 'utilitarianism' is misleading in several respects, including the fact that 
groups intermediate between oneself and all - such as class, community or 
occupation groups - provide the focus of many actions involving committed 
behaviour.,,172 
Sen's address to the neglects of neo-classical economics is notable for its 
attempt to describe morality and self-interest together, especially given that, in doing 
so, it does not posit a singular or entirely predictable relationship between the two. 
Moral economy approaches therefore, as I have attempted to illustrate, are interesting 
in the present context insofar as they introduce ethical considerations in order to 
critique 'self-interest' as a single and 'pure' motivation for economic activity. As 
Sen points out though, the issue ultimately at stake is not the 'choosing' of one 
approach over the other, the 'ethical' over the' engineering,' rather "it is a question 
of balance of the two approaches to economics.,,173 
This address to, or attempted additive 'correction' of, neo-classical economic 
assumptions is however reminiscent, in some regards, of the issue of 'embeddedness' 
in the field of economic sociology, described in the previous chapter. Here, it is 
worth following this comparison through briefly as, where economic sociology, I 
suggested, ran into problems regarding the relative positioning of the 'social' and 
'economic,' 'moral economy' offers a similarly problematic situating of the 'moral' 
and 'economic.' 
169 Ibid., p.19 
170 Sayer, Moral Economy and Political Economy. p.2 
171 Sen, On Ethics and Economics. p.19 
172 Ibid., pp.19-20 
173 Ibid., p.6 
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Recall, from the previous chapter, Mark Granovetter's characterisation of the 
supposed independence of economic relations from social ones as a "grievous 
misunderstanding.,,174 'New' economic sociology, as per the previous chapter, aims 
to demonstrate that the economy (contra neo-classical economic approaches) is, as 
Granovetter denotes it, 'embedded' in a dense network of social concerns and 
relations that in tum are crucial to understanding the function of this. Similarly, for 
moral economists, what is at stake is a 'misunderstanding,' a problematic neglect or 
refusal on behalf of neo-classical economic approaches - only this time normative 
issues are highlighted for attention. Economists need to "re-establish moral 
considerations as a proper part of the understanding and evaluation of economies,,,175 
it is claimed. 
What a moral economy approach, in both its analytical and normative 
aspects, aims essentially to achieve then is a 'humanising' of economics, a re-
insertion of the supposedly forgotten 'person' into a realm of rationality and 
calculation. 176 This proposal however encapsulates a difficult contradiction. Morality 
suffuses markets, the contemporary economy is, on the one hand, 'internally' a moral 
one in so far as such concerns may be identified to influence behaviour. The extent 
to which this is supposedly 'forgotten' though necessitates, on the other hand, an 
'external' ministering and evaluation of this same 'morality' in an attempt to make it 
both more evident (the analytic aspect), and more virtuous (the normative aspect). 
This 'contradiction' is probably not problematically so should one's aim in 
discussing moral economy be the revival of humanism in the economy. 'Self-
interest,' in such an account, while undesirable as a singular motivator of economic 
behaviour, need not be much further interrogated insofar as its ethical status is 
concerned. The return to Smith in moral economy, the attempt to rescue his writing 
from too faithful an account of self-interest, while interesting from a historical 
perspective, does very little ultimately in the way of thinking through the 
174 Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem ofEmbeddedness." p.53 
175 [Paraphrasing Geoffrey Hodgson] Sayer, Moral Economy and Political Economy. p.l 
176 Also see on this topic, Mark A. Lutz, "Centering Economics on Human Dignity," Review o/Social 
Economy 53, no. 2 (1995). 
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contemporary complexities that complicate any account of 'self-interest' as largely 
antithetical to 'morality' as it were. 
The present problem of describing a 'market ethics' offers a case in point. In 
common with the designation 'moral economy,' the 'market ethics' which emerges 
from the prevalent business case rendition of CSR, holds that it is possible for the 
'ethical' to have an 'economic' value. This recognition however, for moral economy 
approaches, is itself the achievement, so to speak. Pitted against mainstream 
economics, moral economists work to find the supposedly 'forgotten' ethical, and 
reinsert this as a counter to what is perceived as an overly reductive account of 
economic life. The relationship that the term 'market ethics' describes between its 
objects differs significantly on this point though. The 'achievement' of speaking the 
ethical and economic together is not the outcome - the kind of market ethics that I 
am suggesting characterises the contemporary practice of CSR takes this 
relationship, this potential implication, as given, as a sort of working assumption. 
The protestations offered by moral economists in this context, though 
interesting for their attempt to recognise and discuss the ethical and economic 
together, can finally only go so far. The business case makes both an implicit and 
explicit recognition of the implication of the ethical and the economic, this 
recognition being the very basis for the practice of CSR itself. Or, more accurately-
the potential of this implication is what specifically becomes appealing. What a CSR 
'market ethics' draws attention to that is specifically not intended by a moral 
economy account is the potential to make market (for lack of a better phrase) the 
recognised overlap between the economic and ethical. Simply, this very space is that 
in which CSR operates and seeks to expand and market. 
A proposition such as this is liable however to be dismissed from a moral 
economy perspective as a reduction of morality to 'market choice' or "mere 
individual preference."l77 This supposed 'reduction' is identified by Sayer as one of 
the "main sources of misunderstanding ... in neoclassical economics.,,178 Values, he 
holds, can not be re-cast in terms of a preferential 'freedom-of-choice' model, 
177 Sayer, Moral Economy and Political Economy. pA 
178 Ibid. 
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whereby what counts as 'moral' lies outside the scope of public justification. Rather. 
"justifications have to do more than appeal to mere convention - to 'what we do 
round here;' they must show how they are not arbitrary but have some normative 
force, for example by demonstrating how they produce beneficial consequences.,,179 
As Sayer seeks to point out, morality is socially embedded; it is not down to 
individuals to unilaterally decide what is moral. 180 
The tension described here, between 'individual choice' and 'embedded 
morality,' is one that again works to replicate a distinction between 'markets' and 
'morality.' The 'choices' made in markets, such an account suggests, are necessarily 
ethically impoverished ones in as much as these amount only to 'individual 
preferences,' and are therefore without relation to a publically justifiable good. Held 
up against contemporary CSR practice though, we might begin to inquire as to the 
descriptive accuracy of this conclusion. How accurate is it, for instance, given the 
identifiable 'market for ethics' that the business case suggests, to conclude that this 
marketability must divorce these 'ethics' from public justification and re-invent the 
'ethical' as merely a matter of individual or, more accurately, consumer choice? 
Chapter Five will take up this question in an empirical context by looking at 
the consumptive choices made by ethical consumers. There I will suggest that any 
such division between markets and morals is complicated by close attention to the 
material and affective content and circumstance of 'choice,' which, in daily practice, 
is rarely so one dimensional and abstract as the reduction to 'preference' implies. 
For now though, in order to further explore the proposal that 'public justification' is 
a normative requirement lacking in a market context, I want to turn to CSR's own 
derivation of the' ethical' in order to note how this differs from those accounts 
discussed thus far. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid., p.1O 
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From Responsibility to Responsiveness 
Although I hope to avoid repetition here, it is worth recalling for a moment 
what I described in the previous chapter as the convergence in academic CSR 
literature around the empirical attempt to correlate ethical and financial performance. 
This, I suggested, marks a distinct move away from the more traditional business 
ethics focus on the suggestion of particular ethical models that might be proffered in 
order to answer the structuring question: 'What ought I do in my business 
relationships?,181 Reliant on moral philosophy, and applying the dictates that this 
generates however, business ethics as a discipline becomes marginalised - isolated 
both from the business world to which its recommendations seek to apply, and from 
an rapidly emergent CSR movement which, while ostensibly seeking to address 
similar concerns, in fact takes the whole question of business and ethics in a 
markedly different direction. 
For the purposes of this chapter however, this story might be re-told, with a 
slightly different emphasis, as one that demonstrates the shift from ethical principle 
to ethical practice. Or, as William Frederick, a CSR commentator prominent for over 
thirty years originally characterised it - the shift from 'responsibility' to 
'responsiveness. ,182 The reorientation that this shift implies is, as Frederick 
emphasises, quite profound. While 'responsibility' deals in "obligation," the "action 
oriented" concept of 'responsiveness' deals "in the maximization of potential." 183 
Renaming the responsibility-centred approach 'CSR sub 1,' and the newer 
responsiveness orientation 'CSR sub 2,' Frederick illustrates precisely the fate to 
which 'principles' are condemned by the practical evolution ofCSR: 
While the debate over the merits of CSR sub 1 has always carried heavy philosophic 
overtones, CSR sub 2 shuns philosophy in favor of a managerial approach. The 
abstract and often highly elusive principles governing CSR sub I are replaced by 
CSR sub 2's focus on the practical aspects of making organizations more socially 
responsive to tangible forces in the surrounding environment. The often speculative 
181 Beversluis, "Is There 'No Such Thing as Business Ethics'?" p.223 
182 Frederick, "From CSRI to CSR2."See also; Raymond A. Bauer and Robert W. Ackerman. See; 
Ackerman and Bauer, eds., Corporate Social Responsiveness: The Modern Dilemma. 
183 Frederick, "From CSRI to CSR2." p.150 
70 
generalities that becloud the debate about CSR sub 1 yield to the analytic posture 
and methods of CSR sub 2 scholars and business practitioners who seek to 
understand the problems and prospects of making specific organizations socially 
responsive. 184 
This clearly laid out evolution reinforces a number of the points that this 
chapter has attempted to draw attention to. Firstly, with regard to defining the 
relationship between morality and the economy, as is evident from the preceding 
quote, the contemporary 'responsiveness' orientation (from which the business case 
for CSR derives) is already recognisant of the through-going relation between these 
spheres. This, as Frederick again notes, is a working assumption: "CSR sub 2 
assumes that CSR sub l' s central question of whether companies should respond to 
social pressures has already been answered affirmatively by general public opinion 
and a host of government social regulations and that the important task for business 
now is to learn how to respond in fruitful, humane, and practical ways.,,185 
Secondly, as the term 'responsiveness' serves to make clear, what counts as 
ethical practice in the context of CSR is determined both by specific concerned 
'publics' and as a function of society-wide conceptions of what 'ethically' matters in 
the given contemporary moment. The concern then that ethics become 'mere' 
preference, not subject to "public justification" I 86 as a market choice, is not 
straightforwardly borne out in CSR to the extent 'responsiveness' identifies external 
social and moral pressures as the drivers of ethical corporate action. I87 
However, 'responsiveness' is also a somewhat misleading term in this regard. 
While Frederick is keen to underscore the receptive orientation of the 'responsive' 
organisation, this characterisation is apt to overly emphasise external demands, and 
needs to be tempered by a reminder of the constructive nature of the various ethical 
practices that might be deployed in this context. To this end, Chapter Three develops 
an account of markets that emphasises their constitutive 'reflexivity.' There, this will 
be encountered as a methodological consideration necessary to contend in order to 
184 Ibid., p.155 
185 Ibid. 
186 Sayer, Moral Economy and Political Economy. p.4 
187 This point is taken up again in Chapter Three in the course of discussion regarding the 
performative and reflexive function of public or popular attention. 
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empirically approach CSR as a market practice. It is not simply a matter of 
'responding' to pressure by taking action, I will claim, or even of pre-empting this 
pressure, and in either case reaping any potential financial reward. Rather, as the 
following chapter will suggest, a significant re-framing of how what is 'ethical' 
comes to count as such within the market economy is occurring. 
Before this discussion can take place however, and on the basis of the 
'responsiveness' orientation just described, it is first necessary to turn our attention 
to a body of sociological literature that presents a third possibility for thinking 
markets and morality. Where the previously discussed approaches have maintained 
that these, to varying degrees, constitute different and separable spheres, in the 
following section I will review one particular theoretical perspective through which 
markets and morality are thought together in contemporary sociology. Specifically, 
this entails the suggestion that markets are actively moralised and moralising entities 
that function to encourage certain forms of self-regulatory governance. 
Moralising Markets: The New Economy and Governmentality Approaches 
'Responsiveness' as a corporate posture, recalls sociological descriptions of 
the so-called 'new economy.' 188 This term aims to describe a set of developments in 
Western capitalism most frequently associated with the late 1990s, though some 
features of which continue through to the present. 189 According to theorists of the 
'new economy,' what characterises this development are a series of transformations 
in economic life: the dematerialisation of economic processes and production, the 
centrality of knowledge and culture (hence branding and so forth), as well as the 
advent and import of processes such as globalisation and privatisation. Though 
variously described, appearing also for instance as the 'Information Society,' 190 or 
188 See, for instance, Nigel Thrift, Knowing Capitalism (London: Sage, 2005). Manuel Castells, The 
Rise of Network Society. The Information Age: Economy, Science and Culture. 2 ed., vol. 1 (Malden, 
MA: Blackwell, 2000).; Scott Lash, Critique of Information (London: Sage, 2002).; Andreas Wittel, 
"Towards a Network Sociality," Theory, Culture & Society 18, no. 6 (2001). 
189 See, for instance, Nigel Thrift, "'It's the Romance, Not the Finance, That Makes the Business 
Worth Pursuing': Disclosing a New Market Culture," Economy and Society 30, no. 4 (2001). 
190 Castells, The Rise of Network Society. The Information Age: Economy, Science and Culture. 
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'Knowledge Economy,' 191 and despite each description having a slightly different 
emphasis, common threads are a focus on the advent and effect of new media and 
communication technologies, and the supposedly subsequent transition to an 
increasingly service-based economy in which economic products become intangible 
in nature. 192 Herein, what have traditionally been understood as 'soft' forms of 
business knowledge become paramount, leading to growth in sectors such as human 
resources, advertising and branding, and management disciplines. 193 
To this list, in line with new economy approaches, CSR might also be quite 
reasonably added. As the 'responsiveness' discussion sought to demonstrate, those 
working within CSR and the discipline of management understand the potential 
economic benefits of CSR to lie in the kind of adaptive flexibility it may lend a 
corporation in what are characterised as rapidly changing social circumstances. It is 
not though my current aim to establish the accuracy (or otherwise) of claims 
regarding the new economy using the advent of a market-based CSR as evidence. 
Rather, I have introduced this concept here primarily for the reason that it has 
provided a backdrop for the widespread adoption and application of Foucauldian-
inspired governmentality approaches to the study of the economy. 
What the suggestion of a "governmentalized economy,,194 allows, in contrast 
to approaches previously discussed in this chapter, is that markets themselves be 
actively moralising entities. Regulation in markets need not be enforced, in such a 
reading, by external means or coercion; instead it is through the practices and 
techniques characteristic in particular of the 'new economy' that self-regulating and 
self-monitoring actors are produced. In this way, 'governmentality' links processes 
such as globalisation, privatisation, and deregulation, to the predominance and 
increasing pervasiveness of neo-liberal ideology. This trend, often concomitantly 
entailed in sociological descriptions of 'marketisation' and 'economisation, '}95 is 
191 Peter Drucker, Post-Capitalist Society (Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann, 1993). 
192 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). 
193 The growth of so-called 'ethical careers' is examined in these terms in Chapter Six. 
194 Michel Foucault, "On Governmentality," Ideology & Consciousness 6 (1979).; Nikolas Rose and 
Peter Miller, "Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of Government," British Journal of 
Sociology 43 (1992). 
195 See, for instance, James G. Carrier, "Introduction," in Meanings of the Market: The Free Market in 
Western Culture, ed. James G. Carrier (Oxford: Berg, 1997). p.50 
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widely critiqued, using the language of governmentality, insofar as it has been 
understood to represent the incursion of the economic in the political, or an 
"economization of the political.,,196 And, while a great deal of attention has been 
directed towards this topic in terms of the consequences for state and civil society 
institutions,197 this is only just now beginning to be paralleled by a focus on the 
'marketisation' of morality. 
Here, for the most part, 'morality' has been broadly defined and discussed in 
governmentality terms in relation to practices such as accounting,198 individual credit 
reporting,199 and the new politics of transparency. 200 Most notable though, for 
present purposes, is a 2008 article by Ronen Shamir in which a governmentality 
perspective is specifically adopted with regard to CSR.201 In this article, entitled 'The 
Age of Responsibilization' Shamir links the economisation of public domains to 
moves to moralise markets and business through CSR. "[C]ommercial enterprises," 
Shamir notes, "increasingly perform tasks that were once within the civil domain of 
moral entrepreneurship and the political domain of the caring welfare state, 
dispensing social goods other than profits to constituencies other than their 
shareholders.,,202 In this account, 'moralisation' and individual 'responsibilisation' 
are, importantly, processes internal to the 'economisation' that Shamir describes: 
196 Ronen Shamir, "The Age ofResponsibilization: On Market-Embedded Morality," Economy and 
Society 37, no. 1 (2008). p.1 
197 See, for instance; Anthony Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).; David Harvey, A Brief History ofNeoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005).; Thomas Lemke, "The Birth ofBio-Politics: Michel Foucault's Lecture at the 
College de France on Neo-Liberal Governmentality," Economy and Society 30, no. 2 (2001).; Bob 
Jessop, "Capitalism and Its Future: Remarks on Regulation, Government and Governance," Review of 
International Political Economy 4, no. 3 (1997).; Graham Burchell, "Peculiar Interests: Civil Society 
and "Governing the System of Natural Liberty."" in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, 
ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Heme I Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
1991). 
198 Peter Miller, "Governing by Numbers: Why Calculative Practices Matter," Social Research 68, no. 
2 (2001). 
199 Alya Guseva and Akos Rona-Tas, "Uncertainty, Risk and Trust: Russian and American Credit 
Card Markets Compared," American Sociological Review 66, no. 5 (2001). 
200 Jacqueline Best, The Limits o/Transparency: Ambiguity and the History of International Finance 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005). See also, for more a more general discussion of market 
moralities in governmenatlity terms; also see; Ronnie Lipshutz, Regulationfor the Rest of Us? 
Globalization, Governmentality and Global Politics (London: Routledge, 2005). 
201 Shamir, "The Age ofResponsibilization: On Market-Embedded Morality." 
202 Ibid., p.2 
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"moralization is not an 'external' force bearing on and 'correcting' the process of 
economization. ,,203 
The replacing of laws with guidelines, and the reliance on self-reflexive 
regulation that Foucault identified to be among the techniques of a governmentality 
reliant on "behaviouristically manipulable being[s],,,204 are described by Shamir in 
relation to CSR and understood to form an enabling ground for its very development. 
Here, Shamir isolates 'responsibilisation' as the primarily relevant 'tool' or 
"technique of government" insofar as it acts to sediment "a reflexive subjectivity 
deemed suitable to partake in the deployment of horizontal authority.,,205 While the 
type of power deployed via 'responsibilisation' is subtle, it nonetheless has a 
particular rationally which, as Foucauldian scholars are quick to point out. "defines 
the telos of action or the adequate means to achieve it.,,206 
As functions internal to the 'marketisation' process, 'responsibilisation' and 
'moralisation,' are subject to the same critiques typically levelled in governmentality 
terms against this. Moralisation, as Shamir concludes along these lines, is a product 
of "neo-liberal epistemology" inasmuch as it amounts to a "set of practices that 
contribute to a constantly evolving and adapting neo-liberal imagination ... that 
[work] to ground and reframe socio-moral concerns from within the instrumental 
rationality of capitalist markets. ,,207 
While then, on the one hand, this reading provides, through its engagement 
with governmentality, a means of sociologically addressing markets as moralising 
entities and the possibility that morality can have a market basis (both as suggested 
by CSR), on the other hand, given that no distinction is made between the practices 
entailed in moralisation processes and the blanket outcome of these - 'neo-
liberalism' - the critique becomes a overly totalising and largely tautological one. 
203 Ibid., p.3 
204 Foucualt, Michel (1979) in, Lemke, "The Birth of Bio-Politics: Michel Foucault's Lecture at the 
College de France on Neo-Liberal Governmentality." p.200 
205 Shamir, "The Age ofResponsibilization: On Market-Embedded Morality." p.4 
206 Thomas Lemke, "Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique," Rethinking Marxism 14, no. 3 (2002). 
p.5 1· " 3 ( .. 1· 1· ) 
207 Shamir, "The Age ofResponsibilization: On Market-Embedded Mora lty. p. ongma Ita ICS 
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CSR, Shamir suggests elsewhere, is 'de-radicalized,208 on account of its being a 
market-based practice, and yet, when description and criticism are, from the outset 
and a priori rolled into one, as in ascriptions of governmentality that seek to 
catalogue 'ever more pervasive' neoliberalism, the very point of asking the initial 
question, appears to me to get hopelessly lost. 
Though a more sophisticated critical approach than the 'boundless market' 
critiques discussed earlier, when applied as both question and answer to the complex 
of proposition of a market-based CSR, 'governmentality,' I am suggesting, can 
nonetheless easily segue into similarly inadequate conclusions. Like the 'boundless 
markets' concerns, the charge of 'neo-liberalism' is not made only on a political 
basis - but also on a moral one. The spatial metaphor at work, although 
incorporating an understanding of markets as productive, practical, and reflexive 
achievements, maintains, in much the same way as prior models, a proper outside, a 
sphere rightfully distinct from the market and in need of protection from this ever 
advancing threat. As Foucauldian scholar Paul Rabinow writes: "no one can doubt 
that capitalism is more expansive, destructive, and productive than ever before. No 
one can doubt the growing scope and scale of market relations and the concomitant 
commodification of an ever greater range of things previously held to be external to 
the realm of monetary value.,,209 
Shamir's suggestion, that "the moralization of markets has become an 
important part of the neo-liberal global social order, one which not only neatly fits 
the principle of self-regulation, but moreover, one which essentially grounds the very 
notion of moral duty within the rationality of the market,,,210 entails, as I understand 
it, a kind analysis and politics by symptomology. What I mean to draw attention to by 
this suggestion (and this is often particularly observable in relation to the charge of 
neo-liberalism, though equally may also be observed elsewhere),211 is the tendency 
wherein objects, practices, and processes of sociological interest are critically 
encountered not on the basis, as it were, of their own merits, but rather pre-emptorily 
208 Ronen Shamir, "The De-Radicalization of Corporate Social Responsibility," Critical Sociology 30, 
no. 3 (2004). 
209 Paul Rabinow, Anthropos Today (princeton: Princeton University Pres~, 2,?03). pp.14-15 
210 Shamir, "The Age ofResponsibilization: On Market-Embedded MoralIty. pA 
211 f' 1 b l' . ''&: • t Here, possibly in relation to some accounts 0 goa IsatlOn lor ms ance. 
76 
understood as mere 'symptom' of something else. In the present instance, this is 
demonstrable in the initial approach to CSR as 'responsibilisation' technique, and 
predictably borne out in the subsequent suggestion that any market-based ethics is 
simply a symptom of something else, in this case, a global "regime,,212 ofneo-liberal 
govemmentality. 
The following and final section of this chapter represents an effort to redress 
the tendency I have just described by manoeuvring some critical space wherein it is 
possible to take seriously the actual content of processes and practices themselves 
without the pre-emptingjump to symptomological condemnation. Latour's 
discussion the 'means' and 'ends' here will function as an alternative route of entry 
to the question of market morality, one that, as I will go on to suggest, can be utilised 
in defining a theoretical approach that leaves the content of the 'ethical' open to 
empirical description as opposed ideologically pre-proscribed. 
Making Means Mean More - Towards Ethics as Practice 
Moral philosophy has traditionally been characterised by a concerns with 
ends - the consequences or outcomes of a decision or action. This teleology is 
immediately evident, for instance, in the utilitarian concern with an outcome that 
confers the greatest good for the greatest number. Equally though, deontological 
theories, despite the apparent lack of concern for ends professed by the designation 
of an action as always right or wrong (e.g. thou shalt not kill), have already in 
making this designation, decreed the consequence to be that which is morally 
unacceptable. If morality belongs to the realm of ends though, what may be said for 
instrumentality - in particular the kind of instrumentality that attempts to achieve 
'self-interested' ends? This is not easily accommodated in either a utilitarian or 
deontological moral schema, (as the moral economy approaches described earlier 
already went some way to suggest). Instrumentality, evidently, is not neutral from an 
212 James Crotty, "The Structural Contradictions of the Global Neoliberal Regime," Review of Radical 
Political Economies 32, no. 3 (2000). 
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ethical standpoint, the question therefore of how we might begin to discuss the 
morality of 'means' themselves becomes pressing. 
Latour usefully addresses this issue through his examination of the moral 
status oftechnology.213 Cast as 'mere' instrument, he notes the way in which 
technologies themselves are divested of moral significance, understood only "to give 
a more durable shape to schemes, forms, and relations which are already present in 
another form and in other materials.,,214 This hygienic separation of means from ends 
however, as Latour demonstrates, is not only difficult to maintain, but also 
problematic insofar as attention is diverted away from the intermingling of morality 
and technology.215 Means, to put it simply, are, for Latour, not simply a tool for the 
achievement of ends. Rather, our efforts must be directed towards noticing the way 
in which intention and ends are themselves changed, or displaced, in line with the 
practical form taken by a particular technique or means.216 
As Latour notes, if "you want to keep your intentions straight, your plans 
inflexible, your programmes of action rigid, then do not pass through any form of 
technological life. The detour will translate, will betray, your most imperious 
desires.,,217 'Instrumentality,' in such a reading, is polluted, so to speak, with 'ends' 
from the very beginning. Importantly, what this indissoluble overlay of ends and 
means marks out as worthy of sustained critical attention is actual practices 
themselves. If morality occupies, in moral philosophy, the realm of ends, then the 
market-based re-inception of ethics which this thesis attempts to describe highlights 
instead the potentially productive meaningfulness of means. 
Latour's perspective emerges within STS and is part of the broader ANT 
concern, already discussed in previous chapter, with "objectivism,,218 or the 
recognition that humans are not the only beings that can occupy the role of agent. In 
213 Bruno Latour, "Morality and Technology: The End of the Means," Theory, Culture & Society 19, 
no. 4 (2002). p.247 
214 Ibid., p.250 
215 Ibid., p.248 
216 Ibid., p.252 
217 Ibid. 
218 Theodore R. Schatzki, "Introduction: Practice Theory," in The Practice Turn in Contemporary 
Theory, ed. Theodore R. Schatzki, Karin Knorr Cetina, and Eike von Savigny (London: Routledge, 
2001). p.1O 
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what has been described as "the practice tum in contemporary theory,,,219 the 
empirical description of activities, objects, and things, takes precedent over analysis 
at the level of the individual or, at the other end of the spectrum, the overarching 
social structure. In relation to ethics then, and again following Latour, such an 
approach begins from the premise that "[m]orality is no more human than 
technology,,,220 and hence 'dignity,' as it were, is re-proportioned equally between 
morality and the practices in which it is bound.221 
While it is the task of the empirical chapters to examine the situated 'doing' 
of ethics in detail, suffice to say for now that the practices entailed in measuring 
ethics (Chapter Four), consuming ethically (Chapter Five), and aspiring to work 
ethically (Chapter Six), may be understood to function as concrete demands for what 
Latour has called the "describability" and "evaluation,,222 of options. What I take this 
to mean in the present context is that ethical demands might be said to inhere not 
only in the practices that newly bear the prefix 'ethical' ('ethical consumption,' and 
so forth), but also in the actual proliferation of attempts to describe how any given 
practice may become 'ethical' in the first place, as well as the equally ubiquitous 
means of evaluating these practices. Ethics then, to return to the terminology of ends 
and means, are also, in this context, far from a sole concern with ends, the very 
proliferations of 'means-of-ethics' themselves. 
What makes 'practice' a critically advantageous focus with regard to the 
problem of markets and morality as it has been understood in this chapter is that 
unlike other approaches discussed, the content of what is 'ethical' stands to be 
empirically elaborated, both in-practice, and as-practice. A privileged sociological 
relationship to ethical 'truth' is eschewed in this way in favour of an emphasis on the 
possibilities rendered in 'doing' and 'becoming' that I have described elsewhere. It 
is, I would suggest, neither possible nor desirable to evaluate CSR through recourse 
to any 'authentic' ethics, whether this suggestion entails insisting on a moral sphere 
wholly separable from the 'market,' or whether this achieved through a theoretical 
219 Theodore R. Schatzki, Karin Knorr Cetina, and Eike von Savigny, eds., The Practice Turn in 
Contemporary Theory (London: Routledge, 2001). 
220 Latour, "Morality and Technology: The End of the Means." p.254 
221 Ibid., p.248 
222 Ibid., p.258 
79 
sleight of hand in which 'market ethics' are, from the outset, already not this, but 
really just symptomatic of something else. The further development of an approach 
along these lines however is not a task towards which I can continue by means of 
literature review. The problem of how, in practice, to approach the doing of ethics-
as-practice is a methodological one, and as such, it is to the description of a 
methodology suitable in this regard that the following chapter will tum. 
If, presently, and in conclusion to this section and chapter, I appear 
uncommitted to any theoretical position beyond seeking to approach 'ethics' as that 
which is formed in practice, and as practice in contemporary CSR, and seeing where 
this will lead, it is, I hope, clear that this is not through indecision, or through lack of 
compelling framework. At this point, my primary goal in relation to what is 'ethical' 
has been to avoid pre-emption or prescription, and in doing so I have aimed to create 
a space in which an encounter with something as potentially absurd as a 'market 
ethics' might be fully articulated without a premature move towards critique. 
In closing, I would like finally to add that if this chapter has seemed to make 
ethics do a lot of work, 223 then I feel somewhat confident that it has at least partially 
succeeded in the aims originally laid out. What I mean by this is not that I have 
attempted to somehow overburden ethics, or encourage it to take on that which by 
rights does not belong, but rather a newly functional and increasingly ubiquitous 
ethical is the very result of the kind of re-framing undergone in the process of its 
becoming market practice. This 'un-fixed' market-based ethical, I hope, having come 
to the end of this chapter, is not necessarily the uncomfortable compromise it may 
have seemed at the beginning. 
223 Cf. Thomas Osborne, Aspects of Enlightenment: Social Theory and the Ethics of Truth (London: 
DCL Press, 1998). p. xiii 
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Chapter Three 
o 
From 'Site' to 'Nexus:' 
Research Practice and Methodology 
The tenn 'empirical work,' or 'fieldwork,' implies a locatable site, or 'field' 
into which a researcher may venture in order to observe or collect data on a 
particular object of interest. To begin to think about 'field' in relation to Corporate 
Social Responsibility though is to immediately bump up against the question 'where 
is CSR?' and although it is tempting to be guided by the acronym itself and quickly 
answer - 'in corporations of course,' this response, though not wholly inaccurate, 
only goes part of the way towards telling a potentially more complicated story. 
That CSR is practiced by some corporations, and hence, may be observed to 
be taking place institutionally in the fonn of policies, protocols, agreements, targets, 
and so forth, is not up for dispute here. Indeed, the few sociological studies of which 
I am aware that approach the issue of CSR have feasibly done so by taking as their 
empirical focus one particular corporate setting wherein detailed data on institutional 
practice is collated - this is of course one approach.224 If, however, as I proposed in 
Chapter One, CSR in its contemporary form is distinguishable from prior versions of 
business ethics due to it being 'marketable' or market-based in nature, then particular 
corporate practices must be examined within the context of the demand for them. 
Simply, CSR did not emerge from, and is not practised in, a vacuum - it is within the 
broader marketplace that its various discourses and practices make contact with their 
intended publics, and vie for economic attention. Importantly, it is in the market 
itself that the 'ethical' as it pertains to CSR is made manifest and becomes 
significant. 
224 See, for a firm-level approach, Ronen Shamir, "Mind the Gap: The Commodification of Corporate 
Social Responsibility," Symbolic Interaction 28, no. 2 (2005).; Or, with reference to corporate 
citizenship at British Petroleum, Mark Glazebrook, "The Social Construction of Corporate 
Citizenship," Journal o/Corporate Citizenship, no. 17 (2005). 
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So, if we must now move out of the corporation and into the 'market' to find 
our 'field,' the problem becomes, 'where does one find a thing like the market?' Is it 
even possible to speak of a single 'market' for CSR, when this itself is composed of 
a number of smaller, distinct, and more specific markets? This methodology chapter 
begins in its task by taking up the none-to-easily resolved question of 'where?' 
Given that this research is concerned to explore broadly how ethics are done in CSR, 
and seeing that this 'doing' may be observed taking place in a proliferating variety of 
contexts, research 'site(s)' becomes an issue in need of a great deal of attention. 
Specifically, what I will be doing here in order to begin to generate means of 
empirical engagement with the 'ethical' through CSR, is developing a critique of the 
notion of 'site' or 'field' as it is conventionally understood in social research, asking 
such questions as: Can empirical focus justifiably be restricted to a singular site, or 
does the nature of the question at hand demand simultaneous attention to a multitude 
of significant sites? How does one go about choosing or organising' sites'? What if it 
is necessary to adapt research methods across sites? What are the practical 
difficulties of this, and how might these be managed? 
Without wishing to pre-empt the following discussion, I think it is important 
to say to begin that in the course of analysis 'site' itselfwill come to have a different 
significance in the context of this particular research project. Simply put, I will 
emphasise the contingency of the research 'sites' in question in both time and space, 
and suggest that, as it constitutes, emerges, stabilises and demarks particular sites as 
zones of empirical inquiry, the methodological mode of focus itself need be subject 
to a certain degree of scrutiny. On the basis of these discussions, I will attempt to 
develop a rationale for the choice of 'field sites' in this research, as well as the 
methods engaged within these. Now though, in order to begin to explore the 
previously posed questions in greater detail, I will start my discussion by drawing 
upon some recent work in anthropology that seeks to problematise the traditional 
notion of the single 'field,' and introduce research methodologies specifically aimed 
at dealing with 'multi-sitedness.' 
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The Question of 'Site' 
A great deal of critical attention within the discipline of anthropology has 
been focussed on the methodological problems encountered in designating or 
approaching a particular 'field' or 'site' as the setting for empirical research. A 
discipline whose authority has historically been founded on the supposed integrity of 
long ethnographic engagements in the 'field,' anthropology has, in light of 
postmodern concerns around the reflexivity of research practice, been necessary host 
to this series of re-thinks regarding the 'field.' Importantly, these present, in this 
particular context, a challenge that is methodological in nature. 
In the classic anthropological tradition, 'site' or locale is paramount, but also 
taken for granted, or at least not subject to sustained critical inquiry. Herein, the 
question of what constitutes an adequate 'field' for research had fallen by the 
wayside. The classically propounded 'single-tribe, single scribe,225 approach has 
however come under increasing criticism in light of the theoretical and critical 
developments of the last twenty-five years. Questions primarily concerning 
representation and power have made the ethnographic proposition of a 'spatio-
temporal isolate ,226 increasingly untenable, also making problematic any account of 
the field as it is simply 'found.' 
Even in research situations that previously might have seemed most 
straightforward, the issue of field 'construction' now unavoidably comes to the fore. 
If we recognise the role of the researcher themselves in the designation and 
construction of a supposedly 'native' or 'real-world' field, the boundedness, 
coherence, and 'naturalness' of the 'field' can no longer be uncritically posited. This 
is even more so for objects of study that may be understood from the outset to be 
mobile and multiply situated. 
225 Eva Nadai and Christoph Maeder, "Fuzzy Fields: Multi-Sited Ethnography in Social Research," 
Forum: Qualitative Social Research 6, no. 3 (2005). p.lO 
226 George E. Marcus and Michael M.J. Fischer, Anthropology as Cultural Critique (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1986). p.178. Post-colonial studies, (following pioneering work by 
figures such as Edward Said), has been particularly important in drawing attention to problematic 
anthropological ascriptions of 'nativeness,' 'foreignness' and 'Otherness.' 
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Responding to these issues, the American anthropologist George Marcus has 
called extensively for the self-conscious embedding of ethnography in its 
contemporary surrounds such that it must move "out from single sites and local 
situations ... to examine the circulation of cultural meanings, objects, and identities 
in diffuse time-space.,,227 Coining the term 'multi-sited ethnography' to describe this 
methodological approach, Marcus crucially recognises that where our research 
objects are not singular in themselves, but instead multiply fragmented, our 
methodological approach to them can not justifiably or usefully remain focussed on a 
single site of investigation.228 
Marcus's suggestion of multi -sitedness is intuitively appealing in relation to 
CSR. As I have briefly mentioned already, an exclusive focus on the ethical practices 
of one particular corporation (popular in most qualitative studies of CSR)229 is a 
means of approach not apt to respond to the particular breadth of practices that the 
research at hand aims to explore via the dual emphases (introduced in the preceding 
chapters) on 'doing' ethics and 'becoming market.' 
In addition to, and in line with, these concerns though, 'site' is also readily 
recognised as a practical problem for CSR by those who work in the industry. 
Location is, very literally, an openly contentious question here - for one, the problem 
of where within a company CSR should be situated. Should it be interspersed 
throughout and across divisions and levels so that all employees are responsible for 
it, and involved in its practice? Or, alternatively, should CSR be the sole preserve of 
a special division who oversee it?230 Perhaps, it should be integrated into the Human 
Resources division, or maybe it instead warrants seclusion in a not-for-profit arm, or 
special company division? Furthermore, these apparent divisions, even once 
decided, are not permanent, but subject to constant change. New projects may 
emerge, inaugurating new sites, or leading to the abandonment old ones, departments 
may quickly be assembled, re-named, re-ordered, and/or decommissioned. 
227 George E. Marcus, "Ethnography inlofthe World System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited 
Ethnography," Annual Review of Anthropology 24 (1995). p.96 
228 Ibid. See also, UlfHannerz, "Being There ... And There ... And There!: Reflections on Multi-Site 
Ethnography," Ethnography 4, no. 2 (2003). 
229 Whether these be sociological studies or those from a business ethics or management perspectiYe. 
230 See Chapter Six for a specific discussion of this question as it arises in the empirical conte:x.1 of 
ethical employment. 
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Outside of the corporation, CSR is similarly migratory and mutable. Many of 
the literal sites at which CSR might be said to 'occur' are short lived and sometimes 
fleeting phenomena. Here one might think of conferences, meetings, workshops, or 
conventions - all assembled at a particular point in time, and then rapidly 
dissembled, perhaps never to occur again, or at least not in exactly the same way. 
Even more fleetingly than this, one might count the point of purchase, or the point of 
decision to purchase, as a 'site' ofCSR, and, in a similar vein, a whole host of other 
instances might be claimed as sites where CSR is significantly enacted, structuring 
instances market and of socio-cultural exchange. 
So, it is possible to observe CSR 'happening' in a number of settings, 
professional and popular, corporate and non-corporate. It is certainly a 'multi-sited' 
phenomenon, (or, perhaps more accurately, a collection of multi-sited phenomena). 
Beyond this recognition in itself though - that CSR does take place, and hence may 
need to be researched, across a variety of sites - what further methodological 
assistance can an emphasis on multi-sitedness lend? 
While the apparent multi-sitedness of CSR is, I believe, a significant point, 
this acknowledgment in itself does not offer a great deal of insight into how one 
might go about organising a coherent programme of empirical research that takes 
place across a number of sites. Furthermore, it seems to me that 'multi-sitedness' 
may have more methodological significance than a presentation of this state of 
affairs as 'obvious fact' is able to recognise. What I mean by this specifically is that, 
beyond the initial observation that CSR takes place in a number of different places, 
and that, hence, in order to pose questions to it as a complex and differentiated 
phenomenon, an examination of more than one of its 'sites' might be preferable, 
important questions remain about the emergence, organisation, constitution, 
temporality and distribution of these sites. 
As I have previously emphasised, CSR cannot be taken as distinct from the 
markets in which it occurs and is sustained. Bound up in/as market practice and 
'marketable' by definition, the modes and patterns of function of these markets are 
of great significance in determining the spatial and temporal appearance and 
distribution of CSR. What I am trying to draw attention to in making this observation 
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is that, although the term 'multi-sited' accurately observes that CSR occurs in a 
number of different places, it can not tell us much more than this without 
simultaneous attention to the form of the markets in which CSR exists. Yes, it 
possible to witness practical and discursive enactments of CSR in innumerable 
locales - but the specificity of these locales should not be ignored, overlooked, or 
replaced by the simple observation of their multitude. 
1m portantl y, markets consist in! of very distinct patterns of temporal and 
spatial distribution. If, as I have suggested, 'sites' ofCSR are constantly re-
organising, changing, appearing and disappearing, it is important to note that these 
processes do not occur at random or accidentally. The action of highly reflexive 
markets sees CSR distributed and enacted in the particular patterns in which it may 
observed. These markets themselves therefore, the forms which they take, and the 
nature of their function, are, as I understand it, of particular methodological 
significance in the context of this research. 
To this end, in the following section I will develop an account that 
emphasises the 'reflexivity' of markets as a dimension of method itself. In their 
reflexive function, markets, I will go on to suggest, work to generate and are 
constitute in particular patterns of attention, affect and (potential) profitability, 
which may be seen to cohere into collections of interconnected sites in which 
empirical research can meaningfully be based. 
Reflexive Markets 
In recent sociological work on markets the neo-classical economic depiction 
of an atomised and rational market actor is supplanted by an alternative emphasis on 
the reflexive and heterogeneous organisation of market activity. From a 
methodological perspective, and following such an emphasis, reflexivity and 
heterogeneity are important considerations to the extent these suggest the need for an 
empirical expansion of attention around questions regarding market-based practices. 
Markets, as an account in terms of reflexivity would suggest, are not sequestered and 
well-defined spheres of purely economic rationality. Rather, and this is especially 
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evident in the case of CSR, the organisation and function of markets is often subject 
to intense and ongoing debate between various 'invested' or otherwise interested 
parties. The constellation of actors then that together constitute a particular market 
may likely come from a number of different locations, and hence expectations and 
actions in the marketplace can be extremely heterogeneous. 
To demonstrate this taking CSR as example: herein there exists a number of 
market actors, each with independent, though sometimes overlapping motivations, 
who all, together in the space within and around the market, constitute and evolve it. 
The market for CSR may, for instance, find corporate executives interacting with 
scholars, members of the media speaking with management consultants, NGOs 
convening with governments, or, tellingly, all these actions may happen in reverse, 
or altogether, or criss-crossed, or not at all, depending on the particular demands in 
the marketplace at any given time. 
CalIon, Meadel, and Rabeharisoa have usefully developed a term that seeks 
to capture some of the complexity of organisation that occurs in and around markets 
and wherein the functioning and organisation of these markets is up for debate.231 
The situation that I described above in relation to CSR may, following these authors, 
be characterised as a 'hybrid forum. ,232 This account seeks to highlight a number of 
features about the space of the market itself, as well as the broader environment 
which enables it to emerge. 
Firstly, and as the term 'forum' is intended to illustrate, the marketplace is 
decidedly public in nature. While the phrase 'CSR market' may conjure an 
imaginary of specialist knowledges and professional monopolisation, the market as 
'forum' underscores the importance of public opinion for the function of such a 
market. Significantly, this recognition signals something of a "redistribution of 
competencies,,233 - a variety of specialist knowledges may come together here along 
23lMichei Canon, Cecile Meadel, and Vololona Rabeharisoa, "The Economy of Qualities," Economy 
and Society 31, no. 2 (2002). p.194 
232 Ibid., p.195 
233 Ibid. 
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with relevant fonns of lay knowledge, potentially resulting in amended or new paths 
of action.234 
Secondly, the 'hybrid' nature of the forum attests to both the heterogeneity of 
participants, and the nature of the questions raised within this space.235 Within the 
entangled space of the forum, it is impossible to neatly delineate the multiple 
competing issues and interests, hence, in the mutually infonning and reflexive 
marketplace the boundaries between economics, politics, and ethics can be seen to be 
in continual flux?36 
The hybrid and publically contentious nature of the various markets for CSR 
is both a general point, one that elaborates on the discussion in previous chapters, but 
also a specific one that, in the present context, suggests the need for an alternatively 
construed methodological approach. From within the reflexive entanglement 
described here, it is, I would suggest, problematic to resuscitate 'site' as it has 
conventionally been understood in social research. The various 'sites' in the CSR 
marketplace emerge in the course of engagements in which they are mutually 
articulated, and hence, a focus on any single site in its supposed isolation would 
ultimately prove to be of little use in answering questions posed to CSR as a larger 
'whole.' Rather, what this account of market reflexivity motions towards with regard 
to methodology, is an emphasis on simultaneous and particular processes of 'doing-
in-conjunction' and/or 'doing-in-disjunction.' In the context of theoretically 
infonned research, it is not only that field sites are many, or multiple, it is also that 
they are complexly and dynamically connected. This is to add the matter of 'trans-
sited-ness' to that of 'multi-sited-ness,' and this, practically speaking, means that the 
actions of market participants need to be considered across, as well as within, their 
. I . 237 spatIa groupmgs. 
234 This is particularly evident in the practice of ethical consumption, as discussed in Chapter Five. 
235 Callon, Meadel, and Rabeharisoa, "The Economy of Qualities." p.195 
236 Ibid. 
237 I will go on to elaborate this point later in this chapter with reference to the specific 'nexuses' of 
focal attention the proceedingly described methodology designates. 
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Additionally here, given the emphasis on reflexive hybridity, attention to 
instances of unexpected (or usually un-examined) complicity is warranted.238 Given 
the high level of reflexivity that I have suggested characterises the market-place for 
CSR, traditionally upheld boundaries between the 'business-world,' 'academy,' 
'media,' 'public' and so forth can not be relied upon to be faithfully articulated. The 
role of 'researcher' in such an environment is also open to some re-definition - the 
ground of scholarly detachment or neutrality proving to be increasingly slippery 
underfoot. I will return to elaborate further on these discussions later in the chapter 
though as presently the topic of market reflexivity presents some further issues of 
methodological significance. 
I have already touched on the complex relations between sites as they emerge 
in a marketplace that is understood as reflexively constituted, the question of how 
particular sites fonn, cohere, and come to be significant however, is one that, thus 
far, has not received the requisite attention. Here though, given the context of a 
reflexive market, 'site' becomes, as I have suggested, an increasingly difficult notion 
to define and sustain. Given the dynamic proliferation of sites in the marketplace, 
how is one to know which are the most significant? How are sites organised? Can 
smaller specific sites of market transaction be stacked together meaningfully under 
an umbrella classification, or does this not capture the density and complexity of 
relation between sites that may not be finitely 'categorised'? The question of the 
emergence, significance, and relations between 'sites' is one of acute methodological 
importance in the context of this research, given that, as previously discussed, a 
simultaneous focus on multiple instances of empirical 'doing' within CSR is 
required. 
To this end, in the proceeding sections, I will attempt to define a 
methodological approach to market practice that re-describes the notion of field-site 
via attention to what I will understand to be the reflexive constitution of markets 
through circulations of attention, affect, and profit. This discussion will draw on 
accounts from within economics and sociology that enable, to varying degrees, a 
238 George E. Marcus, "The Uses of Complicity in the Changing Mise-en-Scene of Anthropological 
Fieldwork," in Ethnography Through Thick and Thin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). 
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reflexive understanding of market practice. What I will be aiming to do through this 
discussion is to re-think 'multi-sitedness' through changing, reflexively constituted 
and materially assembled markets. Ultimately here, I will suggest that, in the context 
of this research, 'multi-site' is usefully succeeded by a methodological understanding 
of site(s) as a kind of 'focal nexus.' In the course of discussion I will articulate 
exactly what I mean by this, suffice to say for now though that what the formulation 
of 'site' as 'nexus' seeks to capture is the how particular and patterned condensations 
of attention, affect, and (potential) profitability in the marketplace produce individual 
sites of significance, and inaugurate the types of practice and discourse that are 
relevant in these sites. 
Attention-Affect-Profit 
The kind of market reflexivity that this chapter has begun to describe 
provides a way into an alternative approach to studying markets. Recall, from the 
preceding chapters, what I suggested were a series of problematically rendered 
spatial conceptions - business and society, economics and sociology, markets and 
morality. There, terms such as 'marketisation,' were understood to participate in this 
is spatialisation via their suggestion of a 'non-market' that might be expanded into or 
encroached upon. A methodological encounter with 'ethics' as these are practiced in 
reflexive market contexts however demands that a means of describing markets 
dynamically, as these are in process, need be developed. 
Here, the notion of 'becoming' market (as was introduced in Chapter One), 
can work to draw our attention to the highly contingent nature of market practices 
that might otherwise be described in an over-determined and over-determining way. 
From this perspective, it is necessary to ask the question of how it is that a market 
'becomes.' The marketability of ethics that the CSR business case suggests is not 
derived abstractly and nor it is it sufficient to suggest that this is achieved entirely by 
the suggestion itself, through a function of (performative) rhetorical force. Instead, it 
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is necessary to understand how profitability, or more specifically, the potential for 
profitability239 emerges in this instance and is sustained. 
The economist Andre Orlean addresses this question through a discussion of 
what he terms 'social beliefs. ,240 In market contexts, as Orlean recognises, individual 
beliefs are formed not only in reference to themselves, but also in reference to the 
perceived beliefs of others. The term 'social belief' is intended specifically to refer to 
individually held beliefs regarding what a group believes: "individual i believes that 
'the group believes that proposition P is true,' in other words, beliefs about the 
beliefs of the group itself."241 
This kind of belief is readily observable in the popular discussion of market 
'mood.' The 'market,' we frequently say, is 'depressed,' or 'elated,' 'tense,' or 
'confident,' 'bearish' or 'bullish.' Alternatively, we may attribute belief to the 
market even more directly, for example, phrases such as, "the market believes that 
this currency is undervalued.,,242 Importantly, these beliefs are not just arbitrary, nor 
are they simply a reflection of market 'reality' per se. 'Social beliefs,' as Orlean 
designates them, are the very thing that make an impact on the market. Large 
numbers of beliefs, representations or expectations, when shared by the group of 
agents operating in the process of exchange, operate in a self-fulfilling way to bring 
about and perpetuate the 'reality' that they expect or perceive.243 
Profitability then, following such an account, is a possibility that has a 
relationship to collectively held beliefs. Or more accurately, as Orlean explains, "[i]n 
a market, agents make a profit when they succeed in correctly predicting the 
evolution of the opinion of the groUp.,,244 In this way, such an account suggests, what 
people are attending to (what people believe others in the market are attending to), is 
239 Where I refer from here on to 'profit,' unless otherwise specified this is to the potential for 
profitability, not certifiable or calculable profitability. Equally, this is designed to entail the 
recognition that where there is opportunity for profit, there is also, often, the danger of loss. In CSR, 
such an eventuality might be understood as a kind of observe to the business case suggestion of 'doing 
well.' As encapsulated in ideas such as 'reputational risk,' it is recognised that not' doing good,' can 
have a negative impact on the bottom line. 
240 Andre Orlean, "The Cognitive Turning Point in Economics: Social Beliefs and Conventions," 
(Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques, 2006). 
241 Ibid., p.6 
242 Ibid., p.14 
243 Ibid., p.5 
244 Ibid., p.24 
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connected to beliefs about the particular opinionative orientation of the market, 
which, resultantly, operates in a self-fulfilling way to produce profitability. 
Economic sociology has also highlighted the importance of an awareness of 
both others and self in market contexts. CalIon, Meadel, and Rabeharisoa, for 
instance, emphasise that market actors are self-aware and alert to their role in the 
organisation of the market. Involved in a constant analysis of market function, actors, 
according to these authors, actively seek to conceive and establish new parameters 
for action and new opportunities for profit with the market sphere.245 Moreover, as 
Knorr Cetina and Bruegger observe, the signals of others' involvement in the 
marketplace are noted and subsequently affect the strategies and attitudes of other 
market participants.246 Writing with reference to currency traders, these authors 
describe how individual trades are noticed by others and may function directly to 
"trigger trading responses,,,247 or indirectly to shape the attitudes of market 
participants more generally. Profit making activities then, are undertaken by a large 
and diverse group of knowing actors who are involved in a continuous conscious 
reflection on their own actions in relation to the actions of others, and in relation to 
the constellation of the market as a whole. 
Put simply, what people think, but more importantly, what people think that 
others (or 'the market') thinks, is significantly constitutive of any given market. 
Hence, the phenomenon of attention itself becomes an important factor. What do 
people think, that others think is worth thinking about? And, in a much more general 
sense, what is being 'attended to' at a society-wide level at any given moment? What 
is important, or worthy of attention? 
Orlean's term, 'social belief here however, is potentially too narrow to 
sufficiently appreciate the role for attention I am attempting to designate in the 
present context. As Knorr Cetina and Bruegger emphasise in their account, attention 
and awareness in markets is not only a cognitive process, but that which is 
245 Callon Meadel, and Rabeharisoa, "The Economy of Qualities." p.194 
246 Knorr Cetina and Bruegger, "Global Microstructures: The Virtual Societies of Financial Markets." 
p.927 
247 Ibid. 
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technologically engineered and materially constituted.248 'Attention,' more than just 
noticing and noting what others are noting, actually assembles and constructs 
practices, contexts, events and other happenings. What literally comes to matter is, in 
this way, a function of attention in a market context where this has a relationship, in 
a broad sense, to profitability. 
With regard to the market ethics that this thesis describes however, a third 
consideration need be added in addition to attention and profit - affect. Fundamental 
in CSR, as the business case describes, is a relationship between what is 'good' and 
what is 'profitable.' The 'ethical,' as the following chapters will demonstrate, is 
primarily enacted in the examined market contexts in an affective mode, (as opposed 
to consisting in an abstract collection of rules or principles for instance). What this 
requires in the present discussion then, simply and in other words, is that a means of 
methodologically noticing the co-articulated and co-articulating functions of affect 
alongside and together with those of attention and profitability be described. 
Here, my use of the term affect is not intended to reference individual 
emotions or feelings as per a psychological emphasis,249 but broad structures of 
feeling as motions or "lines offorce.,,25o Equally, affect as motion (the capacity to be 
affected or moved), is not intended as a pre-social designation, rather, following 
Brian Massumi, affect is "open-endely social," or "social in a manner 'prior to' the 
separating out of individuals." 251 
Attention-affect-profit, conjoined in this way, draw our attention to the 
interdependence of the three terms in actually constituting the various markets for 
ethics that this chapter seeks to methodologically define. The definitely bounded 
248 In another article, Knorr Cetina and Bruegger approach the computerised trading' screen' as an 
'appresentational device' through which 'postsocial' relationships are organised. Herein, things 
themselves are understood to be possessed of the sort of inter subjective qualities typically reserved for 
human relationships. Hence, some objects are related to as "experiencing, feeling, reflexive and 
remembering beings." p.163 Knorr Cetina and Bruegger, "Traders' Engagement with Markets: A 
Postsocial Relationship." 
249 This is not to suggest that individual feelings have no constitutive role in more broadly conceived 
affects, just to specify a different level of analysis. In this way, my interest in affect in markets might 
also be distinguished from behavioural economics approaches that seek to demonstrate the 
'disruptive' or 'irrational' effect of individual emotions in economic decision making. 
250 Nigel Thrift, "Intensities of Feeling: Towards a Spatial Politics of Affect," Geografiska Annaler 
86, no. 1 (2004). p.60 
251 Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham & London: Duke 
University Press, 2002). p.9 
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spatiality of approaches that separate the market from the non-market, gives way, 
through an account of the materially productive constellation of attention-affect-
profit, and is replaced by an alternative emphasis on movement and change. 
This co-articulated and changing relationship between attention, affect and 
profit has perhaps never been more evident than it is now, in the wake of the 2008 
global financial crisis which, for a time at least, turned us all very obviously into 
attentively beholden, affectively engaged and economically imperilled market-
watchers/market participants.252 Within the intersubjective planes of reflexive 
activity in which markets are constituted, it is clear that nothing remains static. 
Feelings change, attention shifts focus, and new areas of concern open up, giving rise 
to new or different opportunities for profit (or, as has lately been the case, risk of 
loss). In place of static or unidirectional linear metaphors of market expansion then, 
it is necessary to address the dynamically constitutive role that circulating co-
articulations of attention-affect-profit play in materially organising particular 
markets.253 
Following this, and on the topic of space (and 'site'), while it remains correct 
to say that CSR is variously practiced and made manifest in a number of different 
locales, it is also pertinent to note the specificity of these spaces and how it is that 
they come to be significant 'sites' for CSR. The reflexively brought about 
circulations of attention-affect-profit in the CSR market do not occur equally across 
it, so to speak, as though the 'market' were an undifferentiated plane. Rather these 
circulations themselves act to form the market, assembling and dispersing more or 
less intense or concentrated points of practice, discourse, people, goods, materials, 
and services. What intensity contributes to the process of research design will be 
252 This is not to suggest that under 'normal' economic circumstances, the function of attention-affect-
profit in designating and constituting markets is less important, only that it less clearly obvious than in 
'crisis' conditions. For more on this point, see Chapter Seven. 
253 Benjamin Lee and Edward LiPuma make an argument along these lines when they suggest that 
circulation is more than the simple movement of commodities, people, and ideas. Conventional 
notions that posit circulation and exchange as processes of meaning transmission, these authors 
contend, fail to recognise the substantive and constructive role that circulation plays in bringing about 
certain phenomena. See; Benjamin Lee and Edward LiPuma, "Cultures of Circulation: The 
Imaginations of Modemity, " Public Culture 14, no. 1 (2002). p.192 
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detailed in the following discussion. Before going on to this though, the current 
description of attention-affect-profit need also be articulated in temporal dimension. 
Recall here, for a moment, Orlean's observation that profit may result from 
'correctly predicting the evolution of group opinion.' In this vein, CSR provides us 
with a particularly clear demonstration of the importance of 'time' as a market 
dimension, both as it confers novelty and creates expectation. Temporally, CSR may 
be distinguished from its predecessors as 'novel' and 'contemporary.' Part of its very 
marketability (conferred as a function of attention-affect) may even stem from this 
apparent newness insofar as it functions as a competitive differentiator. Additionally, 
CSR might also be said to trade in expectation - what CSR sells is the expectation of 
a different (more ethical) future. 
Here, an examination of a particular mode of circulatory attention may prove 
illuminating - that of hype. Self-perpetuating, and frequently triggered by the 
suggestion of novelty, hype effectively highlights the temporal specificity of the 
circuitous co-articulations of attention-affect-profit that this section has sought to 
describe. Although 'hype' is often prefaced with the tenn 'mere' so as to 
dismissively imply its lack of productivity, in the context of this discussion of 
reflexive market phenomena, it is important to understand hype to be actually 
"indicative of the emergence of new networks and activities.,,254 Understood to be a 
constitutive mode of attention, hype is not something that might be 'factored out, ,255 
as it were, in order to expose an 'authentic' reality, rather, in market contexts, hype 
itself accumulates value but can also quickly lose this again. 256 
In an investment context, hype is encountered via the roughly analogous 
concept of market 'noise.' This phrase refers, in investment parlance, to all the 
• • .j:', • ,,257 A b k 
'extras' that are thought not count as "true Investment InlOnnatlOn. 00 on 
this topic designed to help investors steer a path through the 'noise,' worriedly claims 
that "[r]umor, innuendo, chat rooms ... and stock price momentum have replaced 
254 Nik Brown and Mike Michael, "A Sociology of Expectations: Retrospecting Prospects and 
Prospecting Retrospects," Technology Analysis and Strategic Management 15, no. 1 (2003). p.16 
255 Franklin, S., 2001, in, Nik Brown, "Hope against Hype - Accountability in Biopasts, Presents, and 
Futures," Science Studies 16, no. 2 (2003). p.17 
256 Brown, Ibid., p.18 This is what Nik Brown refers to as the' hype dilemma.' p.17 
257 Richard Bernstein, Navigate the Noise: Investing in the New Age of Media and Hype (New York: 
Wiley, 2001). p.xv The author is a quantitative analyst at a Wall Street brokerage. 
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strategic planning, fundamental research, disciplined investment approaches. and risk 
analysis.,,258 Following the description developed over the course of the present 
discussion however, 'market reality' does not lay obscured beneath temporally 
contingent 'noise' in the form of attention (rumour for instance) and affect (entailed 
in market momentum), but instead is an active, moving, material, and constellatory 
articulation of these. 
The emphasis I have placed here on the reflexive circulation of attention, 
affect, and profit within the marketplace should not be understood as an attempt to 
completely account for, or circumscribe, CSR within these dimensions. It is instead 
the spatial and temporal flexibility and sensitivity that such an approach renders that 
make it useful in the present instance where, as I have previously stated and will now 
return to explain in more detail, the problem is to incorporate this understanding as a 
dimension of methodology. 
Focal Nexuses 
Multi-sited methodologies, as has been noted previously, go so far as to 
recognise that many contemporary phenomena can not be meaningfully examined 
from within the confines of one particular site. In positing multiple sites of interest 
though, this methodological approach still needs to address the question of the 
connections between sites - how are they significantly related? Here, Marcus and 
others working in this area have proposed that multi-sited fieldwork takes shape via a 
number of "tracking,,259 strategies. This is the suggestion that the "connections, 
associations, and putative relationships,,,26o between sites might be followed, leading 
to the development of a series of threads, paths, patterns, conjunctions and 
258 Ibid., p. xii. For a sociological discussion of the momentum trading technique Bemste.in me~tions, 
see; Daniel Beunza and David Stark, "Tools of the Trade: The Socio-Technology of ArbItrage III a 
Wall Street Trading Room," Industrial and Corporate Change 13, no. 2 (2004).; Or, Alex Preda, 
"Where Do Analysts Come From? The Case of Financial Chartism," in Market Devices, ed. Michel 
CalIon, Yuval Millo, and Fabian Muniesa (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007). 
259 Marcus, "Ethnography inlofthe World System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited Ethnography." p.95 
260 Ibid., p.97 
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· . • 261 H JuxtaposItIOns. owever, an account of attentive and affective market reflexivity 
such as I have been developing over the preceding pages, adds some layers of 
complication to this notion of 'tracking.' 
While 'multi-sitedness' draws attention to the constellation of different 
locales that may be significantly involved in the constitution of any given research 
object and attempts to follow the connections between these, by subjecting 'multi-
sites' to an understanding of reflexive and circuitous market action, I have attempted 
to suggest that this particular approach does not go far enough. As I wish to propose 
it, it is not only that the relationship between 'sites' is of importance, but how. 
where, and when, particular sites become established and significantly notable as 
'sites. ' 
It is to this end that the previously elaborated account proves useful. Patterns 
of attention, affect and profit can be seen to emerge in highly particularised ways, 
and with varying degrees of intensity. Importantly, these patternings are not 
ephemeral, not fleeting dashes across the market envisioned as a somehow intangible 
or imperceptible realm - they are, on the contrary, (and to re-iterate), material, 
discursive, and practical manifestation of reflexive market action. 
Such an account suggests a different methodological approach to examining 
market phenomena. 'Multi-site' may be usefully re-worked in the present context 
(via attention-affect-profit) such that this respects the temporal and spatial 
contingency of the reflexive marketplace, giving rise to an alternative understanding 
in terms of/ocal nexuses. What this designation seeks to capture is the particularity 
of emergence of specific, and notably intense 'nexuses' of market activity. 
Significantly then, the term 'nexus' attempts to speak to a number of different 
matters of methodological import within the market setting. 
Firstly, and as previously described, the 'nexus' is a constellation in which 
attention, affect, and profit, can readily be seen to function in mutually co-
implicating, and co-articulated ways. As such, and secondly then, a 'nexus' is at once 
both a kind of trope (in the sense of the word as 'concept,' or even 
261 Marcus, "Ethnography inlofthe World System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited Ethnography." p.95, 
p.l05 
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popular/public/familiar discourse), and a term that draws attention to specific sets of 
'sites,' practices, materials, goods, that are organised within it. Thirdly, 'nexus,' as I 
am attempting to methodologically utilise it, is not that which can be considered in 
its singularity, or isolation. The plural configuration, 'nexuses,' attests to the lack of 
clear boundaries between what might be termed 'nexical fields.' Though the preface 
'focal' distinguishes one nexus from the next, and indeed, each is important in its 
specific particularity, the matters of distinction and overlap, are always of 
simultaneous analytical concern. 
The significance of the 'nexus' as I have attempted to describe it here, is 
however, perhaps much better demonstrated in context than explained in the abstract. 
To this end, in the following section, I will now attempt to employ the account that I 
have been developing as a response to some of the methodological questions around 
CSR and 'site' that were proposed to begin. 
The 'Focal Nexuses' of CSR 
This chapter began with the simply configured question - where is CSR? 
Over the course of discussion, I have attempted to demonstrate that however simple 
this question may appear, to provide an answer to it in the form of a research 
methodology is necessarily to contend with a series of challenges around the issue of 
'site.' Moving away from singular, or simply 'multiple' sites though, due heed to the 
reflexive constitution of CSR as market-based might become an empirical 
possibility. 
Approaching the 'field' ofCSR with the question of which site, or sites, in 
mind, leads, as we have seen, to a particularly unproductive engagement. CSR 'sites' 
are everywhere, and ethics is in ready play - practically and discursively - across the 
majority of them. The significance of 'sites' vis-a.-vis each other is impossible to 
establish, the spatial and temporal specificity of sites is difficult to systematically 
address, even what constitutes a 'site' is readily and openly contentious. 
If we enter the field not looking for sites to begin with though, but are attuned 
instead to varying intensities in the patterns of attention-affect-profit that make a 
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market (focal nexuses) - some semblance of order does begin to emerge. Culturally 
and economically significant by definition, the focal nexuses of CSR are discernable 
as those constellate co-articulations of attention-affect-profit that may be seen to 
emerge, and proliferate, large numbers of goods, services, practices, discourses and 
so forth in their name, in doing so, coming to occupy the something of the status of 
popular 'trope.' Following this understanding, three major 'focal nexuses' may be 
seen to significantly constitute the market for CSR at the time of writing - the 
'Ethical Corporation,' 'Ethical Consumption,' and 'The Ethical Career.' 
Before I go on to discuss the specific research sites suggested by these 
nexuses, and the methods I will employ to explore them, some further explanation is 
in order regarding the designated nexuses of focus - their relationship to what might 
be termed the 'entire field ofCSR,' and the relationship between them. Firstly, I am 
not making any claims about the size of the entire field of CSR in identifying these 
three nexuses within it. As Annemarie Mol has noted "the precise size of a field is of 
little importance to the theorist who does not try to map that field, but [instead] tries 
to discern patterns in it.,,262 Together, these nexuses of focal import do constitute part 
of the total 'field' of CSR, but they cannot be said to capture it, nor, specifically, am 
I claiming that they might be understood as some kind of 'representative sample' of 
it. 'Representativeness' per se is not at stake, though, arguably, this is bound up to an 
extent in the formulation of nexus as it pays heed to 'attention' itself. 
Secondly, the so-called 'designation of three focal nexuses,' does overstate 
the boundedness and distinction of each. While it is the case that patterns discernibly 
cohere in the market through each of the suggested nexuses - these patterns are far 
from finitely distinct, and instead can be seen to significantly overlap with others. As 
such, what I am not aiming to achieve through the 'nexuses' methodology is a 
straightforward 'compare and contrast' set up. Rather, and to render things in a 
F oucauldian way for a moment here, each nexus might be said to function as a 
specific 'surface of emergence ,263 for ethics within CSR. As such, it is not a matter 
of establishing equivalences between each (for a start 'corporations,' 'consumption,' 
262 Annemarie Mol, The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice (Durham NC: Duke University 
Press, 2002). p.181 
263 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology o/Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1994 [1969]). p.4l 
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and 'careers' are not analogous or comparable in a straightforward way). Similarly 
though, nor is it a matter of seeking to discern a set of differences. These 'focal 
nexuses' serve a methodologically structuring function insofar as they mark out 
particular, socially contemporaneous zones where 'ethics' may be encountered as it 
is handled in practice within CSR. 
This approach seeks to give an enlivened account of 'ethics' in CSR, and 
hence it is necessary to go beyond a straightforward focus on similarity and 
difference. Instances of disjuncture are as likely within, as between the focus 
nexuses, and as such the 'nexus' formulation itself demands a more nuanced 
attention of the role of the researcher themselves - an attention that can duly 
recognise instances of reflexive complicity, hanging together. and movements apart 
(a topic to which I return in a later section of this chapter). 
No finite bounds ultimately exist between the various focal nexuses and the 
sites that they inaugurate. This is readily evident in the case of the CSR 'events' that 
I go on to discuss in the subsequent section. These might simultaneously be 
described as professional debates, company advertorials, recruitment drives, 
promotional exercises, and so on, and therefore simultaneously be of significance 
across nexuses - speaking at once of 'ethical' corporations, consumption, and 
careers. What is important so far as I am concerned though, is not the precise nature 
or purpose of a particular 'site,' but how it functions reflexively within the broader 
marketplace producing particular enactments and instantiations of the 'ethical' in the 
course of its occurrence. 
Organising method through 'nexuses' is, admittedly, a somewhat 'messy' 
way forward. As John Law, 264 and others, 265 have suggested though - this is not 
necessarily a bad thing. If prevailing social science methodologies are ill-equipped to 
cope with the 'messiness' of the world, and even more worryingly might be said to 
h ·b·l· f ,,266 th h "work with some success to repress t every POSSI 1 Ity 0 mess, en per aps 
264 John Law, Making a Mess with Method (Centre for Science Studies, Lanc.aster University, 2003 
[cited 30th October 2006]); available from http://www.comp.lancs.ac.ukJsoclOlogy/paperslLaw-
Making-a-Mess-with-Method. pdf. 
265 See, for example, Nigel Thrift, "Afterwords," Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 18 
(2000).; Or, John Urry, "The Complexities of the Global," Theory, Culture & Society 22, no. 5 (2005). 
266 Law, Making a Mess with Method. p. 3 
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there is something to be gained in an embrace of the 'fuzzy,,267 fluid, and changing. 
Insofar as I understand it, this 'something' at stake is a more contemporaneous and 
attentive mode of focus, worth perhaps, getting a little messy for. 
'Nexical Sites' and Research Methods 
In this section I will describe how the designated focal nexuses - the 'ethical 
corporation,' 'ethical consumption,' and 'ethical career' - mark out particular 
materials and settings of empirical significance, and go on to outline which research 
methods I will adopt in relation to each of these. As will be demonstrated here 
, 
within the focal nexuses 'nexical sites ,268 come in a variety of shapes and forms. 
Physical and virtual, permanent and fleeting, expert and lay, bounded and 'fuzzy,' 
these are just some of the differentiating terms that might be employed to capture the 
array of empirical materials and settings to which this project attends in the process 
of addressing the contemporary 'doing' of ethics in CSR. 
The 'Ethical Corporation' 
The 'ethical corporation' is empirically manifest in a few key 'nexical' sites 
in the CSR marketplace. Broadly speaking these take two forms - meetings and 
events, and text-based materials. 
London is host to many CSR conferences, meetings and events, some of 
which are free to attend, and many of which take place at institutions such as The 
London School of Politics and Economics. 269 These events are widely advertised, 
267 Nadai and Maeder, "Fuzzy Fields: Multi-Sited Ethnography in Social Research." 
268 My prefacing of 'sites' with the term 'nexical' here is intended to recall previous discussions of 
market reflexivity, and continue to draw attention to the dynamic presentation of sites of interest as 
they open up, and may persist for sometime, or, just as easily, disperse again. This recognition is 
significant in that it makes particular demands on research practice - given the somewhat unstable 
nature of some of the 'sites' in question, 'fieldwork' must adapt to proceed at once in both pre-
planned and opportunistic ways. . 
269 See the last section of this chapter for a discussion of the significance of London itself as a settmg 
for this research. 
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often, significantly, as 'networking' opportunities,270 and usually bring together 
industry experts and consultants for the purpose of panel and public discussion. As a 
research site, they are particularly fruitful in that a number of representatives of the 
CSR industry, from a number of different firms are in attendance, conversing with 
each other as well as the assembled audience. As such, expert and lay opinions meet 
here - what CalIon might call an instance of a 'hybrid forum' at work. Notes, 
recordings, and transcripts, from attendance at several of these events over the four 
year course of my research have been complied.271 
So-called 'ethical ranks' or 'ethical ratings' are a second site of key 
significance inaugurated within the ethical corporation nexus. These quantitative 
tabulations, published by a variety of sources, seek to rank corporations from most 
ethical to least, and, in performing this function, are intimately tied to the 
marketability of CSR itself. These ranks are widely available, and are published by 
many popular business, and consumer magazines and papers, but it is perhaps as they 
function to inform the 'socially responsible investment' (SRI) industry that these 
ranks have the most sway. As the name suggests, SRI is the practice of investing 
funds in companies deemed to be 'socially responsible' and is frequently offered as 
an investment option by pension and superannuation funds. 
Here, I will look at how the 'ethical' is variously configured within a number 
of major ranks, complied for the year 2007: The 100 Best Corporate Citizens List, 
The Accountability Rating, and the EthicalScore system published by Covalence. As 
will be discussed further in Chapter Four, competition between ranks and methods of 
measurement is intense, and little consensus exists on the question of 'how best to 
measure?' Quite the opposite in fact; as will be elaborated, the need to demonstrably, 
and often quantitatively, establish ethical corporate-hood both leads to and is caught 
up in the proliferation of differing measurement techniques in a highly competitive 
commercial measurement industry. 
270 The significance of 'networking' as a kind of CSR work is taken up in the discussion of ethical 
careers in Chapter Six. . 
271 I attended a number of these events through my connection with the LSE student CSR socIety. 
(with whom I also did a period of participant observation - as I mention go on to describe in the text). 
I have made transcripts of fifteen such events attended during the period 2005-2009. 
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Additionally, empirical research on CSR conducted in the field of 
Management Studies will be subject to analysis. Herein (and, as was described in 
Chapter One), CSR is empirically constituted as an object of quantitative inquiry. 
and the particular convergence that may be witnessed between scholarly approaches 
to CSR and those of a commercial nature is of note. Especially significant, and as 
will be further described in Chapter Four, is the statistical attempt to 'prove' or 
'disprove' the business case as this is encountered as a hypothesis available for 
testing. Most frequently such 'tests' proceed by attempting to correlate the variables 
of 'ethical' and 'financial' performance, however, as with ethical ranks, little 
consensus emerges in this task beyond the consensus on widespread disagreement. 
'Ethical Consumption' 
The market for 'ethical' consumer goods is highly visible and rapidly 
growing. 'Ethical consumers' are those who seek to buy products and use services 
offered by 'ethical' companies and organisations, and hence, the connections here 
between attention (in the form of media and advertising), affect (the suggestion that 
ethical consumption is a way of living the 'good life'), and profit (in the form of 
purchases), are readily observable. 
In order to explore ethical practice within ethical consumption, I will focus 
on a forum wherein this is actively constructed, articulated and contested - the 
Guardian Newspaper's online Ethical Living blog. As Dhiraj Murthy notes, there has 
been some reluctance on the behalf of social researchers to fully utilise blogs and 
other online user-driven media as research 'fields. ,272 The continuing methodological 
primacy of face-to-face interactions and observation however, fails to take note of 
the increasingly technologically mediated character of everyday life in many parts of 
the world.273 
The extremely high volume of user responses on the Ethical Living blog very 
much attest to this movement online - over the course of the recorded year (2008), 
272 Dhiraj Murthy, "Digital Ethnography: An Examination ofthe Use of New Technologies for Social 
Research," Sociology 42, no. 5 (2008). p.839. 
273 Ibid., p.849 
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over one hundred and seventy thousand words of blogger and respondent content 
were generated on this website and collected for analysis. A number of structural 
features of the Ethical Living site, how this is organised, and the question of why it is 
more appropriate than other similar sites, all need to be addressed in some detail 
, 
especially in regard to Murthy's claims regarding digital neglect in social science 
methods. Given the space that such a discussion requires however, and the need to 
introduce a large amount of empirical material by means of demonstration, this 
conversation takes place closer to its object as it were, at the beginning of Chapter 
Five. 
The 'Ethical Career' 
The burgeoning interest in so-called 'ethical careers' attests to the growth of 
CSR as an industry and job-market, as well as drawing attention to a sentiment 
within employment more broadly. Firms readily advertise their CSR credentials in 
the process of recruitment, and evidence that more people are looking to work in 
what is now being called the 'ethical sector' is provided by the proliferation in 
recruitment services aimed specifically at employment in CSR and related fields. 
Here, empirical engagement takes a number of forms: Firstly, I attended four 
large graduate careers fairs held in London in 2007-8 (two specifically 'Ethical 
Careers' Fairs, one hosted by Imperial College, the other by Forum3, and two 
Careers Group Graduate Fairs);274 secondly, I was member and participant observer 
for one year in the London School of Economics and Politics (LSE) Student Union 
CSR society which consists of graduate student members interested in careers in 
CSR·275 thirdly I conducted informal interviews with two ethical-careers advisors , , 
274 Imperial College Ethical Careers Fair, 21 st January, 2007, Great Hall, Imperial College London; 
The London Graduate Summer Recruitment Fair, 19-20th June, 2007, Islington Business Design 
Centre London· The London Graduate Autumn Recruitment Fair, 22 October, 2007, Islington 
, , th . 
Business Design Centre, London; The Guardian London Graduate Fair, 17-19 June, 2008, Islmgton 
Business Design Centre, London; and forum3, 10-11 th October, 2008, Islington Business Design 
Centre, London. 
275 In academic year 2007-8, I attended all the meetings and events held by this soci~ty ar:d in addition 
conducted informal interviews with the president and other board members. The SOCIety m 2007-8 
consisted of approximately twenty active members. 
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and the editor of a leading guide to ethical careers;276 and lastly, ethical recruitment 
websites and other similar sources of online data were also collected and are utilised 
in discussion in Chapter Six. As per the 'Ethical Consumption' section above, the 
specificities of these contexts require much further detailing and elaboration, which, 
again, will take place in context of discussion in the requisite empirical chapter. 
'Ethnographic' Research and Polymorphous Engagements277 
The anthropological understanding of 'field-site' has, thus far in this chapter, 
received a great deal of attention. The practice of ethnography as research method 
though, while consistently present in the background, has yet to be explicitly 
discussed. 'Ethnography' inasmuch as this has traditionally referred to a long 
engagement in a foreign setting, has, in the past, been easily justified on the basis of 
this 'foreignness' offield in itself. Notably however, when the field becomes 'multi-
sited,' or 'nexical' as I have characterised it, and the task is to address issues of 
contemporary concern in modem settings such as the City, the old justifications no 
longer hold, and new types of research relationship are entered into. 
With regard to the present research, 'ethnography' (as this term as been 
recently re-understood by authors such as Marcus) does function usefully as a frame 
of reference through which to focus some of the methodological problems 
encountered when seeking to ask questions of a market-based object. Furthermore, 
insofar as it recognises that the practical demands of any given research site or 
situation requires flexibility in method - ethnographic research practice does give 
rise to the important possibility, following Hugh Gusterson, of 'polymorphous 
engagements. ,278 The significance of this in the context of a research approach such 
as that which I have been developing here is that research method need not be 
276 Gideon Burrows, editor of The Ethical Careers Guide, 11th October, 2008; Judith Baines, ethical 
careers advisor at LSE, 28th May, 2009; Laura Brammar, ethical careers advisor at DCL and C2, 26
th 
June, 2009. 
277 Hugh Gusterson, "Studying up Revisited," PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review 20, 
no. 1 (1997). p.119 
278 Ibid. 
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finitely designated beforehand - prior to engaging specific 'fields' of concern.279 
This leaves the researcher free to follow previously undesignated routes of 
significance that emerge in the course of empirical inquiry. In doing so however, in 
contexts as highly reflexive as those described here, unexpected affinities and 
complicities are also likely to emerge. 
Reflexive Affinities and Research Complicities 
If, methodologically speaking, we are to take seriously the account of market 
reflexivity developed here - then a focus on the relationship between researcher and 
researched in the context of this study is also deserving of attention. As CalIon notes, 
market actors "are now colleagues whom [scholars] have to take into consideration 
and who contribute in their own right to the production of knowledge and its 
transcription in reality.,,28o This is the inevitability that the previously discussed 
'hybrid forum' attests to. Once the organisation of markets has become a collective 
and political issue that takes place in thoroughly hybridised spaces,281 there can be 
no outside or elsewhere, no detached space from which to comment on this from. 
Marcus suggests that in such research contexts "complicity,,282 requires 
special attention. "[I]n any contemporary field of work, there are" Marcus notes 
"always others within who know (or want to know) what the ethnographer knows, 
albeit from a different subject position, or who want to know what the ethnographer 
wants to know.,,283 Another indictor of this situation is the way in which critiques 
mobilised by social scientists are already anticipated and even elaborated by those 
h h hi 284 W 0 t ey are researc ng. 
Not solely the preserve of supposed 'ivory towers' intellectuals, reflexive 
'dismantling' has been taking place in the international business community as well 
279 Jack Katz, "Ethnography's Warrants," Sociological Methods Research 25, no. 4 (1997). 
280 CalIon, Meadel, and Rabeharisoa, "The Economy of Qualities." p.195 
281 Ibid., p.197 ., " 
282 Marcus "The Uses of Complicity in the Changing Mise-en-Scene of AnthropologIcal FIeldwork. 
283 Marcus: "Ethnography inJofthe World System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited Ethnography." 
p.112 
284 Riles, "Real Time: Unwinding Technocratic and Anthropological Knowledge." pp.339-100 
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as the international academic community.285 Nigel Thrift draws attention here to the 
recent growth of an independent "analytical capacity within business," 286 and 
highlights the increasingly active role of the media as a facilitator and disseminator 
of ideas. 287 Recent concerns in managerial literature mirror those in the social 
sciences. As Thrift observes, "[ t ]he new managerialism depends on the notion that 
the world is uncertain, complex, paradoxical, even chaotic.,,288 Debates regarding the 
'messiness of method' and the 'complexity of social objects,' can thus be observed 
occurring in settings far afield from the sociology department. Similarly, the present 
variety of business metaphor that utilises ideas of constant movement and adaptation 
- for instance, talk of 'surfing,' 'flows,' 'tracing,' and 'networks, ,289 is mirrored by a 
sociological emphasis on these same ideas. The business imperative to 'become 
more open to a changing world,' echoes sociological endeavours to craft new 
research practices and methodologies that might be better equipped to 'know' this 
'ever-changing world.' 
To the extent that sociological texts such as Audit Society recognise the 
process whereby business and management techniques come to operate in the 
university, we might recall that, this process being a two way street, sociology has a 
presence in business world also. Indeed, the density of this two way traffic has led 
one commentator to suggest that currently "[t]he university is more central to the 
operation of the City than it has been to any society in which it has existed.,,29o The 
emergence of corporate anthropology291 and corporate sociology are telling in this 
regard. The commodification of these forms of knowledge certainly marks out 
'complicity' and 'reflexivity' as deserving of attention, and, for this reason, I 
elaborate on this further in Chapter Six, where, as student, graduate, 'networker,' and 
285 Nigel Thrift, "Shut up and Dance, or, Is the World Economy Knowable?," in The Global Economy 
in Transition, ed. William Lever and Peter Daniels (Harlow: Longman, 1996). p.12 
286 Ibid., p.22 
287 Ibid., p.22 
288 Ibid., p.20. 
289 Ibid., p.19 
290 Westbrook, in Douglas R. Holmes, George E. Marcus, and David A. Westbrook, "Intellectual 
Vocations in the City of Gold," PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review 29, no. 1 (2006). 
p.164 
291 See, Lucy Suchman, Anthropology as 'Brand': Reflections on Corporate Anthropology. (The 
Centre for Science Studies, Lancaster University, 2000 [cited March 23rd 2007]); available from 
http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uklsociology/papers/Suchman-Anthropology-as-Brand.pdf. 
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researcher of ethical careers, my own role as 'researcher' is frequently 
(mis)interpreted in the practice of research in a number of interesting ways. 
It is important however, I think, that an account of researcher and researched 
in terms of complicity should not suggest 'conspiracy,' or characterise this 'wanting 
to know' as based on suspicion. It is not a case of being 'duped' into complicity with 
'them,' the 'researched,' and hence failing to maintain an appropriate 'critical 
distance.' Instead, as the recognition of reflexivity comes to inevitably map the 
researcher onto the terrain that they are attempting to chart, objectivity and critical 
distance are called into question as straightforwardly desirable methodological 
objectives. 
LONDON: 'Global City' 
To this point I have attended to a series of methodological intricacies around 
the notion of 'field,' expanding this to 'fields' or 'sites,' then 'nexuses' to denote, 
among other things, a lack of permanence, indefinite boundaries, and multiple 
connections. Taking a step back from this specific focus however, a broader 
geographical bound or field that I have yet to discuss emerges - the City of London 
itself. Although I have not stated it explicitly to this point, the research for this thesis 
all took place in London. I spoke to people in London, who are based in companies, 
institutions, and organisations, that, even if multi-national in nature, have operations, 
or an office, here, in the capital. I attended events and careers fairs that occurred in 
London; joined a London university-based student society; and during the four years 
of this research lived and worked, here, in London. 
What is the particular significance of this though? On the one hand the 
geographical definiteness of London seems to provide a convenient boundary for 
what is a large empirical undertaking. On the other hand though, is the ease with 
which it might simply be said that my research represents a London-specific account, 
not somewhat problematic or uneven potentially dismissive in a number of regards? 
The question of the significance of 'London' to CSR, points us towards a discussion 
of the general versus the particular, and the 'global' as opposed to 'local.' While 
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London is of course a finite place, a city of concrete, metal and stone, it is also an 
abstract or paradigmatic place, what might be referred to in contemporary parlance 
as a 'global city. ,292 
According to Edward Soja's Postmodern Geographies, 'it all comes together 
. L A I ,293 O· h d . m os nge es. r, m ot er wor s, anythmg and everything of significance to the 
geographer of postmodem times may be found in this 'prototypical' metropolis in 
which "the micro and macro ... [and] the concrete and the abstract, can be seen 
simultaneously in an articulated and interactive combination.,,294 Similarly, but with 
regard to CSR, the City of London might be understood as one of those places 
where, to borrow Soja's phrase, 'it all comes together.' Importantly, my suggestion 
here is not that CSR 'originates' in London, and emanates outward to a peripheral 
'elsewhere,' nor am I claiming that London is somehow the 'centre' or most crucial 
place in this movement. CSR happens in a large and varied number of locales, it is 
certainly not restricted to London. However, I would like to suggest that, in the 
absence of cities such as London, understood as a paradigmatic place of the 'global,' 
CSR might not emerge, come together, or 'exist' at all. 
What I am attempting to draw attention to here is the concentration of 
'globality' in geographically particular and highly important spaces such as London. 
When researching a phenomenon that might broadly be said to assemble under the 
mantra of the 'global,' such locales inevitably take on particular research 
significance. To evoke the 'nexus' once again, London is a hub of 'global' attention, 
activity, and innovation, to the point where it is feasible to suggest that all things I 
have understood to be of significance with regard to the 'global' phenomenon of 
CSR can be signalled here, in this single city. 
In other words, London, one might say, is the big nexus, or even itself the 
paradigmatic nexus. And, if there was ever any doubt about this, the impact of the 
2008 'global' financial crisis inland on London should go someway towards 
suggesting otherwise. As has been the subject of much news coverage, London's 
292 See, Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo (princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1991). 
293 Edward W. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion o/Space in Critical Social Theory 
(London: Verso, 1989). p.191 
294 Ibid. 
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status and influence as a city/destination/global hub, derive in large part from 
financialisation or, as this is tellingly abbreviated, from the activities of The City. ::95 
Further, this situation is not only recently the case, instead, as some historical studies 
suggest, "the modem economic era began in Britain not with the emergence of 
industrial capitalism and the industrial proletariat, but with the arrival of financial 
capitalism and the financial bourgeoisie.,,296 The modem age, "dated not - as the 
Victorians had supposed - from the 18th century, when England became the 
Workshop of the World, but from the 1 i h century, when London became the world's 
money market. ,,297 
The 'restricted' locality of my research is thus not as straightforward in 
implication as it might seem, and to follow each statement I make with the qualifier, 
'in London,' would be to miss the point. Yes, research will take place here, in this 
very particular space and time, but the 'here and now' in this case are both a focus in 
and of themselves, as well a sign of the system that produces them. This account may 
be mistaken as an attempt claim 'generalisability of findings,' however it is not 
possible or, as I see it, desirable to 'generalise' in this case from London to 
elsewhere. Rather than being a question of 'generalisability' per se, it is one of 
significant particularity and the importance of a specific place within CSR - one that 
is simultaneously situated, and unbound, necessarily local, but also constitutive of 
the 'global' itself. 
295 Figures for 2007 show London as first on the Global Financial Centres Index. This is a b~-annually 
produced index of global competiveness amongst forty-six financial centres. Closely followmg 
London on the 2007 Index was New York, and subsequently Hong Kong, Singapore, and Zurich. The 
forward to the report notes that, significantly distinct from the rest of the rated cities, London and 
New York are the only "true global [mancial centres." See, 
http://ukintaiwan.fco.gov.uklresources/enlpdf/global-financial-centre-index 
296 John Pemble, "Golden Dolly," London Review of Books 24 (2009). 
297 Ibid. 
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Chapter Four 
o 
Ethics by Number? 
This chapter turns an empirical eye to one manifestation of 'ethicality' that 
emerges within the business case for Corporate Social Responsibility. As was 
detailed in Chapter One, contemporary CSR is characterised by the business case 
proposition that it is possible for a corporation to 'do well, by doing good.' There, 
this understanding served as the basis for my claim as to the importance of 
approaching 'ethics' in this context as market-based in nature. Here, the business 
case will be understood to function in theory and practice as a ready-made question 
or hypothesis. Simply, 'is CSR really good for business?' And, 'can the adoption of a 
socially responsibility actually be proven to have a positive effect on a corporation's 
'bottom line?" Primarily in the field of Management, studies in this vein have 
proliferated and converged in their focus on establishing the ultimate profitability (or 
otherwise) of practicing CSR. 
The desire to empirically test the veracity of the business case practically 
translates into the requirement that CSR be measured. Not confined to the academic 
'laboratory,' this propensity to measurement is also readily observable in the 
commercial practice of compiling CSR rankings and ratings, as well as being 
foundationally evident in the oft-repeated call for better means of assessing the 
various loosely described 'impacts' of CSR itself. A market creation in a 'market 
that calculates, ,298 CSR may be seen enacted and re-enacted in number of forms that 
are quantitative in nature. This chapter will attempt to elaborate these through a 
focus on three of the predominant ways in which CSR is quantitatively rendered, 
making inquires around the proposition of an 'ethics done by number.' 
298 Michel CalIon and Fabian Muniesa, "Peripheral Vision: Economic Markets as Calculative 
Collective Devices," Organization Studies 26, no. 8 (2005). p.1229 
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As outlined in Chapter Three, the first source of empirical material on which 
this discussion will draw are a number of studies, primarily published in major 
Management journals, which attempt to empirically ascertain the relationship 
between CSR and company profitability. Commercially published ethical ranks and 
ratings will be introduced and examined as a second example of CSR measurement. 
And, lastly, excerpts of material gathered from a CSR forum featuring industry 
professionals will be brought to the discussion. Here, the particular analytical focus 
will be on the ubiquitously evoked, but enigmatically defined, 'metric.' 
'Measurement' in these debates, though apparently unanimously agreed upon in 
principle, occupies in practice, as I will discuss, a position wrought by numerous 
tensions. 
Importantly, in highlighting these three means by which CSR is made 
'quantifiable,' I do not intend, a) to suggest that these are the only examples wherein 
this might be said to occur, or b) that CSR may be said to subsist entirely in 
quantitative forms. Rather, my contention in this chapter, is that owing to the 
business case formulation through which contemporary CSR is largely inaugurated 
as market-based, quantitative and calculative functions do proliferate and gain 
purchase, hence working, in a number of identifiable instances, to create aspects of 
CSR in their image. The examples I highlight here are those which may be seen most 
frequently, and which I found to have the most pertinence in the course of empirical 
enqUIry. 
Given the concentration of quantitative techniques which characterise CSR 
'measurement,' subsequent questions arise regarding the kinds of relationship with 
number being enacted. This chapter will look to sociological treatments of number 
and calculation in order to engage these questions and explore the significance of 
quantification in this context. An emphasis on the productivity of calculation and 
continuities between 'quality' and 'quantity,' it will be suggested, is fruitful with 
regard to examining the multiple and complex manipulations in which numbers find 
themselves continually employed in the practice of CSR. 
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Making Ethics Count 
Recall, from Chapter One, the discussion of 'self-interest' as a motivation for 
ethical business behaviour. There, I suggested that differing relationships to the 
question of self-interest could be understood to splinter approaches to the question of 
responsible corporate behaviour. In one camp, self-interest was an anathema, 
undermining the possibility of 'ethics,' while in the other camp, self-interest as (at 
least partial) motivation for responsible corporate behaviour lay at the heart of the 
very proposition of a business case. What I did not emphasise in Chapter One 
however, is how the contemporary development of CSR around the latter account (as 
a set of market phenomena) is accompanied (or even one might say achieved) by the 
concomitant development of distinctive set of techniques for the empirical 
assessment of this. A burden of proof accompanies the proposal that it is possible to 
'do well by doing good.' Within markets understood as devices for collective 
calculation, 'doing well' relative to 'doing good' is that which may be made 
quantifiable. This proposition, as I will presently go on to discuss, occupies the 
attention of both scholars and practitioners in the field. 
Management Studies & the Measurement of CSR 
The increasing predominance of empirical research techniques applied to the 
investigation ofCSR in the discipline of Management Studies is something which 
management scholars themselves have been concerned to investigate and document. 
In a 2006 article appearing in the Journal of Management Studies for instance, a 
group of scholars led by Andy Lockett conduct a statistical review of a broad range 
of CSR literature, finding that, across all relevant journals between the years 1992-
. f .. ,,299 2002, "empirical research has been overwhelmmgly 0 a quantItatIve nature. 
Another similar review of changing trends in CSR research notes a significant move 
299 Andy Lockett, Jeremy Moon, and Wayne Visser, "Corporate Social Responsibility in M~agement 
Research: Focus, Nature, Salience and Sources ofInfluence," Journal of Management StudIes 43, no. 
1 (2006). p.115. The exact percentage of quantitative empirical work that this research finds amongst 
the studies surveyed is 80%. 
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d .. I 300 towar s emplflca approaches as of the 1990s. A convergence of empirical 
concern is also noted by these researchers and others. 301 The field of CSR research 
, 
they suggest, has become increasingly specialised and methodologically confined to 
the examination of one particular kind of relationship - that between CSR and 
company profitability.302 This concern with financial benefit of course follows from 
the definitional proposition that the business case supplies. 
Important though, is the manner by which attempts to establish this 
relationship proceed. The chosen technique is statistical - an attempt to correlate 
'CSR' and 'profitability' operationalising these two factors as variables. In this 
context, CSR is measured, and becomes calculable, as the variable 'Corporate Social 
Performance' (CSP), while profitability is calculable as overall company 'Financial 
Performance' (FP).303 
By now, a truly extensive body of research has grown up in this vein. Despite 
the torrent of data however, the outcome of this work, as one major commentator in 
the field has put it, "can be easily summarized: at best, it is inconclusive.,,304 On the 
whole, it is widely acknowledged by those working in the field that any consensus on 
the CSP-FP relationship is yet to be reached. Data that confirm a positive 
relationship between CSP and FP is certainly plentiful. Similarly plentiful however 
are studies that contradict these findings by demonstrating no significant correlation. 
300 Frank G. A. De Bakker, Peter Groenewegen, and Frank den Hond, "A Bibliometric Analysis of 30 
Years of Research and Theory on Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Social 
Performance," Business and Society 44, no. 3 (2005). p.283 
301 See, Ibid., and also, Lockett, Moon, and Visser, "Corporate Social Responsibility in Management 
Research: Focus, Nature, Salience and Sources ofInfluence." 
302 De Bakker, Groenewegen, and den Hond, "A Bibliometric Analysis of30 Years of Research and 
Theory on Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Social Performance." See, for a critique of 
this development, Duane Winsor, "The Future of Corporate Social Responsibility," International 
Journal o/Organizational Analysis 9, no. 3 (2001). 
303 Tim Rowley and Shawn Berman, "A Brand New Brand of Corporate Social Performance," 
Business & Society 39, no. 4 (2000). Corporate Social Performance (CSP) is used to "test the social 
responsibility notion by outlining the various duties or constituency groups that corporations must 
honour." p.397 Hence, it might be understood as a methodological operationalisation of the CSR 
construct in the form ofa variable. However, so widespread now is the use ofCSP as an analogy for 
(or replacement of) CSR, some researchers contend that there is no point in maintaining this 
distinction and contend that they may be used interchangeably. See, De Bakker, Groenewegen, and 
den Hond:"A Bibliometric Analysis of30 Years of Research and Theory on Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Corporate Social Performance." 
304 Vogel, The Market/or Virtue: The Potential and Limits o/Corporate Social Responsibility. p.29 
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Overwhelmingly the case though are equivocal findings that, in their final analysis, 
are not able to provide a conclusion one way or the other. 305 
I will return toward the end of the chapter to discuss the significance of this 
calculative inconclusiveness further with regard to the 'veracity' of the CSR business 
case. While, on one level, this ambiguity seems to undermine the surety of the 
business case claim, in the course of discussion I hope to demonstrate how, in 
practice, such a claim functions to make problematic the possibility of its own 
'proof or 'disproof.' In the course of a market meeting between 'value' and 'values,' 
the lines that demark the 'quantitative' and 'qualitative' stand to be re-drawn, 
converting 'veracity' in the process into the wrong question. For now though, I want 
to continue on to explore the way in which equivocal expositions of the CSP-FP 
relationship frequently to give rise to the call for better and more accurate 
measurement. 
Blame for the inconclusiveness of correlative studies has centred on the 
purported 'definitional ambiguity' of 'Corporate Social Performance' as a 
variable.306 Given that both the definition and measurement of CSP are less than 
evident,307 much debate in the field now focuses on how best to define CSP as a 
functioning variable, and subsequently, how best the accurate measurement of this 
may be achieved. As a result, empirical research is presently characterised by a 
fastidious focus on the technical aspects of 'metric' development and application -
the organising question simply, 'how best to measure?' The minutiae and 
305 For a positive correlation, see for example: Andrea Beltratti, "The Complementarity between 
Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility," Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance -
Issues and Practice 30, no. 3 (2005). Neutral effect: Abagail McWilliams and Donald Siegel, 
"Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Performance: Correlation or Misspecification?," 
Strategic Management Journal 21, no. 5 (2000). Inconclusive: "no studies have unambiguously 
established that socially responsible firms ensured a higher return on equity than other firms," See: 
Joshua Daniel Margolis and James P. Walsh, People and Profits? The Searchfor a Link between a 
Company's Social and Financial Performance (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2001).; Ronald M. Roman, 
Sefa Hayibor, and Bradley R. Agle, "The Relationship between Social and Financial Performance: 
Repainting a Portrait.," Business & Society 38, no. 1 (1999). 
306 See, for example, M.B.E. Clarkson, "A Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating 
Corporate Social Performance," Academy of Management Review 20 (1995).; also, Rowley and 
Berman "A Brand New Brand of Corporate Social Performance." 
307 Mar~olis and Walsh, People and Profits? The Search for a Link between a Company's Social and 
Financial Performance. 
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complexities of the quantitative manoeuvres that result in a CSP measure thus figure, 
in the academic sphere at least, as a major point of discussion. 308 
The Commercial Measurement of CSR 
Concern with the accurate measurement of CSR is no less salient in the 
commercial sphere of practice, only here it is often manifest in a less technical 
manner. The call for 'better metrics,' for more 'widely accepted' measurements of 
CSR, issues forth from numerous locations in the corporate world. It may for 
instance, often be found at the end of a report or survey of executive attitudes, 
characterised as CSR's "biggest challenge.,,309 Or, as is also frequently the case, it 
may be heard from CSR professionals themselves as they address each other as well 
as various interested publics. I will go on to discuss these instances and others in 
greater empirical detail later in the chapter, suffice to note for now though, that the 
tone in which these calls may generally be observed to be made is at once effusive 
and aspirational, but also sometimes conflicted as to how practically to proceed. 
The academic/commercial divide that I have been describing up until now, 
while worth introducing in order to demonstrate where different types of empirical 
research in CSR typically issue forth from, should not be left uncritically stated. 
Where I have been designating an 'academy' as distinct from an 'industry' it is 
important to note, as counterpoint, the extreme permeability of these designations in 
the present case. It is in fact possible to observe a high degree of reciprocity, and 
even convergence, between scholarly and commercial approaches to CSR. Both, in 
practice, feed off and into one another. To the extent that the business case maxim of 
'doing well by doing good' acts to organise empirical engagement in particular ways, 
308 See major debates over the best way to regress the variables, for instance; McWilliams and Siegel, 
"Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Performance: Correlation or Misspecification?" 
Concentration of academic attention on the technicalities of CSP measurement can also be discerned 
in the profusion of conferences recently organised on this topic - for example a 2006 Melbourne 
University conference titled 'How Best to Measure?' 
309 Oracle and The Economist Intelligence Unit survey of 136 executives and 65 institutional 
investors, October 2004. Participants were asked about "the influence of corporate responsibility on 
global business." Reported in, Lisa Roner, "While 25% of Global Fortune 500 Co~panies Pr~duce th 
Ethical Reports, Investors Are Most Interested in Transparency." Ethical Corporatzon "\1agazme, 17 
February, 2005. 
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it does so simultaneously in the numerous spheres of attention to CSR. If. as I have 
just claimed, it is possible to say that the commercial or 'public' face of CSR 
exhibits a less technical concern with CSR measurement, this is not to imply the 
irrelevance of technicality in this sphere, but rather just to observe the way in which 
this work is done elsewhere. 
The following examples of quantifying practice in CSR provide an apt 
demonstration of this point. In the highly reflexive realm of the contemporary CSR 
market, the proliferation of ratings, ranks, indices and metrics for the measurement 
of relative ethical performance illustrate the (strange) meeting of calculative 
expertise, potential profitability, and demands for the increased visibility of 
corporate behaviour. 
- Rating, Ranking, Measuring 
Nowhere is the enormity of the market for CSR more evident than in the 
proliferation of practices, agencies, consultancies, ranks, funds, and indices, that 
have emerged very recently, (mostly in the last five years), in order to address the 
growing demand for information on responsible corporate behaviour and take 
advantage of the opportunities that this new market may have to offer. Here, I will 
attempt to describe only small slices of this considerable field - demonstrating with 
each example addressed the particular methods employed to render CSR calculable, 
paying particular attention to how these 'calculabilities' interface with, or lead on to, 
the issue of profitability. As will become evident, the examples that I have chosen to 
discuss in detail here have been chosen on the basis of their difference from one 
another, but also on the basis of their standing or general acceptability in the field as 
a whole. 
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'Best Corporate Citizens' 
Firstly, the 100 Best Corporate Citizens310 list: In its 8th annual edition in 
2007, this widely respected and popular measure ranks, from one to one hundred, 
major public companies on the basis of a "range of environmental, social, 
governance, and financial metrics.,,311 Presently published by Corporate 
Responsibility Officer (The CRO) magazine, this ranking was originally developed 
and published by its predecessor, Business Ethics magazine, (this name change is 
itself indicative of the shift in trend from 'business ethics' to CSR discussed at length 
in Chapter One). In order to begin to compile the list, first, and this practice is 
common to all methods of ethical ranking, what are referred to as 'eligible universes' 
have to be delineated. What this means simply is that companies considered eligible 
to be featured on the list are drawn from particular sources, most frequently, well 
recognised share indices. Importantly, each different ethical ranking system 
designates its own 'eligible universes,' (though frequently there is a great deal of 
overlap between these owing to the fact that there are a limited number of large and 
well-respected share indices). Alternatively, some ranking systems a priori eliminate 
companies on the basis of how they earn their revenue. As such, weapons 
manufacturers, tobacco companies and so forth may be excluded. This however is 
not the method employed by the CRO, the criteria for inclusion on their 100 Best list 
is simply that the company be listed on one of three major share indices - the Russell 
1000, S&P 500, or Domini Social 400 indices. 
Inclusion and ranking in the list is detennined by calculating company 
perfonnance in eight categories: "shareholders, community, governance, diversity, 
employees, environment, human rights, and product.,,312 Scores in seven of these 
eight categories are based on data sourced from KLD Research & Analytics, (a large 
research provider, who, on their website, underscore their 'independent' status). The 
KLD database contains infonnation from what is referred to on their website as 
310 See, for 2007 list; http://www.thecro.comlfiles/CROlOOBestCorporateCitizensList2007.pdf 
311 The Methodology Behind the Rankings (KLD, www.kld.com. 2007 [cited 30th November 2007]). 
312 Ibid. 
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" It' 1 ,,313 Of h d ,. . mu Ip e sources. t ese, ata acqUIred through dIrect communication with 
listed companies' is marked out for special attention. Here, two points are worth 
noting - firstly, the distinction between an 'independent research provider' and a 
consultancy firm, and secondly, the significance in this context ofKLD's claim 
regarding their 'direct communication with companies.' 
The variety of existent methods for ranking CSR quite literally compete in 
the marketplace. Though each lays claim to objectivity and freedom from bias, ranks 
too, it should be emphasised, are market-objects.314 By underscoring their status as 
'independent research provider,' KLD draws attention to its supposed neutrality. 
Consultancy firms, by contrast it is implied, can not be similarly rigorous insofar as 
they are in the employ of particular firms that they may also take part in ranking. 
This claim to independent neutrally however, should not be mistaken for the 
suggestion that KLD has no relationship with the firms on which it collates data. 
As the second point above draws attention to, KLD are keen to point out the 
'direct communications' they undertake with the ranked companies. In a market 
whereby a number of ranks are complied solely on the basis of publicly available 
information, 'direct communication' suggests that KLD are privy to infonnation that 
is unavailable to most. Independence and the practice of 'direct communication' are 
thus advertised insofar as these, for KLD, are understood to provide their data with a 
competitive edge in a crowded marketplace. It is an obvious point, but the eventual 
100 Best list (complied from data provided by KLD) operates, to the extent that the 
list is perceived to be reliable and is respected within the business community, to the 
financial benefit of both the listed companies and KLD themselves. 'Objectivity' is 
thus a highly tradable chip in the CSR ratings game. 
A final point worth noting with regard to this particular ethical rank is the 
origin of the data that goes towards scoring the 'eighth' performance category. The 
'shareholder' category of the 100 Best list is a financial rating. Not based on the 
quantification and aggregation of information regarding social or environmental 
performance, it is purely a measure of financial return - specifically, a three-year 
313 Ibid. www.kld.comlreearchlsocrateslbusinessethicsl0012007/ 
314 See, for a discussion of competition between environmental measurement firms in relation to 
governance; Barry, "The Anti-Political Economy." 
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average of total return to the shareholders ("stock price appreciation plus 
dividends,,315) of each assessed company. Thus, notably, for the publishers of the 100 
Best, profitability is itself a requisite component of being one of the 'Best Corporate 
Citizens. ' 
The inclusion of profitability data in the compilation of the rank itself is a 
clearly demonstrative instance of the business case in action. This is not to suggest 
that other CSR ranks which assess financial performance are any less complicit in 
this reasoning, just to note the explicitness of this particular example. Ethical ranks 
of all kinds in this context, whether or not they directly include data on company 
financial performance, recall an observation made by Fabian Muniesa, Millo Yuval, 
and Michel Callon - "being economic is not a qualification that comes from outside 
the agencement.,,316 
What I take to be the significance of this understanding is that market 
'devices' (as Muniesa et al. would term them), such as the ethical rank, are not only 
'economic' after the fact. It is not only that a high CSR rank may, for instance, 
subsequently see a company included in various ethical investment portfolios, in this 
way generating greater profits, or even that, it could be claimed, a high score may 
have positive reputation, brand, or employee motivation effects. While all these 
outcomes are of course a possibility, this is because the 'market device,' in this 
example, the CSR rank, has already worked to render 'ethics,' in this context, more 
'economic' at the outset. Or, more accurately, following Muniesa et ai., markets may 
be observed to contain devices that aim at "enacting particular versions of what it is 
b . ,,317 to e economIc. 
EthicalQuote 
This is interestingly illustrated in a different way by the EthicalQuote system 
developed by Swiss company Covalence and first published in 2004. Unlike 
measures that seek to rank companies on the basis of their 'actual' socially 
315 The Methodology Behind the Rankings. 
316 Muniesa, Millo, and CalIon, "An Introduction to Market Devices." p.4 
317 Ibid. 
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responsible behaviour, Covalence's EthicalQuote system functions to provide an 
"evolutionary picture" 318 of how companies are perceived with regard to their ethical 
reputation. Here, 'direct communication' with the company is neither prized nor 
necessary, and tricky judgements regarding what counts as 'ethical' are side-stepped 
to a degree. Where KLD proceed in their ranking by delineating eight realms of 
responsibility, hence entering into definitional debates as to what might be said to 
'count' as ethical corporate behaviour, Covalence employ a technique that seeks to 
measure "ethical performance as it is perceived and communicated in society,,,319 
employing 'reputation' as a barometer of this. 
Methodologically speaking, Covalence's analysts monitor media (primarily 
using the internet) and, on this basis, constantly establish and re-establish an up-to-
date norm of the expectations of 'society' as these pertain to corporate ethics. The 
practical task remains however, just as it is for KLD, to codify, or quantify 
qualitative data. In the case of the EthicalQuote, this is done by assigning a 'below 
expectation,' (-1), or an 'above expectation,' (+ 1), to various media and public 
documents concerning the surveyed companies, then aggregating these to give an 
idea of 'ethical reputation' as it is perceived at a given point in time. 
Although this account does not do full justice to the intricacy of Covalence's 
method, for the purposes of this discussion, it illustrates the basic point concerning 
the creation of a market-ready variable. As Covalence's promotion material attests, 
EthicalQuote is a tool able to "help investors, enterprises themselves, and public 
interest organizations [in] analyzing the ethical risks and opportunities that come 
with multinational enterprises' operations.,,32o Ethical reputation, even as that which 
may quite uncontroversially be said to have imaginable 'economic' consequences for 
a company, is arguably made 'more economic,' or may at least be said to partake in 
the performance a particular version of the economic, insofar as it is quantified and 
made calculable in a particular way through EthicalQuote. 
318http://www.covalence.chlindex. php/products/methodology / [Accessed 30th November, 2007] 
Covalence's 'eligible universe' consists 0[300 companies classified as large capitalisations in the 
Dow Jones World Index. 
319 Ibid. 
320 Ibid. 
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To return quickly to a point I have been sketchily outlining through this 
section, ranking systems, ethical rating agencies, ethical investment screens and so 
forth, all compete, as market devices, on the basis of their particular distinctiveness. 
To survive, they must be perceived to be of use - to have a function. As such, it is 
possible to observe a multiplicity of techniques and methodologies for the 
measurement of CSR, each justified on the basis of the propounded merits of its 
particular approach. This is described by some commentators as leading to a problem 
of 'balance' between "standardization and differentiation," 321 basically, the 
difficulty of establishing an agreed upon or 'standard' measure of CSR. Although 
many, including those who work in rating and ranking, may indeed agree in principle 
that a standard measure of CSR is desirable for the purposes of comparison, the 
proliferation of non-comparable measures may be understood to arise in a market 
context from the desire to competitively 'differentiate one's product.' 
The 'usefulness' of such measurement systems extends beyond their 
marketability to particular companies. While the EthicalQuote system need be 
'bought' by a company seeking to monitor its ethical reputation, a consultancy firm 
is in the employ of a commissioning company, and 'independent' research firm KLD 
advertises its 'direct communication' with analysed firms, the measurement of 
corporate ethics may also proceed, as Celia Lury and Liz Moor note, without the 
direct involvement of companies themselves.322 Corporate critics, non-governmental 
organisations, and activist groups often utilise formats such as the rank, audit, and 
even corporate 'annual report,' to alternatively highlight perceived wrong-doings 
absent in official accounts.323 An example of this is 'Burning Capital,' a performance 
ofBP's 2007 results by activist group PLATFORM staged on the day before BP's 
official results announcement and press conference.324 The annual report format was 
utilised by PLATFORM to call attention to the way in which BP's investments of the 
321 William Baue, Corporate Social Responsibility Rating Agencies Balance Standardization and 
Differentiation (www.socialfunds.com/news/. 2003 [cited 30th November 2007]). 
322 Celia Lury and Liz Moor, "Brand Valuation and Topological Culture," in Blowing up the Brand, 
ed. Melissa Aronczyk and Devon Powers (New York: Peter Lang, 2010). [forthcoming] 
323 Ibid. 
324 PLATFORM, Carbon Web, Burning Capital, A performance ofBP's fourth quarter and full year 
results, 2007, 4th Feb, 2008. http://www.platformlondon.org!carbonweblburning! 
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past year might be measured alternatively against growing concern about climate 
change. 
In addition to differentiation on the basis of methodology and intention, CSR 
rankings also differ notably with regard to the presentation of their output. Here, as I . 
alluded to previously, the behind the scenes calculative detail and complexity is 
glossed by a user-friendly 'public face.' Very often, inquiries as to a company's 
'ethical standing' may not get any further than this. Distributed as press releases, 
quoted briefly in various surveys, or as an evening news sound-bite, the method 
behind the rank does not travel, its qualitative origins and calculative compilation 
stay mostly concealed. 
The presentation of ranks, for instance, frequently sees these reduced to their 
barest components. In the case of the well-respected AccountAbility325 rank a 
numbered list is simply offered. This is reproduced below: 
Figure I: AccountAbility Rating 2007326 
1. BP 
2. Barclays 
3. ENI 
4. HSBC Holdings 
5. Vodafone 
6. Royal Dutch Shell 
7. Peugeot 
8. HBOS 
9. Chevron 
10. DaimlerChrysler 
325 AccountAbility is a large, not-for-profit sustainability partnership founded in London in 1995, but 
now with a number of global offices. See; http://www.accountability21.net/ 
326 http://www.accountability21.net/default.aspx?id=1496 [Accessed 30th November, 2007]. Quickly 
looking over a rank such as this one, the companies that rank highly often come as something of a 
surprise, (particularly so in this case given the aforementioned concerns that activist groups such as 
PLATFORM have expressed about BP). This AccountAbility ranking is a case in point - headlined by 
two companies that of late have received considerable amount of bad press with regard to their ethical 
credentials. In other ranking systems BP may have been excluded a priori on the basis of being 
involved in an 'extractive' or polluting industry. What this ranking does go to show again though is 
the extent to which ranks themselves are 'market-devices.' A high ranking from AccountAbility might 
be achieved for instance, through large amounts of corporate spending on CSR advertising and 
pUblicity. Or, as was the case particularly when Lord Browne was BP CEO, a high profile 
management that is publicly committed to the CSR cause and hence draws attention to it. Also 
interesting to note is the large variations in rank outcomes. It is not uncommon to find the top 
companies in one account, either absent from, or very low scoring in another. Levels of consistency 
are extremely low. 
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This information is presented just as it is shown here on the company 
website, prefaced only by a brief introduction that notes how, in the 2007 ratings, 
"European companies ... lead the way. ,,327 The 100 Best provides slightly more 
detail than this, presenting a linear ranking of its one hundred companies alongside 
their raw numerical scores in each of the eight sectors, as well as the average of these 
on which the final ranking position is based.328 By contrast to the relative simplicity 
of these presentations, Covalence's EthicalQuote distinguishes itself by means of 
what their promotion material refers to as its " innovative graphical outcome. ,,329 
"Inspired," as the company notes, "by stock quotes,,,330 EthicalQuote, is made 
available as a graph: 
figure2: Et~ic~IQuoteO~tput Gr~ph for the \\leek Pr~ceding 26th November, 2007 
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327 Ibid. 
328 http://www.thecro.comlfiles/CRO 1 00BestCorporateCitizensList2007 .pdf th 
329 http://www.covalence.chlindex.php/products/methodology/#9 [Accessed 30 November, 2007] 
330 Ibid. 
124 
Here, as with the 100 Best, raw scores accompany the output ranking (or, in 
this case, graph). As is clear from the contrast between this and the previous 
example, rankings are also differentiated by timescale. While the 100 Best and 
Accountability rating are published annually, EthicalQuote is 'live' so to speak, 
updated weekly, and graphically available in week, month, and year long views. 
In researching and presenting this discussion of CSR ranking I have drawn 
only on publicly available information. Primarily, this information was sourced from 
the publishing or compiling company's website, and offered for no charge. To 
engage in a discussion of this level around CSR measurement is unproblematic in 
terms of access to information. The companies that compile the ranks I have 
discussed here offer obligingly to guide you through a user-friendly version of their 
calculative methodology, complete, often, with useful pictures and other aids to 
understanding. This may be said however, only insofar as these 'guides to method' 
serve as promotional materials to demonstrate, for instance, a particularly 
comprehensive database of source information, or a novel, 'innovative' approach. 
Not entered into, as critics of CSR ranking keenly point out, are discussions 
concerning how exactly what comes to 'count' is decided to begin with, or how 
exactly codes become measures, and measures become subject to calculation and 
various forms of aggregation. These processes, critics claim with no slight measure 
of irony, while marauding under the banner of 'transparency,' frequently serve to 
confound this in their secrecy and complexity offunction.331 I will return to discuss 
this contradiction in further detail though towards the end of this chapter. 
A Trust in N umber? 
If the preceding discussion attempted to identify and illustrate just some of 
the modes in which CSR is commonly made calculable and rendered quantitative, we 
might continue to ask what may be said in a sociological vein regarding the 
331 Roner, "While 25% of Global Fortune 500 Companies Produce Ethical Reports, Investors Are 
Most Interested in Transparency." p.2 
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significance of this numerical profusion. A notable approach to questions of 
quantitative predominance comes courtesy of Ted Porter and highlights 'trust' as a 
crucial analytical dimension. Numerical solutions, Porter suggests, tend to emerge in 
climates characterised by doubt and mistrust, the supposedly non-interpretative or 
'objective' nature of numbers themselves giving rise to what is referred to as a 
widespread "trust in number. ,,332 
As understood by Porter, but also similarly theorised by sociologists such as 
Michael Power and Mary Poovey, numbers can work to resolve doubt, confer 
certainty and universality, establish expertise and authority, and de-personalise, or 
'objectify' knowledge.333 To employ Poovey's phrase, numbers perform ideally as 
representations of "non-interpretive facts.,,334 These, she contends, "have come to 
seem pre-interpretive or even somehow non-interpretive at the same time as they 
have become the bedrock of systematic knowledge.,,335 The quantitative aspect of the 
market context itself, might then, following this account, be understood to belie a 
desire for "correct representations,,336 of financial information. Crucially here, the 
numerical connotes a kind of informational transparency, suggesting freedom from 
distortion, and self-apparent 'truth.' 
Given the perceived 'firmness' or conferred 'stability' of number, Porter's 
thesis regarding climates of mistrust is intuitively appealing. Where doubt prevails, a 
"calculative lingua franca,,33? promises impartiality and freedom from polluting bias. 
332 Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). The 'trust in number' that Porter suggests appears in 
slightly different form in the work of many other scholars; Nigel Thrift speculates about a 
generalisation of what he calls "faith in number," for instance. p.592. Nigel Thrift, "Movement-Space: 
The Changing Domain of Thinking Resulting from the Development of New Kinds of Spatial 
Awareness," Economy and Society 33, no. 4 (2004). 
333 Theodore M. Porter, "Making Things Quantitative," in Accounting and Science, Natural Inquiry 
and Commercial Reason, ed. Michael Power (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).; Porter, 
Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life.; Mary Poovey, A History of 
the Modern Fact: Problems of Know ledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1998).; Michael Power, The Audit Explosion (London: Demos, 1994). 
334 Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and 
Society. p.xi 
335 Ib'd .. 1 ., p.Xll 
336 Paul Rabinow, "Representations Are Social Facts," in Essays in the Anthropology of Reason 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996 [1986]). 
337 Michel CalIon and John Law, "Guest Editorial: Absence-Presence, Circulation, and Encountering 
in Complex Space," Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 22 (2004). p.724 
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To employ this reasoning in the case of CSR, it might be claimed that where 
companies are called upon to 'prove' their ethical credentials, quantitative 
measurements may come to prevail as it is these that present data most 
'transparently.' While this reasoning holds that quantitative methods emerge as the 
practice of choice in CSR simply because they are taken to be the 'best' or most 
accurate, it is perhaps more fruitful to approach this issue, to begin, in a slightly 
different way. Which forms of practice, we might ask, are the most convincing or 
persuasive in this particular context?338 
This question may be interestingly explored by briefly recalling the study of 
ARESE (a French CSR ratings agency) conducted by Frederique Dejean, Jean-Pascal 
Gond and Bernard Leca.339 In the preceding section, I drew attention to the way in 
which the techniques employed to assess CSR themselves have a market-value; in 
Dejean et al. 's account, this is explained, partially at least, with reference to various 
functions of 'trust.' In a series of interviews with ARESE analysts and executives, 
Dejean et al. learn that the CSP rating measures that the company design and operate 
are purposefully quantitative in nature not because quantitative measures are 
perceived to be the most effective, but because this methodology was understood to 
conform most closely to the expectations of the financial community regarding the 
derivation of ratings. 340 In selling their services to the financial community, the key 
features ARESE sought to stress were the quantitative, reliable, and complex nature 
of their metrics?41 As one ARESE analyst is quoted by Dejean et al. as saying: 
When investors came to see us looking for information about our ratings, we gave 
them a presentation of our methodology - we called it the 'black box' - it was a 
computerised presentation. We'd run it at least once for all our customers ... 
Sometimes we'd show it to prospective clients and they'd sign up straight 
away ... That's proof they were convinced by what they saw. 342 
338 Marilyn Strathern, "New Accountabilities: Anthropological Studies in Audit, Ethics and the 
Academy," in Audit Cultures, ed. Marilyn Strathern (London: Routledge, 2000). p.l 
339 Frederique Dejean, Jean-Pascal Gond, and Bernard Leca, "Measuring the Unmeasured: An 
Institutional Entrepreneur Strategy in an Emerging Industry," Human Relations 57, no. 6 (2004). 
340 Ibid., p.752 
341 Ibid., p.753 
342 ARESE analyst, in Ibid., p.753 
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Conforming to the technical expectations of those who seek to use it , 
ARESE's 'black box' works, according to Dejean et aI., via a kind of exploitation of 
the financial community's 'trust in number.' At once, quantitative techniques and 
outputs serve to legitimate the practice of social rating itself and function as a 
particular selling point. This again recalls CalIon's previously quoted observation 
about 'becoming economic.' CSR does not become 'economic' by virtue of being 
measured. That it is already economic is reflected in the existence form and , , 
function of the measurement techniques themselves. ARESE's potential clients 
apparently seek to be convinced, thus, in financial markets that are themselves 
quantitative in content, Dejean et aI. claim that persuasion comes in the form of 
calculability. Again, the ARESE analyst: 
We'd use statistical and exploratory analysis ... to justify our seriousness, to say: 
'Look, it's simply through analysis, we have a system of analysis - a complex black 
calculating box?43 
This explanation in terms of 'legitimacy' and trusted forms of output 
however, is also unsettling on a number of accounts. On the one hand, it is 
reasonable to expect that those who deal daily with numbers are comfortable with 
this form of output, and similarly, that a certain stock might be placed in the 'expert' 
status conferred by complex calculations. On the other hand however, 'trust' 
provides a very one dimensional account of the variety of relationships to number 
that are most likely being enacted here. Number may function to confer legitimacy, it 
may be on occasion be a trusted and convincing form of information. Equally 
though, instances of 'mistrust' in number,' it seems to me, might also simultaneously 
be observable alongside and in-conjunction. 
More important than the relative balance of trust and mistrust though, is the 
sense in which this particular form of explanation makes a 'black box' of the 
question of quantification itself. Questions regarding the processes which work to 
derive quantity from social phenomena or 'quality,' are sidelined by the focus on 
trust, and an interesting set of issues regarding practices of 'making quantitative' are 
343 ARESE analyst, in Ibid. 
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thus left un-approached. Drawing, in the following section, on field work conducted 
at a London School of Economics CSR forum, while highlighting the ways in which 
the participant CSR professionals are involved in various relationships of trust (and 
mistrust) with number, I will also go beyond this to note the ways in which the 
complex relationships to quantification enacted recommend a closer attention to the 
actual creation of 'number' in this context. 
'The Floor and Not the Ceiling ... ' 
On the surface of it, that some form of quantitative measurement tends to be 
the foremost method of establishing the 'ethicality' of a corporation seems to lend 
support to claims regarding the 'trustworthiness' of number. However, while the 
'metric' is rarely absent from discussions ofCSR, its presence is neither 
uncontroversial, nor uncontested. Ubiquitous is the suggested need for the 'right 
metrics,' or 'better metrics,' yet these calls are frequently made as 'answer,' or posed 
as 'solution,' while a discussion of how these 'better' metrics might be arrived at, or 
what they may look like, is deferred, or shifted elsewhere. Even in discussions that 
purport to address the question of measurement explicitly, this deferral is readily 
identifiable; the 'right metric' often conjured as the property of an aspired-toward, 
but yet-to-be achieved future. 
Responding to a question specifically addressing 'how' the positive impacts 
of CSR might be assessed, this tendency is discemable in responses given by the 
CSR professionals participant in the 2007 LSE forum CSR at its Crossroads.344 For 
Gib Bulloch, Director of Accenture Development Partnerships (a not-for-profit arm 
of Accenture), the search for the right metric takes on something of a quest-like 
quality: 
Well, the problem is knowing how to measure ... we don't yet quite know how to 
measure employee satisfaction, uplift in attitudes towards the company, employee 
344 'CSR at its Crossroads.' 18th January, 2007. Event organised by the London School of Economics 
Student CSR Society. This event featured a panel of four CSR professionals - Gib Bulloch of 
Accenture, Dorian Emmett of AngloAmerican, Katie Stafford of Marks & Spencer, and Andrea 
Sullivan of Lehman Brothers. 
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hires ... The question - how many people are we lifting out of poverty, how many 
people are we helping? It's the Holy Grail and I am not sure that anyone has got it 
right.345 
'Not quite knowing how to measure' occupies a kind of double position in 
this discussion though. On the one hand, it is a critique of prevailing metrics, as well, 
potentially, of the possibility of 'measurement' at all, while on the other, it is also the 
driver of ever more extensive quantification. Here, the responses of Dorian Emmett, 
Head of Sustainable Development at AngloAmerican, demonstrates this latter 
tendency while surreptitiously recognising the problems of measurement to which 
Bulloch attests: 
You have to be able to performance manage and therefore you have to have the right 
metrics and databases that can process non-financial metrics ... We do need to 
develop new metrics in these less-determinate areas.346 
The term 'non-financial' is an interesting negation. That there is not a 
positive term in the language of metrics to refer to the "less determinate areas" of 
which Emmett speaks, demonstrates the difficulties that surround "knowing how to 
measure" with regard to CSR. Significantly though, for Emmett, these difficulties 
suggest the need for the development of "new" metrics. On this basis, any charge of 
technological determinism with regard to the measurement of CSR is somewhat ill-
conceived. Organisational performance, as these examples attest, is always being 
imagined and re-imagined before, or irrespective of, the availability of measures that 
may be up to the task.347 
Concomitantly though, sociologists have aptly noted the way in which, 
within technocratic measurement regimes, the very failures of the system may be 
transformed into opportunities for its further expansion. As Michael Power has 
observed, it is in response to difficulties regarding 'how to measure' that efforts 
emerge to develop measurement systems that are more attuned to complexity and 
sensitivity, but, in this moment, these same systems of measurement extend to 
345 Gib Bulloch, 'CSR at is Crossroads.' 
346 Dorian Emmett, 'CSR at is Crossroads.' 
347 Michael Power, "Counting, Control and Calculation: Reflections on Measuring and Management," 
Human Relations 57, no. 6 (2004). p.768 
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address new domains and objects.348 The 'gaps' created by technocratic failure, as 
Robert Castel has put it, serve as further "targets for intervention. ,,349 
While this tendency is certainly observable in Emmett's statement, excessive 
attention to moments of technocratic 'expansion' may bear insufficient witness to the 
converse - what Annelise Riles has called moments of "technocratic unwinding.,,35o 
The call for more and better measurement is indeed prevalent in CSR, (the earlier 
quote from Bulloch exhibits, in much the same mode as Emmett's, a desire to see 
metrics develop and become more accurate in areas where they presently lag), and 
yet, as I have said, doubts as to the ultimate suitability of these persist. This is 
discernable in the following comment also made by Bulloch: 
Metrics are the floor and not the ceiling of where CSR can go. We need to set the 
ceiling where we want it to be.351 
Following from previous discussion, we might perceive in this statement an 
element of 'distrust.' The 'metric' is not unproblematically proposed as that through 
which a 'sum CSR' might be calculated. As the 'floor' and not the 'ceiling,' metrics 
and the quantitative techniques these entail are positioned as inferior in relation to 
something 'other,' which, in the present accounts at least, is not understood to be 
quantifiable. If this relationship to number may be said to be characterised even in 
part by trust, it is, as CalIon and Law suggest, certainly a "dried Up,,,352 or 
undermined kind of trust. Conversely, 'real' trust is alternatively positioned beyond 
the possibility of quantifiable accountability. A comment from Andrea Sullivan of 
Lehman Brothers echoes Bulloch's sentiment: 
348 Ibid., p.775 
349 Robert Castel, "From Dangerousness to Risk," in The Foucault Reader: Studies in 
Governmentality, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1991). p.288 
350 Riles, "Real Time: Unwinding Technocratic and Anthropological Knowledge." p.398 
351 Gib Bulloch, 'CSR at its Crossroads.' 
352 Michel CalIon and John Law, "On Qualculation, Agency and Otherness," Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space 23 (2005). p.724 
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We do measure and set goals, but we are also more holistic than that '" We look at 
investors and suppliers and when something is not ethically sound we are not in 
't 353 ' 1 • 
Critiques of number and quantitative methodology are not only available to 
sociologists or those working outside what may be thought of as the economic realm. 
These critiques are similarly available and common to those in the business world 
and are employed not only in anticipation that they might otherwise be levelled from 
elsewhere. In this highly reflexive realm, they are also delivered 'authentically' (so 
to speak). The trust/distrust formula here becomes problematic and its analytic 
limitations evident. It is not possible, I would suggest, to dichotomise in this case, 
demarking those who may be said to 'trust' in number ('economists,' 'business-
people,') from those who do not (,sociologists,' 'critical thinkers'). In the final 
appraisal, 'trust' per se takes something of a back seat with regard to the more 
pertinent issue of noting the differences between that which is understood to be 
calculable as opposed to that which is characterised as non-calculable.354 
The preceding examples might be alternatively approached, following this, 
through a consideration of what might be called the 'moral economy of 
pricelessness.' Although I do not wish to propose that pricelessness and non-
calculability are exactly analogous, bear with me as I go on to discuss the two - and 
fmally the parallels between CSR professionals and social scientists with regards to 
their critiques of number. 
'Some Things are Priceless' ... (but for Everything Else Employ a Calculator?) 
Briefly, my claim here is that evocations of'immeasurability' or 'non-
calculability,' whether these hail from industry or academia, take part in an economy 
of quantification that is largely circular in nature, and that can function to obscure the 
possibility of a more nuanced account of calculation. To explain, as CalIon and Law 
353 Andrea Sullivan, 'CSR at its Crossroads.' Following Lehman's 2008 bankruptcy through over-
exposure in the sub-prime mortgage market, this statement takes on a certain measure of irony. See 
Chapter Seven for further discussion of 'hindsight' as conferred by the financial crisis. 
354 Recall along these lines Chapter Two's review of 'self-destructinglboundless/corrupting' 
sociological approaches to markets. 
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have argued, "incalculabilities" are constructed, made, or enacted into being just as 
much as calculabilities are.355 The calculable and incalculable are mutually 
constitutive and reinforcing - simply, the existence of one implies and depends on 
the other. Departing somewhat from CalIon and Law's account of the 
'incalculable, ,356 it is interesting to alternatively consider, in the context the previous 
empirical examples, the notion of 'pricelessness,' and specifically the way in which a 
certain moral economy may be seen to function around this. 
The MasterCard slogan is an eloquent demonstration of the moral tone of 
incalculability that I am referring to here: "Some things are priceless, for everything 
else there's MasterCard.,,357 The designation of 'some things' as beyond or 'above' 
the possibility of quantification suggests a certain immorality attached to number. 
not only in the designation of 'price' ('money can't buy love,' and so forth), but also 
in the suggestion that the simplification, classification, and calculation that constitute 
quantification are no match for the messy 'real world.' Bulloch and Sullivan testify 
to the importance of CSR metrics, but significantly these are understood to only go 
part of the way towards constituting a CSR 'whole.' 
This moral economy of priceless ness though, overlaps interestingly with 
another. Where the CSR professional may be disposed to designate the priceless, for 
sociology, judgement has traditionally been that which is often counter-posed to 
calculation. Here, the expansion of quantitative techniques into areas "properly the 
domain of human judgemenC358 is frequently highlighted as a matter of critical 
concern. How, it is asked, may very complex things, such as human values and 
ethics, possibly be 'measured,' how can these simply be reduced to numerical 
355 Ibid., p.718 (original italics) 
356 Ibid., p.717. Specifically, and as opposed to 'incalculability' per se, CalIon and Law identify two 
strategies to what they term 'nonqualculability,' these are "rarefaction" and "proliferation." 
Rarefaction is illustrated with reference to Quaker worship and selfless love or agape, and is 
characterized by the authors as proceeding via the withdrawal of all qualculative resources. 
Proliferation, conversely, implies impeded calculation as a result of an overload of qualculative 
resources, and is illustrated by the example of a telethon (televised fundraiser), p. 717. My interest in 
nonqualculability is more straightforward - simply put, I am using the term to introduce a focus on 
the construction of 'pricelessness' as a form of incalculability. 
357 Series of MasterCard advertisements, 1997-2007. 
358 For overview of debate, see, Power, "Counting, Control and Calculation: Reflections on Measuring 
and Management." p.772 
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scores?359 Additionally though, and for others, the issue at stake is not so much 
moral as political and concerned with 'expanding' neo-liberal governance - if 
number works to stabilise, establishing agreement and reducing the space of 
contestation, are measurement regimes in fact 'anti-political' in nature?360 A 
common starting point for both these modes of sociological critique is in the 
observation of a current 'mania' for measurement.361 Porter, in particular, makes this 
observation, the present, for him, characterised by "promiscuous measuring,,362 
extended to ever new domains and making ever more objects visible in terms of 
calculation. 
The spread of this 'measurement mania' also produces new objects for 
sociology itself. Recent studies to have emerged address, for instance, audit,363 
bl ' .. 364 . 365· k 366 d . . pu IC opmIOn, accountmg, ns, an varIOUS other contemporary practIces 
whereby a 'making quantitative' may be observed. Given the claims regarding 
reductionism and de-politicisation that have arisen in from some of this work though, 
it is perhaps worth taking a closer look at how measurement functions, and in 
particular, at claims regarding the metrological transformation of quality into 
quantity. Can this process be demonstrated, in any convincing way, to reductively 
result in the abstraction of important meaning and the limitation of political 
opportunity, or, might it serve alternatively as an occasion for the rethinking of both 
359 See, for instance, David Boyle, The Tyranny o/Numbers: Why Counting Cant Make Us Happy 
(London: Harper-Collins, 2001). 
360 See, for critique and discussion of this perspective, Barry, "The Anti-Political Economy." 
Barry notes how, following Max Weber's work on rationality, forms of measurement and calculation 
have been understood as 'essentially anti-political instrument[s]' To the extent that political questions 
are understood to be re-posed, via calculation, as technical problems that may be solved. 
Measurement thus, is 'thought to reduce the space of the political and to limit the possibility for 
disagreement.' p. 272. 
361 See Power "Counting Control and Calculation: Reflections on Measuring and Management. " , 
" , 
Thrift, "Movement-Space: The Changing Domain of Thinking Resulting from the Development of 
New Kinds of Spatial Awareness."; Ian Hacking, The Taming o/Chance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990).; Porter, "Making Things Quantitative." 
362 Porter, "Making Things Quantitative." p.44 
363 See, Power, The Audit Explosion.; Marilyn Strathern, Audit Cultures (London: Routledge, 2000). 
364 Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose, "Do the Social Sciences Create Phenomena?: The Example of 
Public Opinion Research," British Journal o/Sociology 50, no. 3 (1999). 
365 Miller, "Governing by Numbers: Why Calculative Practices Matter." 
366 Hacking, The Taming o/Chance. 
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'quality' and 'quantity' in this context? The next section will address itself to these 
questions. 
The Texture of the Quantitative 
Calculation, it is oft-noted within sociology, proceeds through a kind of 
double production of reality. As explained by Herbert Kalthoff, in order to 
quantitatively 'show something,' or to bring something into existence, something 
else must be made 'disappear. ,367 This may be further elaborated by reference to 
Callon's notion of framing (discussed previously in Chapter One). In order for 
calculation to begin, it is noted, "a clear and precise boundary must be drawn 
between the relations which agents will take into account and which will serve in 
their calculations and those which will be thrown out of the calculation as such. ,,368 
Entities thus, in order to be calculated or taken into account, must first be detached -
ordered, moved, arranged and 'framed' in a single space.369 
Objects, or dimensions of objects, that find themselves for whatever reason 
outside this frame will remain unquantified, and therefore, literally speaking, can be 
said not to count. The calculation process proceeds subsequently utilising only the 
framed entities. These, as a second step, are then associated with one another, subject 
to various transformations and manipulations, then, finally, calculated to extract a 
result. The resultant entity - whether it be a sum, list, rank, or so forth, is 
subsequently free to circulate, to move elsewhere unencumbered by its originating 
calculative apparatus. 370 
At the heart of critiques proposing the inherently reductive nature of 
calculation are concerns that the 'unframed' might be dismissed as an 'externality,' 
lost from view as a function of its 'immeasurability,,371 or simplified beyond 
meaningful recognition in the process of numerical classification. These concerns are 
367 Herbert Kalthoff, "Figures, Writing and Calculation: Thoughts on the Representation of Economic 
Practices," Economic Sociology - The European Electronic Newsletter 3, no. 3 (2002). p.28 
368 CalIon, "Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics." p.16 
369 CalIon and Muniesa, "Peripheral Vision: Economic Markets as Calculative Collective Devices." 
p.1231 
370 Ibid. 
371 Power, "Counting, Control and Calculation: Reflections on Measuring and Management." p.775 
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particularly acute around the measurement of what have been termed 
"intangibles.,,372 Taking CSR measures as example here, the previously mentioned 
problematic of how something such as 'ethical behaviour' may be classified and then 
numerically scored weighs heavily on the minds of some critics. Systems for the 
translation of quality into quantity, for instance a scale from 1-10 that requires a 
business manager to enter a rating of environmental impact, are aggregated here 
together with other scores, thus resulting in what Power characterises as a situation 
where "technically meaningless" "proxy measures end up representing the thing 
itself.,,373 Noting the way in which these quantitative methodologies are informed by 
an empirically realist sensibility (wherein the measurement tool is claimed to render 
an accurate picture of real world variables), Kalthoff also critiques such practices on 
the basis of their self-referentiality: "The practice of representation is then not a 
mirroring activity anymore, but works on a non-identical replication - a replica 
which does not know an origin, but no final point, either, and which - entirely 
incomplete - only refers to itself.,,374 
However, the claim that number is 'de-politicising,' or even' anti-political,' 
goes further than the charge of self-referentiality. Herein, measurement is crucially 
recognised to be performative in function - as such it is actually productive of 
certain realities, and not just a tool for description.375 Number, it is proposed, via 
action on entities that have been made countable in the first place, acts to re-produce 
the world in its own image. Simply put, number is not merely descriptive, it acts to 
construct - "number performs number.,,376 As such, measurement tools, it is noted, 
dQ not merely 'measure' an independent reality, they actually contribute to the form 
and shape of the purportedly 'measured' reality.377 Recalling for a moment earlier 
discussion surrounding the 'firmness' of number (establishment of expertise, 
portrayal of certainty, resolution of doubt, values of precision, representation of 
372 Ibid., p.775 
373 Ibid., p.775-776. Cf. Chapter Two's discussion of 'priceless' ethcial goods - typified by, amongst 
others, Titmuss's concerns regarding the commercialisation of blood donation for instance. 
374 Ibid., p.31 
375 John Law and John Urry, "Enacting the Social," Economy and Society 33, no. 3 (2004). p.391 
376 Thrift, "Movement-Space: The Changing Domain of Thinking Resulting from the Development of 
New Kinds of Spatial Awareness." pp.580-90. 
377 Callon, ed., The Laws of the Markets. p.23 
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"non-interpretive facts,,378 and so forth), it is evident how quantitative processes 
might be proposed to stabilise debate, and hence close down space for contestation. 
Calculability itself here is taken as an indication that political debate has ceased and 
controversy settled - the calculated thing at this point is no longer debateable, but 
now 'useful.' 379 
The question of the boundary between what is quantitative and qualitative 
becomes significant here. 'Judgement' might be posed as the opposite of quantitative 
calculation in critiques such as Porter's, however, as CalIon's break down of the 
calculative process itself begins to suggest, these boundaries are more permeable 
than is typically perceived. Boundaries between the qualitative and quantitative may, 
in much the same way as number does, give the appearance of firmness. However, 
upon closer inspection the purity of these distinctions breaks down. This is 
particularly the case in light of the numerous and competing forms of CSR 
measurement with which I began this chapter. 
Recalling CalIon's account of 'framing,' and the attendant steps of the 
calculation process, it is important to go on further and note, as CalIon and Muniesa 
do, that the actual achievement of each step in the process is not always predictable 
or straightforward, instead it may take a variety of forms.38o At one extreme, 
calculation may be a strictly algorithmic accomplishment, but, at the other it may 
more be more closely akin to judgement, or even intuition.381 Essentially, the merit 
of this approach is that it recognises a continuum between 'qualitative judgement' 
and 'numerical calculation,' broadening the definition of calculation in the process. 
Usefully here, CalIon and Law also fashion an analysis tool that may provide an 
insight into this contested borderland of 'calculability' by adapting Franck Cochoy's 
neologism 'qualculation. ,382 
378 Poovey, A History o/the Modern Fact: Problems o/Knowledge in the Sciences o/Wealth and 
Society. p.xi 
379 Osborne and Rose, "Do the Social Sciences Create Phenomena?: The Example of Public Opinion 
Research." p.372 
380 CalIon and Muniesa, "Peripheral Vision: Economic Markets as Calculative Collective Devices." 
p.1231 
381 Ibid., p.1232 
382 CalIon and Law, "On Qualculation, Agency and Otherness." p.719 
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At its core, 'qualculation' attests to the need for any given thing to 'qualify' 
to be counted: "Qualculation implies qualification.,,383 In an increasingly service-
based economy, processes of qualification, CalIon contends, are on the rise, leading 
him to describe an 'economy of qualities. ,384 Applying this observation to the 
instance ofCSR measurement, the extent to which what 'counts' is always a matter 
of judgement is immediately obvious. In order to calculate, rank, tabulate or correlate 
a company's social performance, it must first be decided what exactly is to count as 
'social performance.' Moreover, before this move can even take place, 'social 
performance' has already been 'qualified' in so far as it has become something that 
we desire to count in the first place - it is understood, following various reasonings, 
and on the basis of contemporary patterns of attention-affect-profit (as described in 
Chapter Three), to be significant or worthwhile in some way. 
In an 'economy of qualities,' the quality of a product itself, as well as 
contingent processes of qualification and re-qualification (vis-a.-vis other products in 
the market), are of crucial significance. CSR metrics compete for precedence in a 
market that considers them on both these fronts - not only do individual rating 
agencies, rank compliers, social responsible investment indices and so forth, claim to 
offer the best quality analysis, they also seek to competitively differentiate (or 
qualify) themselves with regard to competitors on this basis. For firms - both those 
that practice CSR (and hence stand to be ranked poorly or positively, included in a 
Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) portfolio or not, gain a good ethical 
reputation or a bad one), and firms themselves involved in the measurement of CSR 
(ratings agencies, research firms, rank compliers, various consultancies), the ability 
to modify their list of qualities is always a strategic competitive resource.385 
Given the market-basis of the measurement tools up for discussion here, it 
makes little sense to discuss calculation as it pertains to CSR as something discrete, 
something that has beginnings and ends. Insofar as markets might be most broadly 
characterised as arenas for the determination of 'price,' calculations are constant, 
endless, and not discernibly divisible into 'pure judgement' on the one hand, and 
383 Ibid., p.719 
384 CalIon, Meadel, and Rabeharisoa, "The Economy of Qualities." 
385 See Perroux, in Ibid., p.200 
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'pure calculation' on the other. The EthicalScore ranking system that I introduced 
earlier provides a powerful illustration of this. Although it is graphically presented, 
and statistically complied, the thing that EthicalScore tracks is 'ethical reputation,' 
something we might say, that belongs to the 'subjective' realm of judgement. 
Furthermore, its calculation is quite literally continual. Unlike ranks or ratings which 
may be complied at one point in time, and then again later at another, the lines on the 
EthicalScore chart, as has already been noted, track upward and downward through 
the weeks, months, and years. 
This example also demonstrates a third facet of 'quality' in this context. In 
addition to describing a class and situation or differentiating feature relative to 
others, quality can also show up as intensity. Although it is not, to my knowledge, 
directly presented in the EthicalScore output, it would be possible, on the basis of the 
data collected, to compile and chart the intensity of attention around the CSR 
practices of any followed company. This attention itself, in a market context, is 
reciprocally relevant to both previously described dimensions of quality insofar as 
these may be altered according to the nature of the attention received. New and 
altered qualities themselves evolve on the basis of changing trends and shifts in 
attention. 
In the broadened sense of the term 'calculation' that CalIon and Law's 
qualculation attempts to establish, the multitude of different (and differentiated) 
'quantitative' means for the assessment of CSR that I have discussed here, exhibit 
various dimensions that I would describe as political in nature. Processes of 
qualification are themselves products of contestation. Debate about the best way to 
measure in a market context does not finally result in agreement on a standardised 
methodology. Although, as was previously noted, many in the CSR industry suggest 
that the lack of standardisation across ratings and measures is problematic for the 
purposes of cross-comparison, no movement towards the resolution of this issue is 
made, instead, ever more companies offering 'better,' 'newer,' and more 
'innovative' strategies emerge. 
Moreover, it is not only those in the industry, so to speak, who are involved 
in debates about how qualification occurs. As Andrew Barry and Don Slater note 
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with reference to the example of organic food, consumers themselves are becoming 
increasingly critical and reflexive regarding different contemporary qualifications 
and exactly what these imply.386 Public concerns regarding corporate practices and 
the integrity of proclaimed 'ethical' behaviour are not absent from the 'expert' 
measures of CSR, rather, public attention and expectation are the very dimensions 
that work to shape the classificatory systems which form the basis for CSR 
measurement and rating. 
The issue of 'expert' versus 'lay' opinion in CSR measurement does require 
more attention and will be picked up in the following section with regard to demands 
for 'transparency.' For now though, to conclude this discussion, I want to reflect 
quickly back on the issue of 'trust' in number. Earlier, I recalled Porter's claims 
regarding the 'firmness' of number - that its values of precision and resolution of 
doubt form the basis for a widespread 'trust' in number. An over-emphasis on the 
apparent 'firmness' of number though can mean that the uncertainties, flexibilities, 
and 'qualitative' intricacies that riddle calculative practices are overlooked. 
Numbers, while giving the appearance of accuracy, are increasingly derived in 
situations characterised by ambiguity. An "aura" 387 may surround numbers, 
however, perhaps particularly for those for whom acts of numerical contortion are 
regular practice, the finality and accuracy of these is not always a foregone 
conclusion. 
For' calculating professionals' involved in anything from CSR measurement 
to financial modelling, but also amongst the public more generally (the popular 
phrase 'lies, damn lies, and statistics' springs to mind here), number might be 
observed to occupy a state of useful malleability. This is not to suggest that a 
familiarity with the manipulability of numbers necessary results in a subsequent lack 
of trust of numerical representations. Although I am suggesting here that numbers 
may be made talk, I do not wish to suggest that they may be made say absolutely 
anything one might want. Instead, the point is that the numerical is always dense 
386 Andrew Barry and Don Slater, "Introduction: The Technological Economy," Economy and Society 
31, no. 2 (2002). p.186; See also, for a governmentality perspective on consumer co-creation; Detlev 
Zwick, Samuel K. Bonsu, and Aron Darmody, "Putting Consumers to Work: 'Co-Creation' and New 
Marketing Govern-Mentality," Journal of Consumer Culture 8, no. 2 (2008). 
387 Strathern, "New Accountabilities: Anthropological Studies in Audit, Ethics and the Academy." p.8 
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with quality and can exhibit different textures. How these textural qualities may be 
combined or combed together, and with what result, is both the matter of expert 
attention and that which leads to further innovation. 
It may be that I am now perhaps over-emphasising the claimed 'malleability' 
of number. It is not a case though of one reading or another. Certainly firmness and 
malleability are always co-present features of the numerical. Where presently I have 
chosen to emphasise the more flexible aspects of quantitative practices, this is 
primarily as counterpoint to previously discussed accounts that trade on an 
understanding of the stability and certainty that number confers. Significantly, the 
tendency towards numerical firmness and the tendency towards numerical 
malleability are always simultaneously at play in a strategic economy staked on the 
dynamics of accuracy and inaccuracy, belief and disbelief, trust and suspicion. 
My emphasis here has been on the ways in this proposed 'malleability' of 
number might be understood to mitigate against the premature foreclosure of 
contestability in market spheres. However, this suggestion is not designed to 
undermine real concerns regarding the spread of quantitative technologies and the 
new opportunities for managerial and governmental intervention that can emerge in 
the process. The making visible of 'social performance,' 'corporate ethical 
reputation,' and so forth, inevitably does open these domains to a particular type of 
managerial scrutiny, one which, as has been discussed, often sees these placed 
correlatively alongside financial outputs. The sociological recourse to charges of 
'reductionism' and 'de-politicisation' though, fails to address metrological practices 
in the richness and reflexivity of their current market deployment. In the context of 
the various empirical examples discussed here, it has, I hope, been possible to see the 
supposed monolith of measurement, give way, and in its place much more specific, 
strategic, and highly textured practices emerge. 
As such, an 'ethics by number' need not necessarily be a hollow one. The 
measurement, in this instance, of both value, and values, is a productive process 
constitute in texture, quality, and intensity. That which is produced represents the 
pluralisation of ethical potentialities, and while this 'pluralisation' in and of itself is 
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not necessarily an ethical achievement simply on account of its praxis,388 to the 
extent that the actions this propels may be understood to beckon possibilities of a 
previously unrealisable nature, the 'ethical' poverty of attempts to quantify the 
'unquantifiable' is not guaranteed. In the following, and final section, this 
proposition is further explored via the tension between 'practice' (calculation) and 
'principle' (transparency). 
Black Boxes and Transparent Windows 
Lying beneath the proliferation of techniques for CSR measurement 
discussed here is what Marilyn Strathern has referred to as an "original ethical 
impulse.,,389 Insofar as these seek to make information public, measures of CSR 
enact transparency as a value. 'Visibility' is virtuous not only in principle (as that 
which is apparent opposite to the concealed or secret), but also in the sense that 
where information is openly available, public debate may occur. 390 
Having been concerned thus far with the explication ofCSR's calculative 
techniques themselves, the dimension of 'visibility' that these confer has not yet 
received sufficient emphasis. As has been made reference to throughout the chapter 
though, the final step in calculation is the detachment and circulation of the newly 
formulated object, where, at last, it comes into contact with its intended public. 
Weare all familiar with more conventional or routine measures of 
performance - reports of transport punctuality, average waiting times, and class sizes 
for instance,391 these, we might say, embody a political culture of openness and 
accountability. In this way, these measures are 'popular' in nature, and, although 
rigidly quantitative in form, they are nonetheless decidedly public in character.392 It 
is similarly so with CSR meta-measures. Social Responsibility reports are freely 
available and advertised on company websites, important ethical ranks are published 
388 Mariam Fraser, "Facts, Ethics and Event," in Deleuzian Intersections: Science, Technology and 
Anthropology, ed. Casper Brunn Jensen and Kjetil Rodje (New York: Berghahn Press, 2009). p.74 
389 Strathern, "New Accountabilities: Anthropological Studies in Audit, Ethics and the Academy." 
390 Marilyn Strathern, "Externalities in Comparative Guise," Economy and Society 31, no. 2 (2002). 
p.254 
391 Ibid., p.773 
392 Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life. p.97 
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widely in the most popular business magazines and newspapers - Business Week, 
The Economist, The Financial Times, and complied in conjunction with the most 
significantly invested and widely watched ethical share indices, (here the 
FTSE4Good and the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) come to mind). A 
comprehensive log of the variety of ways in which measures of CSR are publicly 
showcased is beyond the scope of my current intention, most broadly though it is 
possible to imagine that this would include an enormously diverse range of sites and 
forms of presentation - from the professional CSR conference at one extreme, to in-
store signage, packaging, and so forth, at the other. 
However, despite the indisputably 'public' orientation ofCSR measures, the 
claim to 'transparency' is not as straightforward as it appears. Transparency, it might 
be said, is somewhat illusive - while appearing self-evident and natural, it is actually 
something that must be achieved. 'Making visible' suggests a revelation, the removal 
of barriers, an unfettered view. In the present case though, in place of these 
imaginaries, we have instead a very different figure to contend with - that of the 
'black box.' 
Latour describes a 'black-box,393 as anything whose constitution or make-up 
can, for present purposes, be taken for granted. CSR measures, though employed in 
the name of informational transparency, achieve this visibility, somewhat 
paradoxically through a series of calculative processes which, for a number of 
reasons, remain inaccessible and opaque - 'black boxed' as per Dejean et al. 's earlier 
example. It is not only that expert statistical knowledge is required to understand the 
various manipulations through which, for instance, a CSR rating is arrived at. 
Moreover and more practically, the intricacies of calculative processes are often 
what, as I have already noted, competitively differentiates one service provider from 
another in the CSR marketplace. Insofar as your CSR measurement technique is also 
your unique selling point, the constitution and operation of this may be a secret 
closely guarded. Even this requirement for competitive secrecy though is not without 
393 See Chapter One; Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers 
through Society (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1987). 
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its qualifications - of course your differentiating methods must also be explicated to 
an extent if you intend to attract custom on the basis of these. 
In making visible certain performances and not others, transparency acts as a 
frame, the shifting bounds of which can work to conceal or make invisible that which 
lies beyond, while making natural or highlighting that at the centre. The 
contradiction here, between, on the one hand, the 'self-evident' virtue of 
transparency, of 'making visible,' and on the other, the complex technical (or black-
boxed) means through which this must be achieved, recalls a contrast between what 
we might say, following Strathern, are two different Western approaches to the 
question of ethics itself.394 
To explain further - we might note that, on the one hand, information about 
the world exists which attempts to calculatively account for it, while on the other, 
some information functions precisely insofar as it remains at a remove, and does not 
proceed via calculation.395 In the first mode it is possible to recognise a tendency 
towards 'purification,' here the world is described, broken into various dimensions, 
and subsequently calculated. 'Knowledge' is the tangible result or outcome of such 
processes, and this may be produced specifically with the intention of guiding or 
recommending certain actions.396 Insofar as it usefully enables people to act on its 
recommendations, knowledge produced in this way must be as accurate as possible, 
and hence discussion revolves subsequently around the appropriateness of the 
instruments of description themselves - how accurate are these, how powerful? 
Following from the previous discussion of 'quality,' CSR metrics might, in 
this vein, be characterised as having a 'qualified quality' - it is on the basis of their 
various qualifications, internally, and relative to other measures that they may be of 
use. The desire for better 'metrics' might be said to fall into this category of impulse, 
as, similarly, may debates in fields such as management that concern the accurate 
calculation of CSP and financial performance. 
Secondly though, and on the other hand, some information might be said to 
be powerful for precisely the opposite reason, because it is "not contaminated with 
394 Strathern, "Externalities in Comparative Guise." p.263 
395 Ibid. 
396 Strathern, "Externalities in Comparative Guise." 
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h d ·1 ,,397 M h· t e etal s. easurement ere IS superseded by the kind of reasoning understood 
to be valuable "because it exists at a remove from the world.,,398 This kind of 
information commonly circulates in the form of principles or norms. 399 
Transparency, following this characterisation, we might recognise as valued for its 
own sake. It has an 'unqualified quality;' as principle, it is difficult to refute its self-
evident' good,' and herein lies the power in its evocation. The tension around metrics 
experienced by those working in CSR speaks similarly to this second approach. 
Here, recall the unsayable 'incalculabilities' that are imagined to set the CSR 
'ceiling' or make it 'whole,' the 'non-financial' or otherwise 'priceless.' 
Information importantly provides a basis upon which we can act, and here 
'ethical' information is no different. This chapter has been concerned for the most 
part with the calculative establishment of ethical information. Ranks, ratings, metrics 
and so forth are a form of information about the world on the basis of which a 
number of different actions follow and decisions are made. To give just one example 
of the many forms that this action may take, a high ethical rank or rating may mean 
that a company is newly included in a Socially Responsible Investment portfolio, and 
this might subsequently result in new avenues for share trade and investment. This 
really is though just one of the multitude of foreseeable 'actions' that may follow 
from the production of this kind of information on corporate ethics. Equally, 
however, as the present section has sought to highlight, information is not the only 
route to action in CSR. Calls for transparency also find a route to action. 
This is implied significantly in both 'ethical' approaches - in the first case, 
the produced knowledge itself provides a basis on which to act, and in the second, 
"the ethical principle has already jumped from description to action ... [t]he 
anticipation of action is as much a condition of the description, we might say, as a 
consequence of it. ,,400 The issue of ethical action however, is a particularly 
complicated one with regard to CSR, and finally brings us back to the question of the 
business case with which this chapter began. 
397 Ibid. 
398 Ibid. 
399 Ibid. 
400 Ibid. 
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Considerable effort, as I have already noted, is expended debating the 
veracity of the business case model. David Vogel, an important CSR commentator, 
goes so far as to claim that "[v ]irtually all contemporary writing on CSR emphasises 
its link to corporate profitability.,,401 Yet, the 'evidence' that we might imagine exists 
to back up this claim is, as was previously noted, at the very best inconclusive. To 
those tempted to inquire as to the continuing salience of the business case in the 
absence of any proof of its veracity, this chapter, though not directly addressing this 
question, does propose a set of unconventional perspectives on it. 'Quality,' in 
particular, works to provide a more textured account of CSR. Although measured, 
and measurable, CSR is not finally just 'quantifiable.' As in Strathem's delineation-
ethics may be, in some instances, by 'calculation,' but, simultaneously it is often also 
by 'principle.' Calculabilites produce, by corollary, incalculabilities. Given, 
however, that action is implied in both cases, we might also note the way in which, 
in practice, 'motivation' as such, rarely derives from only one or the other. The 
business case adheres, as it were, not only on the basis of business, but also on the 
basis of principle. Mutually and performatively articulated, action emerges, in this 
particular market context, through the strategic negotiation of the two. 
The explorations undertaken in this chapter have primarily sought to inquire 
after the forms of practice that emerge within the contemporary market for corporate 
ethics. The predominance of quantitative approaches, I have claimed, should not be 
taken as a sign of the social 'impoverishment' of this field; rather it provides an 
occasion for a more careful attention to the subtleties of how and what number 
performs. Well informed and highly reflexive users - members of the public, the 
academy, and business - all skilfully trade in number in order to construct new 
arenas of accountability, change existing practices, and probe new avenues to profit 
and viability. The strict demarcation of quality from quantity ultimately overlooks 
the more interesting possibilities that inhabit the borderlands of the two. 
401 Vogel, The Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility. p.19 
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Importantly, no consensus emerges with regard to the measurement ofCSR-
there is no final yardstick and the "life of business organizations [proves] no less an 
arena of puzzlement and contention over issues ofworth.,,402 Critical counter-
discourses abound regarding the efficacy of CSR measurement, and the practice is 
continually subject to various forms of critique from observers within the industry 
and without. Debates over the 'best' way to measure CSP, though not often overtly 
political in intention, occupy a political space nonetheless, and from within it 
contribute to building a critical discourse around the ethical behaviour of business 
organisations. Grappling with new types of ambiguity, if quantification processes 
may still be said to be caught up in reductive attempts at purification, it is certainly 
"a messy kind of purity that is being produced, [and] of course, one which has to 
work hard to keep itself in place: we simply do not see the work going on.,,403 
402 Monique Girad and David Stark, "Heterarchies of Value in Manhattan-Based New Media Firms," 
Theory, Culture & Society 20, no. 3 (2003). p.77 . 
403 Thrift, "Movement-Space: The Changing Domain of Thinking Resultmg from the Development of 
New Kinds of Spatial Awareness." p.587 
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Chapter Five 
o 
Part I 
Ethical Consumption as Material Practice 
In a recent book entitled The Ethical Consumer: Buying/or a Better World, 
author Melissa Corkhill celebrates the mainstreaming of ethical consumption -
"gone are the days," she writes, when consuming ethically was only of concern to 
"the granola fringe.,,404 The recent popularisation of ethical consumption however, 
has not been greeted with equal enthusiasm by all. Described by prominent 
environmentalist George Monbiot in his Guardian column as a "pox on the planet," 
ethical consumerism, he suggests by contrast, amounts to nothing more than "buying 
bits of soap with leaves in it.,,405 In the first instance then, ethical consumption is a 
trivial 'fringe' concern before many people are doing it, whereas in the second, the 
very fact of its mainstreaming is what results in triviality. 
What is certain is that with the advent of so-called 'ethical consumption,' 
consumptive practices have become morally problematised to unprecedented degree. 
Consumption is now a matter of widespread moral concern, and consumptive 
choices are frequently presented in ethical terms. However, as the opening example 
serves to demonstrate, much of the current focus on the 'ethical' dimensions of 
consumption proceeds along the lines of a peremptorily concluded defence or 
critique of its effectiveness in producing 'change' (as this is variously conceived). 
This chapter will seek to contribute differently to the discussion of ethical 
404 Melissa Corkhill, The Ethical Consumer: Buying/or a Better World (New York: Sterling, 2008). 
(Book jacket) 
405 George Monbiot, Ethical Shopping Is Just Another Way o/Showing How Rich Your Are (2007 
[cited 30th August 2008]); available from 
http://www.guardian.co.uk!commentisfree/2007/ju1l24/comment.businesscomment. 
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consumption by aiming alternatively (and in line with previous chapters) to elaborate 
an account of 'ethical consumption' as the practice of a market ethics.406 
The empirical setting for this task will be a blog series hosted by the 
Guardian newspaper online (www.guardian.co.uk). Entitled Ethical Living, the 
pages of this blog consist of posts made by a group ofstaffbloggers,407 and are 
accompanied by a stream of comments in which a conversation builds up between 
readers online. On the blogsite, as will be demonstrated, consumer objects and 
consumer practices are understood to be primarily constituent in the attempt to lead 
an 'ethical life. ' This chapter will therefore begin by describing the blogsite in some 
detail, in doing so also focusing on its utility as an empirical site for the observation 
of 'market ethics in action. ' 
Following from this, the ways in which markets themselves function as 
settings for the emergence of particular modes of 'doing' ethics within the context of 
ethical consumption will be at the fore of consideration. What emerges from the blog 
content is how objects, materials, and practices come to consist, through affective 
investiture, a kind of consumptive ethics that is negotiated readily through the 
activities of daily life. It is not simply the 'fact,' of the affective materiality of this 
consumptive ethics that is of significance here however, it is that the mutability 
conferred in this process offers particularly engaging avenues for subsequent 
discussion. Stable, lasting, or agreed definitions of how one might consume 
'ethically' are, following this, unlikely to be found, and, as such, the ethical 
potentials of the marketplace are not pre-determined, but precisely up for grabs. 
Part Two of this chapter develops the themes of the first, and draws from the 
same set of empirical material, but also entails a slight shift of gear. The structuring 
focus there will be on the supposed exclusivity of 'choice' and 'care.' As suggested 
in a recent book by Annemarie Mol,408 the proliferation of 'choices' in a market 
context might be understood to actively delimit the alternative possibility of a (less 
406 See Chapter Two for an elaboration of this concept. . ... 
407 See Appendix B for a table recording the names of contributing bloggers on Ethical LIvmg ill 
2008, and the number of blog posts made by each. See, for further discussion of this topic, the chapter 
section entitled 'blog.' 
408 Annemarie Mol, The Logic a/Care: Health and the Problem a/Patient Choice (New York: 
Routledge, 2008). 
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marketable) 'care.' Through an elaboration of how the notion of 'choice' functions in 
a market context to designate various modes and means of consuming 'ethically' 
however, I will emphasise an alternative possibility - that care, in the context of 
ethical consumption at least, is actually constituent in the very choices we make. 
This reformulation though will require an attendant reconsideration of what we take 
to be the bounds of 'ethics' and 'markets' both in this context. 
"1998, short for web log (which is attested from 1994, though not in the sense 'online 
journal'), from (World Wide) Web + log" 409 
This opening discussion will suggest that blogs may be approached as a 
sociologically significant form of empirical practice inasmuch as they function as a 
contemporaneous, open, and continually updated forum for opinion and debate. 
When they first appeared in the late 1990s, blogs functioned primarily as online 
diaries, most frequently 'owned' by a single user who would typically add daily 
posts, usually regarding their own thoughts or feelings, and, as such, readership and 
participation mainly consisted of web-savvy individuals with a specific shared 
interest. 
The mainstream media's relatively recent embrace of this form of 
communication however, means that in some areas one may have expected to 
encounter traditional reporting, this has recently been replaced by 'blogging.' Those 
who read newspapers online will be familiar with the experience of clicking through 
to what appears to be a traditional journalistic article and being transported instead to 
the 'blogs' section of the news site, where, generally speaking, articles are less 
lengthy (typically in the region of five hundred words long) and are often posed in 
the form of a question or controversy in order to invite discussion and debate. 
409 'blog.' Online Etymology Dictionary (2008 [cited December 3rd 2008]); available from 
www.dictionary.com. 
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The present chapter takes as its empirical focus a year of activity on the 
Guardian.co.uk's Ethical Living blog.410 Unlike more traditional single authored 
blogs, Ethical Living is a loosely configured, but on-going and frequently updated set 
of posts contributed by a varying set of reporters (referred to hereafter as 'staff 
bloggers') on any topic that might conceivably fall under its titled remit. Over the 
course of 2008, eighteen individual staff bloggers contributed to Ethical Living, the 
most posts made by a single blogger being twenty-three, with nine bloggers 
submitting only one post. For 2008 the total number of individual staff-contributed 
Ethical Living blog posts was one hundred and six, (106).411 Blogs are posted by the 
staff bloggers with varying frequency (i.e. not on a fixed submission schedule), and 
these individuals may also publish elsewhere in the paper.412 
Included in the 'Environment' section of the Guardian website,413 and 
navigable either from here, or from the blogposts home,414 Ethical Living is the 
newer of Guardian. co. uk's two 'Environment' grouped blogs, the other simply 
entitled Environment. Started in July of2007, Ethical Living spun off from the 
original Environment blog, both blogs presently co-existing and for the most part 
addressing distinct concems.415 Specifically, while Environment covers the concerns 
of the more 'traditional' environmentalist, typically reporting on deforestation, 
emissions targets, activism, conversation attempts and similar, Ethical Living, as its 
name suggests, takes as its main focus the kind of everyday practices and activities in 
which participants engage, addressing the ethical or unethical dimensions of these. 
This difference is captured visually in the respective graphics that accompany the 
two blogs. 
410 http://www.guardian.co.ukIenvironmentiethicallivingblog. See Appendix A for a detailed 
breakdown of the number ofblogposts and accompanying comments. The flrst blogpost submitted in 
2008 (l st January) is where I begin my survey, observation ending with the last comment (2nd Jan, 
2009) made to the fmal post submitted in 2008 (31 st December, 2008). The blogs and comments for 
the year amount to a total of 178,834 words. 
411 See Appendix A for a graphical representation ofblog statistics. 
412 See Appendix B for a tabulated summary of this information. . 
413 http://www.guardian.co.ukIenvironment. Other headings under which Guardian. co. uk publIshes 
blog content are 'News & Sport,' 'Business,' 'Culture,' 'Life & Style,' 'Media,' 'Science & 
Technology,' and 'Other.' 
414 http://www.guardian.co.ukItonelblog 
415 On rare occasion, a post may appear under both blog streams if its topic is sufflciently relevant to 
both. 
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Figure 3: Environment and Ethical Living Blog Header Graphics 
ENVIRONMENT 
ET-HICAL 
-
The concerns of the Environment blog are illustrated in the contrast between 
the natural environment in the foreground (depicted by flora and fauna) and the 
nuclear power station and chimney stacks silhouetted in the distance. Concerns that 
come under Ethical Living, by contrast, are depicted pictorially in the form of 
personal consumptive practices (recycling, driving), new technology (the fuel cell 
hexagons, 'clean' wind turbines, the car - perhaps alternatively fueled?), and 
calculability (the black 'carbon footprint' at the base of the picture). As such, Ethical 
Living seeks to address ethical concerns as they are encountered daily in these forms 
and others. 
Something of the difference in sprit between the two related blogs is also 
captured by the first ever submission to Ethical Living, posted on Friday July 13th, 
2007 by Guardian blogger Rebecca Smithers. Entitled 'Animal Friendly Pizza?' it 
poses such questions as, "Are your buying habits influenced by a company's animal-
friendly credentials?" and "Can being kind to animals be good for a company's 
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bottom line?,,416 This post, and the many others that follow it and constitute the 
Ethical Living archive, all make, albeit in a variety of ways, a distinctive and explicit 
address to the ethical aspects of consumptive processes while also defining 
consumption itself very broadly. 
Drawing attention to a certain breadth of definition with regard to 
consumption here, I am attempting to flag upfront a tension that I will go on to 
suggest becomes significant in the second section of this chapter - that of 
'consumerism' in relation to 'consumption.' While the phrase 'opposition' here does 
no justice to the relationship between these two notions that I wish to develop and 
discuss in the course of this chapter, it is suffice to note for the moment that the 
ethical 'living' to which the blog title refers, is varyingly manifest in both pro-and 
anti-consumerist ways. The emphasis I employ on reading the blog content in terms 
of 'consumption' rather than 'consumerism' is designed to make room for these 
differing manifestations of 'ethical living' in my discussion, rather than excluding 
certain 'non-consumerist,' but nonetheless consumptive practices on the basis that 
money may not change hands. 
I hope to make the significance of this tension clearer, as I mentioned, in 
due course. Presently though, to return to the suitability of Ethical Living content for 
analysis within the remit of this chapter and with regard to the project as a whole - it 
is the address to daily concerns, objects and practices insofar as they might be 
deemed 'ethical,' or conversely, 'unethical,' that makes this blog particularly 
relevant. Having suggested in Chapter Two that the advent of what I referred to as 
'market ethics' - the process doing of ethics through the market - in tum necessitates 
an analytic approach that is sensitive to the varying kinds of material enactments that 
this 'ethics' might take (as opposed, conversely, to the contemplation of ethics in the 
abstract), the Ethical Living blog provides an empirical context in which precisely 
what is of concern is the stuff of everyday life - it is the daily praxical minutiae 
under examination that mayor may not be understood to constitute modes of 
consumption that are 'ethical.' 
416Rebecca Smithers, Animal Friendly Pizza? (July 13th, 2008 [cited September 15 2008]); available 
from http://www. guardian. co. uk! environment! ethicallivingb log/2007 /j ull 13/animalfriendlybusiness 
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Before I go on to examine more closely the specifics of how discussions 
taking place on Ethical Living function to establish the kind of ethics-inlas-practice I 
have just briefly described, further attention to the blogosphere as an empirical 
setting for contemporary sociological research is in order. To this end, the remainder 
of the present section will seek to provide such a description, in the process aiming 
additionally to give a sense of the pace, colour, and intensity of interaction as it takes 
place online. 
Researching in the Blogosphere 
The fact of growing blog readership, and the sheer number of conversations 
now taking place online, highlights deficits in sociological notions of the 'field' that 
only stand to become more pressing. This problem, addressed already to an extent in 
the methodological discussions of Chapter Three, is worth re-visiting briefly here 
with regard to what Dhiraj Murthy has described as the "high level of invisibility of 
digital ethnography in sociological methods.,,417 
With everyday life becoming increasingly technologically mediated, the 
'field' of sociological interest can not afford to remain restricted to the type of face-
to-face interaction in which sociality has typically been understood to subsist.418 
Blogs, and other forums of online interaction, offer to the sociologist a uniquely 
contemporaneous snapshot of current concerns and people's negotiations of these. 
Unlike traditional types of empirical inquiry, blogs are spontaneous and subject-led. 
Conceptualised as a kind of 'first draft,' or unfinished thought, blogs, and the 
ensuing online conversations that they entail, possess an immediacy that is attractive 
417 Murthy, "Digital Ethnography: An Examination of the Use of New Technologies for Social 
Research." p.848; See also, Nick Couldry and Anna McCarthy, eds., Mediaspace: Place, Scale, and 
Culture in a Media Age (London: Routledge, 2004).; Bella Dicks, Bambo Soyinka, and Amanda 
Coffey, "Multimodal Ethnography," Qualitative Research 6, no. 1 (2006).; Henry Jenkins, Fans, 
Bloggers, and Gamers: Exploring Participatory Culture (New York: New York University Press, 
2006).; Stephen G. Jones, ed., DOing Internet Research: Critical Issues and Methods for Examining 
the Net (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1999). 
418 See, for instance Carol A. Bailey's recently published defmition of 'field research': Field research is 
the systematic study, primarily through long-term, face-to-face interactions and observations, of 
everyday life. (Bailey, 2007: 2, original emphasis), in Murthy, "Digital Ethnography: An Examination 
of the Use of New Technologies for Social Research." p.848 
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insomuch as it offers to the social researcher a particular, organically unfolding. 
handle on the contemporary. 
A kind of finger-on-the-pulse, daily thoughts might be jotted down as they 
occur on a blog, your 'story' does not need to have been requested or commissioned, 
and your opinion, or position on the given issue does not need to be emphatic or 
fmal. Rather, blogging is a kind of co-construction, the interest does not so much lie 
in the original post that begins a conversation, it is the form, content, and tone of the 
entire participatory thread as it functions to record a set of feelings in present time 
that becomes significant. 
On Ethical Living, blogs posts are open for user comments for seven days -
this time restriction a factor in achieving the kind of contemporary 'snapshot' effect 
that distinctively characterises blogging. Moreover, this effect is fully intentional, not 
an accident born of practical concerns for instance. Guardian. co. uk note on the site 
that "[c]losing comment threads after they've been open for a while ... means that the 
conversations [contained] are kept relatively fresh and contemporaneous.,,419 
Although invitations to leave comments online in response to any given issue 
or news item are now ubiquitous, blog posts often elicit particularly lively and 
involved discussion in comparison to standard news or commentary articles. While 
this is due in part to the nature of blogging itself (designed specifically to pose 
questions and invite debate on matters of contemporary importance, as indicated 
above), a shared sense of community amongst the bloggers on certain sites is also 
important. 
Here, it is worth dwelling on how a notion of community functions and is 
structured in the blogosphere. There exists a Guradian.co. uk 'Community and User 
Experience' team to bring this into effect via the application of what is known as the 
Guardian 'Talk Policy,420 - a formal set of community standards and participation 
guidelines. These also seek to remind users that what they post is public, 
"[r]emember that this is a public forum, and your words will be archived on this site 
and available for anyone to find for a long time - the web has a very long 
419 http://www.guardian.co.uklcommunityfaqs/#q214 
420 http://www.guardian.co.ukltalkpolicy.This stipulates, amongst other things, that while "debate and 
dissent" are "welcome," "obscenity and mindless abuse," are "actively discouraged." 
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memory.,,421 Forums, they state additionally, are intended to be "a welcoming space 
for intelligent discussion. ,,422 
More interesting perhaps though, are what might be described as community-
generated or community-enforced means of holding individual contributors to 
account. A not uncommon sequence of online events may unfold as per in the 
following example, part of the response to an original blog posted by Mark Lynas 
entitled 'The Green Revolution Postponed,423 and concerning the environmental 
impact of Chancellor Alistair Darling's November 2008 pre-budget report: 
421 Ibid. 
R 
Nov 25 08, 12:05pm 
Green growth is a contradiction in terms 
D 
Nov 25 08, 12:21pm 
R 
R said 
'Green growth is a contradiction in terms.' 
What do you mean by this? Are you for growth or against it? For green 
measures or against them? And in each instance why? 
Nov 25 08, 2:07pm 
m~ . 
423 Mark Lynas, Green Revolution Postponed (2008 [cited November 25th 2008]); ~vallable from 
http://www.guardian.co.uklcommentisfree12008/nov125/pre-budget-report-economICS. 
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D 
I am very much for green measures (despite the naysayers, we've installed 
solar heating, and very efficient it is too), but the word "growth" is what 
worries me. 
I've been saying for a long time that this country could, given its 
unsurpassed record in innovation, be at the forefront of developing and 
implementing less wasteful lifestyles. However we don't need to "grow' in 
the traditional economic sense - that's why we're in such a mess .... 
Nov 25 08, 2:56pm 
R, thanks for the clarification. I was hoping you meant something like that 
and not say, we need growth at all costs goddamnit and green measures 
ain't gonna cut it.-I24 
Here, R's initial ambiguous and apparently unyielding comment is not 
ignored or bypassed by subsequent commenters. Instead, demands for elaboration, 
clarification and further engagement are put to the initial contributor in order that he 
or she playa more constructive role in the blogged discussion.425 
The previously quoted exchange is also demonstrative of another kind of 
community continuity and functioning internal accountability - blogging here is not 
simply a matter of giving one's two cents and logging off never to return. Rather, as 
is evident, those who have contributed to a stream continue to check it throughout 
the day, and sometimes over the course of multiple days, in order see if their 
response has elicited comment, read other's comments, add to the discussion further, 
or elaborate upon their initial position. The blogger D from the previous example 
made a total of eight comments in the discussion that ensued from Mark L ynas ' 
424 Exchange between R and D, (original emphasis and italics), in Ibid. 
425 This pattern is frequently encountered on the Guardian.co.uk's blog streams, the questioning or 
enquiring comment made the subsequent blogger often gaining support from other users, either via the 
'Recommend?' button, a tab that allows users to 'vote' for a particular comment (the vote numerically 
displayed beside the post, D in the previous example gathering three votes for his query, for instance), 
or simply through the supportive mention of a previous contributor's comment in one's own post. 
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original post over the course of the day. In this way, the commenters themselves as 
well as the blog form itself, can be seen to make certain demands on participants 
such that sustained engagement is encouraged. 
Another noteworthy community-building feature of Guardian. co. uk is that 
you must be a registered user of the site and be logged in order to post comments. 
Upon registration, you choose a usemame that subsequently appears atop each 
comment that you submit. Usemames426 actively link on the site to a profile page 
where, if the owner chooses, they may include any personal information about 
themselves (including their real name if they should so like).427 Collected together on 
the profile page (whether or not the user has chosen to fill in additional information) 
are all the comments contributed by that particular user, across all commentable 
blogs or articles found on Guardian. co. uk. Access to a contributor's profile page is 
open to all (including non-registered users) and is achieved simply by clicking on 
their usemame. Thus, while on the surface of it, comments may be left 
'anonymously' (insofar as you need not use your real name), as the sociologist John 
Quiggan has argued, given that, in practice, blogsites attract a group of "regular 
users," these people become effectively known to one another, and therefore 
accountable, through their "well-established identities within the groUp.,,428 
426 Despite the public nature of the blog in question here, I have chosen not to use the real usernames 
ofblog contributors in this chapter. Respondents will be referred to by the first letter of their 
username, or two letters should this name have more than one syllable. Though this (semi-)anonymity 
is not strictly necessary, I think it courteous nonetheless given that these individuals are not aware of 
their inclusion in this thesis. Staffbloggers however, given their identities are always known and 
attached to their blog posts in order to recognise authorship, will be referred to by name. 
427 Typically, those who do choose to complete their profile include information on their hobbies, 
where abouts they live and similar. Via this mechanism it is also possible to observe which forums 
respondents typically post to, and any continuity between the posts. The type of familiarity between 
users born of this functionality (the ascription ofa continuing username and logged archive of posts) 
also enables the observation of allegiances and even friendships between users, as well as long-
running disagreements which may continue across a number of different streams, concerning a 
number of different issues. Another user's comments from previous streams may be re-introduced by 
a user in a new stream - frequently with the intention of demonstrating a contradiction in thinking -
and in this way, further evidence of a kind of community investiture in particular blogospheres is 
made manifest. 
428 John Quiggin, "Blogs, Wikis and Creative Innovation," International Journal o/Cultural Studies 9, 
no. 4 (2006). p.483. An interesting counter-point to earlier sociological approaches to online life is 
offered here. Contrary to the suggestion that online exchanges are 'anonymous' and 'disembodied' 
therefore allowing a kind of liberating flexibility of identity (see in particular 1990s cyberfeminist 
literature, i.e. Claudia Springer, Electronic Eros: Bodies and Desire in the Postindustrial Age (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1996).). Quiggan's work and my observation here of the Ethical Living 
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User investiture is also made evident in a final observation I wish to make 
with regard to the empirically useful nature of Guardian. co. uk's Ethical Living blog. 
Simply, and unlike many of the other 'ethical living/ethical consumption' blogs I 
investigated in approaching this topic, Ethical Living is host to extremely lively 
discussion as attested to by response numbers. Over the course of 2008, of the one 
hundred and six posts made to the blog, a mere three elicited no comment at all, 
while, at the other end of the spectrum, a number of posts received more than twenty 
comments, with discussion extending over many days. The most comments received 
in response to any single Ethical Living post was seventy-seven (December, 
2008),429 seven other notable posts gathering upwards of thirty responses, (see 
Appendix A for a graphed record of response numbers). 430 
This is remarkable by contrast with the comparable Ethical Consumer 
magazine blogs for 2008 which, for instance, were typically entirely unresponded 
to.431 This is despite the long established and highly respected nature of Ethical 
Consumer magazine itself. Another online site of potential note with regard to the 
present subject matter is the UK-based Ethical Shopping Forum.432 This discussion 
site is still very much in a fledging stage however and critically suffers from low 
participation levels by comparison to Ethical Living. 
My resultant choice to focus on the Ethical Living blog as opposed to those 
less generalist sites mentioned above, does nonetheless have a further empirical 
significance beyond typical comment numbers. The wider scope of Guardian. co. uk 
readership, as opposed to Ethical Consumer Magazine for instance, means that, 
rather than being largely pre-assumed amongst a group of readers who already 
identified as 'ethical consumers,' a broader interest in 'ethical living' amongst an 
blog, point instead towards the consistency and durability of online identity, (demonstrated by 
continuity and similarity between po stings across time). 
429 Lucy Siegle on the ethics of buying fur. Lucy Siegle, Is Fur Slowly Becoming Acceptable? 
(December 16th, 2008 [cited 22nd December 2008]); available from 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environmentiethicallivingblog/2008/dec/16/fur-gwyneth-paltrow-ethical-
living-fashion. 
430 It has been suggested that a blog post attracting over 100 comments will typically have descended 
into repetitive 'flame war.' The term given to the exchange of slander online. See, Quiggin, "Blogs, 
Wilds and Creative Innovation. II p.488 
431 http://www.ethicalconsumer.orglEthicaIConsumerBlogs/tabidl621BIogID/.13/Def~u1t.asp~ . 
432 http://forum.shop-ethical.co.ukJindex.php This discussion site has no affihated pnnt medIa and IS 
funded instead by on-site advertising. 
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even broader readership means that, in the threads that amass in response to the 
Guardian blog posts, what is at stake is establishing the very terms of what 'ethical 
living' might constitute. How to consume ethically is, for the most part, not the 
subject of common understanding or prior agreement amongst respondents, by 
contrast it is the very substrate of daily discussion and contestation. 
To the extent that a blog might be understood as a kind of public forum or 
public sphere,433 the fact of its being online does of course not make it unproblematic 
with regard to 'offline' demographic concerns. Although some accounts of online 
life (and blogging in particular) place a great deal of emphasis on the potentially 
democratic and egalitarian forms of participatory culture the internet may foster,434 a 
sociological approach to the question of online participation perhaps best proceed 
with some caution. 
Just above, I suggest that the 'wide scope' of Guardian. co. uk readership (by 
comparison to specialist ethical consumer forums) is methodologically favourable 
with regard to the kind of analysis the present chapter aims to undertake. While this 
is so, a question that remains regards just who reads Ethical Living, or, more 
specifically, who contributes to the comment-streams that this chapter seeks to 
examine? In many ways there is of course no straightforward answer to this. 
Significant differences are easily pointed out between individuals who log on to 
Guardian. co. uk as a whole. Even just considering likely differences in web 
readership and browsing habits results in the necessary recognition of a plethora of 
potential usage variations. Some may log on to the same site frequently and with 
some loyalty, while others may browse multiple news sites without habitually 
returning to any single one. Of those who read the blogs, some (like myself) may be 
avid readers who have never left a comment, while for others commenting and being 
involved in the conversation may be one of the primary reasons for following the 
blog.435 
433 Murthy, "Digital Ethnography: An Examination of the Use of New Technologies for Social 
Research." p.839 
434 See, Hugh Hewitt, Blog: Understanding the Information Reformation That's Changing Your World 
(Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 2005). 
435 This usage trend may be observed by using the profile function available on Guradian.co.uk. As I 
have mentioned in a previous footnote, it is possible via this to track the contributions of particular 
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Further, and perhaps more pertinent, methodological considerations 
additionally arise in response to the question of 'who.' Access to an internet 
connection, for a start, is of course not equally available across different income 
groups and social classes, nor even if internet access were equally available, would 
usage patterns, user skills or confidence levels be necessarily comparable or 
coincident. The relative novelty of blogging means also that a reasonable degree of 
media-savvy might generally be expected amongst those who become involved its 
practice, and although blogging has become more accessible as it has become more 
widespread, this accessibility is very far from universal. This situation of stratified 
access however need not be understood to present a methodological hurdle or 
problem as such. Rather, as Saskia Sassen suggests, this only emphasises the need to 
develop our "analytic categories" carefully enough to "capture the complex 
imbrications of technology and society.,,436 Any empirical research in the 
blogosphere must recognise that while blogs may be said to confer a new type of 
public space, this space is certainly not utopian in nature. 
The preceding observations are not only methodological in significance 
though. More fundamentally, they draw attention to the fact that the material 
resources that may be applied to making 'ethical' consumer choices varies greatly 
between individuals and across groups. It goes practically without saying that ethical 
consumption is, for the most part, a concern of the relatively affluent, yet at the same 
time, it is important that this statement not be made uncritically, or function too 
definitively as an exclusion of those who may be ethical consumers regardless, 
whether in ways that are the same or different. 
Nonetheless, the question of social identity is one that it is impossible to 
begin a critical discussion of consumption without addressing in more depth. 
Traditionally, this issue has been a mainstay of sociological analysis and at present is 
most comprehensively attended to in work produced by researchers of 'consumer 
culture.' For this reason, the following section will begin with a brief review of some 
users. A number of commenters, this function reveals, are frequent users and discussants, who are 
likely to follow more than one of the Guardian.co.uk's blogs. . 
436 Saskia Sassen, "Towards a Sociology ofInformation Technology," Current Socwlogy 50, no. 3 
(2002). p.365 
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of the relevant literature in this field, before turning to the blog material in order to 
elaborate upon how the practice of ethical consumption comes to bear on identity, 
transforming the 'self into an object of reflection and scrutiny. However, even 
insofar as ethical consumption may (in a classical consumer culture reading) be 
understood as a socially distinguishing practice in terms of identity, I will suggest in 
response that an account overly emphatic in this particular vein risks providing an 
unjustly reductive account of ethical consumption, one that, most problematically, is 
ill-equipped to treat claims of an ethical nature with the seriousness they deserve. 
Consumption, Distinction, and being a 'Guardian Reader' 
As sociologists and anthropologists of consumption have long sought to point 
out, the classification of people occurs alongside and through the classification of 
consumer goods.437 The breadth of choices that consumers navigate with every 
shopping trip can prompt a constant questioning of these choices in terms of the 
kinds of social identity that they imply. Even something as seemingly 
uncontroversial as a Sainsbury's supermarket tomato addresses us with a variety of 
questions - would we like to 'taste the difference,' are we 'so organic,' or, 
alternatively, more concerned just to cover the' basics,?438 That different levels of 
consumption are differently available on the basis of wealth is reasonably obvious, 
less so however is how different modes or styles of consumption also result broadly 
in line with differences in wealth and influence. 
It is to various elaborations of this latter point that sociological studies of 
consumption have traditionally directed their attention. As Mary Douglas has 
suggested, goods function fundamentally on the basis of their meanings to 
differentiate people with respect to social hierarchy - social status is on display in 
one's style of consumption and the very desire for goods themselves may be 
437 See, Thorstein Veblen, Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study in the Evolution of 
Institutions (New York: Macmillan, 1899).; Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the 
Judgment of Taste, trans. Richard Nice (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984 [1979]).; Mary 
Douglas and Baron Isherwood, The World of Goods: Towards an Anthropology of Consumption 
(London: Routledge, 1996 [1979]). 
438 These are the names ofthree sub-brands into which one UK supermarket (Sainsbury's) classify 
their own brand products, including meats, deli, fruit and vegetables and canned goods. 
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understood as a desire to emulate the consumption of groups of perceived higher 
. I tatu 439 V bl ' I . f ,. . SOCia S s. e en s c aSSIC account 0 conspIcuoUS consumption' makes a 
related observation, proposing that the consumption of certain goods is 
demonstrative of one's distance from the requirements of productive labour and 
hence an indicator of status in this way.440 The extent to which consumptive choices 
operate as a resource for the establishment of social order is perhaps most thoroughly 
described though by Pierre Bourdieu's reckoning of taste in terms of 'distinction. ,441 
Taste, for Bourdieu, is not individual, but cultural, a classifier that emerges from and 
functions to instantiate class distinctions. 
'Ethical consumption,' as a proposal and a possibility, through its designation 
of a 'good' to be achieved through consumption, is undeniably caught up in the 
drawing of social distinctions. Where there is 'good' consumption, there must also 
be 'bad' consumption, and this distinction is sometimes made along the parameters 
of taste and class. Plastic shopping bags and excess packaging for instance have been 
subject to a certain 'vulgarification' of late, whereby more 'wholesome' cotton bags 
containing unpackaged products have been culturally and aesthetically elevated in 
terms of both 'ethics' and 'good taste.'442 
In the blog material on which this chapter draws, class is continually manifest 
in discussion - sometimes the explicit topic of comment (for instance in the 
recognition that 'ethical' products may be more expensive and thus unattainable for 
some),443 and popularly, (as was illustrated by my earlier reference to Monbiot's 
'soap with bits of leaves in it' scepticism) - critique of ethical consumers may be 
articulated along the lines of perceived class affiliations and the varying styles of 
consumption with which these are associated. Yet, despite the various academic, 
empirical, and popular modes in which an argument along such lines might be 
mobilised, I think it important that, in the context of the present discussion, greater 
pause be lent to considering what is at stake in the variously employed practices of 
439 Douglas and Isherwood, The World o/Goods: Towards an Anthropology o/Consumption. p.36 
440 Veblen, Theory o/the Leisure Class: An Economic Study in the Evolution o/Institutions. 
441 Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique o/the Judgment o/Taste. . .. 
442 For a nuanced discussion of the social life of plastic bags see, Gay Hawkins, "PlastIc Bags: LIvmg 
with Rubbish" International Journal o/Cultural Studies 4, no. 1 (2001). 
443 See, in P~ II ofthis chapter, discussion on this point in terms ofan 'ethical premium' to be paid. 
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ethical consumption and, in particular, how exactly these may be understood to 'do' 
ethics. 
My use of this particular terminology is significant here insomuch as it 
captures important theoretical differences between classical approaches to 
consumption in which social identity is symbolic, something you may be said to 
'have,' and more contemporaneous accounts of identity as something you are always 
'doing,' that which is in-process and conferred in practice.444 The problem, in the 
present context, with too heavy an emphasis on the symbolic, is that it functions to 
simply collapse ethical claims onto peremptorily-classified social identities. 
Ultimately therefore, it is impossible to take seriously the claims being empirically 
made by proponents of ethical consumption and those contributors to Ethical Living. 
The symbolic expression of identity through consumption, is of course not prima 
facie at odds with what is 'ethical,' (as is would be implied by over-emphasising the 
classed nature of ethical consumption). Rather, a carefully conducted exploration of 
how it is that the ethical is co-articulated with the self and the social through the 
medium of the market is required. 
One social characterisation that is of course particularly notable given the 
empirical remit of the present chapter is that of 'Guardian reader.' Yet, a case in 
point, even this (definitional) social identity is remarkably unstable on the blogsite. 
Carrying with it notions of liberal-minded ness and middle-classness (the term often 
evoked as a popular critique of these attributes), Guardian readers themselves are of 
course readily aware of this characterisation and bring to it their own reflexive 
critiques and subversions. 
In a discussion of ethical meat production for instance, one blog respondent 
comments that the types of (supposedly free-range) farming practices being lauded 
as 'ethical' in the blog post are in fact not so, and would instead "no doubt offend the 
average Guardian reader.,,445 The reflexive recognition of what is expected by the 
'average Guardian reader' functions here to make problematic any easy recourse to 
444 See for example, Lisa Adkins, Revisions: Gender and Sexuality in Late Modernity (Buckingham: 
Open University Press, 2002). . 
44 DC, in Bibi van der Zee, Cooking Pots Ready for a Return to Rabbit (24th October, 2008 [cIted 
January 27th 2009]); available from 
http://www . guardian. co. uklenvironmentl ethicallivingblog/2008/octl20/week 
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uncritical approaches to the question of to whom the right to determine what is 
finally' ethical' might belong. 
As our consumptive decisions become, increasingly, instances for self-
scrutiny, the self is made an object of reflection in these terms, and thus more than 
just an instance for marking social distinction, the making of the entire 'self is at 
stake in our changing ways of living. 446 As Gay Hawkins observes, '[t]o be a person 
now means cultivating particular modes of reflexivity. It means developing special 
ethical techniques and capacities.,,447 This is not to deny the ever-present "play of 
power in subjectivity,,,448 however it is to caution against an account of ethical 
consumption too over-determined by 'distinction.' The proposal that the choices of 
the less affluent are determined only by Bourdieu's "choice of the necessary,,449 (or 
by necessity) is, after all, ultimately a very problematic one with regard to the matter 
of policing participation in this contemporary market' ethical. ' 
Consumers are, for the most part, remarkably adept at negotiating the many 
contradictions that consumption entails to the best of their inclinations and means. 
Take, by means of example, the following comment contributed in response to a blog 
post that specifically raises the question of privilege with regard to the purchase of 
organic food.450 
Bw 
Apr 24 08, 12:34pm 
I prefer to get veg from the market when I have time, but they don't bother labelling 
it as organic or not, that's a supermarket thing. 'Organic' veg in the supermarket 
looks exactly the same as regular veg but costs about three times as much, so I'm not 
tempted, it looks like a marketing scam to me. Especially as I can make very nice 
meals with the normal stuff. 
446 Hawkins, "Plastic Bags: Living with Rubbish." p.ll 
447 Ibid., p.13 
448 Ibid., p.12 
449 Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste. 
450 Kevin Anderson, Is Organic Food Only for the Privileged? (23rd April, 2008 [cited 4th February 
2009]); available from . 
http://www.guardian.co.ukJenvironmentiethicallivingblog/2008/apr/23/organicfoodonlyforthepnv. 
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I know there's great local produce where my mum lives in Dorset, but you have to 
pay through the nose for it cos it's cool and trendy.451 
Ascriptions of consumer 'knowingness and reflexive playfulness of course 
tread a dangerous line. It does not follow that you are 'free' to make any choice you 
like simply on the basis of not being entirely bewildered by the world of 
consumptive choices in which you may find yourself.452 Uneven opportunities for 
participation in practices such as ethical consumption certainly exist, I am not 
attempting to deny this here. My point is only that this 'unevenness' is not always 
wholly predictable or subject to a rigidly pre-defined framework. 
From Fluffy Bunnies to Dirty Nappies - What Counts as Ethical Living? 
An additional consideration that arises with regard to an overly-determined 
relationship between consumption and social identity is that in placing too much 
emphasis on the symbolic function of goods,453 we may resultantly overlook the 
material nature of these. Much contemporary research on consumer culture has 
proposed a certain 'postmodem' dematerialisation of goods and a supposedly 
attendant aestheticisation of consumer life.454 This suggestion is perhaps at its most 
extreme in Jean Baudrillard's claim that we no longer consume things, only signs.455 
By contrast however, as even the most cursory glance across the topics of discussion 
on Ethical Living reveals, things, objects, and material practices themselves are very 
much the daily matter of ethical consumption. 
In order to further investigate this tension here, the present section will 
explore the way in which 'things' themselves are understood, deployed, and 
manipulated in the course of the blogged conversations. An emphasis on consumer 
451 B . Ib·d ~,m 1. 
452 Don Slater, Consumer Culture and Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997). p.169 
453 Jean Baudrillard takes this emphasis on the symbolic function of goods to its most extreme, see, 
Jean Baudrillard, Simulations (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983). 
454 Mike Featherstone, Consumer Culture and Postmodernism (London: Sage, 1991). 
455 Baudrillard, Simulations. 
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culture as material as opposed to dematerialised has, I will suggest, particularly 
important implications in the context of ethical consumption insofar as this generates 
certain tensions around the ethicality of consumption itself (and in particular 
proposed over-consumption) as a mode of acting-in and being-in the world. 
As I will go on to explain however, it is not the fact of 'materiality' per se 
that warrants special sociological interest in the present context. Where 
anthropological accounts such as that of Douglas and Isherwood emphasise the 
materiality of all culture, and approach consumer culture as one form of material 
culture wherein, they observe, everyday objects carry cultural meanings,456 the 
ensuing analysis ofblogged 'ethical life' will suggest that herein 'materiality' is 
engaged very much in terms of potential. Or, in other words, in terms of what, 
practically and affectively speaking, things 'do.' 
Although this observation concurs with recent STS approaches to the 
discussion of objects which have variously sought to demonstrate their practical, 
technical, and social 'entanglement,' I am also attempting to go beyond the 'fact' of 
this observation in order to understand how new types of ethical relations coalesce 
and are practiced or 'done.' Practically speaking, in the following sections, this will 
entail attempting to detail how, on the Ethical Living blogsite, an array of objects, 
practices, techniques, and understandings are more (or less) coherently rendered 
under the rubric of the 'ethical' in the process of being introduced or implicated in 
online discussion. This will not entail the attempt to draw up an exhaustive catalogue 
of these things (this task of course would be extensive and well outside the remit of 
this chapter), rather the question can be approached in a way that seeks to enable a 
closer attention to how, within a consumptive context, different types of material 
'ethical' relations come to be achieved. 
The Stuff of Ethics 
In line with its difference from the Environment blog already detailed in a 
previous section, the Ethical Living posts submitted by staff bloggers, though wide 
456 Douglas and Isherwood, The World of Goods: Towards an Anthropology of Consumption. p. 51 
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ranging in actual topic, typically concern the kind of matters which are subject to 
daily domestic consideration. As such, food, transport, household consumables, and 
domestic energy technologies are topics of discussion that frequently reoccur. A 
parade of familiar and often very mundane household items and domestic practices 
become, in this way, contentious flashpoints around which impassioned debate often 
erupts. 
Some of these, unsurprisingly, occupy almost by now, the status of 'usual 
suspect.' The relative merit of free-range and/or organic chicken, for instance, makes 
an appearance on multiple occasions on the blog and in the ensuing comments over 
the course of 2008. A January 10th, 2008 post is headlined, "Can meat ever be 
described as 'ethical' and would you pay extra for it? Alison Benjamin enters the 
free-range chicken debate,,,457 while a Christmas spin on the topic asks a similar 
question of turkey, "Will your turkey be organic this year? Are you saving money by 
cutting back on expensively reared meat this Christmas?,,458 On the transport front, 
car-share schemes459 and cycling460 are discussed in terms of their ethical credentials 
on more than one occasion. Highly energy consumptive household appliances, such 
as tumble dryers and boilers, also come in for their fair share of attention. 461 
Of significance here is that blog postings such as these make their address to 
ethics via the very material substrate of consumer objects and practices, and the 
attendant affective consequences of this. To elaborate, take by means of extended 
457 Alison Benjamin, Can Meat Ever Be Described as 'Ethical' and Would You Pay Extra/or It? 
(January 10th, 2008 [cited November 4th 2008]); available from 
http://www.guardian.co.uklenvironment!ethicallivingblog/2008/janl07/week. 
458 Bibi van der Zee, Will Your Turkey Be Organic This Year? (18th December, 2008 [cited 15th 
January 2009]); available from 
http://www.guardian.co.uklenvironment!ethicallivingblog12008/declI5/week. 
459 Adharanand Finn, Green Worker: Give Your Colleagues a Lift (2nd June, 2008 [cited 16th January 
2009]); available from 
http://www . guardian. co. ukl environment! ethicallivingblog/2008/junl02/ despitetherecentrisein.; Nik 
Berg, Petrolheads Take to Life in the Slow Lane (1st July, 2008 [cited January 16th 2009]); available 
from http://www.guardian.co.uk!environment!ethicallivingblog/2008/jul/Ol/petrolheadstaketolifeinth. 
460 Adharanand Finn, Is a Motorised Bicycle Ethical? (12th May, 2008 [cited 15th January 2009]); 
available from http://www. guardian. co. uk! environment! ethicallivingblog/2008/may/ 12/week. 
461 See, Leo Hickman, Ten Ways to Save Money by Going Green (3rd June, 2008 [cited 18th January 
2009]); available from . 
http://www.guardian.co.uk! environment! ethicallivingblog/2008/junl03/tenwaystosavemoneybygom., 
for a discussing of tumble dryers, for instance. Or, Carolyn Fry, Tread Lightly: Install a Condenser 
Boiler (23rd May, 2008 [cited January 15th 2009]); available from 
http://www.guardian.co.uk!environment!ethicallivingblog/2008/may/19/week. 
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example, staffblogger Bibi van der Zee's consideration of rabbit as ethical food 
stuff. Initially proposed on the basis of its supposedly 'free-range' existence and 
"'low-carbon footprint,,,462 van der Zee writes: 
Rabbits live wild, spend their days bouncing happily around the hills, eating grass, 
discussing who'll play Bigwig in Watership Down II, and generally living life to the 
full until the rabbiters come out. Their carbon footprint? Just the farting and the 
exhaust fumes of their killers, I should think.463 
Having begun the post thus, with some enthusiasm for the potential 'ethical 
materiality' of the rabbit, van der Zee subsequently sets off to the local butcher in 
order to investigate further. Once at the butcher however, the stuff of the rabbit itself 
presents to the author a new dimension of ethical quandary - the rabbit, very simply, 
is both too whole and too fluffy. 
They sell them in my local butcher, hanging by their hind legs from a butcher's hook 
at the back, skin and bunny ears still on. 
Look, I really wish that I was like Hugh Feamley-Whittingstall and Jamie Oliver 
and raised my own pigs and scratched their backs ... before slitting their throats, but 
the reality is that all the meat I've ever bought has been skinned and ready for the 
pot. 
But not rabbit. This is how the buying bit unfolds: I ask for the rabbit, the butcher 
reaches it down and then grabs the cleaver to his right. Wham! Off comes the little 
bunny head. Wham! Wham! Off come the little bunny feet. Whuuzzt! Off comes -
oh my god - the lovely soft bunny fur. Then chop, chop, chop, the whole bloody lot 
is swept into a bag and tied up and handed over the counter, the butcher still chatting 
away about how the rabbit market is moving as I try to keep a polite expression on 
my face.464 
462 van der Zee, Cooking Pots Ready for a Return to Rabbit. 
463 Ibid. 
464 Ibid. 
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The butcher's rapid, cleaver-wielding dispatch of an entire bunny into a 
bloody plastic bag is an ethically important moment here. It is the 'Wham, Wham, 
Wham, Whuuzzt,' of the butcher's knife on fur and bone that affectively confront the 
writer and offend her "disciplined forms of sensuousness,,465 - her sensibilities - in 
the process making problematic her initial suggestion that rabbit might be an 
'ethical' meat. The physical actions of the butcher, the very 'stuff of the rabbit itself. 
the process from whole to plastic bag, disqualifies, for the writer, the ethical relation 
otherwise materially conferred by free-range field living. 
Van der Zee's ethics of 'furriness' do not go uncontested in the blog stream 
though. Evidently, this is only one means by which the material and affective stuff of 
the rabbit may come to matter ethically. One reader, for instance, comments: "It's 
never made much sense to me that some herbivores are okay to eat and other 
herbivores are not. The whole reaction to seeing it with the fur on is also 
mystifying. ,,466 
Other comments contribute in a different way by enthusiastically providing 
rabbit recipe ideas, "Rabbit Dijonnaise," from one reader, "delicious, it was, braised 
with a creamy mustard sauce and tender as a lover's kiss," 467 and "rabbit Curry,,468 
from another. In this way, van der Zee's affective displeasure is ethically countered 
by the pleasure of others expressed in equally material terms. This example serves to 
highlight how the 'ethical' is imbricated with the affective and corporeal, as well as 
attesting to a certain ubiquity of ethical concern. The 'ethics' at play here are not 
overarching "command moralities,,,469 abstracted and finite dictates of moral right 
and wrong decreed fro'm above or elsewhere. They emerge everyday in practice and 
of material, subsisting in disgust and pleasure, texture, colour, taste and sound. 
This is not to claim that ethical consumption does not entail certain 
prohibitions, structured interdictions concerning what one should or should not do, 
should or should not buy. These, of course, proliferate, and spring easily to mind 
around issues such as sweat-shop labour to name just one, (the sections of Part II of 
465 Hawkins, "Plastic Bags: Living with Rubbish." p.15 
466 &, in Ibid. 
467 CW, in Ibid. 
468 D . Ib·d 
_, III 1. 
469 Hawkins, "Plastic Bags: Living with Rubbish." p.8 
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this chapter entitled 'Buying Right and not Buying Wrong,' and 'Negative 
Purchasing,' discuss some of the formal strategies of ethical purchasing in some 
detail with regard to the notion of market 'choice'). What I am attempting to draw 
attention to for now though is how, in the blog material at least, ethics does not 
substantially subsist in uncontraveneable commands or stringent doctrines; rather, it 
is that which is situationally construed and dynamically defined in practice. 
Another way in which this is manifest in the blogstream is through 
unpredictability. Much of the life of the blogsite is to be found in the direction that 
the ensuing comment stream takes, and the often very intricate and involved 
conversations that develop. These conversations however, rarely unfold in 
straightforward or expected ways. The following section will examine in some detail 
a blog post and accompanying comment stream that is exemplary in this regard, 
further elaborating the account of a practical and material ethics of 'doing' that I 
have sought to build thus far. 
The Ethical Mutability of Things In-Use 
As I have already mentioned in previously having described the form of the 
Ethical Living blog, it is frequently the case that the initial post contributed by the 
staff blogger is designed to provoke opinions, encouraging the reader to comment. 
The wide-ranging familiarity of some of the blog topics described above 
(consumables, domestic energy, and so forth) may therefore be understood to stem 
from the desire to ensure a mutual frame of reference between blogger and reader, 
starting a conversation that, for most, will have some resonance in their daily lives. 
This seeming conventionality of reference with regard to what are popularly 
considered to be the typical 'topics' and 'objects' of concern within ethical 
consumption is, however, frequently subverted and made highly unconventional in 
the course of often unpredictable discussion streams. 
A notable example of this kind of unpredictability emerges in response to a 
(rather conventional) offering from staffblogger Leo Hickman entitled 'Ten ways to 
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save money by going green. ,470 True to its title, this blog post provides a catalogue of 
supposedly money saving 'green' tips, from using video-conferencing and car clubs, 
to joining a food co-operative, or swapping from disposable to cloth nappies for 
children. Accompanied by a picture of Hickman's cloth-nappied daughter 
(reproduced below), it is this last point that attracts the most amount of attention in 
the ensuing fifty-nine comments, and thus largely shapes the blogged discussion. 
Figure 4: Header Photo accompanying June 3rd, 2008 Ethical Living post 
Leo Hickman trials cloth nappies on his daughter. Photograph: Graham Turner 
Discussion regarding the ethical merit of cloth versus disposable nappies 
does take some reasonably familiar forms in the ensuing comments - there is, on the 
one hand, the need to wash and dry cloth nappies, using therefore detergents and 
perhaps a tumble dryer (this being labour and resource intensive and therefore 
potentially expensive). Cotton cultivation, so some point out, also has attendant 
problems including high water and chemical use. On the other hand though, cloth 
nappies do not contribute to landfill, and they lack packaging and contaminating 
plastics.471 Like in the preceding rabbit example, it is possible to see here how it is 
470 Hickman, Ten Ways to Save Money by Going Green . 
47 1 See various contributors in blog stream, Ibid. Especially L W and~. 
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through the very 'doings' of the materiality of the nappy that claims to its ethicality 
( or otherwise) are staked - from the very cotton fibres of which it is woven, to the 
kinds of material practices (washing, drying, and so forth) that its use entails. 
This particular conversation takes an interesting tum though when ethical 
attention shifts from the nappy on the baby's bottom to unexpectedly focus on the 
material being of the baby itself. On the proffered basis that 'existence' necessarily 
involves depletive consumption and that the planet can only take so much of this, 
one contributor makes the following controversial observations: 
o 
June 3 08, 10:13pm 
An article bemoaning risks to the planet illustrated with a picture of the author's 
child has zero credibility.472 
0: 
June 3 08, 1 :57pm 
Educated Westemers deciding to have fewer children would really be a good start, 
and would have an instantaneous effect of local and global consumption.473 
These comments, perhaps unsurprisingly, provoke in the ensuing blog stream 
a protracted and at times quite heated debate in which not having children is lauded 
by some contributors as the only virtuous response to resource scarcity - the initial 
respondent further suggesting for instance that the accompanying discussion of cloth 
nappies is itself symptomatic of the need for "guilty breeders to find ecologically 
conscionable ways to justify their continuing over-consumption.,,474 Those rushing to 
agree with this stance proffer their own childlessness as evidence of a life-style that 
is ethical in tenns of having a low impact: "I have less children [therefore] I have 
472 0 . Ib'd 
=..Ill 1. 
473 0 . Ib'd _, III 1. 
474 0 . Ib'd 
_,Ill 1. 
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done less damage than yoU.,,475 Equally however, the apparent absurdity of this 
stance is quickly highlighted by others, one pointing to the obvious by simply noting, 
"I'm a bit puzzled as to the sustainability of that as a solution. Probably good for the 
environment, not so good for humankind.,,476 
Elsewhere in this lengthy comment stream, observant readers shift their 
attention onto Hickman himself, commenting on the extent to which the blogger may 
be seen to practice what he preaches. Noticing the large stainless steel refrigerator in 
the background of the header photograph (above), one respondent offers up their 
own money-saving green recommendation, reflexively commenting: "Don't buy a 
super-huge, energy guzzling, but oh so cool stainless steel fridge freezer (00pS).,,477 
Following this lead, another reader comments: "If Hickman really is using eco-
nappies and isn't using a tumble dryer, how come his kitchen isn't hung with damp, 
steaming terry cotton?,,478 A further respondent adds to the (seemingly deepening) 
absurdity with the suggestion that "the nappies are probably drying over the back of 
the vast fridge-freezer. A green way of using the wasted heat given off ... unless it 
has escaped via the [open] back door in the photo. ,,479 
Contentious objects proliferate in the preceding exchanges - what begins as a 
debate about nappies, becomes one about appliances, from the 'cool' materials from 
which they may be made, to the potentially useful heat-giving panels on their back, 
from the kitchen door (open or closed), to the crawling baby, metabolizing precious 
sugars and emitting noxious carbon dioxide with every breath. This example, while 
somewhat extreme with regard to content, is however not unusual with regards to the 
mutability of 'ethics' posited. Ethically speaking, 'things' are never only 'things,' 
they are the materials that they consist and the practices of which they are part or 
entail. 'Doing,' is paramount and, for this reason, 'ethical consumption' resists stable 
definition. 
This is not to suggest, in the other extreme, that what falls under the banner 
of 'ethical consumption' is in any way random or indiscriminate. On the contrary, 
475 C . Ib·d 
.=m 1. 
476 .R, in Ibid. 
477 L W, in Ibid. 
478 E, in Ibid. 
479 R . Ib'd ~m 1. 
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the blogsite itself here may actually be understood to function as a mechanism of 
definitional attention in many regards. Ethical Living does most often address topics 
around which a degree of 'ethical' awareness already exists - in this way ensuring, 
as I have mentioned, that the topics addressed 'matter,' so to speak, to the browsing 
readership.480 Equally, however, the actual process ofblogging about a particular 
issue under the heading 'Ethical Living' can act to recast the object or practice being 
discussed in 'ethical' terms in a way in which it may not previously have been. 
Definitional finality is resisted though, and the boundaries of attention 
shifting, in the case the mutable, material, and practical consumer ethics that this 
section has described.481 Drawing from the blogosphere a range of objects and 
practices both more and less familiar to us in terms of ethics (from rabbits to babies 
to fridge-freezers), I have attempted to illustrate here how materiality and material 
practices themselves are ethically imbued - the very 'stuff of ethics as 
contemporarily enacted in the mode of consumption. 
So, to return to the account of 'material culture' with which this discussion 
began, it is possible to see how, as a means via which to describe current practices of 
ethical consumption, this recognition simply does not go far enough. To the extent 
that Ethical Living is concerned with material relationships between people and 
things it does of course operationally evince the recognition that ours is a material 
culture. Critically however, this observation serves only as a starting point. As the 
480 I think it worth emphasising that the blogsite in question (as do most) operates in a competitive 
market. The Guardian is a newspaper after all, and even in its online version aims to be 'sold' or 
subscribed. The amount of net traffic to traverse blogs such as Ethical Living function inevitably in 
this context as measure of relevance and interest, which subsequently translates into profits in the 
form of advertising revenue. This market-based dynamic of attention is dually reliant on 'prior' public 
attention (publicity) as it were, but also very much part of the mechanism of designating, and re-
ordering the variety of attention that may be brought to bear on a given matter. 
481 As was mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the aim here has of course never been to 
arrive at a final definition of what ethical consumption is, or even a definition of what it 'is' for this 
particular set ofblog contributors. Rather, as I have hoped to demonstrate, this is precisely what is 
resisted by the mutability of ethics as/in material practices that I've attempted to elaborate. Even the 
blog form itself can be understood to functionally contribute to this definitional impossibility 
insomuch as it works reflexively so as while, on the one hand, it is inevitably involved in a kind of 
continuing definitional activity, on the other, the impossibility of success is guaranteed as internal 
definitional tensions are repeatedly bought to the fore, acting as the main driver of continued blog 
responses. 
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blogged discussions introduced in this section have demonstrated, objects, things, 
and practices are mediators of social relationships; that this is the case though is not 
the end of the story. Further than this, it is the nature of any given object or 
materiality itself that comes, in the present case, to ethically matter in terms of the 
'how' or what may be 'done.' It is the very matter of objects themselves, as well as 
the material relationships and forms of practice in which they are implicated and 
employed, which may function in ethical terms. The rabbit's habitation in a grassy 
field, to recall a preceding example, is important, so it's very 'rabbit-ness,' its 
wholeness, and fluffiness, the fact of its "little bunny head" and "little bunny feet." 
Yet, in underscoring the importance of the 'object' so to speak, it is not 
towards any straightforward championing of this approach that I aim. In this regard, 
my point here need be distinguished from one being made with some frequency in 
STS concerning the sociological 'status' of objects. Herein, adopting an object-
centred focus, much work has sought to underscore the material 'entanglement' of 
people, objects, technologies and so forth, presenting this as a research outcome or 
conclusion as it were. What then results is a normative sociological valorisation of 
entanglement and object-centeredness as something alternative, or subaltern, 
something that requires a sociologist to point it out inasmuch as this understanding is 
not thought to arise 'inside' public discourse. 482 
The story I am trying to tell, by contrast, does not aim to end with a 
description of the extent to which 'ethical consumption' is always a socio-material 
enterprise. Instead, this is exactly what is taken for granted at the outset. As has been 
evident in the examples taken from Ethical Living, the material nature of 
contributor's concerns are certainly not opaquely or obscurely so. This chapter's 
focus on the material practice of bloggers and respondents then, emerges not from 
any desire to specifically endorse or promote this as a style of critical engagement. 
Rather, insomuch as 'stuff (and what you can do with it) forms the substrate of 
'ethical living,' it is through further attention to this that an exploration of the 
reconfigured 'ethical' of 'ethical consumption' must proceed. 
482 See for elaboration along similar lines, Noortje Marres, "Testing Powers of Engagement: Green 
Living Experiments, the Ontological Turn and the Undoability ofInvolvement" European Journal of 
Social Theory 12 (2009). 
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Beyond acting as rejoinder to certain consumption literatures, the 
significance of this observation in the present context still requires much elaboration. 
To this end, the second part of this chapter will take the account of consumptive 
ethics as material 'doing' established thus far and explore this in its natural habitat so 
to speak - the competitive marketplace. 
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Chapter Five 
o 
Part II 
Ethical Consumption as Market Practice 
As the majority of our consumptive relationships are enacted in the mode of 
the consumer and in the context of markets, a pertinent question arises regarding 
how we may begin to treat the claim that an ethical relation may be established 
therein. 'Consumption,' as it is conjoined with an 'ethical' directive, immediately 
presents, both theoretically and practically speaking, a number of apparent problems 
and paradoxes. The (rationally-acting) individual consumer seems to bump up 
uncomfortably against a collectively construed 'ethical' that eschews self-interest as 
primary motivator. Similarly, the reigning supremacy of market 'choice,' appears to 
quash the possibility of an alternative' care.' This second part of Chapter Five will 
seek to address tensions such as these, elaborating them through analysis of the blog 
material. What stands to be developed in the process is an alternative approach to 
understanding 'markets,' one which witnesses the instability of their supposed 
structuring dichotomies, and on the basis of this unravelling, may ultimately lead 
away from long-enduring abstractions and towards a more textured account of our 
consumptive lives. 
Previous chapters of this thesis, in particular Chapter Two, have already 
touched on some of the theoretical paradoxes associated with the proposition that 
ethics might be 'done' through the market. The self-interested intent of market 
exchange has typically been understood to be anathematic to classical accounts of 
ethics which refuse to allow self-interest as a motivator.483 Any market-ethics 
defined on the basis of this understanding is therefore a necessarily compromised 
one. 
483 See, for discussion, Sen, On Ethics and Economics. p.81 Or discussion of Sen in my Chapter Two. 
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In the present context, the assumptions under which an address to ethics 
made through the market constitutes some sort of failure may be usefully re-
examined via attention to Annemarie Mol's recently articulated distinction between 
'choice' and 'care.' Contrasting what she terms a 'logic of choice' with that of 
'care,' Mol suggests that there are certain fundamental incompatibilities between 
these.484 'Choice,' in its prevailing Western evocation, is a celebrated ideal of 
individual autonomy - it is apparently through our ability to choose (often from an 
array of choices offered in a competitive marketplace) that we may express our 
individuality, and even exercise our personal freedom. The demand that we make 
judgments, that we choose from a range of options, places emphasis on the fact that 
some choices are better than others, and as such, the ability to rationally adjudicate 
between these is of primary significance. Familiar from the discipline of economics, 
where this description is entailed in the previously introduced figure of homo 
economicus (the rationally calculating actor of economic decision making), choice 
appears to set us at a distance, cordoned off from, or 'outside' that thing which we 
are making a choice regarding.485 In these ways, 'choice' may be understood to 
fundamentally underlie our notions of our own centred and agentic selfhood - that on 
the basis of which we understand the ways we may be-in, act-in, and effect the 
world. 
As Mol seeks to demonstrate in the context of patient care, the flip side of the 
supposed autonomy of choice is that we may become increasingly governable via 
this conferral of individual responsibility. Choice, as been most thoroughly 
demonstrated utilising Foucault's notion of 'govemmentality, ,486 is also an 
obligation which functionally operates to constitute us as particular kinds of 
governable subjects. The figure of the 'ethical' consumer, charged with the self-
484 It should be noted that Mol is writing in a different and specific context - that of health care 
provision for diabetic patients. In introducing her work here it is not my intention to Ull?ermine the 
strategic suitability of her conclusions in her chosen context. Moreover, Mol does specIfically 
emphasise the non-generalisable and contingent character of her analysis; reco~sing that.' elsewhere, 
the choice-care relationship may not necessarily be one of mutual exclusIOn .. It IS ~O,t spe~Ifically 
against Mol's thesis that this chapter presents its analysis, instead the 'paradIgmatIC cho~ce-care 
division, as clearly articulated in Mol's work in particular, is employed only as a structunng platform. 
Mol, The Logic o/Care: Health and the Problem o/Patient Choice. p.74. 
485 Ibid., p.81 
486 See discussion of this in Chapter Two. 
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monitoring of their purchase decisions in line with this intent, is perhaps especially 
open to a reading in such tenns - "people consume particular conceptions of what it 
is to be ethical- ones that tum upon notions of accepting one's responsibilities and 
obligations,,,487 one study concludes in this vein. 
The possibility of 'true' care, therefore, and according to Mol, is elided by 
the dominating logic of choice. 'Care,' she supposes, can not be achieved via choice , 
but grows instead out of sustained and collaborative efforts to "attune knowledge" to 
the everyday specificities of "complex lives.,,488 However, in the case of ethical 
consumption at least, this conclusion presents something of a conundrum. How can 
we take seriously here any ethical claims specifically articulated in a market context 
and supposedly enacted via a logic of choice? Can ethical relations (such as care) 
subsist in market-based practices, or does this suggestion mistake 'responsibilisation' 
for 'ethicalisation?' The following discussion will investigate these questions by 
introducing some of the fonnal strategies of 'ethical' choice-making discemable in 
the practice of ethical consumption. As will be seen however, in practice many 
difficulties in reliably demarking 'choice' and 'care' inevitably emerge. 
Buying Right (and not Buying Wrong) 
By means of beginning this discussion, it is useful to recall the CSR business 
case reasoning - that a company may 'do well by doing good.' One of the ways in 
which this statement functions is on the basis of the understanding that consumers 
will actively choose to buy products that have been responsibly produced. For the 
consumer to uphold their end of the CSR bargain, it is required that they exercise 
their choice at the point of sale, opting to purchase one product over another on the 
basis of its understood ethical credentials. 
In ethical consumption parlance though, this practice of ethics through the 
exercise of market choice is articulated using a different set of tenns. Choosing to 
487 Clive Barnett et aI., "Consuming Ethics: Articulating the Subjects and Spaces of Ethical 
Consumption," Antipode 37, no. 1 (2005). p.42 
488 Mol, The Logic o/Care: Health and the Problem o/Patient Choice. 
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buy 'more ethical' products over 'less ethical' or 'unethical' ones is known to ethical 
, " b . ,489 d d 
consumers as posItIve uymg, an un erstands money to function as a "vote,,490 
which can be cast with every purchase decision or shopping trip. A series of Ethical 
Living blog posts are assembled explicitly around this very notion, urging readers to 
join an initiative to Tread Lightly (as it is titled on the site) by making "small" 
positive changes to their purchasing behaviour that "that added together will make a 
big difference.,,491 
This strategy is also propounded in a June 6th, 2008 blogpost by Jessica 
Aldred entitled 'Is there any point in going green?' Accompanied by a photo of a 
poster that provocatively reads 'Why bother?', in this post Aldred quotes the writer 
and environmentalist Michael Pollan as he presents a case to why consumers should 
in fact bother to buy 'positively': 
You will set an example to other people, and if enough people bother, they can 
influence behavioural change on a wider scale. Consciousness will be raised and 
may even change. Markets for consumers with these new values will expand and 
prosper. New moral imperatives will become established.492 
This belief in the effectiveness of a market-moving consumer-led ethics is 
echoed by some in the comment stream. Notably one reader submits the following 
plea as an imperative to ethical consumerism via 'buying right': 
EH 
June 6 08 3 :59pm 
Why bother? Because it could be you. Yes, you could be the one whose small 
change finally removes the log jam; the straw that breaks the camel's back. Change 
489 Ethical Consumer, 'Why buy ethically?' 
http://www.ethicalconsumer.org/ShoppingEthically/WhyBuyEthically.aspx [assessed 13 January, 
2008] 
490 Ibid. 
491 Jessica Aldred, Is There Any Point Going Green? (6th June, .2?08 [cited Jan~ary 27th 2009]): 
available from http://www.guardian.co.uk/environmentiethica1hvmgblog/2008/JunI?2/w~ek. 
492 Pollan, Michael, quoted in Ibid. Michael Pollan is the author of a 2~08 book entItl.ed In Defense of 
Food.', Michael Pollan, In Defense of Food: An Eater's Manifesto (ChICagO: ThorndIke Press, 2008). 
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does not occur in a linear fashion. It comes in a series of quantum leaps and tends to 
flip from one state to another when the critical point is reached. As I said, it could be 
you that finally flips the switch and that is why you should bother.493 
The 'logic of market choice' approach to practicing ethical consumption 
reaches its fullest realisation though, not just in the suggestion that you must exercise 
your spending choice particularly and carefully in order to consume ethically - but 
that you must also spend more than you otherwise would in order to do so. Often 
implicit, and sometimes very explicit, within both business-case and ethical 
consumer understandings of ethical consumption is that 'ethical' goods may cost 
more than their (,unethical' or 'less-ethical'?) equivalents. As such, in a 
straightforward reading at least, an ethical premium of sorts stands to be paid by so-
inclined consumers. 
In its most archetypal form, this notion is manifest in a question asked 
numerous times on Ethical Living of items such as organic chicken - "can it really 
cost £13?,,494 Inquiring as to why anyone would pay this much for a chicken, and 
answering this question for herself and others, staff blogger Alison Benjamin writes 
that, "[i]t's not that I particularly care about chickens or get a warm glow knowing 
that my dinner once roamed semi-freely in the fields.,,495 Instead, for Benjamin, the 
justification of this extra 'ethical' expenditure comes in the form of knowledge 
regarding the types of farming practices to which what she refers to as "processed 
chickens,,496 are subject. "If people see what really constitutes their dinner," she 
comments, "they may not be so willing to feed it to their children.,,497 
Here, as in the first part of this chapter, we can locate ethical significance in 
the actual materiality of the object in question and in the material practices through 
which it is constituted. Benjamin's concern is with what actually 'constitutes' her 
493 EH, in Ibid. 
494 Bibi van der Zee, Open Season on Ethical Consumers (24th July, 2007 [cited 3rd November 
2008]); available from . 
http://www.guardian.co.uklenvironmentlethicallivingblog/2007/ju1l24/openseasononethicalconsume. 
(Added italics) ? 
495 Benjamin, Can Meat Ever Be Described as 'Ethical' and Would You Pay Extrafor It .. 
496 Ibid. 
497 Ibid. 
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dinner, as well as the various practices entailed in that constitution, referred to here 
as 'processing.' Interestingly and in addition, in this particular instance of ethical 
'mattering,' a couple of other considerations are also brought explicitly to bear _ 
firstly, the cost of the chicken, and secondly, who it is intended to feed. 
The higher price of the chicken itself is understood to materially constitute its 
enhanced 'ethicality' via freedom from mass-processing, but this status is 
particularly significant, justified one might say, because the chicken is to be eaten by 
one's children. Care for one's children here hinges on the ethically constituted 
materially of the chicken itself, yet this very thing is conferred as a function price via 
economically differentiated fanning and processing practices. 
Care, though, is not the only thing to be bound in a justificatory way to the 
paying of a higher purchase price for supposedly more ethical goods. Continuing 
down the comment stream stemming from Benjamin's initial post, a range of 
differing and creative approaches to justifying the extra cost of 'ethical' foods may 
be observed: 
M: 
Jan 1408, 11:48pm 
It may be more expensive to buy an organic or free range chick, but if you use all the 
leftovers for (i) cold the next night, (ii) a chicken pesta pasta another night, and 
more importantly, (iii) use all the fridge leftovers, e.g. old carrots, onions etc to 
make a fantastic stock (and reduce wastage), then the extra meals it generates 
actually works out to be great value. A healthy bargain indeed!498 
Greater financial outlay here prompts a more complete utilisation of the 
product than may have otherwise been made. The additional value theoretically 
reaped leads this reader (counter to expectations) to subsequently proclaim a bargain 
- and a 'healthy' one at that. Thus, in this comment, high cost is ethically linked to 
both the reduction of waste, (and therefore actually to the saving of money), and 
even to health (arguable a fonn of self-care). 
498 M . Ib·d 
=lll 1. 
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Another practical response frequently found in the Ethical Living blogstreams 
to the often higher price attached to ethical products entails a kind of strategic buying 
accomplished via a cost versus (ethical) benefit analysis. This well demonstrated in a 
contribution by staff blogger Kevin Anderson as he writes: 
I couldn't always afford to buy organic. It easily doubled my food costs so I had to 
buy organic strategically. What would give the earth and family farmers the most 
bang for my buck?499 
Respondents to this blogpost are quick to echo Anderson's sentiments, 
supplying their own strategies for consuming as ethically as possible but factoring in 
their own priorities, for example: 
cc: 
Apr 23 08, 11 :05pm 
As a recent convert to organic food, I buy strategically, and factor in how much it 
costs, how far it's travelled and most importantly - taste!500 
In this way, the well-being of others (in the form of Anderson's 'family 
farmers'), and the well-being of the self (via the pleasure of taste), both come to 
ethically figure in terms of 'getting the most bang for one's buck.' The choice to buy 
a more highly priced but perceivably ethical product then, is one that, as the 
preceding examples demonstrate, may be arrived at in various ways. Others, the self, 
pleasure, care, value, health, the environment, and even the whole 'earth' may factor 
as simultaneously ethical and economic considerations in the situated, everyday 
consumptive decisions of individual ethical consumers. 
Economic downturn late-2008 (a result of the so-called 'credit-crunch') 
registers interestingly on the blogsite in the form of concern regarding people's 
continued ability to buy ethically. In this way, (albeit less explicitly than in the 
499 Ibid. 
500 CC, in Ibid. 
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preceding examples), the price premium that may be borne by ethical consumers is 
also acknowledged and referred to. For proponents of ethical consumption, and in 
particular the Ethical Living staff bloggers themselves, the suggestion that one might 
abandon ethical consumption due to financial constraint is greeted with much 
concern. In the following December posting for instance, van der Zee worries: 
Will all the years of effort getting the message across to the public tum out to have 
been in vain now that we're all trying to save money? Will people start sneakily 
buying a £2 supermarket chicken where previously they would have made the trip to 
their local organic butcher?50l 
The image of stealthily bought chicken, while on the one hand very 
humorous, on the other is indicative of the way in which, through positing a 'right' 
choice, positive buying, and in particular the idea of an 'ethical premium,' may be 
seen to functionally designate two competing varieties of consumption - good 
consumption, and bad consumption. Concerned with the propensity of 'others' to 
sneak back to the supermarket, van der Zee' s statement supports the findings made 
by John Connolly and Andrea Prothero in a study of 'green' consumers that notes 
how a separation between one's own (good) consumption and others (bad) 
consumption is frequently made.502 This primarily results, the researchers claim, 
from a failure to ascribe the same degree of meaning to the consumptive choices of 
others as you do to your own.503 
Such a dynamic may be called upon to explain the lengthy justifications of 
personal consumptive choice that are often to be found on the blog comment stream, 
and frequently deployed in order to counteract negative assumptions made by others. 
This dynamic is evident, for instance, in the following exchange occurring on Ethical 
Living in December 2008. Here, the initial respondent's suggestion that she intends 
501 Bibi van der Zee, My Green New Year's Resolutions (31st December, 2008 [cited 12th January 
2009]); available from http://www. guardian. co. uklenvironmentlblog/2008/ dec/311 green-new-year-
resolutions. .. " 
502John Connolly and Andrea Prothero, "Green Consumption: Life-Politics, Risk and ContradIctIOns, 
Journal of Consumer Culture 8, no. 1 (2008). p.128 
503 Ibid. 
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to go back to using her car more than she had been doing due to the dangers 
associated with cycling is met with subtle critique from a subsequent responder who 
offers up their own cycling practice as preferable: 
W 
01 Jan 09, 5:29pm 
This year, after so many near misses on my bike due to people texting while driving 
... I've resolved to use cars more. 
Mo 
01 Jan 09, 6:05pm 
It sounds like you really tried hard to go green. I encourage you to keep trying, 
where and when you can .... What helps me is not giving a damn whether drivers 
are inconvenienced by my presence on the road. I have every right to be there and in 
the age of global heating, ever more so. 
W 
01 Jan 09, 6:18pm 
Am I worth more to the green cause as a dead or damaged rider/walker? 
Mo 
01 Jan 09, 9:29pm 
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In my experience, trying to 'make yourself small' by squeezing to the side of the road 
only encourages drivers to cut you off or overtake you in a dangerous manner. I am 
out there wide enough so they can't squeeze past. It works! 
W 
02 Jan 09, 9:56pm 
[Mo], whatever made you think I ride my bike in a 'small' way? Would I really have 
survived biking to work every day for over 10 years that way? I'm plenty wide with 
two panniers full of shopping and I ride the middle of the lane. I AM traffic. I'm not 
riding alongside traffic. 
And for the record, I've been a vegan for 21 years. I've always grown my own fruit 
and veg organically. I chose to foster rather than increase the population myself. I 
gave up flying two years ago. Anything else I'm supposed to do while the rest of the 
western world uses up the oil driving to get plastic consumer crap from shopping 
malls?504 
The suggestion made by Mo that presumed W's cycling practice to be 
"small," (and hence less 'ethical' in as much as a weak, rather than strong claim for 
cycling against motoring was understood to have been staked), provokes an 
indignant response in which W takes pains to both vindicate the cycling practice 
under question and extol the virtues of her own consumptive choices. 
This final comment in particular structurally reinforces the 'good' versus 
'bad' consumption couplet and reminds us that that 'positive buying' has a sister 
practice, but also natural opposite, in what is formally referred to in ethical 
consumption parlance as 'negative purchasing. ,505 Following the 'your pound is 
your vote' reasoning, by 'negative purchasing' or not buying certain objectionable 
products or services (,plastic consumer crap' broadly defined in the preceding 
example), you may be said to be casting your vote via the pound withheld. 
504 v 'R I . Exchange between Mo and Y:L. in van der Zee, My Green New .1 ear s eso utlOns. 
505 Ethical Consumer, 'Why buy ethically?' 
http://www.ethicalconsumer.orgiShoppingEthically/WhyBuyEthically.aspx [assessed 13 January, 
2008] 
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Another instance of this, from the many possible examples on Ethical Living, 
is entailed in Leo Hickman's question, "Is buying Zimbabwe produce supporting 
farmers or an evil dictator?"so6 Although Hickman does concede that there is "no 
certain way of knowing" the answer to this question, the prospect of negative 
purchasing is nonetheless considered as a means by which consumers might exercise 
their individual choice towards the achievement of ethical consumption. 
This example, the previous, and others discussed in this section unanimously 
ascribe to the logic that markets may be moved on the basis that consumers buy right 
(positively) and abstain from buying wrong (negatively). As is particularly evident in 
the above cycling example though, this strategy problematically appears to shift the 
onus of corporate responsibility onto the individual consumer. W's indignant final 
statement could be called upon to sum-up this situation - here she provides a 
catalogue of her life told as a series of individual consumptive choices, ending this 
by volleying rhetorically back to her respondent with the question "Anything else I'm 
d t d ?"S07 suppose 0 0 .... 
The italics and trailing ellipsis added to this quote though perhaps render it 
somewhat misleadingly. Individual consumer responsibility in the practice of ethical 
consumption makes no sense in isolation without reference to an 'other' (animate or 
inanimate) towards whom we wish to behave ethically, and to a collectivity with 
whom we act in order to achieve this, (especially evident when described as a need 
to 'move markets'). The fundamental claim made by proponents of ethical 
consumption is, after all, that consumer choices might be made with the benefits to 
the collective (over, but sometimes as well as) the individual in mind. Car-pooling or 
buying a bike might therefore be suggested on this basis even if this is a more 
inconvenient or personally risky means by which to make one's way to work. 
Distinct from accounts which posit an economically rational and self-
maximising individual consumer, ethical consumption actually suggests two types of 
collectivity - a collective to be benefited, and also, the need for collective action. 
506 Leo Hickman, Is Buying Zimbabwe Produce Supporting Farmers or an Evil Dictator? (15th May, 
2008 [cited January 14th 2009]); available from 
http://www.guardian.co.uklenvironmentl2008/may/15/ethicaIliving.lifeandhealth. 
507 W in, van der Zee, My Green New Year's Resolutions. (Added italics) 
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While one person can 'make a difference,' it is suggested, this difference is most 
substantial when the actions of this one person combine with the similar actions of 
others. Consider the following comment, made in response to an aforementioned 
June 2008 blog post that expressly debates whether there is "any point going green;' 
given, for example, that "reducing your carbon footprint is pointless when someone 
else is happy to increase theirs?"so8 
Z 
June 6 08 2:22pm 
" .I just wanted to let y'all know what I witnessed in Tesco on Dean Street in Soho 
the other day. A woman, (50s?) had each item in her basket placed in the clear fruit 
and veggie bags. EVEN A MAGAZINE?! At first when I saw her put through a 
pack of bleeding meat in one of the fruit bags I thought fair enough, but when I saw 
the already packaged cherry tomatoes go through and then the bagged up Grazia, I 
was dumbfounded. She subsequently put one small basket's worth of shopping in 2 
tesco carrier bags which she then put in a re-useable shopping bag she'd brought 
with her! !!! I am so angry at myself for not saying anything ... 
I then angrily carried all of my shopping home in my arms, pockets and down my 
trousers ... 509 
A number of interesting things are going on in this comment, significantly, 
for instance, the ethically contentious plastic bag changes status dynamically as it is 
used, or in practice. Placing bleeding meat in one is 'fair enough,' but using it to 
contain a magazine provokes outrage. For the purposes of the present discussion 
though, what is most notable is the shopper's solution to the problem of another's 
perceived over use - going personally without. The pocketing of one's groceries in 
this case may therefore be understood to suggest that 'ethical living, ' for the sake of 
oneself and others, is something which may only be successfully achieved 
collectively and together. 
508 Aldred, Is There Any Point Going Green? 
509 Z in, Ibid. 
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Yet, in many ways, the 'buying right and not buying wrong' based 
approaches to ethical consumption discussed here provide an overly simplistic 
account of 'market-moving' as that which results from the summation of individual 
choices. In turn, a narrow version of 'markets' as linked up chains of consumer 
choices emerges. As the following section will seek to elaborate however, ethical 
consumption practices are many and varied. While those discussed so far are 
explicitly articulated by their proponents as intra-market strategies, ethical 
consumption may also be performed as an outright rejection of market-based 
exchange, and sometimes directly formulated as an anti-capitalist critique. The 
demarcations of intra-market and extra-market, or pro-and anti-consumer however, 
do not, as I will go on suggest, prove feasible insomuch as these mistakenly figure 
markets as external and bounded entities. 
The Joy o/Thrifflo - An Anti-Consumptive Ethics? 
Where the previous section discussed what we might, for now at least, 
describe as an intra-market approach to ethical consumerism, the present section will 
demonstrate that contrasting anti-consumerist, sometimes anti-consumptive, and at 
other times explicitly anti-corporate and anti-capitalist strategies are equally apparent 
on the blog.511 As much as these positions might appear, on the surface of it, to differ 
from those previously discussed (or even be their mutually exclusive opposite), it is 
important to underscore, as I will attempt to do in the ensuing discussion, that these 
seemingly conflicting approaches are most often articulated and enacted together in 
the attempt to consume ethically. 
510 India Knight, "The Joy of Thrift," Sunday Times, November 2nd 2008. See also, India Knight, The 
Thrift Book: Live Well and Spend Less (London: Fig Tree, 2008). The author writes that the book is 
designed to "show you how to say no to waste, save pots of money, and look good while you are 
doing it." 
511 It is interesting to note that a similar division of perspectives can be observed in academic 
literature that seeks to discuss the UK government policy on sustainable development. In a journal 
article on the topic, social economist Gill Seyfang for instance draws attention to, on th~ one hand,. a 
"view prevalent in international policy discourse that green and ethical consumerism WIll be. s~f~cIent 
to transform markets," and, on the other, the need for governments to "encourage less matenalIstic 
lifestyles based on new definitions of 'wealth.'" (The latter perspective endorsed ?~ Seyfang ~ 
preferable). See, Gill Seyfang, "Consuming Values and Contested Cultures: A Cntical AnalYSIS of the 
UK. Strategy for Sustainable Consumption and Production," Review of Social Economy LXII, no. 3 
(2004). p.323 
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For those concerned to promote an 'ethical' abstinence from consumption, 
the spectre of 'over-consumption' as moral ill looms large, with the much de-cried 
wastefulness of 'consumer culture' receiving a good deal of blame for this. These 
concerns are particularly acutely stated in the blog posts of late 2008 where the 
annual excesses of Christmas consumption coincide with deepening economic crisis 
to produce a particularly intense concentration of ethical concern about reductions in 
expenditure, excess, and waste. 
In her blog post, "Ethical Shopping for a Thrifty Christmas"S12 for instance, 
Lucy Siegle weighs the virtues of frugality against ethically unpalatable Christmas 
spending: 
Naturally I also know to avoid the "Shopocalypse", as termed by the reverend Billy 
and the Church of Stop Shopping. I should probably take a leaf from Buy Nothing 
Day and have a Buy Nothing Christmas, but the thought of that is too grim. 
So I have theoretically settled on a thrift Christmas - a blanket rule of £20 per 
person maximum, irrespective of family pecking order - and preferably from a 
charity shop.S13 
Not buying anything then, in this extract is, as Siegle understands it, the most 
ethical Christmas prospect ("grim" as it might be). In lieu of this though, the second 
most 'ethical' approach is to spend less money. This, however, does not 
subsequently entail the attempt to get as many 'cheaper' products as possible; rather 
the resolve to buy from a charity shop 'ethically' combines helping others and 
reducing waste (by having bought second hand). 
The suggestion that virtue is inherent in frugality and thrift is not of course a 
new one, nor is it unique to ethical consumption. Veblen's critique of leisure and 
conspicuous consumption, for instance, morally hinges on the virtue of a contrasting 
512 Lucy Siegle, Ethical Shopping/or a Thrifty Christmas (26th November, 2008 [cited 12th January 
2009]); available from . . .. ' 
http://www.guardian.co.uklenvironmentlethicallivingblog/2008/nov126/greenchnstmas-ethlcalhvmg. 
513 Ibid. 
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notion of labour, and workmanship borne out of necessity. 514 The making and 
mending of useful things is, for Veblen, the mark of a kind of cognitive and moral 
purity that separates those who labour from those who leisure. This familiar 
sociological assumption can also be drawn from Bourdieu's account of 'distinction' , 
which concludes on a similarly problematic note. Compelled, according to Bourdieu, 
by 'actual necessity,' by a functional relationship to things, the working classes, 
unsullied by 'bourgeois' ideology, are consequently assumed to be more virtuous on 
the basis ofthis.515 
Classically, the practice of religious asceticism has also long associated 
frugality with purity and moral virtue. 'Worldly' asceticism, the secular, capitalist 
and accumulative version of asceticism theorised by Max Weber in The Protestant 
Work Ethic,516 is particularly resonate in approaches to ethical consumption that 
advocate abstaining from consumption to the largest degree possible. Some of the 
reflexive complexities of this practice are captured in the following Ethical Living 
exchange. Herein, the ideas for living ethically proffered by some contributors (for 
example, cutting down on meat, walking places, baking your own bread)517 are 
derisively likened to the wearing of a 'hairshirt' (a religious device designed to cause 
the wearer some degree of discomfort or pain by means of repentance) by the quoted 
respondent: 
C 
June 3 08 2:18pm 
Accept that technology will have to get us out of this mess. Not hair shirts and 
d· I· 518 attempts to re-me leva lse us ... 
514 See, Slater, Consumer Culture and Modernity. p.163 
515 Ibid. 
516 Strictly speaking, according to Weber, 'worldly asceticism' originating in the Pr~t~stant 
Reformation, later becomes secularised, and can subsequently be applied to both rehgIOus and secular 
ascetics. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o/Capitalism. 
517 G, in Hickman, Ten Ways to Save Money by Going Green. 
518 C . Ib·d 
=> In 1. 
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Attracting a large degree of criticism on the basis of this comment in the form 
of accusations of 
the following post: 
'laZI'ne " lfi hn ,519 d ,. ,520 ss, se IS ess, an Ignorance, kresponds with 
C 
June 3 16:47 
Alright people. Put your hair shirts down. 
Here are some facts about me: 
1) I own no car. 
2) I travel on public transport everywhere. 
3) I recycle (have to or they won't take it Lol) 
4) I have, as mentioned HAVE NO CHILDREN ... 
My life contains considerably less consumption than I imagine many of yours 
does.52l 
These comments demonstrate a certain continuity in the construal of virtue in 
terms of abstinence and recompense between historical accounts of asceticism and 
some contemporary practices of ethical consumption. For those who advocate 
consuming less, virtue lies not only in reducing one's use (or 'waste') of material 
goods, but also in the attendant saving of money. The price of a given thing may be 
understood, in this context, to have therefore become in itself a consideration of an 
ethical nature (inasmuch as use-reduction and cost reduction are understood to 
frequently coincide). As in the preceding 'thrifty Christmas' example, and in 
particular given the then situation of worsening economic downturn, monetary cost 
recurs in such way on a number of occasions in the blogstreams, where paying less is 
understood to represent having consumed less, and therefore having consumed more 
'ethically' on this basis. The following blog post suggests that the benefits offered by 
519 A . IbOd ~m 1. 
520 D . Ib"d 
_,m 1" 
521 C " Ib"d 
=> m 1" 
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a condensing boiler, a simultaneous saving of money and gas (and therefore carbon). 
represents the best (most ethical) consumptive solution to household water heating: 
Staffblogger Carolyn Fry 
May 2308 
In How to Live a Low Carbon Life, author Chris Goodall calculates that a large 
household using a boiler of mid-70s vintage to supply 15,000 usable kWh of energy 
to heat the property over a year, would save more than two-thirds of this by 
installing a condensing boiler. This equates to a whopping carbon saving of 1.92 
tonnes of C02 a year. 
Not surprisingly, there are also cost savings to be had by cutting energy use so 
significantly. At an average price of 3p per kilowatt, the savings for the same 
household would be £303 per year. This means that if they were to pay £3,000 for a 
new boiler and professional fitting, they would make their money back within 10 
years.522 
Fry's claims are followed by a debate in the blogstream questioning just how 
energy efficient, and therefore, how cost efficient condensing boilers are: 
Th 
May 27 08, 4:08pm 
Unfortunately the main beneficiaries from condensing boilers are the makers of 
plumbing. The proponents tend to compare the theoretical efficiency of a 
condensing boiler with the typical efficiency of a noncondensing. I've seen 
suggestions that in reality the best condensing boilers are about 83% efficient, a gain 
of approx. 8%. Against that, you have to factor in the additional cost ofthe larger 
radiators you will need, because condensing boilers only save energy if the water is 
. ld b'l 523 heated to a lower temperature than wIth your 0 01 er. 
522 Fry, Tread Lightly: Install a Condenser Boiler. 
523 Th in Ibid. 
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In exchanges such as this, a method for the calculation of ethical value for 
money is achieved. In the previous section, the premium to be paid for ethical goods 
was justified in itself or offset against other purchases, in the present, saving money 
coincides ethically with a saving in resources. In both though, 'ethical' consumption 
(even as the practice of consuming less) inevitably always proceeds via market 
mechanisms. The method is one of determining the best value. Only value is not a 
sole function of price, rather ethical value for the price paid. This coincidence of 
value and values demonstrates the extent to which 'ethics,' in the context of ethical 
consumerism, is fundamentally transformed. This transformation though does not 
just occur in a single direction - it is not simply the case that what we once took to 
be relations of an 'ethical' nature have been colonised by corruptive 'market forces.' 
Rather, an expansion in the types of practice that we understand to constitute markets 
themselves is necessary. 
Furthermore, an augmentation in the boundaries of what we recognise to be 
'market' as opposed by 'non-market' is suggested. Even where the ethical 
exhortation is, for instance, to abstain from buying things altogether, whether via 
near as possible self-sufficiency, or as articulated in the form of a critique of 
capitalism, a rendition of ethics in terms of market value is nonetheless finally 
achieved. Consider, for instance, the following excerpt, taken from staff blogger 
James Randerson's November 24th, 2008 post: 
Staffblogger James Randerson 
Nov 2408 
So in these chastened economic times, Alistair Darling is presumably even less 
impressed than usual with Buy Nothing Dayan annual protest against consumerism 
and globalisation. Its organisers describe it thus: 
"Buy Nothing Day (Saturday November 29), is a simple idea, which challenges 
consumer culture by asking us to switch off from shopping for a day. It's a global 
195 
stand off from consumerism ... Anyone can take part provided they spend a day 
without spending! ,,524 
'Buy Nothing Day,' as a means of protest, is of course intended to have a 
symbolic and political function. Even understood thus however, (and not for instance 
as an anti-consumerist creed by which you must live your life), there is a certain 
irony inherent in its function. Abstaining from shopping, purposefully reducing 
consumption, ultimately, and in the same way as practices such as positive buying, 
operates to underscore the significance of consumer practices and re-situate the 
commodity itself as a proper site for the resolution of ethical problems.525 The 
product, and the market for that product, becomes the very locus of intervention, 
thus, those who advocate consumptive reduction as a measure of independence from 
a maligned consumer market, end up themselves complementing the exact 
consumptive circle that they seek to critique. In this way, the apparently 'extra-
market' is never exactly thus. A distinction between market and not-market becomes 
increasingly untenable and analytically dubious. 
A critical difference between the terms 'consumerism' and 'consumption' 
may be usefully re-instantiated here. Where 'consumerism' is too easily critiqued 
and made the obvious target by those who would simply isolate 'buying stuff itself 
as an ethical problem (a position adopting in varying degrees by bloggers and 
commenters discussed in this section), the term 'consumption,' on the other hand, is 
inherently recognisant of the expanded definition I am attempting to establish of the 
kinds of activities that may be said to partake in markets. 'Consumption' tacitly 
achieves an acknowledgment that there can be no easy separation of the intra-market 
from the extra-market. Not 'buying stuff does not necessarily equate to the 
boycotting of the 'market.' 
In a book entitled Consumer Culture, Celia Lury has suggested that we may 
manoeuvre a "critical distance from everyday understandings of consumption [by] 
524 James Randerson, Darling Wants 'Shopocalypse' Now, Pay Later (24th November. 200S [cited 
February 12th 2009]); available from 
http://www.guardian.co.uklenvironmentiethicallivingblog/200S/nov124/week. . 
525 Paddy Dolan, "The Sustainability Of "Sustainable Consumption. "Journal ofj1acromarketmg 22, 
no. 2 (2002). p.17l 
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shifting attention away from the use of things in the sense of consuming or 'using 
,. I ,,526 Th' up , to use III a more genera sense. IS treatment of consumption in terms of 
'use' offers a way of entering and expanding the terms of the 
consumerism/consumption debate insomuch as the use of an object need not 
necessarily be equated only with its destruction. Instead, consumption may be 
understood as a simultaneously productive, or constructive process,527 and, for this 
reason, one in which potentially unexpected 'ethical' consequences may nonetheless 
result. On the basis that 'consumption' may be broadly understood as 'use,' it is 
difficult to argue that 'ethical consumption' is a straight-out contradiction in terms. 
All life, after all, entails the use of some resources, and there is no necessary reason 
that these resource relations might not be understood as 'ethical.' 
In the present and preceding sections of this chapter, the contemporary 
inseparability of 'ethics' and 'markets' has been primarily established through an 
investigation of the various ways in which ethical consumption works via the 
establishment of 'ethical value for money.' This configuration, I have suggested, is 
observable in both the notion of an ethical premium, and in the discussed anti-
consumptive approaches. If 'ethical value for money' still appears though to 
somehow undermine or impoverish ethical consumption as a sincerely 'ethical' 
undertaking, this is because an accompanying account of the underlying 'ethical' 
nature of consumption itself is yet to be developed alongside. 
To this end, the final section of this chapter will return to the problem of 
'choice' versus 'care' in order to explore the contrary possibility that ethical 
consumption may actually function as a market-based means of enacting certain 
practices of ethico-material 'care.' Attempting to do justice to practices of ethical 
consumption as they are lived by individuals, this account will understand how these 
are articulated within the broader desire to lead a 'good life. ' 
526Celia Lury, Consumer Culture. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996). p.1 
527 Ibid. 
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Caring Choices and Markets Out of Bounds 
Consumption, as Alan Warde points out, is not just one practice, it is instead 
a moment in almost every practice - "items consumed are put to use in the course of 
engaging in particular practices."s28 As such, it is possible that we are simultaneously 
both caring and choosing selves. Acts of 'choice' do not necessarily exclude the 
dimension of care, and equally 'care' need not only be understood as such when it is 
entirely immured from 'choice' - even as this is conferred in the context of markets. 
Simply put, these are not dimensions of life that we necessarily engage in separately 
from one another. 
When, as in the present case, claims about consumption are made under the 
rubric of the ethical, critically speaking it is only fair that these claims be addressed 
on the terms that they claim as opposed to pre-emptively undermining them on this 
very basis. The approach that I have taken throughout this chapter has attempted to 
see this through. Whereas Mol's aforementioned choice/care division can work to 
reinstitute long-held distinctions about what constitutes 'market' as opposed to 'non-
market' practice, this chapter has attempted to problematise any recourse to 
distinctions such as these. 
In this final section then, it is worth briefly emphasising how, at a 
fundamental level, it is possible to claim that consumption is always already an 
ethical matter insomuch as it is a realm for the negotiation of how we want to live, 
and the establishment of what may be said to constitute the 'good life.' 529 Care for 
familiar others and care for the self are as much a part of ethical consumption as 
more formally articulated concerns regarding care for distant others and for the wider 
environment. 
Daniel Miller's North London shopping ethnographies have sought to 
effectively illustrate this point. Purchasing, Miller observes, is primarily directed 
towards others, in particular one's family members, and is influenced by moral 
528 Alan Warde, "Consumption and Theories of Practice," Journal o/Consumer Culture 5, no. 2 
(2005). p.145 . . " 
)29Barnett et aI., "Consuming Ethics: Articulating the Subjects and Spaces of Ethical ConsumptIOn. 
p.26; Richard Wilk, "Consuming Morality," Journal of Consumer Culture 1, no. 2 (2001). p.246. 
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sentiments towards them and regarding how to live.53o Similarly, and to draw from 
my own life as example, although not a self-identified ethical-shopper, the groceries 
to be found in my shopping basket on a Sunday may differ markedly in 'ethical' 
terms to those procured on a weekday. Sunday's carrots, for instance, might be 
purchased on a leisurely trip to the morning farmers market, they will be organic and 
local, their green tops still on, tied together rustically with string and deposited into a 
suitably organic bag (no point relying on them to supply plastic ones there!). 
Wednesday's carrots on the other hand, bought in a rush at the end of the day from 
the local supermarket and destined for a quick stir fry rather than an elaborate 
weekend roast, are likely to be a much more plasticky, high food-mile affair. 
Condensed into a single carrot therefore, (explicitly professed desire to shop 
ethically or not), are myriad of cares. 
Between ostentatious asceticism, old-fashioned frugality, hairshirts, 
wholesomeness and thirteen pound chicken then, what is being worked out are 
particularly contemporary conceptions of 'goodness' and 'care.' Ethical consumers 
are always in the process of juggling multiple ethical 'choices,' these however are 
not abstractly construed; rather, making the 'ethical choice' is about enacting certain 
cares. As in the following example, care for one's family and the environment may 
be enacted through the medium of choice even where cost is an explicit 
consideration: 
B 
17 Jan 08, 9:23pm 
Ethical dilemmas abound - should I buy the hideously expensive organic courgettes, 
nope, they've been flown in from Morocco, then there's the bog-standard ones grown 
in Spain, nope, they come in a tray and are wrapped in plastic film, so it's the 
sprayed and non-attributable loose ones that are probably the ones I should buy, 
except I don't want to poison my kids with sprays and pesticides and where have 
530 Daniel Miller, A Theory a/Shopping (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998). 
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they come from and by which means of transport have they arrived on a shelf in 
Scotiand?531 
Returning to the 'problem' of underlying self-interest then - this is made 
dramatically more complex in the context of the moral imperative to lead a good life. 
There are affective and sensual pleasures attached to consuming differently,532 and 
these are not 'unethical' even if considered only in their own regard. Material 
pleasure is not incompatible with ethical imperatives; they can be one and the same-
for instance, the taking of pleasure-in-care. 
Mol writes, "[i]n the logic of care ... [y]ou are inside your life, you live it." 
Yet, this description might be applied just as aptly to the practice of ethical 
consumption as I have been describing it here. As a caring practice, consumption is 
not always based on rational decisions. Things are laid out, as in the previously 
quoted comment, we must choose one courgette over the other, and yet finally, this is 
not a choice abstractly arrived at, it is one that is made through various types of cares 
- self, family, others and environment. These caring choices moreover, as I have 
sought to emphasise, are mundane, material, practical, and thoroughly embedded in 
everyday life - an insistence on 'distance' and abstraction fails to adequately address 
the practices of ethical consumption as they are lived. 
The conversations taken from Ethical Living and discussed in this chapter 
demonstrate that, when it comes to living ethically, 'choice' has no complete or 
decisive mastery over' care.' What is 'ethical' is construed via a co-articulation of 
these logics, and the form that this takes is not pre-determined, nor is it fixed and 
unlikely to change. The most 'ethical' outcome in any consumptive context is 
contingent, established both personally and collectively, and thus always, 
imperfectly. This 'imperfection' however, need not be understood as a problem per 
se - within the reflexive context of the market, it is productive - it generates new 
types of ethical 'things' and reconfigured types of ethical relations, for 'better' and 
531 Ii, in Environmental Editor, What's the Point of Recycling If It Just Goes to Waste? (l5th January. 
2008 [cited 12th November 2008]); available from 
http://www. guardian. co. uk/environment! ethicallivingblog/2008/j an/14/week. . ' 
532 Kate Soper, "Re-Thinking the 'Good Life': The Citizenship Dimension of Consumer DIsaffectIon 
with Consumerism," Journal of Consumer Culture 7, no. 2 (2007). p.211 
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sometimes arguably for 'worse.' You may have thought that you were ticking all 
right ethical boxes in one moment, only to suddenly find the irreversible fact of your 
children to newly count against you like big ethical crosses in the next! Ethical 
'potential' inheres in these shifts; praxical reformulations do not reproduce a 
'totalising' or unchangingly 'rational' market logic, consumption itself materially re-
organises markets - not just the other way around. 
The 'market' itself, in the context of the foregoing account, becomes more 
definitionally unstable and unwieldy. Through the course of discussion, the term 
'market,' at once pushed and pulled in opposing directions, reveals itself to be both 
more extensive than first imagined, but also more particular, compromised and 
conjoined - a proposition that, significantly, is never static, instead evolving rapidly 
and responsively. 
Spread beyond their traditionally understood limits, markets proliferate, and 
thus consumers have more choices, consumption is more rational, more sophisticated 
and more reflexive. Yet, to the extent that these markets function as arenas for the 
actual business of living, and now even the very 'doing' of ethics, they become 
disaggregated, incorporated, and appropriated, slipped in where they do not belong -
made at once more integral, but also less 'true' as it were, comprised and colonised 
all the while seeming to pursue their own logic and ambitions. 
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Chapter Six 
o 
'Ethical Careers' 
From the back ofa crowded room in late January of2007 I witnessed 
something unexpected. A friend had organised for a number of CSR "industry 
professionals"s33 to give a panel discussion at the London School of Economics and 
Politics (LSE) and, knowing my interest in the topic, invited me to attend. For two 
hours and forty minutes discussion rolled back and forth across the panel without 
much incident or interest from the audience. In the overheated room, packed to the 
rafters with around two hundred people occupying seats, with others balanced on 
window ledgers and latecomers gathered in the doorway, everyone, by this late stage, 
was near fast asleep. Then, suddenly, the room was awake in an abrupt flurry of 
paper-shuffling, seat-shifting and pen-wielding. The panel had reached the last topic 
on their discussion agenda - how to get a job in CSR. 
Until this point, that there was such an intensity of interest in CSR as an 
employment prospect had largely escaped my attention. In hindsight though, the text 
of the original event invitation did give something away - "The panel discussion will 
be followed by a networking reception,,,s34 it read. And, by the end of the discussion, 
as I tried to head towards the door through a crowd moving forcefully in the other 
direction towards the assembled panel, it was obvious that this 'networking 
reception' was the reason that so many had gathered - something was undeniably 
afoot. 
This chapter attempts to chart the recent rise in interest in what have now 
become known as 'ethical careers.' At the beginning of2007, this phrase was only 
just starting to appear, notably with the publishing of a handbook called The Ethical 
533 E_mail.LSECorporateResponsibilitySociety17th January.2007.Theeventwas.CS~.atits 
Crossroads,' 18th January, 2007, Clement House, London School of Economics and PolItIcs, 
Aldwych, London. 
534 E-mail, LSE Corporate Responsibility Society 17th Jan. 
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Careers Guide 2006_7. 535 Now, two and a half years later in 2009, the tenn 'ethical 
careers' attracts in the order of seventy million hits on Google,536 'ethical careers' 
recruitment services are proliferating,537 a number of UK university websites offer 
information under this title on their webpages,538 and many have specifically 
assigned an 'ethical careers' advisor. 539 Equally, the recent appearance of a number 
of Masters degrees in CSR may be noted,540 and, now running for the second year in 
a row, a formally complied Acona 'CSR Salary Survey,' further attests to the 
emergence of a ethical jobs market.541 
Engaging in a kind of ethnography of a market, and of a concept, this chapter 
unfolds chronologically, beginning by picking up where I left off above - at the start, 
as it were, of my own awareness that such thing as an 'ethical career' existed. Time, 
with reference to that which is emerging, is important. What appears when might be 
understood to depend on when the greatest impact of that appearance might be felt; 
what is it about the 'present' conditions that make such emergences possible?542 
Setting off on its trail through the time of the 'ethical career,' my own role as 
researcher is multiply and variously configured due, in part, to the very dynamics of 
'emergence' themselves. 
Through the empirical fields of inquiry, seeking to speak to people who 
'know' about 'ethical careers,' I am variously (and often unwittingly) the 'expert,' or 
the 'job-seeker,' the 'adjudicator,' 'advice-giver,' 'student-colleague,' or • contact. ' 
535 Gideon Burrows, ed., The Ethical Careers Guide 2006-7 (London: ngo media, 2006). 
536 69,400,000 to be precise. www.google.com [May 16th, 2009] 
537 Life Worth _ www.lifeworth.com, Ethical-Jobs - www.ethical-jobs.co.uk, Ethical Jobs-
www.ethicaljobs.net, People & Planet - http://peopleandplanet.orglethicalcareers/, Ethical Careers -
www.ethica1careers.org, and many similar others. . ., 
538 The University of London, Edinburgh University, Durham University, Bnstol Umv~rsIty: 
Nottingham University, London School of Economics and Politics, and Cambridge UmversIty, among 
others. 
539 Two of whom I met and interviewed for the current chapter, Laura Brammar of University College 
London and C2 Careers Service, and Judith Baines of the LSE. . . 
540 Birmingham Business School, Cambridge University Programme for Industry, Glasgow ~mversity 
Business School, Lancaster University Management School, London Business School, ~ottm~am 
University Business School, Oxford Said Business School, Royal Holloway, and WarwIck Busmess 
School all offer, at the time of writing, MAs or MScs in CSR. . 
541 The CSR Salary Survey, 2008-9~ Acona, Acre, Ethical Performance. AVaIlable from: 
., I I a maSSIve http://www.csrsalarysurvey.coml.This survey, perhaps unsurpnsmg y, revea s 
concentration ofCSRjobs in London (64%) and the South East (14%). . " . 
542 Alex Wilkie and Mike Michael, "Expectation and Mobilisation: Enactmg Future Users, SCIence, 
Technology & Human Values 34, no. 4 (2009). p.3 
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picking up on the notion of research 'complicity' introduced in Chapter Three. this 
chapter seeks to recognise the significance of my own adoption of (or resistance to) 
these roles, employing, at times, a quite consciously self-reflexive perspective - it is, 
after all and unavoidably, a tale of the 'ethical career' told through my of my own 
research experience. 
This journey is taken across a number of sites and through different mediums 
and, as such, the empirical content of this chapter is varied. Having said this, two 
nexical sites emerge as of particular note, and on this basis, will be elaborated briefly 
here. Firstly, the careers fair. Between February 2007 and June 2008 I attend five 
such events,543 selected materials and experiences from which will be drawn upon 
and elaborated in the course of this chapter. Secondly, following my experience at 
the January LSE event, I sought to join the student group through which the panel 
event had been organised - The LSE CSR Society.544 Starting at the beginning of the 
academic year 2007-2008, I attended over the course of the year all the events 
organised by the society, which included a number of group meetings, speaker 
events, and social evenings. In addition to these, I also draw on a variety of relevant 
text based and internet sources, such as recruitment websites, as well as material 
gathered from informal interviews with two careers advisors and the editor of The 
Ethical Careers Guide.545 
The breadth of this methodological approach has much to do with the 
apparent ill-definability of the 'ethical career' as an empirical object itself. Noting 
the definitional breadth of what might count as an 'ethical career,' the first section of 
this chapter will suggest that this need only be an analytical 'problem' to the extent 
that one desires to understand the 'ethical career' as an employment category 
543 Imperial College Ethical Careers Fair, 21 st January, 2207, Great Hall,.Imperial \ollege Lo.ndon; 
The London Graduate Summer Recruitment Fair 19-20 June, 2007, Islmgton Busmess DeSIgn 
Centre, London; The London Graduate Autumn Recruitment Fair. 22 Octoberili2007, Islington, 
Business Design Centre, London; The Guardian London Graduate Fair, I? -19 Jun~, 2008, I~lmgton 
Business Design Centre, London; and forum3, 10-11 th October, 2008, Islmgton Busmess DeSIgn 
~entre, London. 'lib )44 d' d, as WI e This student union CSR society meet regularly over the course of the ac~ emIC ye,ar an , . 
explained seek to organise CSR-centred events and facilitate networking WIth those m t?e mdthius?')I' 
545, ' , Ith 0 b 2008' Judith Barnes e ca GIdeon Burrows, editor of The Ethical Careers GUlde, 1. cto er, " and C2 26th 
careers advisor at LSE, 28th May, 2009; Laura Brammar, ethIcal careers adVIsor at VCL . 
June, 2009, 
204 
consisting of particular job titles or of jobs in a particular sector. Against this, I 
propose that the 'ethical career' as aspiration is analytically preferable in so much as 
this allows for some of the multiple contradictions that this suggestion entails - as 
summed up by Guardian writer Lucy Siegle, " [o]ne person's evil multinational is 
another job-seeker's munificent contributor to the community.,,546 
As 'aspiration' the 'ethical career' might further be understood to do a kind 
of "affective labour.,,547 The invocation of this understanding here however will not 
seek to use it faithfully as such, to refer, as it is intended, to how the types of labour 
in what has been called the 'new economy' are increasingly 'immaterial ,548 _ 
consisting primarily in relationship and communication work. Although this is no 
doubt a valid observation concerning much contemporary 'ethical work,' I am more 
interested in the present case to observe how aspirations themselves, especially in 
their affective aspect, can work to productively articulate their own possibilities for 
realisation. This suggestion is empirically elaborated through a discussion of the 
importance of 'networking' in new and emergent fields. 
The second part of this chapter, building on the first, will focus on how the 
suggestion of an 'ethical career' construes 'ethics' vis-a.-vis the self. Drawing on the 
notion of 'enterprising selfhood,549 here, I will note how much of the discourse 
surrounding 'ethical careers' functions to responsibilise individuals with regard to 
what are understood as their 'own' ethics. As such, ethical career aspirants are 
commonly exhorted to decide on the basis of their own values what kind of career 
would be 'ethical' for them. Rather than reading this as evidence that 'ethics' 
becomes a relative or individual practice though, this process needs to be understood 
in terms of the creation of 'ethical' value in a competitive market for jobs. Turning 
d · h 550 here to Lisa Adkins recent work on property and personhoo III t e new economy, 
it is possible to posit an alternative reading of how 'ethics' subsist, in the proposal of 
546 Siegle, Lucy - Quoted on the back cover of The Ethical Careers Guide, 2006-7. 
547 Michael Hardt "Affective Labour," Boundary 26, no. 2 (1999). 
548 Maurizio Lazz~ato, Immaterial Labour ([cited 16th March 2009]); available from 
http://www.generation-online.org!c/fcimmateriallabour3.htm. . 
549 See, in particular, the volume, Paul Heelas and Paul Morris, eds., The Values o/the Enterpnse 
Culture (London: Routledge, 1992). . 22 0 1 
550 Lisa Adkins, "The New Economy, Property and Personhood," Theory, Culture & Society ,n. 
(2005). 
205 
an 'ethical career,' - not as an individually possessed 'value system,' available for 
application through the process of self-reflection - but rather as a kind of future-
oriented and outwardly-functioning innovative potential in a contemporary economy 
that is apt to value this. 
The Emergence of the 'Ethical Career' 
Startled by the clamorous interest in working in CSR that I had witnessed at 
the LSE, I decided, following this in late January 2007, to see if this same interest 
could be found elsewhere. Not long afterwards, trawling graduate recruitment sites 
on the web, I came across an event organised by Imperial College - 'The Ethical 
Careers Exhibition,551 it was called, taglined with words "corporate responsibility-
social justice - environmental sustainability.,,552 Organised by the Imperial College 
Careers Advisory Service in conjunction with the Student Union, the event was free 
to attend and open to all. Running for its second year, the Imperial event was 
evidence that an interest in 'ethical careers' or working in CSR was not only specific 
to a certain group ofLSE students; it could be noted elsewhere in London as well. 
Keen to find out more and get the opportunity to speak with company representatives 
about CSR, I set off in my crispest shirt, with hair-pulled neatly back, and an 
inexpertly ironed crease laboriously pressed down the front my most 'business-like' 
trousers. 
The irony in my own attempts to look suitably graduate-like lost least on me, 
and making my way self-consciously around the various stalls assembled in 
Imperial's Great Hall, I began to approach the groups of gathered representatives 
inquiring one by one about their company CSR program and any employment 
possibilities therein. At one stall, an engineering consultancy, I pose my question to 
the representative standing foremost behind the desk - "I was wondering if I could 
talk with you about your company CSR program, do you have any information about 
551 Held on Wednesday 21 st of January, 2007, in the Great Hall ofImperial College. Featuring twenty-
one exhibitors. http://www.imperialcollegeunion.org/campaignlethical-careers-fair/ 
552 Imperial College Ethical Careers Exhibition Poster. 
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this with you here today?" Looking blank and confused, he replies "What?" "Your 
Corporate Social Responsibility policies," I elaborate, "this event is about careers in 
CSR," I continue, gesturing to the enormous central poster installation above which a 
banner with the words "All About Corporate Social Responsibility" has been 
suspended from the ceiling. Rescued by a colleague who has overheard, a second 
representative steps forth - "Oh, Corporate Social Responsibility - well I think we 
are currently writing up a report on that, but I mean, what can we really do - we're 
an engineering company - but we are involved in schools and hospitals and stuff in 
developing countries. ,,553 
Having made similarly little headway towards finding out about 'ethical 
careers' at the other stalls, I head to the seminar room at the back of the hall where 
speakers are presenting throughout the day in half-hour slots on topics from 
'Volunteering in India,' to 'Fuel Cell Technology,' and 'Careers in Policy Making,' 
to 'Working for Aid Agencies,' and 'Going Carbon Neutral. ,554 Certainly, from the 
Imperial 'Ethical Careers Exhibition,' no coherence or consensus was forthcoming 
with regard to what particular specificities might definitionally constitute 'ethical' 
employment. The assembled employers were not distinct from those who might 
attend a 'non-ethical' recruitment fair, and the advertised jobs differed only in a 
slight over-representation of volunteering organisations, aid agencies, and energy 
compames. 
Yet, as I was to discover later that year, Imperial's use of the phrase 'ethical 
career' was not anomalous, nor did this phrase lack endurance or purchase. On the 
basis that, as just mentioned, the exhibitors at Imperial College in February did not 
form a particularly coherent group that might be reliably recognised to offer, by the 
very nature of their work, employment of an 'ethical' nature, I decided to widen my 
search, and begin attending more generalist graduate recruitment careers - in 
U · . fL d ,555 particular focussing on the very large 'Careers Group - mverslty 0 on on 
553 Engineering consultancy representative, 21 st January 2007, Imperial Colle~e, Londo~. . 
554 In order, these presentations were given by representatives from the followmg orgarusatIOns -
Development in Action, Imperial College and Ceres Power, Defra, RedR IHE,.and RSK 
555 The Careers Group, part of the University of London, provides careers servIces to students, 
universities and organisations. 
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fairs, held twice annually, once in Summer and once in Autumn. 556 Given the size, 
prominence and popularity of these events, it would be interesting what, (if any), 
evidence could be found that the notion of an 'ethical career' was in existence here. 
As the glossy 'fair guide' you are handed upon entry indicates, the Careers 
Group have been organising annual graduate recruitment events for thirty-three 
years. Held in the cavernous commercial space of the Islington Business Design 
Centre and conducted over two days, the June 2007 event featured over one hundred 
different exhibitors, representing a variety of sectors of the job market - from the 
public sector to finance, management to science, and engineering to what the guide 
entitled 'alternative options' (mostly gap year and overseas volunteering companies). 
A continuous programme of career presentations, seminars, and workshops took 
place in a number of rooms to the side of the main exhibiting area, and in the main 
frontal area of the hall, the Careers Group themselves ran a 'CV -surgery' in which 
graduate were able to work with a careers advisor on improving their CV. 
556 In 2007 the Careers Group Graduate Recruitment Summer Fair was held on the 19
th
_20
th 
June. The 
Autumn E;ent was held on Monday 22nd October. The Careers Group also organise another annual 
event at the Islington Business Design Centre called 'Graduate Select: Finance, Co~sultancy & .IT.' I 
did not attend this latter event given that invite was via application and graduates ":lth degr~es m the 
stipulated areas were sought. The Careers Group events are free to attend, but reqUIre e-maIl 
registration. 
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Figures 5 & 6: The London Graduate Recruitment Fair, Wednesday 20th June 2007 
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Crowded and bustling, the prominently displayed advertising tagline 'One 
event. Hundreds of possibilities,' captures something of the atmosphere - very much 
'fair-like,' a kind of 'one-stop shop' for all things career oriented. Eagar to talk and 
tempt potential recruits to their stall, company representatives venture into the stream 
of human traffic proffering gifts such as the ubiquitous Mars bar, and company 
branded pen. This time, my questions about CSR are readily met by most with a 
ready recognition of what this is. 
While quick to recite company CSR policy, or recent social and 
environmental contributions, most representatives struggle however to tell me how I 
might go about pursuing a career in CSR with them. Twice I am directed to speak 
with the human resources department (McDonalds restaurants and 
Proctor&Gamble), while at TNT I am pointed to a prominently displayed and picture 
filled brochure, 'Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility' proclaimed on its cover-
no CSR jobs are on offer therein though. 
Elsewhere in the fair, one of this years event sponsors, a new recruitment 
group called Ask: What If? has a large interactive display zone set up. Under the 
banner ' Your career - Our future. Some careers are more than just a job,' 557 advisors 
at this stall chat with graduates and guide them through the use of touch-screen 
displays featuring employee biographies and job descriptions. Amongst the featured 
jobs are 'Environmental officer' ("In the fight against climate change, the pressure is 
on business and industry to clean up their act") and 'Regeneration manager' ("It's 
about transforming the places where people live,,).558 Expounding the possibility of a 
career that has a "positive impact on other people's lives and the community they 
live in,,,559 Ask: What If?, (without specifically employing the term 'ethical' career), 
imply something along these lines in their ideas of collective responsibility for 'our 
future,' and 'positive impact.' 
557 Ask: What If? Poster 
558 Ask: What If? Interactive display 
559 Ask: What If? Promotional material; also see, www.askwhatif.co.uk 
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Figure 7: Ask: What If? Central Exhibition 
Later that afternoon and downstairs, a group of sixty or so graduates 
assemble to hear a presentation entitled 'Ethical Careers ' given by University 
College Careers Advisor Laura Brammar. 560 "This is the first time we've offered this 
seminar" Brammar says in opening, "and I felt quite strongly that it should be 
offered - I am certainly seeing more clients who are asking about 'ethical 
careers. ",561 Brammar is keen, given the recognised novelty of the field, to get a 
conversation going with the audience about what it is that might constitute an 
'ethical career.' "What are they?" she asks, further inquiring of the audience, " what 
has lead you to come to this [presentation]." 
The first audience member to respond offers an explanation in terms of 
disillusionment with current recruitment prospects, while a second respondent 
560 Laura Brammer, 'Ethical Careers. ' Presentation given at The London Graduate Recruitment Fair, 
Islington Business Design Centre, London, 20th June, 2007. 
561 Brarnmar _ 'Ethical Careers ' (pennission to quote obtained). Brarnmar also gives a presentation of 
the same title at the following Autumn fair (October, 2007), and at both the next year' s fairs (June, 
2008 & October, 2008). Her presentation is dropped from the June 2009 fair however. This is due, as 
she informs me during a July 2009 interview, to changing priorities brought about as a consequence of 
recession. Interview, 26th June, 2009, Careers Group, Stewart House, London. 
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echoes and expands this to include what he understands to be the prevailing nature of 
employment in general, articulating the desire to contribute to society instead, 
(themes will I will return to discuss more comprehensively in a later section of this 
chapter): 
Audience member One: 1 just got a little bit lost in my degree last year, umm, [I am] 
not very connected with the whole graduate recruitment thing and, yeh, 1 starting to 
get into it in the last few months, but 1 think finance and retail, [sceptical shoulder 
shrug]. .. and I'm looking for something different, and something in the ethical sector. 
Laura: So it sounds like you are disaffected from the 'corporate engine' ... 
Audience member Two: Getting beyond selling stuff. People always selling, stuff, 
just more and more and more. 
Laura: Selling, or selling stuff. 
Audience member Two: Yeh - always 'selling,' 1 want to give something back.562 
"Ethical work,,,s63 Brammar continues on to emphasise, is unlikely however 
to mean the same thing to everyone, or remain unchanged through time: 
... ask, well what are my career values, what's most important for me? For some of 
you, working in a sustainable environment will be the most important thing, for 
others it will be working for a group of people who share the same values. For other 
people its the salary that will help them payoff their student debt, for other people 
562 Audience exchange during 'Ethical careers,' (permissions to quote obtained). Respondents both 
male. 
563 Brammar, Ibid. 
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it's working internationally, so think what's most important to you - know and 
accept that those things can change throughout your career. 564 
One might imagine that when it comes to matters of clarifying definition, 
Gideon Burrows, founder of recruitment website ethicalcareers.org and editor of The 
Ethical Careers GUide565(first published in 2006) would be something of an 
authority. Speaking on this topic at Forum3 566 a 'third sector' careers fair however , 
Burrows only guidance in this regard is that he "count[s] as an ethical career 
anything that involves doing good." As elaborated in his forward to the first edition 
of The Ethical Careers Guide, the concern is not to "define what 'ethical' means" , 
on the topic of what is 'ethical' he admits contributors to the guide "haven't always 
agreed. ,,567 Instead, as Burrows explains, "[ w ] hat we have tried to do is to provide 
information to help you make up your own mind, and the inspiration to encourage 
you to do something about it."s68 
On the home page of his company website, Jason Elliot, founder of Ethical 
Jobs, writes in a similar vein that, "choosing an ethical career ... means doing 
something that serves your practical needs, your personal values and your interests in 
a way that positively impacts upon the world."s69 The suggestion made here and in 
the preceding extracts that the 'ethical' aspect of an 'ethical career' is something that 
must be personally or individually defined is an important one - not least insomuch 
as it renders ethical values to be the property of individuals in a way that 
straightforwardly equates self-fulfilment in ones work with working 'ethically,' and 
in this way might also be said to completely relativise the ethical. As I will go on to 
address in some depth later in this chapter, that these 'conflations' are commonly 
encountered in the proposal of an 'ethical career,' suggests that particular critical 
attention need be paid to how ethics might be understood to be being done in the 
564 Ibid. 
565 Burrows, ed., The Ethical Careers Guide 2006-7. Now in its second edition. This is considered to 
be the fIrst and foremost guide of it~ kind. . th th • 
566 Forum3 Recruitment, Volunteenng and Networkmg event, 10 - 11 October, ~008, Islmgto~ 
Business Design Centre, London. 'Third sector' meaning not-for-profIt and/or chantable enterpnse. 
567 Burrows, ed., The Ethical Careers Guide 2006-7. p.3 
568 Ibid., p.3 
569 Elliot, http://www.ethical-jobs.co.ukI 
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contemporary 'careerist' mode. Indeed, it will be the task of latter sections of this 
chapter to explore these practices with regard to traditionally accepted philosophical 
and sociological understandings of both 'ethics' and 'politics.' 
For present purposes however, the fundamental contingency of the 'ethical 
career' needs to be addressed insomuch as this might be said to make it a 
problematic empirical object to analytically attend. Does it, simply put, make any 
sense to critically engage 'ethical careers' ifit is not entirely clear what is, or what 
can be, included under this heading? This question turns, of course, on the expected 
establishment of a particular kind of empirical object. One with reasonably 
discernable boundaries - so that, to take the present case by means of example, we 
might desire to impose, for instance, an economic criterion to the ethical job such we 
might restrict the object of analysis to unpaid or volunteer work. 
Similarly, divisions could alternatively be made along other lines - jobs are 
'ethical' if they involve working for a not-for-profit organisation, or in the public 
sector, or if 'CSR' is in the job title, or they are listed on an ethical jobs website, we 
might say. Charting the emergence of the 'ethical career' in this brief discussion thus 
far however, it is clear that divisions such as these are precisely what are refused by 
(or at least the subject of vast disagreement between) proponents, practitioners and 
participants. 
So, inasmuch as there is a cultural object called the 'ethical career,' (and this 
discussion has sought to begin to demonstrate that there is, enduringly, across a 
number of sites, and with increasing ubiquity), and this object does not lend itself to 
classification in terms of the standard sector-based, revenue-derived categories of 
public/private, governmental/non-governmental, for-profitlnot-for-profit and so 
forth, how might it be alternatively approached? Not captured within such static 
modes of categorisation is the performative functioning of the possibility of an 
'ethical career' itself. As some of those quoted in this section have indicated, the 
'ethical career' is not primarily imagined in terms of its appropriate 
organisational/corporate/institutional location, it is understood in terms of what one 
can do - the 'doing more,' 'giving back,' 'positively impacting' and 'making a 
difference. ' 
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Importantly, in terms of what it is possible to do - the ethical career might 
additionally be understood to performatively function so as to actually bring into 
being the conditions for its own emergence, coherence, and endurance. What I am 
suggesting is of significance here with regard to the issue of approaching what might 
be understood as an 'ill-defined' empirical category then, is that the stasis implied by 
this formulation fails to comprehend the way the 'ethical career' exists in 
relationship to a 'future' of which it is actually productive. That this process requires 
much further elaboration is clear - for the moment I have only been attempting to 
underscore the importance of such an elaboration in terms of its a priori necessity if 
the 'ethical career' is to make sense as a useful analytical concept at all. 
From 'Demand' to 'Aspiration' 
In the language of economics, dynamics of supply and demand are 
understood to drive markets. As is attested to by the commonly used phrase 'job 
market,' (and this almost goes without saying) employment is awarded on a highly 
competitive basis, and as such, dynamics of supply and demand may be called upon 
to explain (albeit perhaps in overly general terms sociologically speaking) the 
allocation of different candidates to different jobs. The CSR business case logic 
explicitly recognises the role of demand by suggesting that consumers will actively 
choose to buy products they perceive as more 'ethical,' (although as the previous 
chapter sought to demonstrate' choice,' in this context, does not necessarily entail 
the rational self-maximisation that is often implied in economic and some 
sociological treatments of this). In the case of the present object of attention - the 
'ethical career,' an analogous expression of 'business case' logic can be found 
readily propounded. Burrows' Ethical Careers Guide for instance begins with the 
following proposition: 
Most of us can choose which organisation, company, industry or sector we work in. 
The more of us who refuse to work for a company or organisation with questionable 
policies, exploitative working practices, poor human rights or environmental track 
records, the stronger the pressure on them to change. The more of us who work for 
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organisations and companies that actively attempt to create positive social cha 
the faster those changes will come about. 570 nge, 
Echoing this logic, an article published on the ethicalcareers.org recruitment 
website quotes Reed Employment's Head of Marketing, Janine Parry, as saying, "'[a] 
decision to implement a CSR policy makes good business sense: it gives companies 
a competitive edge, saves money and, as our research shows, helps to attract top 
candidates. ,,571 The research Parry refers to is a survey recently conducted by Reed 
indicating that "more than half (57%) of [graduate] candidates believed that having 
an ethically and socially responsible employer was important.,,572 This is taken to 
imply "too few jobs to meet ethical demand,,,573 and hence the competitive situation 
Parry describes. 
A reading of this situation in tenns of straightforward 'demand' however is 
problematic and unsatisfactory from a sociological perspective. While rational actor 
models (from wherein 'demand' derives) assume that decisions are made on the 
basis of opitimising expected benefits, these benefits ex ante, at the time of their 
initial imagining, are only hopes.574 To speak in tenns of 'demand' about ethical 
careers then, is to fundamentally misrecognise what is at stake - 'demand' implies 
that the expectations attached to the demanded thing are always realisable, pre-
detennined in present time to be inherent to it. By necessity however, given that the 
future is fundamentally uncertain, "expectation entails mere hope.,,575 On this basis, 
it is my suggestion that working 'ethically,' is not a 'demand,' but a (hoped for) 
prospect, a desire, or, most accurately and as I will refer to it - an 'aspiration.' 
As 'aspiration,' the apparent 'problem' of ill-de fin ability is overcome; 
'definability' in tenns of conventional employment categories is not at stake. The 
'ethical career' is not a list of job titles, but an aspired to mode of working relation. 
That, for graduate job-seekers, an 'ethical career' operates as a future 'aspiration' is 
570 Burrows, ed., The Ethical Careers Guide 2006-7. p.3 . 
571 Janine Parry of Reed Employment, www.reed.co.uk, quoted in 'Two few jobs to meet ethical 
demand.' http://ngomedia.org.uklartmanJpublishiarticle_439.php 
572 Ibid. 
573 Ibid. . 
574 G.L.S. Shackle (1972), in Jocelyn Pixley, "Emotions and Economics," in Emotions and SOCIOlogy, 
ed. Jack Barbalet (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002). p.71 
575 Ibid. 
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obvious; however, I want to claim that this is not just the case for those yet to begin 
their working lives. Rather, and drawing in this section on Nik Brown and Mike 
Michael's 'sociology of expectations,' I will suggest that the aspiration to work 
ethically is "route of agency" that operates "in the construction of the present's 
futures."s76 That is, given the 'ethical' content of the 'ethical career' is not fixed 
, 
how this is at any present time or point aspirationally conceived is actually crucial in 
bringing about the possibility, in a reflexive market context, of the 'ethical' working 
relation envisioned. 
Networking as Ethical-work 
This self-fulfilling dynamic of ethical career 'creation' may be explored 
further by returning to examine some of the efforts towards getting an 'ethical' job 
made by members of the LSE student CSR Society. From the point at which I joined 
the Society in October 2007, it quickly became clear that the keen interest in ethical 
work prospects I had witnessed in January was not a marginal or mere sideline 
concern of the Society. Rather this aim was ensconced in its mission statement, 
which, at the first meeting of the year was projected via PowerPoint and explained to 
the assembled group by Evan, the newly elected society President. 
Illustrated in the form of a flow chart, the "Mission" indicated that the 
Society's "strategy" was to "deliver events, workshops, platforms for dialogue" and 
"long-term relationship management," in order to "inspire" members, secure 
"internships," and "build CVs," which, through "work with [the] career office" could 
result in the aimed for "offer of [employment] positions."s77 As such, much of the 
task of the first meeting was devoted to nominating what kinds of events might be 
organised, and which contacts might be utilised to get the desired organisations and 
companies to attend. The outgoing 2006-7 society President, suggests, in course, a 
potentially useful new contact: 
576 Brown, "Hope against Hype - Accountability in Biopasts, Presents, and Futures." p.3 
577 Evan, LSE CSR Society Mission Statement, 29th October, 2007. (Names have been changed) 
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I met with someone actually this weekend, from an organisation called 'Just Means, . 
. .. what they do is connect corporations with students, with consultancies _ 
everything CSR oriented. And they advertise jobs or internships in CSR. ... And the 
good thing about this guy and the organisation is they are in contact with large 
corporations who are interested in CSR. And he e-mailed me yesterday and 
proposed two events - one is a careers fair, next term, and the other is a networking 
event, this term. And he proposed that we work together and invite companies and 
speakers to come. So, I think it's great because they're starting up, it's a relatively 
new organisation, so they are looking for companies, just like we are, so we could be 
sharing or pooling resources. 578 
The emphasis placed here on the need to 'network,' and be in 'contact,' 
suggests that the 'ethical career' aspired to by group members is not available in the 
straightforward way of a conventional job vacancy. As Evan explicitly recognises in 
the same introductory session, "you guys, our members, obviously you want 
inspiration, you want to get into contact with companies which don't necessarily 
have jobs assigned for yoU."S79 The CSR job, given the novelty of this field, does not 
reliably exist, nor where it does exist, does it necessarily do so in the same place or 
in the same way from company to company. 
Brammar, the UCL careers advisor, attests to this same issue when she 
emphasises the need to "think beyond the obvious," and be "prepared to do the leg 
work."S80 Evan's repeated reference to 'inspiration' and Brammar's exhortation to go 
'beyond the obvious' underscore a sense of the need to be creative in finding 
'ethical' work. Ethical jobs that are not entirely self-evident may be 'found' as it 
were via networking, legwork, or contacts, but also, given the novelty of field, it 
might even be up to the career aspirant themselves to utilise these means as a way of 
creating the desired job position by convincing others of its necessity or desirability. 
Much to my surprise, I myself was often treated less as 'researcher' and more 
as 'valued contact.' As someone doing research on an emerging trend, in a number 
of situations I found myself unexpectedly cast in the role of' expert.' On more than 
578 2006_7 (Ex-) Society President speaking at fIrst meeting, 29th October. 2007. 
579 Evan, Introductory meeting, LSE, 29th October, 2007. 
580 Brammar 'Ethical careers.' 
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one occasion, the CSR Society President looked to me to weigh in o'n ideological 
disputes that had broken out between members, and, one evening, when a scheduled 
speaker was ten minutes late, I was asked (prior to the eventual arrival of this 
speaker) if I might like to lead the session instead. While this could perhaps be 
accounted for in terms of my academic seniority in the CSR society (its membership 
consisting mainly of masters students and some undergraduates), elsewhere similar 
assumptions of my 'usefulness' were made. 
When, at the Forum3 recruitment event, I asked Gideon Burrows if I might 
interview him about his Ethical Careers Guide, he enthusiastically agreed, but turned 
the intention around entirely - "it would be great to workshop the whole 'ethical 
careers' thing with you, get your perspective.,,581 Similarly, upon leaving a meeting 
with Judith Baines, advisor on ethical careers at the LSE, she wondered if I might 
like to come back and present to students on the topic of how to go about achieving 
an ethical career. 582 
The practice of networking, of making contacts, functions of course to 
actualise and consolidate a fledgling field, serving to better found or establish this, 
and, as I found, is always liable to work as a kind of exchange. In fact, it was on the 
basis of this exact understanding, (as outlined in the Society mission statement), that 
company representatives were invited by the CSR Society to speak to its members. 
Companies, it was reasoned, could "establish their name" and "get in touch with 
interesting students,,,583 while society members stood to gain connections that could 
prove advantageous in securing the kind of job to which they aspired. To such ends, 
events featuring corporate representatives organised by the society over the course of 
2007-8 often had the feel of a reverse job interview. Invited speakers, such as Green 
& Black's CEO William Kendall enthused about CSR - "I passionately believe in 
it,,,584 while society members gently tested such pronouncements,585 at the same time 
581 In conversation at forum3, 11 th October, 2008, Islington Business Design Centre, London. 
582 Interview with Judith Baines, LSE Careers Advisor, 28th May, 2009. LSE, London. 
583 LSE CSR Society Mission Statement, 29th October, 2007. 
584 William Kendall, then CEO Green & Black's, 4th December, 2007. LSE, London. ., . 
585 Kendell was quizzed in particular on the take over of Green & Blacks by 'corporate gIant Cadbur~ 
Scwhepps. 
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attempting to appear non-confrontational, employable, and equally demonstrate their 
own enthusiasm for CSR. 
To say that the aspiration to work 'ethically' is future oriented is not 
equivalent to saying that it is necessarily deferred, or may never be realised. Rather, 
as a 'sociology of expectations' is apt to recognise, "how we reflect on the past and 
imagine the future always emerges from the real time work we would like those 
representations to perform in the now.,,586 On the basis of an understanding such as 
this, networking might be understood as one method via which the 'real time work' 
of the aspiration to work ethically is done. 
This however, is not simply so in the 'rational expectation' sense, as though 
the desire to work ethically functions in the job market as a simple demand. Rather, 
as the reoccurrence of the notions of 'inspiration' and 'enthusiasm' in my description 
of some of the activities of the CSR Society suggests, the aspiration to work ethically 
is primarily an affective more so than 'cognitive' one. Networking then, in the 
present case might be understood as kind of feeling-work, or even, in so much as it 
performatively, or productively brings about possibility of working 'ethically' as 
viable in places it may previously not have been, a kind of ethical-work in itself. 
The' Affective Labour' of Aspiration 
Describing labour through its products, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri 
utilise the term 'affective labour' to draw attention to the frequently immaterial 
nature of these in the contemporary globalised economy.587 Labour, they suggest, 
may seek to produce "a feeling of ease, well-being, satisfaction, excitement or 
passion.,,588 As a description of the types of affective experience that one might 
~86 Brown, "Hope against Hype - Accountability in Biopasts, Presents, and Futures:': p.ll . 
)87 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire. p.292 Distinct from Hardt and NegrI s conce~tIon of 
'affective labour' but an area in which much has been written, is the importance ofmoderatmg affect 
in the workplace' and the affective entailments of certain jobs. Arlie Hoschchild's account of affect. 
management amongst flight attendants is a sociological classic in this field, and equally. a burgeomng 
management literature on emotions can be noted. See; Hochschild, The Man~ge~ Heart: . 
Commercialization o/Human Feeling.; Stephen Fineman, Emotion in Orgamzatwns (London. Sage, 
1993). 
588 Hardt and Negri, Empire. p.292 
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associate with the prospect of working ethically and, equally, as a description of the 
types of knowledge and communication work that are likely to characterise most 
'ethical' jobs, Hardt and Negri's analysis is apt. More substantially though, my 
suggestion with regard to the affective nature of the aspiration to work ethically is 
that it is in the affective mode itself that the possibility of working ethically actually 
inheres and emerges. 
To elaborate, and to return to the importance of 'inspiration' and 
'enthusiasm,' we might note how these function relatedly and in connection with 
regard to the aspiration to work ethically. I have already drawn attention to the 
enthusiastic mode of presentation employed by corporate speakers with regard to 
CSR, and the enthusiasm of the LSE Society members is evident not only in their 
membership and attendance, but also in their eagerness to engage with each other 
and of course 'network' with the visiting speakers. Additionally, as recommended by 
Brammar, enthusiasm with regard to ethical work might be demonstrated by taking 
unpaid internships, or volunteering in your field of interest. 589 Linked to enthusiasm, 
inspiration too is evidently important, not only insomuch as it is a stated aim of the 
CSR Society, but also as it is understood to sustain the very possibility of working 
ethically. Entailed in 'inspiration,' and observable in this context, is the dual hope 
that one's own working life might be personally fulfilling and 'make a positive 
difference' to others. 
Significantly, it is very much through affective modes such as inspiration, 
enthusiasm, hope, and so forth, that we might understand ethical careers to be 'sold' 
in the job market and hence viable at all. This recognition is sometimes made, but 
with a slightly different emphasis, in the observation of a sustaining momentum or 
'buzz' around ethical careers. Noted explicitly in reference to the recent emergence 
and rapid growth of the field, this is also attested to in reverse through a question 
ubiquitously posed of late, and considered in depth in the following chapter - what 
of CSR in a recession? 
While practitioners, proponents and job prospectors alike are aware of the 
importance of keeping momentum up, of keeping the buzz going, this of course does 
589 Brammar, 'Ethical Careers.' 
not function to entirely exclude from the aspiration to work ethically more 
pessimistic or cynical affects. Rather, what emerges are extremely complex and often 
ambivalent narratives that seek to balance fundamental cynicism at the very prospect 
of ethical (corporate) work, against a 'hope,' which, in the face of such cynicism, 
posits itself as genuine, and moreover, being 'hope,' unassailable.590 
The extent to which networking practices are actually typical of the kind of 
relationship work in which contemporary labour largely subsists is theorised under 
varying rubrics. As already mentioned, Hardt and Negri suggest 'affective labour,' as 
a means via which to describe contemporary labour as the production of activities (as 
opposed to consumer commodities), a trend described more broadly by Maurizio 
Lazzarato with reference the 'immateriallabour,591 of communication and 
cooperation, constitutive of what others still have referred to as the 'new 
economy. ,592 While these accounts differ significantly in their intellectual origins, 
focus, and specificity, all seek to theorise the service and knowledge intensive nature 
of the current economy, recognising in particular the emphasis on making 
relationships that is entailed in this - what Andreas Wittel refers to as 'network 
sociality. ,593 
Thus far, I have sought to emphasise how the 'ethical career' as aspiration or 
possibility is enacted through this type of networking or on the basis of such 
relationship work. This has enabled me to suggest that the desire to work ethically is 
not simply constituted as competitive demand for a set of predefined or pre-existing 
'ethical jobs,' but instead is involved in the performative, affective, and relational 
process of bringing such possibilities about. What is yet to be specifically addressed 
in this account though, is how individual 'ethical career' aspirants are personally 
590 A strong sense of ambivalence accompanied both interviewed careers advisor's a~pro~che~ the to 
the 'ethical career.' Despite specifically advising students on how to pursue a career m thiS vern, both 
Laura Brammar (UCL & C2) and Judith Baines (LSE) expressed a great deal of cynicism as to this 
possibility. For both, the emphasis very much was on the self-creation of an 'ethical' path. as I go on 
to discuss. 
591 Lazzarato, Immaterial Labour. . . 
592 See, for instance, Thrift, Knowing Capitalism. Also, Adkins, Revisions: Gender and Sex~ahty In 
Late Modernity.; Castells, The Rise of Network Society. The Information Age: Economy, SCience and 
Culture.; Lash, Critique of Information.; Richard Sennett, The Corrosion ofC~ara~ter: The Personal 
Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism (New York: Norton, 1998).; Witte 1, Towards a 
Network Sociality." 
593 W' d N k S . l' " Itlel, "Towar s a etwor ocm Ity. 
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constituted in relationship to this desire. 'Personhood' itself, as Lisa Adkins points 
out, does require specific attention in the context of a 'new economy' of 'immaterial' 
or 'affective labour' insomuch as it may actually be understood to undergo a process 
of material reconstitution.594 Typically though, as Adkins continues to suggest, 
studies of the new economy "side-step" this focus, tending instead to observe how 
new technological objects are "reworking the material processes that constitute 
public and private life", but "stop[ing] short of considering how this reworking of 
materiality works out in regard to people. ,,595 
Following this observation, I want to address the way in which 'ethics' are 
configured in relation to the 'self in the suggestion of an 'ethical career.' In 
particular, I will be evoking the figure of the 'enterprising self,'596 to illustrate the 
way in which 'ethics' are persistently attributed to 'ethical career' aspirants, as 
though these are uniquely' owned,' individually derived, and accessible via self-
reflection. Something of a double movement is also going on here though. While on 
the one hand, one's 'ethics' are understood to be uniquely possessed, and may even 
function on the basis of this apparent singularity as a potentially marketable 
commodity in the job market, at another level, the cultivation of 'ethics' as the 
capacity or potential for a certain type of innovative market practice also emerges in 
the suggestion of an 'ethical career.' 
Ethics for an Enterprising Self? 
I think the most important thing I'm probably going to say to you today is it appears 
to me it's very much down to you to define what it is that you mean by 'ethics.' This 
tenn is being bandied around on a daily basis by people with very different agendas, 
so you need to have some quiet time with yourself thinking what do you mean when 
you say you want an 'ethical career.' 
594 Adkins, "The New Economy, Property and Personhood." p.112 
595 Ib·d 
596 N;k~las Rose, "Governing the Enterprising Self," in The Values a/the Enterprise Culture, ed. Paul 
Heelas and Paul Morris (London: Routledge, 1992). 
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... the sort of nebulousness of this subject is your ethics will depend on your own 
value system and what you particularly think is valuable and is good. So ethics is 
individual, so think about that. 
Laura Brammar, 'Ethical Careers' presentation, 20th June, 2007 
In this extract from Brammar's careers fair presentation, self-reflection is 
proposed as the recommended means via which one might navigate the multiple 
contradictions and tensions that inhere in the suggestion of an 'ethical career.' As 
Burrows concurs, "[i]t's all about what is important to you - not someone else who 
decides what ethics is in some lofty way."S97 In this regard, the proposal that one 
might work ethically has much in common with the popular contemporary version of 
'enterprise' which suggests that self-fulfilment might be achieved "not in spite of 
work but by means ofwork."s98 
This is not to speak of enterprise in the merely organisation sense of 
"individual units competing with one another on the market," rather, as elaborated by 
Rose, enterprise "generally provides an image of a mode of activity to be encouraged 
in a multitude of arenas oflife."s99 Pursuing a career, 'ethical' or otherwise, can be 
understood in the language of 'enterprise' as a means of self-actualisation, a route to 
the maximisation of one's self worth vis-a-vis the self.60o We have encountered this 
idea already with regard to the injunction to work ethically, recall Jason Elliot 
(founder of 'Ethical Jobs') suggestion that this entails "doing something that serves 
your practical needs, your personal values and your interests in a way that positively 
impacts upon the world.,,601 This is also captured more generally in popular 
597 Gideon Burrows, 'Ethicalcareers.org.' Presentation given at forum3, Islington Business Design 
Centre, London, 11th October, 2008. 
598 Rose, "Governing the Enterprising Self." p.151 (Original italics) 
599 Ibid., p.145 
600 Ibid., p.149 
601 Elliot, www.ethical-jobs.co.uk 
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d· f ' . 'd 'hr h 602 Iscourses 0 pursumg one s reams t oug work, and getting a job in which, to 
quote a C2 careers advisory advertisement, "you can truly be yourself. ,,603 
Crucially though, as Rose points out, notions such as these are "governed by 
a single a priori: the 'autonomisation and 'responsibilisation' of the self.,,604 
Something which occurs part and parcel, as Paul Heelas and Paul Morris elaborate 
, 
with the "extension" and "intensification" of market forces across all aspects of 
contemporary life. 60S This process is vividly depicted in Brammar's tellingly entitled 
'Self-Audit' procedure in which she encourages audience members to take part 
during her presentation: 
602 
[On a PowerPoint screen it reads: 'Self Audit: and listed below: Environmental 
Impact, Community/Social, Workplace Practices, Marketplace and Business -
Responsible behaviour, Ethical Governance - transparency and compliance.]606 
Ok - so now, and apologies if this is really patronising ... but I want you to think just 
for a moment what are the ethical issues or aspects of CSR that are most pertinent to 
you, what are the factors that you feel most strongly about, what's actually led you 
to think, you know, actually - working ethically matters to me, it's that aspect of an 
ethical career that appeals more than others. Now it may be all of them, I'm not 
suggesting that some of them you don't give a toss about, I'm hoping that you care 
about all of them. But where would you most like to see yourself fitting in terms of 
lending your efforts and energies. I am going to give you thirty seconds to look at 
those, and if you had to rank the top three - guns to your head - the top three in 
terms of things that you feel most strongly about... Ok, thirty seconds - off you 
gO.607 
www.forum3.co.uk tit 18th 
603 C2 careers text advertisement, The Guardian London Graduate Fair (Careers Group) 17 -
June, 2008 programme. 
604 • E .. S If" 149 Rose, "Goverrung the nterpnsmg e . p. " . 
605 Paul Heelas and Paul Morris, "Enterprise Culture: Its Values and Value, m The Values o/the 
Enterprise Culture, ed. Paul Heelas and Paul Morris (London: Routledge, 1992). p.5 
606 Ibid. 'Self-Audit' PowerPoint slide. 
607 B 'E hi I C ' rammar,· t ca areers. 
In line with the expectations of an 'enterprise' culture, our ethical values and 
personal convictions are depicted as that over which we exercise complete self-
mastery. Self-knowledge being total, thirty seconds of self-consultation should be 
sufficient to detennine our ethical priorities so to speak, and figure out where, on this 
basis, we might expect to work in order to be most 'fulfilled.' 
This "reflexive henneneutics,,608 of self-knowledge is also evident in the 
expectation that ethical career aspirants will be able to articulate exactly why it is 
that they wish to work 'ethically' and, in particular, that this 'motivation' will take 
the fonn of a unique, individual and compelling personal experience or narrative. As 
Brammar explains: " ... essentially what you are going to be asked at the point of 
entering these organisations, whether they are massive, or just two people working 
from a bedroom somewhere, is what are your motivations, and what are the issues 
that matter yoU?,,609 
The question of 'motivations' also occupied much of the more introductory 
social chat that occurred between members of the LSE CSR society. Here, it was not 
uncommon to find these isolated to a particular experiential moment or rendered into 
a coherent narrative. In particular, stories of witnessing corporate exploitation in the 
Third World, often on a gap year, frequently emerged. The Society administrator, a 
particularly enthusiastic CSR proponent, explained to me how, for instance, her 
interest in CSR initially emerged following gap year travels in Orissa in India when 
she recalls being appalled by the pace of tourist development and how this was 
"definitely not [happening] in an environmentally or socially sustainable way.,,610 
This emphasis on knowing your own ethics, and the having of an attendant 
justificatory back-story, might also be understood in the context of an enterprise 
culture as a means via which an establishment of the 'right' (or most economically 
viable) kinds of "values-cum-selfhood,,611 are encouraged. In the present case, this 
recognition draws our attention to the utility of demonstrating that you possess 
certain kinds of 'ethics' in securing particular fonns of employment. This is, of 
608 Rose, "Governing the Enterprising Self." p.149 
609 Brammar, 'Ethical Careers' 
610 LSE CSR Society Administrator, 21 st November, 2007 
611 Heelas and Morris, "Enterprise Culture: Its Values and Value." p.8 
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course, inherent in Brammar's suggestion that employers will want to know what 
your ethical 'motivations' are, but can also be widely observed elsewhere, for 
instance in the trend towards CV building via volunteering. As suggested by Paul 
Canal, managing director of the recruiting agency Charity People, volunteering 
usefully "demonstrates that you care and are actively engaged.,,612 Here, the lauding 
of 'care' and 'active' engagement might be understood to be indicative of the 
emergence of what Adkins and Lury describe as "new workplace hierarchies" 
wherein "knowledge of and management of the self as an individual may be 
exchanged for labour-market remuneration.,,613 
Showing that you 'care,' or, otherwise put, the capacity for empathy, is, as 
Canal attests, something that is highly valued in the contemporary job market. This is 
not just the case with regard to charity, or so-defined 'ethical' jobs in which the 
desirability of empathy is reasonably obvious. Rather, more generally it is indicative 
of the aforementioned tendency towards the integration of individual and 
organisation goals captured in the notion of fulfilment through work. 614 As Eva 
Illouz suggests, "[ e ]mpathy has historically evolved with the rise of the capitalist 
corporation and the needs of managing a corporation.,,615 In this way, emotion may 
be key in articulating a desirable (read successful) kind of corporate seltbood.616 
In his treatise on social entrepreneurship, Everyone a Changemaker, William 
Drayton celebratedly proclaims of empathy: "Our world now requires [this] skill as 
the ticket of admission to [even the] most simple levels of society.,,617 The 'skill' of 
"applied-empathy," whereby each and every action must be contemplated insofar as 
it stands to "impact everyone at several removes around us and long into the future," 
Drayton suggests is now so important that those failing to acquire this will actually 
be economically and socially "marginalized.,,618 This happy 'marginalisation' of the 
612 Canal, Paul, in Sandiford, Adam, "Against the Odds," Ethical Careers Guide, p.15 . 
613 Lisa Adkins and Celia Lury, "The Labour ofldentity: Performing Identities, Performmg 
Economies," Economy and Society 28, no. 4 (1999). p.610 
614 Eva Illouz, "The Culture of Management: Self-Interest, Empathy and Emotional Control." in An 
Introduction to Social Entrepreneurship, ed. Rafael Ziegler (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2009). p.118 
615 Ibid., pp.1 07-8 
616 Ibid., p.119 ., . Gal" 
617 William Drayton, "Everyone a Changemaker: Social Entrepreneurship s Ultunate 0 , 
innovations Winter (2006). p.86 
618 Ibid. 
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un-empathetic may be taken as an example of the extent to which discourses of the 
emotional and economic are mutually constitutive in contemporary society - what 
Illouz attests to with her use of the phrase "emotional capitalism.,,619 
As a path to fulfilment and self-realisation then, work in an enterprise culture 
may be understood to subsist in the personal acquisition, display, and moderation of 
the appropriate emotional (in addition to technical) skills. To what extent however 
, 
does it make sense to understand 'ethics' in the current context as a set of emotional 
or empathetic inclinations, collected in the self, gathered through experience, 
available to articulate through self-reflection, and hierarchically organised in terms 
of relative importance? While much of the discourse surrounding ethical careers 
avoids specifying the content of the 'ethical' on this basis (recall Burrows, "we 
haven't attempted to define what 'ethical' means ... [w ]hat we have tried to do is 
provide information to help you make up your own mind,,620), this does not 
necessarily conclusively constitute 'ethics' as a property of the individual with 
regard to 'ethical careers.' 
Take for example, the 'self-audit' categories of Brammar's PowerPoint 
presentation - "Environmental Impact, Community/Social, Workplace Practices, 
Marketplace and Business - Responsible behaviour, Ethical Governance -
transparency and compliance." While representing some viable sectors in which one 
might seek to work ethically, these do not read as likely descriptors of people's 
actual desires or aspirations. I am aware of course that this 'self-audit' was employed 
by Brammar only as a practical exercise in getting graduates to think about where 
they might most like to work, however, a larger point emerges from this. 
People do of course have different ethical priorities and values - the extent to 
which these specifically give rise to the desire to work 'ethically' though is perhaps 
markedly over-rated in some of the discourses pertaining to this. What this focus on 
'ethics' as a possession of the individual person fails to note, is the way in which 
'ethics' in the context of the emerging market for 'ethical careers' actually functions 
619 Illouz, "The Culture of Management: Self-Interest, Empathy and Emoti~nal Control." p.108 Note 
that Illouz' s claim is distinct from those who impute a debasement of emotIon by present -day 
capitalism - i.e. Hochschild. 
620 Burrows, ed., The Ethical Careers Guide 2006-7. p.3 
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as a kind of future potential, detached from the values of the individual, and 
affectively orientated outwards to the dynamics of the wider market. Thus, while an 
approach in terms of 'enterprising selfhood' can account for the mechanism via 
which we are led to believe that 'ethics' is a property of the self, it is not sufficiently 
attuned to address the way in which these might function productively with an 
orientation to the future in a contemporary marketplace that construes 'ethics' in 
terms of innovatively generative potential. 
Having a Salary, and Wearing One's Sandals Too 
The sense that I am attempting to describe - in which the notion of an 'ethical 
career' functions as a supra-individual and generative future-orientation - is 
implicitly recognised in an interesting way by the LSE CSR Society's stance on the 
seemingly rather more mundane organisational question of how CSR might be 
'integrated' into a corporation. One of the major points covered in the Society's 
Mission Statement, and an issue that was raised many times (and not often with 
unanimous agreement) throughout the year of events and meetings, was what Evan, 
the Society President, referred to in terms of the need to "de-politicise,,621 CSR and 
make it more "practicable.,,622 Here, in this anecdote told at the first Society meeting, 
his concerns are articulated: 
There was this consultancy fair last week, and when we approached those 
consultants, who consult [with] the most important CEOs in the world (like those 
Mackinsey guys - they tell the managers what their strategy should look like), and 
then you ask them, 'What is CSR? How do you cope with that?' And they tell you, 
'Oh, you know what, we've got a department for that!' And then you think, well, 
who is consulting with CEOs, is it you, or is it your CSR department? And that is 
actually the issue we should focus upon this year. We can see that usual jobs should 
include CSR, and [the question is] how can we communicate this to those studying 
here - studying investment banking, studying consultancy, studying everything else 
621 Evan, LSE CSR Society introductory session, LSE, 29th October, 2007. See also, LSE CSR Society 
Mission Statement, 2007-8. 
622 LSE CSR Society Mission Statement, 2007-8. 
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- how can we communicate that those things should be communicated in each 
strategy, of each CEO? 
So we would see our role to de-politicise the topic, to move out of say, the green 
issue, and bring it more into practicability, and to show that it is not a topic for the 
idealistic - for some green parties, but a topic that should be integrated in the day to 
day of wo rk. 623 
Evan's suggestion that CSR should be 'de-politicised' has directly to do with 
the problem of integration. CSR must become a 'practical' as opposed to a 'political' 
exercise if, as Evan proposes it, it is to be an 'integrated' aspect of 'day to day work.' 
No one 'political' issue should hold too much sway as this then makes CSR 
'political' and hence liable to be marginalised. This stance was of course not 
uncontroversial- some members immediately worried that 'de-politicisation' was 
akin to selling out, 'de-fanging' the issue of corporate responsibility, de-radicalising 
this by mixing it with business-as-usual. 
In a conversation with me at the end of his Masters degree, Evan explained 
the situation interestingly though. I had asked whether, given he had finished 
studying, he would now be seeking to get a job in CSR? His reply was emphatic and 
unexpected. I knew how extremely enthusiastic Evan was about CSR and 'making a 
difference' from all the work he had put into the Society and his presidency, 
however, as he explained, this did not necessarily translate into wanting to work in 
CSR specifically. Evan described his fears of getting 'stuck' in CSR, being 
organisationally tucked away and thus ineffective, an accessory or add-on as it were 
rather than being truly in the position to effect positive business changes.624 A CSR-
job then, to adapt a classic feminist phrase, risked for Evan at least, being a kind of 
'green-collar ghetto. ,625 
623 Evan, LSE CSR Society introductory session, 29th October, 2007. 
624 Conversation with Evan, 3rd March, 2008, LSE. 
625 Holly Sklar, Barbara Ehrenreich, and Karin Stallard, Poverty in the American Dream: Women and 
Children First (London: South End Press, 1983). These authors coined the phrase 'pink collar ghetto' 
to refer to the marginalisation of women's work. 
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In addition to being a problem of integration though, this also points towards 
the issue of professionalisation. Where once, working 'ethically' might have meant 
working for low or no pay, proponents of the contemporary professionalisation of 
this field are keen to stress that ethical jobs can now be expected to come with a pay 
packet. Jason Elliot for instance insists, "[ c ]hoosing an ethical career does not mean 
sacrificing a well-paid and exciting position in the corporate sector for an underpaid 
and under-appreciated one.,,626 Or, as more colourfully put by Gib Bulloch, Director 
of Accenture Development Partnerships: "It's no longer a case of the evil private 
sector versus the sandal-wearing bleeding hearts.,,627 
As Evan's concerns attest though, it may not simply be a matter of taking 
home a salary, and getting to wear one's sandals too. An 'ethical career,' in the 
contemporary corporate usage of this term at least, does not invent 'ethics' as a 
unique quality or possession of the individual that pursues it, and in this way - to 
continue the metaphor - your chosen footwear is largely irrelevant. Rather, and to 
draw again from Adkins work on labour in the new economy, ethical labour might 
alternatively be understood to be significant in terms of effects "on the intended 
audience.,,628 In the present case the 'audience' being the wider marketplace for the 
consumption of various contemporary ethics, made up of 'stakeholders' of varying 
kinds including producers, consumers, shareholders and any number of interested 
others. 'Ethics' ceases to be understood as a personally derived set of individual 
values and becomes a mode of affective "cultural work" which, subsequently, is 
variously subject to the "cycles of production, distribution and reception which make 
up contemporary regimes of cultural production.,,629 Organised thus, ethical 
'qualities' such as empathy are not accumulated uniquely and statically banked in the 
'self,' rather 'ethics' is external,630 a function, a 'doing' or a kind of 'work.' 
626 Elliot, www.ethical-jobs.co.uk 
627 Gib Bulloch, speaking at, 'CSR at its Crossroads,' 18th January, 2007, Clement House, London 
School of Economics and Politics, Aldwych, London. 
628 Adkins, "The New Economy, Property and Personhood." p.123 
629 Ibid. 
630 Ibid., p.125 
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In the sense that it is invoked in the phrase 'ethical career' then, 'ethics' 
might be understood to undergo a shift in both temporal and spatial organisation. 
Where an understanding of ethics as a sedimented collection of personal values 
denotes retrospection and internality, 'ethics' as a mode of affective productive work 
in the market economy is future-oriented and outwardly operating. Ethical 'labour' 
therefore is not defined with reference to any particular politics, or restricted to any 
particular employment sector - it is valuable with an eye to the future, in the mode of 
potential, of what might be otherwise possible. 
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Chapter Seven 
o 
Reflexions on 'Crisis' 
On the 26th of September, 2008, a little over a week after the spectacular 
collapse of Lehman Brothers and right amidst the stock market pandemonium that 
this spurred, an email forward appeared in my inbox - "Unbelievable ... where it all 
began," it read. Inside was a link to a New York Times article dated the 30th of 
September, 1999, and entitled "Fannie Mae Eases Credit to Aid Mortgage 
Lending. ,,631 Positive, even ebullient, in tone, the article described how the US 
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae)632 were piloting a program of 
eased credit in order to extend lending to "so-called sub-prime borrowers:,,633 "In a 
move that could help increase home ownership rates among minorities and low-
income consumers, the Fannie Mae Corporation is easing the credit requirements on 
loans that it will purchase from banks and other lenders.,,634 Fannie Mae, the article 
continued, "has been under increasing pressure from the Clinton Administration to 
expand mortgage loans among low and moderate income people and felt pressure 
from stock holders to maintain its phenomenal growth in profits.,,635 
Reading this article ten years on and with all the benefits of hindsight, 
'unbelievable' it may be it - but then this is the problematic thing about hindsight. In 
the wake of the economic crisis, 'market ethics' (the phrase I have used throughout 
this thesis to simultaneously highlight the development of various markets-for-ethics 
and understand how, as market-based practice, 'ethics' are done differently) takes on 
a new and pressing dimension. In the recessive economic environs of 2009, the 
631 Steven A. Holmes, "Fannie Mae Eases Credit to Aid Mortgage Lending," New York Times 30th 
September, 1999. Holmes, "Fannie Mae Eases Credit to Aid Mortgage Lending." 
632 Fannie Mae is a mortgage securitisation body created by the US Federal Government in 1938. 
633 Holmes, "Fannie Mae Eases Credit to Aid Mortgage Lending." 
634 Ibid. 
635 Ibid. 
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particular concern that has now come to dominate mainstream discourse is the 
'ethics' (or otherwise) o/markets themselves. 
This new locus of concern has significant implications for a CSR made 
popular on the basis of a proposed coincidence between what is 'ethical' and what is 
'marketable.' For this reason, the present chapter will begin by utilising the 2008 
financial crisis as an opportune departure point from which to critically reflect back 
over the period of this research as one during which notable economic changes were 
taking place. This will involve describing how the growth in popularity of CSR in 
the UK, and particularly in London, can be understood to have taken place alongside 
and as a function of the growth in importance of the financial sector, and relatedly, 
the governmental trend towards increasing deregulation. Given this lineage, one 
might suspect the present prognosis for CSR to be unfavourable, and yet, as this 
chapter will go on to explore, it is not necessarily clear that this is the case. 
The question of whether CSR would survive the crisis and subsequent 
economic downturn was one asked repeatedly and with great frequency over the 
course of 2008-9. As a market phenomenon, the success of CSR has been widely 
interpreted to be linked inescapably to the 'success' of markets themselves. Given 
the 'failure' of markets, so also the 'failure' ofCSR. And yet, upon closer 
consideration, and in line with the approach developed over preceding chapters, the 
ascription of 'success' and 'failure' in this formulation may be critically understood 
to present a number of difficulties. That markets 'failed' appears, on the one hand, 
reasonably self-evident. What though, this chapter will seek to alternatively ask, is 
exactly at stake in 'failure'? Equally, the term 'crisis,' as intuitively appealing and 
experientially accurate a descriptor as this may be, requires further attention and 
unpacking to the extent that unquestioningly instituted within is a particular version 
of economic 'success.' 
In the course of inquiries regarding the 'fate' ofCSR, the present chapter 
goes on to formulate a different stance regarding the characterisation of 'economic 
crisis' or, more specifically, regarding the critical and political efficacy of this 
characterisation. That the economic situation, in the wake of the precipitous market 
tumble of September of 2008, was understood to be almost unprecedentedly 
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disastrous in financial terms matters inasmuch as it is this understanding that gives 
rise in concrete ways to what it is possible to do. 'Crisis' gave rise, for instance, to 
. the suggestion of 'the death of capitalism,' and in this way was understood by some 
to represent a new window of opportunity for Left politics. That economic recovery 
is now well underway and no such 'opportunity' emerged as predicted however, 
suggests instead the need for much care to be taken around face-value ascriptions of 
economic 'success' and 'failure.' In the present instance, the extent of' crisis' and the 
degree of 'failure' result, counterintuitively in a precedence of economic 'recovery' 
that actually functions, I will suggest, to almost entirely proscribe the possibility of 
'reform,' and in the process perpetuates increasingly severe economic volatility into 
the future. 
So that our theoretical accounts of economic dynamics are to be able to 
identify and avoid such problems, it is important that we are aware also of the extent 
to which these may be similarly reliant on implicit or explicit notions of 'success' 
and 'failure.' In economic sociology (to return to a discussion begun in Chapter 
One), Callonistic performativity provides, on this basis I will suggest, some cause for 
critical concern. Entailed in the suggestion of 'performativity' is that things 'work' 
as they are meant to, yet, as this chapter will seek to elaborate, a certain dynamism is 
lacking here. While 'not working,' has been modelled in a performative vein by 
Donald Mackenzie as 'counter-performativity,,636 the continued desirability of a 
performative emphasis is nonetheless brought into question by the context of 
economic 'crisis.' The veil of normalcy displaced, we might take the opportunity to 
dwell not on the coherence of economic knowledge, but on its contestability and 
fluidity. 
This requires not an abandonment of performativity, but a realignment. Away 
from the implicit assumptions of 'success/failure,' things simply 'working' or 'not 
working,' how might we be otherwise able to describe economic processes in the 
constant flux of change? The emphasis on the reflexive-affective nature of markets 
and market practices developed over the preceding captures and particularly in 
636 Donald MacKenzie, "The Big, Bad Wolf and the Rational Market: Portfolio Insurance. the 1987 
Crash and the Performativity of Economics," Economy and Society 33, no. 3 (2004). p.306 
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Chapter Three, provides a starting point here. Drawing on a collected array of 'crisis' 
flotsam in the form of newspaper clippings, magazine articles, sound bites and 
stories, this chapter will take a short journey back through the tumultuous times of 
the 2008-9 economic crisis in order to reflect upon, in light of these events, both the 
'market ethics' that have been the object of this thesis, and the kind of critical 
perspectives that sociology adopts in response to 'crisis.' My emphasis here will be 
on the inevitability (as opposed to the exceptionality) of 'crisis' in financialised 
economies constituted as much in co-temporalised structures of feeling, as in 
calculative techniques, instruments, and models. 
Where' crisis' is rule though, the efficacy of this very description is called 
into question. Crucially, this requires a concomitant re-thinking of how ethics might 
be encountered in contexts characterised by endemic volatility and change, and 
further, how politics might also function without recourse to the different 'beyond' 
that 'failure' seems to promise, but upon which it rarely delivers. In the final 
instance, these might be understood as ethical and political questions that tum on the 
whereabouts of hope. Long the preserve of a radical and utopic 'elsewhere,' hope, I 
will suggest in closing, perhaps need not be quite so intangibly sequestered. Market-
spaces, as this chapter will conclude, while not necessary hope-filled, need not be 
pre-emptively dismissed as 'hope-less' either. 
A Long Bull Run 
Research on this thesis began in 2005. It .was in this same year that I first 
became aware of 'corporate social responsibility,' my interest sparked by the rapid 
ascendency and sudden ubiquity of this notion. From nowhere, and all of a sudden, 
'CSR' seemed to me to be everywhere and setting the stage for the kind of questions 
that, over the preceding chapters, this thesis has sought to ask. What is evident now 
(though was of course not at the time), is that already by 2005 many global 
economies were nearing the peak of what, for some at least, was a long period of 
exceptionally bullish growth. That the CSR business case proposal gained in 
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popularity and became widespread during this ebullient era is significant now not 
only with regards to the future of CSR, but also to the approach of this thesis. 
Neither the verification nor endorsement of the business case have been at stake in 
the work that has preceded, but then neither has the business case reasoning ever 
seemed so problematic as it does in the present moment. 
This chapter begins then by describing the popularisation of CSR in terms of 
its particular historical economic and political context. Specifically, I want to focus 
on how what might be called the 'market popularism' attendant in an era of primarily 
finance-led economic growth forms a foundation for the emergence and plausibility 
ofCSR's business case logic. In this way, CSR can be described temporally, with 
regard to changing market conditions across time, but also spatially, in so far as I 
also want to draw attention to the particularity and significance of the City of 
London itself in this era of financialisation. Too straightforwardly causal a 
description of the ascendancy of CSR in line with the ascendency of the City though 
runs into problems of both a theoretical and political nature. Looking to the approach 
I have developed in the course of this thesis however, an emphasis on critical 
sensitivity to describing non-linear and non-polar processes of economic change will 
emerge. 
'Market Popularism' 
In an influential polemic entitled One Market Under God, the American 
writer Thomas Frank coins the term 'market popularism' to critique the ascendancy 
of the market as a supposedly democratic organisational form.637 Writing during the 
nineties era of dot. com boom, Frank claims that markets, in addition to being 
"mediums of exchange," have become popular "mediums of consent.,,638 For Frank, 
this outcome is the result of a kind of un-holy trinity wherein the American traditions 
of laissez-faire and rugged individualism are understood to have joined forces with a 
newly vigorous and widespread shareholder capitalism. Markets, under this sway, 
637 Thomas Frank, One Market Under God: Extreme Capitalism, Market Popuiarism and the End of 
Economic Democracy (New York: Anchor Books, 2001).p.xiv 
638 Ibid. 
are mistaken as functioning democracies639 - they are supposed "friend of the little 
guy," and possessed of the power to bring down the "pompous and snooty.,,640 
Democratic tallying machines, giant "global plebiscites,,,641 it is markets, so 
proponents of this view such as ex-Citibank chief Walter Wriston claim, that offer 
real "Power to the People.,,642 
The proposed connection between markets and democracy is of course not a 
new one, (as Frank himself recognises). 643 Recall, from Chapter One, that Milton 
Friedman famously argued something akin to this when he suggested that liberty is 
the freedom to express and satisfy one's choices in a market context.644 Democracy, 
following this account, might be understood analogously in terms of the 'freedom to 
choose.' What Frank diagnoses however, in the frenzied 'new economy' of the late 
nineties, is a new depth of ideological penetration so to speak. Markets are "in 
command," and carried by marketers, dot.com millionaires, management gurus and 
shareholders at large, it is the ideology of market popularism which supplies them 
with the "legitimacy required to rule.,,645 
By May 2001 though, in an 'Afterword' to One Market Under God, Frank is 
writing already about market popularism in the past tense. The year 2000 had seen 
dot.com stocks slide, and the 'new economy' bubble spectacularly burst. The 
halcyon days the late nineties were over, and naIve trust in markets a thing of the 
past. Within months of publishing his treatise, history had apparently proven Frank 
right - the era of market popularism - dangerous, elusive, and false, had met its 
inevitably disastrous end. 
Writing now however, in a perhaps analogous era of market-disillusion, it 
seems that 'market popularism' may be more enduring a problem than even Frank 
639 Ibid., p.30 " ... since markets express the will ofthe people, virtually any criticism ofbusiness could 
be described as an act of despicable contempt for the commonman." 
640 Ibid. 
641 Walter B. Wriston, The Twilight of Sovereignty: How the Information Revolution Is Transforming 
Our World (New York: Scribner, 1992). p.? 
642 Ibid. 
643 Thomas Frank, One Market Under God: Extreme Capitalism, Market Popularism and the End of 
Economic Democracy. p.xiv 
644 Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom. . 
645 Frank, One Market under God: Extreme Capitalism, Market Popularism and the End of Economic 
Democracy. p.xv 
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was willing to give it credit for. Without transposing directly from the American 
context of the late nineties to recent years here in the UK, a related kind of faith in 
markets at work in the pre-credit crunch optimism of the British economy might be 
diagnosed. 
CSR and the City 
Common to both progressions through boom and bust, is the context of the 
increasingly financialised economy in which they take place. The period of UK 
economic growth that climaxed in summer 2007, was primarily attributable to the 
success of London as a global financial centre.646 The extent to which this was the 
case is demonstrated in the ten percent GDP accounted for in 2007 by financial 
services, of which nine percent was generated in the City of London. 647 Figures for 
this same year show furthermore that one in every thirty jobs in the UK was in the 
financial sector. The centrality of finance in the British economy is apparent still 
now, post credit-crunch, in debates surrounding the improvement of financial 
regulation. Herein, more stringent financial regulations are frequently understood to 
threaten the competiveness of London as a global financial centre and thereby 
undermine the economic prospects of the UK as a whole. 648 
646 The hallmarks of a finance-led growth regime include a booming stock market, the ready supply of 
credit to sustain consumption, and a permanent optimism surrounding asset-price expectations. See, 
Robert Boyer, "Is a Finance-Led Growth Regime a Viable Alternative to Fordism? A Preliminary 
Analysis," Economy and Society 29, no. 1 (2000). p.116; See also, Michael Pryke and Paul Du Gay, 
"Take an Issue: Cultural Economy and Finance," Economy and Society 36, no. 3 (2007). p.339 
647 In 2007, according to the British Trade and Cultural Office, financial services accounted for 10.1 
percent of UK GDP, and for 14 percent of UK GDP when added to associated services such as legal, 
accounting and management consultancy. http://ukintaiwan.fco.gov.ukienldoing-businesslbusiness-
investment-in-ukluk-business-environmentluk-financial-services/. The 9 per cent figure for financial 
services in the City of London as a percentage of UK GDP is according to London Mayor Boris 
Johnson, speaking at the Conservative Party conference 5th October, 2009. See, Andrew Porter, 
"Conservative Party Conference: Boris Johnson Issues Challenge on Europe," The Daily Telegraph, 
6th October 2009. 
http://www. telegraph. co. ukinews/newstopics/politicsl conservative/6263485/Conservative-Party-
conference-Boris-J ohnson-issues-challenge-on-Europe.html 
648 The issue of maintaining London's competiveness has a been much debated one not only in 
relation to financial regulation, but also with regard to restricting remuneration in the banking sector. 
In the later half of2009, amid the suggestion that large end of year 'bonuses' be paid in the banking 
industry, public debate on this topic was particularly intense. See, for instance, BBC News, "Tories 
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The 'third way' political philosophy of the Labour government incumbent 
during the recent years of economic boom facilitated the growth of the City. The 
roll-back of government in certain traditionally public sectors and the promotion of 
free-market initiatives were/are characteristic of a governance style that, while 
seeking to maintain certain public provisions, does so at the same time as capitalising 
on the wealth creation possibilities offered by the competitiveness of the 
marketplace.
649 
This deregulatory climate has, in the words of one commentator, 
given rise to a kind of "free-market fundamentalism,,,65o and, whether or not this 
overstates the case, it is difficult to deny that the pre-crisis years of the British 
economy were flavoured by a distinctive kind of market-derived 'win-win' 
optimism. 
Bye, Bye 'Business Case'? 
The business case for CSR is, of course, a prime exemplar of this 'win-win' 
optimism insofar as it promotes the easy coincidence of 'doing well' and 'doing 
good.' Transferring responsibility for ethics to the marketplace, the unfortunate 
'either/or' may be done away with - it need not be a choice, the 'ethical' versus the 
'profitable,' one paves the way to the other, (or so the story has gone). That the 
growth of CSR has occurred alongside, and been entailed by, the growth of the City 
in recent years has certainly lent plausibility to the business case logic. What of the 
business case now though? In the current economic climate, the idea that markets 
may be enlisted as ethical vehicles appears more implausible than ever before. 
And yet, while, undoubtedly, the business case is more difficult to swallow 
now than it once was, an interesting reversal of fortunes for CSR is also taking place 
as a function of the financial crisis. In a number of ways, the current crisis has seen 
CSR proposals writ large and endorsed as necessity. Where during the boom years 
Want End of Bonus Culture," 15th August 2009. Or; The Wall Street Journal, "UK City Minister: 
Government Ready to Act If Bank Bonuses Excessive," 21st October 2009. 
649 See, along these lines, the then UK Prime Minister Tony Blair's pitch of 'personal prosperity for 
all.' BBC News, "Blair Stresses Prosperity Goals," 13th January 2005. 
650 Frank Ackerman, "The Economics of Collapsing Markets," real-world economics review. no. 48 
(2008). p.282 
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ethics in business arguably risked being a 'mere add-on,' nice, but not actually 
essential, at present 'ethics' and 'social responsibility' are being proposed as core 
concern going forth by both government and business. "Markets need morals ,,651 
, 
was Gordon Brown's emphatic response for instance, announced amidst stock 
market freefall on the day that UK share prices experienced their biggest one-day 
drop. While David Cameron, speaking at the January 2009 World Economic Forum 
in Davos, called for "capitalism with a conscious," saying that while he intends to 
stand up for business, he would also "stand up to business when the things that 
people value are at risk.,,652 
From all comers within the current debate on the crisis, common agreement 
is also being achieved around the importance of disclosure and transparency in 
ensuring future financial stability.653 These proposals have long been essentials in the 
CSR toolkit, and in this way, combined with widespread calls for the 'moralisation 
of markets,' the crisis offers a vindication of sorts for CSR proponents, many of 
whom have not missed the opportunity to say' I told you so,' by publishing 
numerous articles along these lines.654 While CSR may once have been "a luxury," 
this is "no longer," they point out: "In today's climate, looking beyond short-term 
651 BBC News, "Markets Need Morals, Says Brown," 6th October 2008. "Gordon Brown has urged 
global markets to abide by a system of 'morals,' including 'responsible risk-taking' and a 'work-
ethic. '" 
652 David Cameron, Conservative Party leader, quoted in, Dearbail Jordon, "Cameron Calls for 
'Capitalism with a Conscience.'" The Times, 30th January 2009. Also see, Phillip Blond, "Let Us Put 
Markets to the Service of the Good Society," Financial Times, 13th April 2009. " ... George Osborne, 
shadow chancellor of the exchequer, signaled that the Conservatives are breaking with the neo-liberal 
absolutism of the past 30 years to forge a new approach to the market economy. Mr. Osborne could 
not have been clearer; he repudiated laisser [ sic] faire economics and the libertarian philosophy that 
licensed its practice." 
653 Oliver Kessler, "Towards an Economic Sociology of the Sub-Prime Crisis?," Economic Sociology-
The European Electronic Newsletter 10, no. 2 (2009). p.11 
654 See Ethical Corporation, "Why Ethical Leadership Matters More Than Ever in a Downturn," 11 th 
November 2008. Or, Stephen Howard, Chief Executive of Business in the Community, Responsible 
business is "more important than ever," in Roger Trapp, "Corporate Social Responsibility Is Vital for 
Business Survival," The Independent, 10th March 2009.; also, Tony Webb, "Corporate Social 
Responsibility in a Recession, 10 Reasons to Keep Doing It," Ethical Corporation, 24th October 
2008.; Vivek Wadhwa, "Why Be an Ethical Company? They Are Stronger and Last Longer." 
Business Week, 17th August 2009. "A focus on short-term profits to the exclusion of all else led ~o the 
current fmancial crisis. ArId guess what? Companies with the steadiest moral compasses have saIled 
through it." 
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profit is increasingly important," corporate social responsibility is now "vital for 
business survival. ,,655 
Paradoxically however, situated problematically alongside such 
pronouncements, are contrasting concerns regarding the continued viability CSR in a 
recession. A slew of articles, to be found mainly in CSR trade publications, describe 
how to respond to potential budget cuts by doing "more with less.,,656 Most strikingly 
perhaps, an enormous amount of attention has been devoted to the question of 
whether CSR itself can even weather the economic storm. Along these lines The 
Economist, for instance, suggests that economic downturn provides a "stress test for 
good intentions." 657 The implication here being that corporate commitment to social 
responsibility will be tested by presumably more pressing financial considerations. 
Seemingly, a failure of the business case logic is evinced by the repeated 
suggestion that CSR may have just been a boom-time fad. 658 Surely, if businesses 
had actually bought into the argument that profits and competitiveness could be 
bolstered by practicing CSR they would be seeking to increase, not decrease, their 
'ethical' commitments as a means out of crisis? CSR is crucial in a downturn, CSR is 
exposed as mere fad: the contradictions appear to multiply endlessly, but then 
'contradictive dichotomisation' may be part of the problem as it were. Analytical 
configurations such as 'contradiction' and 'paradox,' actually emerge, in this 
instance, from the demand that 'success' or 'failure' be attributable to the business 
case. 
This leads to the question of whether it is desirable to interpret the 
ascendency of the CSR business case in terms of the economic 'successfulness' of 
the era in which this occurred. Frank's 'market popularism' would surely answer in 
the affirmative by suggesting, somewhat tautologically, that when markets are 
booming, market-organisation appears to work, and, 'popularised' as such, ever 
more things are likely to be organised on such a basis. The efficacy of the business 
655 Trapp, "Corporate Social Responsibility Is Vital for Business Survi~al." ". . 
656 Doug Cahn and Patrick Neyts, "Surviving Budget Cuts: Do More With Less, Ethical CorporatIOn, 
25th November 2008. 
657 The Economist, "A Stress Test for Good Intentions: The Recession Is a Test of Companies' 
Commitments to Doing Good ",14th May 2009. 
658 See, for instance, Ibid. Or; John Entine, "Financial Crisis: Crunch Time for Ethical Investing," 
Ethical Corporation, 28th October 2008. 
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case is, as we have seen, a major question for CSR itself (recall, from Chapter Four 
for instance, the various attempts to correlate ethical and financial performance). 
And yet, if a reading in terms of 'faddishness' is pursued, there is little more at stake 
in such a question than the prevailing market mood, or economic outlook. In the 
remainder of this chapter I want to look more closely at ascriptions of economic 
'success' and 'failure.' It may be the case that with respect both to CSR and our 
engagements with what is 'market' more broadly, such ascriptions work against a 
more dynamic and sensitive account of economic process and change. 
The Politics of Invisible Success and Paroxysmal Failure 
Inarguably, "the dominant mode of apprehension of the market, at the 
moment, ... is one of failure. ,,659 This quote is taken from a 2005 article by Hirokazu 
Miyazaki and Annelise Riles and made in reference to the post-Asian crisis Japanese 
financial markets, yet it might just as easily have been written in response to the 
recent sub-prime crisis. The apparent 'failure' of markets, following this, was 
certainly in ample evidence almost anywhere that one should cared to have 
100ked.660 Without recapping familiar events in too much depth - 2008-2009 saw 
large portions of the global banking system 'bailed-out' by government funds, 
worldwide financial and property markets collapsed, and a so called credit-crunch 
saw inter-bank lending grind, for a period at least, effectively to a halt, (and this is to 
name but few of the profoundly unsettling consequences of the crisis). On an 
experiential level, in the so-called 'real' economy, this has meant devastating job-
losses, home repossessions, extreme levels of anxiety and a host of other ills far too 
wide-ranging and numerous to recall in the space of this chapter. Indeed, the severity 
of the financial crisis of was so pronounced as to lead many across the political 
spectrum (from Left-wing student groups to The Wall Street Journal) to proclaim a 
659 Hirokazu Miyazaki and Annelise Riles, "Failure as Endpoint," in Global Assemblages, ed. Aihwa 
Ong and Stephen J. Collier (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005). p.320 . 
660See for an academic account in terms of 'failure;' Peter Miller, "When Markets and Models Fall: 
Rethiclcing Risk, Regulation and the State," Risk and Regulation: Special Issue on the Financial 
Crisis January (2009). 
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'crisis of capitalism' 661 itself, (an ascription which I will return to discuss in greater 
detail later in this chapter). 
Despite the undeniable palpability of failure however, the question of what is 
at stake in this ascription needs to be asked. What are consequences of proclaiming a 
'crisis'? Practically and politically, to repeat the style of question that has structured 
this thesis, what does 'crisis' do? Just above, I suggested that the recent crisis does 
not necessarily amount to a 'failure' of the CSR business case. Further, I want now 
to suggest that there is good reason to give some thought to idea that the current 
crisis does not, in the traditionally understood way, necessarily constitute a 'failure,' 
or even a 'crisis' at all. As Michael Power recognises, there is a critical danger in 
taking the "label of financial crisis too much as face value," even though, on the 
basis of the "reach of its effects," the "temptation to be thoroughly realist about [it] is 
very great. ,,662 
These claims will require some explanation, (which will be attempted over 
the course of this chapter), and are of course made with numerous provisos and 
caveats. Foremost, I want to emphasis that in no way are these suggestions intended 
as a denial of the profoundly felt distress and, in some instances, material deprivation 
and loss that have been, and continue to be, sustained a as result of recession. 
Instead, what I am attempting to suggest, is that caution need be exercised before 
buying too readily into ascriptions of market 'success' and 'failure.' These, simply 
put, come with a number of unexpected and oftentimes unintended side-effects that 
bear both on the efficacy of any progressive politics, and on the description of any 
market ethics. 
661 This was a ubiquitously made proposal from late 2008 to early 2009 and observable across the 
board from student protest movements to academia and pro-free market press. See; 'Dancing on the 
Grave of Capitalism,' (student event), Halloween - 31 st October, 2008 outside the ex-Lehman 
Brothers office in Canary Wharf; Geoffrey M. Hodgson, "After 1929 Economics Changed: Will 
Economists Wake up in 2009?," real-world economics review, no. 48 (2008). SASE Conference, 
"Capitalism in Crisis: What's Next? Economic Regulation and Social Solidarity after the Fall of 
Finance Capitalism," Paris 16-19th July, 2009.; Richard A. Posner, "Capitalism i? Crisis," Th~ Wall 
Street Journal 7th May 2009. "The current economic crisis so far eclipses anythmg the AmerIcan 
economy has ~dergone since the Great Depression that "recession" is too tepid a term t~ describe it." 
See also; Richard A. Posner, A Failure o/Capitalism: The Crisis 0/'08 and the Descent mto 
Depression (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). ., 
662 Michael Power, "Opportunity out of Crisis: Economic Sociology and the AnalYSIS of Risk, 
Regulation and Security," Economic Sociology - The European Electronic Newsletter 10, no. 2 
(2009). p.4 
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From 'Capitalism in Crisis' to Recovery Or Reform 
Certainly, the language of 'crisis' does flow naturally from the drama of 
upheaval and uncertainty. As stock markets began their slide into the abyss in the 
latter half of 2008, reaction was, understandably, ever increasingly alarmist in tone 
(so very much so that one did begin to wonder with what degree of catastrophising 
hyperbole everything would end). From a sociological perspective, the proposal that 
we are in the grips of a 'crisis' does have numerous very important advantages and 
affordances. For one, it is an intuitively appealing way to sensitively describe 
people's experiences of financial turmoil and the resultant recession. These 
experiences have been 'out of the ordinary' (to say the very least) and in this sense 
certainly do warrant description in 'crisis' terms. Furthermore, 'crisis' can function 
as a politically astute ascription, a way of drawing attention to and recording pain 
and upheaval in the hope perhaps that the act of doing so will mean the same thing is 
less likely to happen again. When 'crisis' is represented as 'opportunity,' for 
instance, this is often on the basis of such reasoning. 
Rahm Emanuel's now famous saying, "You never want a serious crisis to go 
to waste,,,663 speaks to such a possibility in addition to acknowledging the prospects 
that 'crisis' might offer in terms of doing things in a way that they have not 
previously been done. Less than one year on from Emanuel's statement though, 
already the 'crisis' is being cast as 'opportunity missed.' An August 2009 Guardian 
article for instance asks: "Has the left blown its big chance of success? The collapse 
of unfettered capitalism should have been a golden opportunity for the left. So where 
did it all go wrong?,,664 
663Emanuel, Rahm, [United States White House Chief of Staff under president Barack Obama] 9th 
November, 2009, Video interview with The Wall Street Journal, 
http://allthenewsthatfits. wordpress. com/2008/ 111211rahm -emanuel-dont -waste-a-serious-crisis/ 
664Andy Beckett, "Has the Left Blown Its Big Chance of Success?," The Guardian, 17th August 2009. 
See, along similar lines, but from the opposite end of the political spectrum; Phillip Steph~ns, "Crisis? 
What Crisis? The Market Confounds the Left," Financial Times, 11th June 2009. "Surely It was only 
yesterday that the west was engulfed by the crisis of capitalism? ... Pace the doomsayers W?o 
predicted imminent Armageddon, liberal market capitalism has survived ... As for the predIcted lurch 
to the left, it has not materialised. I have not seen anyone rushing to imitate the Russian model of state 
capitalism. " 
245 
That numerous and variously perceived 'failings' constituted the recent 
'crisis' is taken for granted by the suggestion of 'opportunity.' Over the course of the 
preceding year, political critique has largely centred on the analysis of failure, ('how 
did things go wrong?), and, in particular on the attribution of blame (,who was at 
fault?'). This pattern is perhaps most clearly evident in the furore around executive 
salaries and the bonus culture in banking. Banks and bankers, we have come to 
understand, are mostly to blame for the 'crisis' to the extent that their 'excessive' pay 
levels promoted unacceptable risk taking and predatory lending practices. 
While this conversation is arguably a very necessary one in a number of 
regards, what strikes me most here is the way in which the dominance of this 
response, and others made along similar failure-attributing lines, functions to confer 
upon 'failure' a kind of exceptionality, that, in the process, worryingly precludes an 
adjunct critical analysis of what constitutes 'success.' The 'failure' entailed by 
'crisis' is paroxysmal- it is intense, outrageous, violent and unexpected. 'Success' 
however, as the obverse to this kind of 'failure,' can cease to be similarly highlighted 
as extraordinary, and thus recede from equal exceptionality to utter normality. 
There are, however, a number of good reasons to very wary about the 
'invisibility' conferred upon 'success' via the designation of 'crisis' - in particular, 
how 'business as usual' proceeds in such a reading to be just that. The few years 
preceding the crash were, it need be emphasised, not 'usual' or 'normal' in any 
straightforward or feasibly sustainable way. Economic growth rates all over the 
globalised West were exceptionally high, house-prices UK-wide seemed determine 
to rise indefinitely, and London in particular was awash with City cash and in the 
sway an inflationary deluge on the basis of the kind of lifestyles that this could 
afford. This 'abnormal' situation though, has, for many, come to represent 'business 
as usual.' Simply, impressive and continued economic growth are now what is 
widely expected. Against this, it is critical to underscore that 'boom' years are just 
that, and yet the manic quality of such economic good times is the very thing that 
'crisis' overlooks through its insistence, in the mode of exceptionality, that 
something has gone wrong. 
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A different, but analogous issue also emerges here around 'sub-prime,' or, 
specifically, how what is at stake in this designation is co-opted in a similarly 
uncritical way through the prevalent interpretation of 'failure.' Attempting to 
develop a cultural economy perspective on this topic,' Paul Langley notes, for 
instance, how the acquisition of a foe in the shape of failed financiers "rather 
conveniently secures" 665 the 'successful' identities of 'responsible' prime borrowers. 
In this way, as Langley goes on to note, "the prevailing tendency to clearly identifY 
unscrupulous and predatory lenders as the cause of the crisis may actually be 
politically disabling.,,666 Practically speaking, what the blame games of the crisis 
may inaugurate (or intensifY) is a kind of 'double-economy' wherein it may be that, 
going forward, only those who presently hold equity in their homes, or alternatively, 
are able to offer a large cash deposit, will offered a home loan at a reasonable rate of 
interest. To the extent that it encourages such an eventuality, 'failure' is an ascription 
to approached very carefully indeed. 
The suggestion that the 2008 'crisis' presented a (now supposedly missed) 
political opportunity is also involved in a problematic kind of (mis )attribution of 
blame. The Guardian article I referred to earlier proceeds to diagnose a kind of Left 
malaise in the 'missed opportunity' of crisis. The Left were not really interested 
enough, its author suggests, they did not respond speedily enough, they may even 
have just "run out ofideas.,,667 The kind of 'opportunity' presented by 'crisis' is 
never questioned though - and herein lies the problem. While, as per the comments 
that opened this discussion, crisis can, under some circumstances, open towards a 
discussion of how things may be done differently, counter-intuitively, the exact 
reverse may also be true, and, as preceding discussion has began to suggest, this is 
likely the case in the present context. It is not malaise that killed the 'opportunity' of 
crisis but rather the uncritical exuberance with which 'crisis' was cried. , 
To demonstrate this in a different way, consider what have become the 
opposing poles of 'recovery' and 'reform.' The extremity of the financial crisis, its 
665 Paul Langley, "Sub-Prime Mortgage Lending: A Cultural Economy," Economy and Society 37, no. 
4 (2008). p.490 
666 Ibid. 
667 Beckett, "Has the Left Blown Its Big Chance of Success?" 
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nearly unprecedented severity, required, even demanded that governments act fast. 
Recall, for instance, the positive international reception that the British government's 
comprehensive bail-out plan attracted at the time. The aberrant exceptionally of 
'crisis,' and all its unhappy effects, may, alternatively to 'opportunity,' be 
understood to have actually prompted a race for recovery, that in effect functioned to 
secure and perpetuate the preceding status quo, against the erstwhile possibility of 
reform. The point is not that I wish to dispute the necessity (or otherwise) of the 
government-led banking bail-out - simply, the hurtle towards 'recovery' permits few 
occasions whereby we might stop to consider what the landscape of a 'recovered' 
economy will look like. As was mentioned earlier, there is a profound tendency to 
misrecognise that the 'euphoria' of economic upswing is just that - euphoric, not 
sustainable, not permanent. 
'Reform' as such, barely had a chance, and now with markets firmly back on 
the up, the possibility is almost all but forgotten. Consider for instance, how rapidly 
Financial Services Authority Chairman Adair Turner's indictment of the of the 
banking industry was shouted down,668 or how, at the 2009 G-20 summit, the need to 
protect 'London's competiveness' was once again an oft-heard refrain.669 In place of 
'reform,' the' crisis' has left in its wake a more monopolised financial sector, 
populated by institutions deemed 'too big to fail;' the moral hazard implied by this 
with regard to the taking of future risks contributing, furthermore, to the likelihood 
of future 'crises' going forward. 
Will we then, on this basis, be back in very little time to the 1999 yesteryear 
with which this chapter opened and wherein it is said to have 'all began'? This is 
very difficult to know, and 'where it all begun' is highly unlikely ever to look 
668 Turner, Adair, quoted in Phillip Inman, "Financial Services Authority Chairman Backs Tax on 
Socially Useless Banks," The Guardian, 27th August 2009. . 
669 The G-20 Leaders' Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy was held m London on 
the 2nd of April, 2009. Tag-lined with the words 'Stability-Growth-Jobs,' duri.ng the. course.ofthe . 
summit consensus was reached around the need for economic stimulus plans mcludmg the Immediate 
re-capitalisation of banks, removal of trade barriers, and the continued need for fiscal policy 
maintenance of low interest rates. Notably the proceedings themselves were overshadowed by the 
protests that took place around them. The G-20 was, as a functi?n ofthes~, very much ~ emo~ional 
flashpoint of the crisis. Collective anger directed towards the CIty found hteral expreSSIOn dunng the 
course of the protests in actions such as the storming of the Royal Bank of Scotland's London 
Headquarters. 
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exactly the same. What is apparent though, is that the mechanisms via which we 
represent the economy do matter. The present discussion has not detailed 
exhaustively all the ways that various 'failures' have been attributed in the course of 
the overarching 'crisis,' it has only attempted to build a beginning picture of how 
these notions can problematically delimit the politically efficacy and critical 
incisiveness of our responses to economic issues. In the following section, this 
picture is further elaborated by critical re-return to CalIon's 'performativity 
programme.' To the extent that 'success' and 'failure,' or, as will be explained, 
'working' and 'not working,' are instituted in the sociological approaches that we 
seek to apply to researching economic phenomena, the situation of political pre-
emption that this section has described stands to be perpetuated. 
From Performativity to ... 'Counter-performativity'? 
The kind of Callonistic performativity introduced in Chapter One of this 
thesis and referred to on various occasions throughout provides, broadly speaking, an 
account of the 'successful' functioning of economics. Recall, for instance, CalIon 
famous assertion: "Yes, homo economicus really does exist.,,670 This statement is 
designed to draw attention to the (proposed) performative verisimilitude that exists 
between economic theory and practice. In this way, theories based on performativity 
note how economics may be observed to 'work' insofar as reality conforms to 
theory.671 If this is the case though, why, as has been asked repeatedly, did 'no one 
see this crisis coming?' 
This question does of course not function as a 'rebuttal' of Callonistic 
theories of performativity. What it may serve to highlight though is something of an 
overly blinkered reliance in some accounts of performativity on ideas of success and 
failure, of things 'working' or 'not working.' Recall, by means of elaboration, how 
670 Callon, "Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics." p.51 (original 
italics) 
671 Note that this claim is distinct from the judgement of whether economics works 'for good' or 'ill.' 
A value judgement along these lines is not necessarily being i~part~d ~ ra~e~ it i~ 'successful 
functioning' that is noted. The question of whether such an onentatIOn ImphcItly Imparts a value 
judgement nonetheless is the issue at the core of many of the objections to Callon's work that Chapter 
One sought to recognise. 
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the concept ofperfonnativity has both 'weaker' and 'stronger' interpretations. In the 
'weak' or 'generic' sense, perfonnativity points to the way in which supposedly 
'natural' categorisations, are not given but instead endlessly performed 
constructions.672 CalIon hereby points out that the 'economy' is perfonned by 
economic practices and techniques - accountancy, metrology, and so forth. A 
'stronger' claim though is to be found in statements such as that regarding homo 
economicus quoted above. This statement approaches what Donald Mackenzie 
describes as "Austinian' perfonnativity,,673 (after the philosopher J. L. Austin674) 
whereby economics is understood to actually bring into being the relationships it 
describes. While "less universal,,,675 claims such as this ascribe a kind of 'success' to 
the postulates and techniques of economics insomuch as they are productive -
understood to perfonn and mould an attendant reality. 
Alongside these two versions of performativity however, MacKenzie 
describes a third possibility not made explicit in the first two - that a theory or model 
may be "counterperfonnative.,,676 Examining the history of portfolio insurance,677 
and writing in reference to the 1987 stock market crash and its aftennath, Mackenzie 
suggests that the widespread adoption of the practice of portfolio insurance acted to 
undennine the "preconditions of its own empirical validity.,,678 Or, in other words, 
widespread adoption functioned to decrease rather than increase verisimilitude: the 
'failure' of portfolio insurance, while perfonnative, was an instance of 
perfonnativity operating the 'wrong' way. 679 Through this fonnulation, MacKenzie 
uncouples perfonnativity from the necessary ascription of 'success' (insofar as 
672 MacKenzie, "The Big, Bad Wolf and the Rational Market: Portfolio Insurance, the 1987 Crash and 
the Performativity of Economics. " p.305 
673 Ibid., p.303 
674 Austin, How to Do Things with Words. A performative utterance, according to Austin, is one that 
makes itself true. A famous example being the pronouncement of a judge, "I hereby sentence you ... ,. 
675 MacKenzie, "The Big, Bad Wolf and the Rational Market: Portfolio Insurance, the 1987 Crash and 
the Performativity of Economics." p.305 
676 Ibid., p.306; see also; MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Sill, "Do Economists Make Markets?" . 
677 Portfolio insurance is a means of hedging a stock market portfolio against risk by short-sellmg 
stock index futures or by buying stock index put options. 
678 MacKenzie, "The Big, Bad Wolf and the Rational Market: Portfolio Insurance, the 1987 Crash and 
the Performativity of Economics." p.306 
679 Ibid. 
250 
'success' is intended to refer to the expected or desired outcome), however, the 
alternative still is necessarily attributed as a 'failure.' 
Instances of economic 'performativity' and 'counterperformativity' might 
also be readily discerned in the contemporary context. Consider, by means of 
example, some text extracted from a recently published Goldman Sachs research 
report entitled 'Reflections on the Crisis - Two Years On:' 
... this may be the first 'Facebook' crisis; in other words, so many people all over 
the world have such a strong opinion about it, partly due to access to some sort of 
infonnation, that it has produced opinions that are almost definitely distorted, but 
nonetheless powerful. The very popularity of the view that there was a strong 
likelihood that the grim days of the 1920sl1930s would be repeated last Winter and 
in the Spring made this scenario more unlikely to play out. The fact that so many 
policy makers were born to parents who lived through the 1930s, and had read of 
how inappropriate policy probably caused the Great Depression to be such a 
depression, made it unlikely that they would sit idly by and do nothing when faced 
with the post-Lehman shock. 680 
Here, a combination of widely held and very grim expectations (in addition to 
experiences imputed to the parents of policy makers), are understood to 
'counterperformativily' mitigate against the likelihood of these expectations actually 
becoming a reality. The accuracy of otherwise of this conclusion aside, we can see 
how (on a theoretical level at the very least), instances of 'counterperformative' 
processes may lead actually to desired (and hence successful), but not necessarily 
'expected' outcomes. In addition therefore to 'failure' being 'counterperformatively' 
derived from the attempt at 'success,' the reverse may be true, 'success' too may be 
achieved 'counterperformatively.' 
Along lines such as these, it may be possible to argue that perfonnativity-
based perspectives can indeed be usefully employed in the context of economic 
crisis. However, the more pertinent question that perhaps needs to be asked regards 
the desirability of doing so. It is not exactly a matter of whether or not economics, as 
680 Jim O'Neill, "Reflections on the Crisis - Two Years On," in Global Economics Weekly (London: 
Goldman Sachs Global Economic Commodities and Strategy Research, 29th July, 2009). p.3 
(Research report approved for public distribution). It is interesting to note here how the title '!~o 
Years On' temporally situates the beginning of the crisis in the su~er of2?0~. ~guably this IS over 
a year before many of those outside the finance industry would descnbe the cnsls to have begun. 
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a result of 'failure,' is now rendered as Power suggests, "non-performative.,,681 As 
the preceding discussion has attempted to illustrate, attributions of performativity can 
be made in 'weak' and 'strong' ways, and be plausibly drawn on both when things 
'work' and when they do not. CalIon himself does recognise that smooth economic 
performance is not the norm. Responding to the frequency of economic upset and 
conflict, CalIon has claimed that performativity is always best thought of as a "co-
performation" - seeking to emphasise using this formulation how performativity is 
achieved in practice, and collectively (thus rarely unanimously).682 
What though, we might stop to ask, does a reliance on this approach achieve? 
Or, moreover, what is elided through over-reliance? Applicable in every direction 
and in every circumstance, recognisant of its problems, but accompanied by 
numerous qualifiers via which these may be circumnavigated, Callonistic 
performativity teeters on occasion between irrelevance and indistinguishably. That a 
critical preponderance around 'performativity' can be limiting is especially 
highlighted by the context of economic crisis. The restriction of economic outcomes 
to performative 'success,' or counterperformative 'failure,' (or any other contortion 
of performative direction and polar outcome), problematically distracts attention 
away from the detection of cyclical and patterned but dynamic market processes. 
These do not often lend themselves for analysis in terms of straightforward 
replications of an original model or plan. 
One means into demonstrating this is to return to the discipline of economics 
itself. The tendency, from a strongly performative perspective, is to focus primarily 
on the models and assumptions proposed by neo-classical economics. However, as 
recent months have demonstrated, "the intellectual dominance of neoclassical theory 
is not inevitable.,,683 Economists working against the neo-classical tradition have of 
course long insisted this, 'crisis' though has provided them with a platform. In the 
search for explanations that neo-classical economics is thought to have failed to 
681 Power, "Opportunity out of Crisis: Economic Sociology and the Analysis of Risk, Regulation and 
Security." pA . " . . 
682Michel CalIon "What Does It Mean to Say That Economics Is PerformatlVe?, III Do Economists 
Make Markets?, ~d. Donald MacKenzie, Fabian Muniesa, and Lucia Siu (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007). p.350 
683 Robert Boyer and Yves Salliard, Regulation Theory: The State o/the Art, trans. Carolyn Shread 
(London: Routledge, 2002). p.5 
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provide, the spotlight is now on alternative economic theories, (although this should 
not be taken to imply that they were not always there, or that neo-classical 
economics until now has had no challengers). The lack of coherence of the economic 
discipline as a whole has become much clearer to see as a function of the present 
crisis, and in this way the over-determination of 'performativity' in terms of a single 
economic account is evident. 
Unearthed by crisis, Keynesian interventionism,684 for instance, is back on 
the 'mainstream' agenda, and Hyman Minksy's much neglected treatise on financial 
instability is experiencing a revival. Behavioural economics which, although always 
popular, has tended to be relegated to the sidelines (the subject of one lecture on all 
undergraduate economics and finance courses but never more than one685) is now 
also back in vogue. Beyond the 'classics,' such as Kahneman and Tversky's 
demonstration of irrational economic decision making,686 Charles Kindleberger's 
'crowd psychology' account, Manias, Panics and Crashes,687 and Robert Shiller's 
Irrational Exuberance,688 have both come in for widespread attention of late. 
Elsewhere, a number of more contemporary schools involved in the 
description of alternative economics are also coming to light and gaining attention. 
The Real-World Economics movement (formally the unfortunately named Post-
684 Keynes advocated that government policy employ both fiscal and monetary means in order to 
regulate the business cycle. By contrast, neo-classical economics recommends the sole use of 
monetary policy. See; John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of Peace (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920). 
685 This was related to me by an Economics and Finance graduate. 
686 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Judgement and Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases," 
Science 27, no. 4157 (1974).; See also; Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, eds., Choices, Values 
and Frames (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Kahneman and Tversky are 
psychologists by training and devise a number of experiments to demonstrate the irrationality of 
individual economic decision making. This grounding in individual psychology presents however, a 
series of concerns from a sociological perspective. Ultimately, most behavioural fmance presents 
scant challenge to neo-classical assumptions insofar as it attempts to describe human actions in terms 
of distorting influence on (otherwise properly functioning) economic markets. See, for further 
discussion: Marieke de Goede, "Resocialising and Repoliticising Financial Markets: Contours of 
Social Studies of Finance," Economic Sociology - The European Electronic Newsletter 6, no. 3 
(2005). p.23 
687 Charles P. Kindleberger, Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, 4th ed. 
(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2000 [1978]). The year 2000 re-print of Kindleberger's text might 
be noted to interestingly coincide with the tech-crash. In the wake of economic crisis a turn to 
alternatives is always observable. 
688 Robert J. Shiller, Irrational Exuberance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
")5'" 
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Autistic Economics movement),689 started in 2000 as a protest group of disaffected 
economics students in France, and now acts a as kind of umbrella for a variety of 
different economic perspectives, from behavioural to eco-feminist. Also worth 
mentioning, though not quite as recent an advent, are the French Regulation SchooL 
spearheaded by Michel Aglietta 690 and Robert Boyer. 691 This group of Marxist 
economists employ the term regulation not as an English language reading would 
suggest (in relation to governmental economic interventions), instead what they 
mean to draw attention to is the proposed normalisation or 'regularisation' of a 
financialised capitalism which they suggest is intrinsically prone to crisis, (and thus 
is understandably of interest at present).692 The discipline of economics then, despite 
the recent predominance of neo-classical perspectives, can not fairly be said to 
operate a single consensus view. In much the same way as the other social sciences, 
there is always much which is contentious - where there is a lot at stake, there is also 
usually much which is up for grabs. 
In addition to exposing the diversity of economics, the current crisis might 
also be said to have demystified it. For a time, especially as Lehman Brothers 
crumbled and stock markets began their uncontrolled slide, we all became market-
watchers, and the Financial Times was the first place many people looked to get the 
news. Whether it was the finer points of derivates trading, the exact organisation of a 
Ponzi scheme, the potential perils of short-selling, or the financial markets usage of 
the word 'tranche,' the doors to a closed, technical, and expert world flung open and 
it was suddenly not out of the ordinary to hear ruminations about fiscal stimulus in 
the pub, or speculations regarding the Libor rate across the supermarket aisle. 
689 Edward Fullbrook, ed., Real World Economics: A Post-Autistic Economics Reader (London: 
Anthem Press, 2007). One supposes that the (somewhat unfortunate) use of the term 'autistic' is 
intended in this usage to critique the perceived rigidity of neo-classical economics. 
690 See, Michel Aglietta, "Shareholder Value and Corporate Governance: Some Tricky Questions," 
Economy and Society 29, no. 1 (2000). 
691 See, Boyer and Salliard, Regulation Theory: The State o/the Art. Boyer, "Is a Finan~e-Led Growth 
Regime a Viable Alternative to Fordism? A Pr~lim~ary Analysis."; Robert Boyer, Ma:1.O D~hove, . 
and Dominique Pilhon, "Contemporary FinanCial Cnses: Between Newness and RepetitIOn, Issues m 
Regulation Theory 52 (2005). . 
692 See for further elaboration, Jessop, "Capitalism and Its Future: Remarks on Regulatlon, 
Gove~ent and Governance."; Bob Jessop, Capitalism, the Regulation Approach, and Critical 
Realism (Department of Sociology, Lancaster University, 2003 [cited 20th July 200?]); available 
from http://www.lancs.ac. uklfass/socio logy Ipapers/jessop-capitalism -regulation-reahsm. pdf. 
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It is not just though the newsworthiness of extreme events that has 
engendered such widespread interest. What has become clear now in an 
unprecedented way is the extent to which the fate of the so-called 'real' economy is 
bundled-up, part and parcel, with that of the financial economy. Problematically, 
economic sociology itself can act to reinforce this unhelpful distinction between the 
'financial expert' and 'lay person' insofar as a performative approach usually focuses 
on practices of complex calculation, and in particular, how this is performed via the 
use of financial models. To what extent though, maya model be meaningfully said to 
represent a 'market,?693 Is economic knowledge and practice quite so one-
dimensional as this narrow domain of focus may lead us to believe? As the preceding 
discussion has begun to suggest, 'economics' is not so over-determined as an 
account that operates between the poles of 'performativity' and 'counter-
performativity' implies. 
In the remainder of this chapter then, I want to begin to tell an alternative tale 
of the' crisis.' This will involve an elaboration (by means of beginning 
demonstration) of the suggestions I have made here regarding the significance of 
'crisis.' As a 'state of exception,,694 the term 'crisis' implies an aberration, an 
absence ofnonnality - crisis is the presumed 'exception' to the rule. Following 
Giorgio Agamben though, we might do well to also consider the obverse possibility, 
that 'exception' itself is the prevailing 'rule.' 
An Affective Anatomy of 'Crisis' 
"Can we ever trust Wall St again?" 
Forbes Magazine cover headline, 2001 
"The real history does not get written, because it is not in people's brains but in their nerves 
and vitals." 
693 Daniel Beunza and David Stark, "Reflexive Modeling: The Social Calculus of the Arbitrageur," 
Working Paper http://ssrn.com (2008). p.39 .... 
694 Giorgio Agamben, State a/Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: Umversity of ChIcago Press, 
2005). 
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Alfred North Whitehead695 
The alternative reading of 'crisis' that this section offers is not intended as a 
'replacement' account, nor is it an attempt to re-write history; it is a matter instead of 
differing emphasis and supplementation. In particular, what I will be seeking to 
highlight are the temporal and affective dimensions of the recent economic 
upheavals. Following from previous .discussion, this focus may be understood as a 
means via which to temper the neglects of 'performativity' by producing a sensitivity 
to market changes as a function of both feeling and time. Contra the 'exceptionality' 
of crisis, what I hope will emerge from this is a sense of the pro-cyclical - not as 
repetitious and reliable, but as a mode of self-sustaining dynamism. 
This is not the same as suggesting that the credit crunch, on that basis that it 
is part of the 'business cycle,' could have 'predicted' exactly. Nor is it to remake the 
'performativity' argument using an altered set of terms. It is a different point I am 
currently seeking to move towards. One that, following the description of the 
economic functions of affect and attention that this thesis has pursued, may enable a 
description of the market dynamics through which 'crisis' is constituted in terms 
other than those of 'failure' or 'not-working,' and in doing so allow some space from 
which ethical possibility may remain to be observed, even when markets have ceased 
to be 'popular.' 
Some of the behavioural economics texts that I mentioned briefly in the 
previous section make a good place to start this elaboration insomuch as they have 
sought to explain economic 'crises' as a function of the affective dimensions of 
market cycles. Employing the emotionally charged language of 'mania' and 'panic,' 
Kindleberger for instance, understands financial crises to be intimately "associated 
with the peaks of business cycles:,,696 "Once the excessive character of the upswing 
is realized, the financial system experiences a sort of "distress," in the course of 
which the rush to reverse the expansion process may become so precipitous as to 
695 Alfred North Whitehead, Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead, ed. Lucien Price (Boston, MA: 
Little Brown, 1954). p.22 
696 Kindleberger, Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises. p.l 
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resemble panic.,,697 What Kindleberger recognises here is that 'crisis' does not 
emerge out of nowhere or strike at random. As he goes on to elaborate: "Speculative 
excess, referred to concisely as a mania, and revulsion from such excess in the form 
of a crisis, crash, or panic can be shown to be if not inevitable, at least historically 
common.,,698 Following this, there has to be a 'tipping point' as such, a point at 
which optimistic exuberance turns to pessimistic restraint. 699 
For Kindleberger though, the affective content of 'crisis' or 'panic' is only an 
effect and not a cause. 'Once the excessive character of the upswing is realized,' 
suggests a correct equilibrium away from which markets have strayed, and to which, 
upon the realisation of this 'excess,' panic will work to effect a return. The 
previously discussed dynamic of recovery or reform suggests however that the 
affective power of 'crisis' has a "quasi-causality,,,700 at least, all of its own. This is to 
begin to suggest what Brian Massumi has described as a logic of "preemption,,701 at 
work in the ascription of 'crisis,' or more accurately in the ever-present "threat" of 
crisis as "a futurity with a virtual power to affect the present quasicausally." 702 
Pro-cyclicality and Preemption 
Threat triggers fear. The fear is of disruption. The fear is a disruption 
Brian Massumi703 
'Crisis' is not just a descriptive term; it is also as a finely calibrated 
economic indicator. It is into the relative sense of collective 'crisis' that we tune in 
order to know (or perhaps feel) the state of the economy. This can be readily seen in 
697 Ibid., p.2 
698 Ibid. 
699 See, for an account in terms of cycles of 'opportunism' and 'restraint,' Mitchel Y. Abol~a, . 
Making Markets: Opportunism and Restraint on Wall Street (Cam~ridge, MA: H~ard Umve~sIty 
Press, 1996).; and, Mitchel Y. Abolafia and Martin Kilduff, "Enactmg Market CnsIs: The SOCIal 
Construction ofa Speculative Bubble," Administrative Science Quarterly 33, no. 2 (1988). 
700 Patricia Ticineto Clough, "The New Empiricism: Affect and Sociological Method," Europe~n 
Journal o/Social Theory 12, no. 1 (2009). p.51; Also, Brian Massumi, "Fear (the Spectrum SaId)," 
positions 13, no. 1 (2005). p.35 
701 Massumi, "Fear (the Spectrum Said)." p.42 
702 Ibid., p.35 . 009])' '1 bl 
703 Brian Massumi, The Future Birth o/the Affective Fact (2007 [CIted 18th October 2 , aval a e 
from http://browse.reticular .info/text! collected/massumi. pdf). p.8 
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the population-level affective policing of 'crisis' itself and, in particular, how this 
changes as a function of time. Recall, for instance, UK Business Minister Baroness 
Vedera's ill-timed 'green shoots of economic recovery' comment. Made deep in the 
darkest days of January 2009, this comment saw her widely berated for being "out of 
touch,,704 and insensitive at a time when popularly and palpably the crisis felt at its 
deepest.
705 
Only eight weeks later though, US Federal Reverse Chairman Ben 
Bernanke's similar 'green shoots' comment saw markets rally, hailing the beginning 
of a recovery. 706 
It is not only linearly or forward across time however that the affective 
character of 'crisis' unfolds. In addition to being a temporally concurrent or 
contemporarily made ascription, employed to describe a situation that has happened 
or is happening, 'crisis' is an affective operation that acts in the present, through or 
via the future. It is in this future dimension, and following from Massumi's account 
of 'fear' and 'threat,' that 'crisis' might be understood to operate according to a logic 
of preemption whereby rather than "acting in the present to avoid an occurrence in 
the future," as for instance the notion of crisis as opportunity suggests, "preemption 
brings the future into the present.,,707 Along these lines, it is the spectre of future 
crisis, as much as the actual eventuality of any present crisis, as a function of which 
the economic conditions of the present are defined. 708 
What this suggests is that the dynamic of 'crisis' that this chapter has sought 
to explore (through, for instance, a description of the prioritisation of 'recovery' at a 
cost to 'reform '), is self-sustaining and self-propelling into the future, as a function 
704 BBC News, "'Green Shoots' Remarks Defended," 14th January 2009. BBC News: "Bit too early: 
Business Minister Baroness Vadera has denied she is out of touch after claiming she could see a "few 
green shoots" of economic recovery. 
705 Ibid. 
706 Stephen Foley, "Markets Soar after Fed Boss Sees 'Green Shoots' of Recovery," The Independent, 
17th March 2009. Foley: "Public figures in the US don't have their tongues cut out for saying that 
they've seen "green shoots" of economic recovery. After Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal 
Reserve, uttered the phrase on television on Sunday night, stock markets soared." The comparison I 
draw between the 'green shoots' comments, is not intended to be over-determined. In addition ~o the 
passage oftirne, and the different national contexts, the 'speaker' of the comment also matters In 
terms of its resultant reception, and this is often so on a political basis. The example is only intended 
to draw attention in a general way to the popular policing of affect under conditions of crisis. 
707 Massumi, The Future Birth a/the Affective Fact. p. 8 
708 Or, as Knorr Cetina and Bruegger note, "Markets are as much defined by \vhat they are not, (~ut 
might become) as by present states." p.170 Knorr Cetina and Bruegger, "Traders' Engagement WIth 
Markets: A Postsocial Relationship." 
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of its very relationship to futurity. The threat (and indeed expectation) offuture 
crises functions, in others words, to actually fuel what, in the present, we take to be 
'recovery.' In this dynamic, crisis is both guaranteed, inasmuch as it ceases to be 
'exception' and becomes 'rule,' and necessary, insofar it is in the wake of crisis that 
particular paths to future profitability are opened up, (albeit in an increasingly 
stratified and potentially monopolising way).709 
Another way of describing this dynamic, following Patricia Ticineto Clough, 
is to say that future crises are anticipated not in order that they may be prevented, but 
so as they may be preempted (and hence capitalised upon), this "leading not so 
paradoxically to [the] proliferation of crisis.,,710 As a function of crisis then crisis , 
proliferates, even 'speeding up,' at a systemic level, the multiply dimensioned 
oscillation between crisis states in a spirallingly pro-cyclical and increasingly self-
sustaining way. Or, as Massumi might describe this motion: "The affective event 
rolls ever more tightly around the time slip of threat, as fear becomes its own pre-
effect. " 711 
This suggests that despite the performative efficacy of a neo-classically 
understood 'equilibrium' in bringing about market 'corrections' (of which the recent 
crisis is commonly presumed to be one), the linearly bi-polar or only one-
dimensionally cyclical nature of such an imaginary, (and, as such, any social science 
descriptions that seek variously to ascribe to this a performatively determining 
effect) are not sufficiently equipped to describe the always "far-from-equilibrium 
meatastability" of a system interdeterminately suspended and "haunted by crisis.,,712 
Even 'stability' does not entail equilibrium, but is itself a sort of flux. While the 
immediate reasons attending subsequent 'crises,' will surely each be different, as will 
the form and period of each 'crisis' itself, what likely endures and strengthens is the 
volatility of the economic dynamic through which these are wrought. 
709 Here, I am thinking ofthe increased post-crisis monopolisation of the banking sect?r in particular. 
Due to the numerous bankruptcies wrought and the mergers forced in late 2008, both mvestment and 
commercial banking are now more monopolised playing fields. A kind of financial survival of the 
fittest, resulting ever more in the 'too big to fail' situation that characterised the severity of the 2008 
crisis. 
710 Clough, "The New Empiricism: Affect and Sociological Method." p.53 
711 Massumi, "Fear (the Spectrum Said)." p.41 
712 Clough, "The New Empiricism: Affect and Sociological Method." p.52 
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So, is 'crisis' still a fitting ascription if used to describe what, on the basis of 
this account, may be thought of as likely or even inevitable? Perhaps - but only to 
the extent that this is employed carefully and in such a way so as not to 
systematically impair our ability to critically respond in the midst of so-called 
'crisis.' Too wholesale an embrace of all the exceptionality that this descriptor 
confers may lead, as I have suggested here, not only to the critical perpetuation of the 
dynamic of 'crisis' itself, but also away from other questions that stand to be asked. 
and other possibilities that might be explored. It is in the spirit of such 'possibility' 
that the following, penultimate section returns to the difficult question of ethics, and 
the ensuing final section to the 'whereabouts,' (seemingly perhaps even more 
unlikely), of hope. These possibilities may seem more distant than ever in market 
contexts where, as I have suggested here, 'crisis' is endemic; in the style of approach 
developed across the preceding pages of this thesis as a whole however, neither 
'ethics' nor 'hope' are to be found in a sequestered 'beyond,' or utopic 'outside' to 
the kind of market practices through which we go about living our lives on a daily 
basis. If there is a critical politics to developed in response to the kind of pro-cyclical 
economic dynamics I describe here, it must, counter-intuitively, be articulated from 
upon the same grounds. 
When 'Crisis' is Rule, What of Ethics? 
'Think of a ruler held up vertically on your finger,' suggests geophysicist-tumed-
finance-scholar Didier Somette. To ask which hand movement or gust of air causes 
its collapse is to miss the point. 'The collapse is fundamentally due to the unstable 
position; the instantaneous cause of the collapse is secondary' (Somette 2003: 4).'713 
Where 'crisis' is not exceptional, the 'doing' of market ethics actually 
becomes about coping with, and even dealing in, volatility. As suggested by the 
preceding description, even periods of supposed economic stability entail a kind of 
'volatile' motion. Upswings are as euphoric and as manic, it turns out, as downturns 
713 In, MacKenzie, "The Big, Bad Wolf and the Rational Market: Portfolio Insurance, the 1987 Crash 
and the Performativity of Economics." p.320 
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are precipitous and sobering. The kind of global finance which has come to largely 
subsist and support many national economies is fundamentally reliant on the 
expectation of volatility, and recognisantly so. Future volatility is itself that upon 
which a wager is made in the process of transacting in the financial marketplace - it 
is not the certainty of the future that is wagered, it is its 'uncertainty,' its very 
"speculative-ness." 714 
The relationship between 'ethics' and 'volatility' is one that has been touched 
upon throughout the thesis already, only in a subtly differing variety of forms. 
Across preceding chapters, both change and dynamism, for instance, have often been 
of explicit concern. This has been seen in discussions pertaining to methodological 
approach (for example, around what constitutes a 'site,' and the 'nexuses' approach) 
and in analytical descriptions of the ethical practices engaged by corporations, 
consumers, and 'ethical' job-seekers. The desire that corporate ethicality be 
demonstrable orland established in relation to profitability, gave rise, as per Chapter 
Four, to a competitive marketplace for novel and 'ever better' measures; as an 
affective and practical achievement the 'ethics' of ethical consumption, in Chapter 
Five, were multiply defined and shifting; and, in Chapter Six's market for ethical 
work, the character of the 'ethical' was contingent and flexibly ensconced as 
'potential.' Indeed, the orienting focus on practice that has structured this thesis from 
the outset has quite deliberately attempted an attentiveness of this sort in order that a 
changing and moving research object be attended to on its own terms. Now, the 
present discussion of volatility suggests an opportunity through which this may be 
taken even further. 
Earlier in this chapter I described the situation in which CSR finds itself as a 
kind of 'paradox.' Recall, for instance, how the claim that markets need ethics is 
being made with increased frequency at present, and across a number of quarters, 
from business to government, and elsewhere between. In the process, CSR has 
received widespread endorsement, and, to a degree, is vindicated (as it were), having 
been 'right all along.' Fears regarding the continued viability of CSR programmes 
amidst corporate budget cuts though have worked against this, undermining claims 
714 Clough, "The New Empiricism: Affect and Sociological Method." p.52 
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regarding the necessity of ethics in business made by practitioners, and openly 
disputing the efficacy of the business case. However, described thus, CSR is 
rendered strangely passive, as though it were something that history might prove 
'right' or 'wrong' and not a market actively interested in its own continuing survival 
and growth. 
As was discussed in Chapter Two, contemporary CSR is understood by its 
own proponents and practitioners to significantly reinvent 'responsibility' (duty) as 
'responsiveness' (a reactive mode). According to Frederick, (introduced in Chapter 
Two), 'responsiveness' refers to "the capacity of a corporation to respond to social 
pressures" or achieve "a generally responsive posture to society.,,71S In the present 
context, bearing 'responsiveness' in mind, the oft-asked 'what will happen to CSR as 
a consequence of recession?' forgets the extent to which CSR is structurally attuned 
to change, and poised to respond. Even further than this though, given the 
description of endemic economic volatility that this chapter has built towards, 
'responsiveness,' (and to also elaborate this concept further in the direction of 
suggestions that emerge from the work of the thesis as a whole), might itself be 
considered a potentially ethical orientation. Constituted in an attentive, affective and 
economic mode of reflexivity, 'market ethics' are perhaps best described 
metaphorically as a 'proprioceptive' practice, a constant turning, attunement, and 
noticing of movements and stimuli. As such, it ceases to be that ethics simply 'are,' 
but are instead, always 'becoming,' at the crest of change and possibility. 
When, as per Frederick's description, 'response' implies a 'reaction' to 
something that precedes but is not contiguous ('social pressures' or 'society' for 
instance), a conventional temporal ordering is posited - 'action-reaction,' 'question-
response,' 'past-future.' Response is a game of catch-up. By contrast though, when 
the only thing that is certain is change itself, 'responsiveness' might be said to 
relocate to the margins of future and present. It is suspended, neither entirely 
prospect or retrospect. This is because a past-future retrospection can not account for 
the mutually reflexive articulation of 'response' and 'that to which is responded,' 
715 Frederick, "From CSRI to CSR2." p.152 
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(note how in Frederick's example 'society' for instance is a separable entity and not 
that in and through which CSR is reflexively constituted). 
Conversely though, and as per the pre-emptory logic that was the subject of 
preceding discussion, prospection is not a straightforward proposition either. When 
expectations about the future are made in the present, they can indeed act in the 
present, and sometimes the present may become materially reordered so as to more 
closely enact the prospected future. This process however, is unlikely as 
straightforward and determining a one as a simple description along such lines 
implies. The discussion of 'crisis' that this chapter has undertaken refrains, in this 
regard, from making the final and determining jump whereby 'preemption' is 
enfolded into a conventional critique ofneo-liberalism. To say, as Clough does, that 
"affect and its modulation ... have been essential to installing a conservative neo-
liberalism,,,716 is, in light of the kind of ethical 'doings' that this thesis has sought to 
notice, describe and analyse, to instil a foregone conclusion in place of an open-
ended question. 
In this regard 'preemption,' as useful as this term is in highlighting the kind 
of systemic market dynamics through which contemporary financialised economies 
are organised, need perhaps be employed only at the same time as an emphasis on 
the ultimate unknowability of what is 'future' is also made. Simply, it is not possible 
to entirely colonise what is 'future' in this way. Inalienably, the future remains just 
that, the not-now and yet-to-be, and as a consequence, necessarily uncertain. Even 
the effects of this 'certainty' (the certainty of uncertainty), although they may act in 
the present, can not be prescribed an overly determining role in describing a yet-to-
be that is more open (and a consequence, more interesting) than sociological 
approaches seeking exclusively to emphasise the curtailment of present possibilities 
allow.717 
716 Clough, "The New Empiricism: Affect and Sociological Method." p.54 . 
717 This has been an ongoing theme of discussion across the chapters of the thesl~. An argum.ent along 
these lines was made in Chapter One in relation to the regulation versus vol~tarlsm debate m ~SR. 
In Chapter Two, this problem was encountered with regard ~o. ~ve~ly d,etermmed g~v~rnmentahty 
approaches to the questions of 'marketisation' and 'responslblhsatl.on. See als~, SImIlar debates ~ak~n 
up in Chapter Four around the supposed 'anti-politics of number,' m Chapter FIve around reductlOnIst 
'choice,' and in Chapter Six with regard to 'enterprising selthood.' 
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In and as an elaborated mode of responsiveness, ethics, in a market context, 
is a type of possibility at the edge. Whether any given practice, relation, object or 
thing is 'ethical,' as the analysis of preceding chapters has sought to underscore at 
varying points, is unstable, liable to change, and, more often than not, entirely 
contestable in the first instance. In a market context, and as 'responsiveness,' ethics 
are neither relative nor random, but a set particular set of possibilities, emergent in 
and through the intensity that occurs where attention, affect and opportunity (for 
profit, but also besides this) collide. 
Throughout, this thesis has addressed the ethical possibilities conferred 
within what is an undeniably difficult space. This apparent 'difficulty' however, has 
been interesting in and of itself. If 'ethical' still seems like the 'wrong' word though 
through which to describe the kind of market relations that have been the focus of 
this work, perhaps this is because in the process, 'ethics' has ceased to be just about 
what is 'ethical.' Herein, ethical work has not only been Ubiquitous, but also 
fundamentally imbricated in the affective registers of daily being and doing. The 
practical complexity of the market terrain itself has lead in this way, over the course 
of the thesis, into what William Connolly has described as "that tropical undergrowth 
of life flourishing beneath the brittle trees of grand moral theory.,,718 
The very difficulty of the market space itself has forced the style of question 
that this thesis has asked - it has been necessary, in the discussed contexts, to ask 
after ethics not as an unambiguous ideal, but instead as that which must be 
practically strived towards, and, finally, hoped for. If ethics is not the ideal, the 
unassailable, or the radically potent, the question has been, what then is it that 
'ethics' becomes? Or, to phrase this differently with regard to the 'hoped for' - what 
does 'ethics' become as an alternative to utopia? 
718 William E. Connolly, Why I Am Not a Secularist (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1999). p.17 
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Between Hope and Hopelessness 
The form of this thesis has mirrored that of its object. Open-ended, and 
concerned with practical 'doings' in contemporary market contexts, the present 
work, like CSR itself, has not sought to impose judgment along the lines of 
traditional moral frameworks. A 'mirroring' of this sort however has not entailed a 
tum away from critique - quite the opposite. Starting from a point beside the 
conventional critiques levelled at market practices has enabled this work to 
encounter its object in a different way. The' beside' as Eve Kofosky Sedgwick notes, 
permits a kind of "spacious agnosticism,,719 inasmuch as it disrupts the linearity of a 
dualistic critical thinking. For all their rhetorical force, 'beneath,' 'behind,' and 
, beyond,' 720 are not the only avenues to critical attention. 'Agnosticism,' as 
unpromising as this may initially seem, is practically equivalent to neither 
ambivalence nor indecision. The 'space' that Sedgwick suggests is a critical one-
only, as I have attempted to highlight, differentially so. Critique can effectively 
emerge from open-ended engagements and from attention to process just as surely as 
it can through adhering to predefined political frameworks, only, I have attempted to 
suggest more contemporaneously and sensitively so. 
The present chapter has functioned to offer a practical illustration of this idea. 
Here, perhaps more immediately than elsewhere, the political significance of the way 
we approach what is 'ethical' in economic life has been at the fore. Ascriptions of 
'success' and 'failure,' 'working' and 'not working,' are familiar and frequently 
useful critical orientations. The politics entailed within however are not always a 
radical, or as effective, as proponents would purport, or as the damnation entailed by 
a word such as 'failure' would suggest. What this beckons then is a careful re-
thinking of what other positions might be occupied, whether alternatively, or beside, 
in the name of 'radical' or 'progressive' politics. Or, phrased differently, if the 
'beyond' on which Left politics relies has become, in practice, self-defeating, how 
might this be otherwise re-imagined? 
719 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2003). p.8 
720 Ibid. 
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The question with which the previous section closed - 'what does 'ethics' 
become as an alternative to utopia?' is, amongst other things, a question regarding 
the whereabouts of hope. On the basis that it looks to a better beyond, hope has 
traditionally been a mobilising trope for radical political causes. Ernst Bloch's 
classic 'Principle of Hope' for instance, speaks powerfully against mistakenly 
reducing "reality to what has become real,,,721 by describing a utopic version of hope 
as counter-point to this tendency. By recognising how that which is hoped-for speaks 
to what is, hope can certainly work to create crucial critical spaces for the 
enunciation of other possibilities and desires.722 In this way, hope also attests to the 
endurance of these desires, partaking in the radical belief that "there must be better 
ways of doing things than are currently found in the world.,,723 
And yet, a hope of this nature is also always necessarily a hope 'out-of-
bounds' and 'out-of-time.' For Bloch and others who have written, and continue to 
write, in the spirit of Marxist socialism, capitalism is that in particular against which 
a utopic outside is sought. It is only 'elsewhere,' "outside of the spirit of 
capitalism,,,724 that hopes, such writing proposes, may be properly realised. 
Following this however, hope is only radical to the extent that it is other; it is 
because it is beyond that hope is powerful, only beyond can it be true to its 
inviolability, only there is it politically radical and effective. 
By contrast and in closing, if this thesis has had any hope to offer it has been 
a hope of an entirely different nature, (and perhaps it has been a hope all of my own), 
that something positive might be said against otherwise reductive accounts of how 
markets come to 'matter' our lives. It has been a hope besides the familiar and 
conventional critiques. As the preceding chapters have sought to illustrate, when 
'ethics' inheres in, and is produced through, mundane and complex material 
practices, what is 'good' does not figure in a straightforward way. This is not say that 
we cannot move towards the 'good,' only that when this 'good' is constituted 
affectively and materially as opposed to ideologically, lines in the sand become 
721 Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope, trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice, and Paul Knight, 3 vols., 
vol. 1 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985). p.157 
722 David Pinder, "In Defence of Utopian Urbanism," Geograjiska Annaler 84, no. 3/4 (2002). p.238 
723 Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift, "What's Left? Just the Future," Antipode 37, no. 2 ~2005). p.220 
724 Mary Zoumazi, Hope: New Philosophies for Change (London: Lawrence & WIshart, 2002). p.19 
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difficult to draw and near impossible to maintain. This is case with regard both to 
prescriptive moral frameworks, and to overly absolutist political frameworks. 
It is of course possible (moreover, sometimes necessary) to make equations 
between market expansion, right wing politics and social conservatism. Where this is 
achieved ideologically through a rigid insistence on separation though, the market 
from the strictly non-market and so on, totalisation upon totalisation is heaped. 725 
Reading against the popular sociological grain, I have suggested in this thesis that, 
within particular markets, un-foretold possibilities do emerge - 'self-interest' is not 
an economically totalised motivator, calculation can be a matter of ethical 'quality.' 
and variously supposed 'individualisations of responsibility,' turn out, upon closer 
inspection, to be less straightforwardly so than is frequently proposed, opening 
instead into different ethico-material ways of living and feeling. Whether or not these 
developments occasion anything quite so radical as 'hopefulness,' I do not know. 
What is 'radical' though is up for grabs, and it is herein perhaps that we may find 
room to "dream other dreams.,,726 Moving 'hope' (as possibility at least) into bounds, 
we might find ifnot exactly spaces of hope, at least spaces that cease to be entirely 
hope-less. 
725 Amin and Thrift have describe this situation as one of 'authoritarian consolation.' Amin and Thrift, 
"What's Left? Just the Future." p.231 
726 Isabelle Stengers, in interview, "We live in a very complicated world;. we have to learn and 
become able to dream other dreams, rather than the simplifying ones which are so use~l for . 
mobilization." Mary Zournazi, "A 'Cosmo-Politics' - Risk, Hope, Change: A Conver.satlOn with. 
Isabelle Stengers," in Hope: New Philosophies for Change (London: Laurence & Wishart, 2002). 
p.256 
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Appendix B 
Table 1: Number of Ethical Living blog postings made by individual 
Guardian.co.uk bloggers, 2008 
Staff Bloggers (in order first contribution, 2008) No. of blog postings 
Jessica Aldred 
Alison Benjaman 
Juliet Jowit 
Environment Editor 
Bibi van der Zee 
Leo Hickman 
Guilio Sica 
Carolyn Fry 
Fred Pearce 
Kevin Anderson 
Adharanand Finn 
Kate Connelly 
Nik Berg 
Matthew Weaver 
Peter Greig 
Felicity Carus 
James Randerson 
Lucy Siegle 
12 
7 
1 
9 
22 
19 
1 
15 
1 
1 
7 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
4 
106 
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